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FOREWORD
The Global Shelter Cluster 
Shelter Projects Working Group, 
April 2017.
The year 2015 marked the 10th anniversary of the Global 
Shelter Cluster, the inter-agency coordination mechanism 
for shelter response. During these ten years, coordination 
has improved in consistency, shelter responses have grown 
in scale, and there are more people with experience in shelter 
programming, but people continue to lose their dwellings and 
be displaced due to conflict and natural disasters. Global 
humanitarian shelter needs continue to greatly exceed the 
capacity and resources to respond.
In recognition of the need for better shelter programming at 
scale, often with limited resources, Shelter Projects 2015-
2016 has been developed as a core product of the Global 
Shelter Cluster, to help us learn from the past so that we may 
better respond in the future. It has been developed through 
a truly collaborative effort of a working group composed of 
international shelter experts from several humanitarian 
organizations and institutions.
This is the sixth edition in the series of publications that 
started in 2008. It contains 31 new shelter case studies and 12 
overviews of responses, contributing to a repository of over 200 
project examples and response overviews, from programmes 
of over 50 agencies in around 70 countries overall. As in past 
editions, the case studies in this book vary greatly in scale, 
cost, duration and project design. Although they are not 
statistically representative of all shelter projects, this growing 
body of knowledge represents a source of learning, includes 
many years of experience of nearly 400 field practitioners who 
have contributed, and reflects the highly contextual nature of 
individual shelter and settlements responses.
The objective of this publication is to share experiences of 
humanitarian shelter and settlement responses, paying close 
attention to the strengths, weaknesses and potential lessons 
that can be extracted from each. We hope that this edition will 
represent a source of inspiration and reflection, and that it will 
contribute to having to “reinvent the wheel” a little less.
Previous case studies have been used for several 
purposes by a diverse audience working in humanitarian 
shelter and settlements. In reviewing past editions, the primary 
uses of Shelter Projects were found to be: 
• As a reference or set of examples to inform shelter pro-
gramming or strategy development; 
• For advocacy purposes, using precedents in discussions 
with governments and local stakeholders in affected 
countries; 
• For workshops and training of national staff of several or-
ganizations, as well as cluster coordination and technical 
teams;
• For research purposes, both by academics and students.
Beyond the case studies themselves, the process and 
inclusion used to develop them are important. Engaging 
those who implemented projects to draft case studies 
encourages not only self-reflection and learning, but also 
helps to ensure that practical and operational challenges are 
included in the case studies. Engaging agencies and many 
people in their production and review ensures broader 
inclusion and investment in their learnings.
By examining the shelter-related needs of populations affected 
by natural disasters and conflict, compared to the total people 
reached with shelter and non-food items (NFI) interventions 
and the funding received by the sector in the past two years, it 
is clear that there is a gap between the scale of needs and 
the funding and capacity of the humanitarian community 
to respond to such needs. Although shelter actors universally 
recognize that affected people remain the first responders 
(and should be supported to address their own shelter needs), 
lack of resources clearly hinders agencies from supporting 
people to help themselves.
The introduction of this edition of Shelter Projects contains a 
discussion of the major natural disasters, conflict-induced and 
complex crises in 2015 and 2016. Although natural disasters 
continue to affect millions of people worldwide, responses to 
conflict are assuming a much larger scale, both in terms 
of displaced individuals and shelter needs for the affected 
populations, primarily due to the protracted nature of several 
ongoing crises. These include, but are not limited to, the 
Syrian crisis, Iraq, Yemen, South Sudan, Lake Chad and 
Ukraine. The Shelter Sector recognizes the need to be better 
prepared to respond to such crises, which in some cases have 
significant, regional, impacts
The website (www.shelterprojects.org) has been updated 
with the new case studies and overviews in this edition, and 
provides an easy way of searching through the large repository 
of examples and opinions collected since the first edition
Whether you are reading Shelter Projects as a reference to 
work on a particular response, to inform better programming, 
are studying it for research or are merely looking at the 
pictures, we hope that you find it as informative as we have 
done in compiling it. However you read it, reflect on how the 
projects described within it represent an enormous amount 
of work by many hundreds of humanitarian workers, often 
working in challenging situations and with crisis-affected 
people, who find themselves in unexpected circumstances 
and often in extreme hardship.
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We would also like to thank those who contributed to previous 
editions of Shelter Projects; those who made suggestions for 
case studies that were not included in this edition and the many 
hundreds of people who have implemented the projects that 
are contained in this book, but who have not been individually 
credited. 
Our thoughts go to all the humanitarian workers and volunteers 
who have lost their lives while on duty in the countries covered 
by this edition and worldwide, and to their families.
This book has been written in recognition of the inestimable 
amount of work done by crisis affected people themselves, 
who have been the main shelter responders despite the 
adversity that they have suffered.
For comments, feedback or questions, please visit the website 
or contact info@shelterprojects.org.
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CASE STUDY SELECTION
The case studies were selected using the following criteria:
• The project must have been a) wholly completed, or 
b) solid conclusions could be gained from its imple-
mentation by late 2016. Some of the projects in this edi-
tion, being in response to protracted crises or during a 
post-disaster recovery process, are ongoing and/or fall 
into category (b).
• Given the scale of emergency shelter needs every year, 
case studies must have had large-scale impacts. Dis-
continued trials, pilot projects or design concepts were 
not included.
• The majority of the project must be implemented 
within the first two years following a natural disaster. 
For conflict-induced crises, chronic emergencies and re-
turn processes, longer time scales are considered. 
• Accurate project information is available from staff or 
individuals involved in the implementation of the project.
• The case studies should illustrate a diversity of ap-
proaches to meet shelter and settlements needs. Provid-
ing shelter is more than simply designing architecturally 
impressive structures, and looks beyond the construction 
of individual houses. In this edition, two case studies deal 
with the set-up and coordination activities of national and 
subnational Shelter Clusters.
For this edition, after a pre-selection based on the above crite-
ria, case studies were drafted by contributors on an improved 
data collection form, which allowed to expand on several 
points, increase the focus on the context and challenges en-
countered, and attach supporting documents that were used 
as evidence. Further, each case study was peer-reviewed 
by members of the Shelter Projects Working Group. The 
review enabled an additional level of critical analysis of the 
strengths and weaknesses of each project, as well as pointed 
out what learnings to highlight and what aspects to expand on, 
ultimately increasing the quality of each case study.
ABOUT THE BOOK
This book contains case studies of the field implementation 
of humanitarian shelter projects, written by shelter practition-
ers with specific interests and experience of each of them. 
As many larger crises have occurred on a regional or inter-
national scale in 2015 and 2016, there is also a number of 
overviews, contextualizing the group of case studies for each 
of those regional crises. In some cases, overviews give the 
background and present the national shelter response for a 
given crisis, within one country. These operational case stud-
ies and overviews are all included in Section A.
In Section B, there are three “opinion” pieces on shelter and 
settlements-related issues, written by individuals with experi-
ence in the sector and a specific interest in the subject
The case studies in this book deal with projects implemented 
by many different organizations, a full list of which can be found 
in the acknowledgements section. Some were implemented 
by governments or a number of agencies under a cluster. In 
order to allow strengths and weaknesses of projects to be 
openly shared, the case studies are not directly attributed 
to individual organizations. As a result of the projects being 
implemented in diverse and often challenging conditions, they 
illustrate both good and bad practices. From every case study 
there are lessons that can be learned, and aspects that may 
be repeated or avoided. These are highlighted at the end of 
each case study. The objective of this publication has always 
been to encourage the learning process and to advocate for 
following good practices.
WARNING - PROJECTS ARE CONTEXT DRIVEN
Any shelter project should take into consideration the local con-
text and the needs of the affected population, which will differ 
in each case. Projects should not be directly replicated without 
proper consideration of the specific context, or there will inevita-
bly be programmatic weaknesses and failures.
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Figure 1. Refugees and IDPs displaced by conflict and violence, 1990 to 2015 (sources: UNHCR, UNRWA for refugee figures; IDMC and USRC for ID  figures)
GLOBAL DISPLACEMENT
As of the end of 2015, 65.3 million people were forcibly dis-
placed from their homes1, with 21.3 million being refugees, 
40.8 million internally displaced and 3.2 million asylum seek-
ers. Figure 1 shows that in 2015 the number of people dis-
placed was the highest since over two decades, mainly due 
to the nature of several protracted crises, particularly those in 
the Middle East. More than 75% of the total displacement was 
within 10 countries, as shown in Figure 2.
Over the course of the same year, there were 19.2 million new 
displacements by natural disasters2, less than the average of 
25.2 million in the previous decade, but almost twice as much 
as the number of people displaced by conflict and violence in 
the same year (8.6 million new displacements).
Over half of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate in 2015 
came from three countries, the Syrian Arab Republic (4.9 mil-
lion), Afghanistan (2.7 million) and Somalia (1.1 million)1.
CONFLICTS IN 2015 AND 2016
Yemen, the Whole of Syria and Iraq accounted for more than 
half of the new displacements in 2015 caused by conflict and 
violence, followed by Ukraine, Nigeria and the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DR Congo). Given changing access and 
needs in 2015 and 2016, the conflicts in Yemen and Nigeria 
have required the most significa t scaling-up effort of human-
itarian activities.
PROTRACTED AND REGIONAL CRISES
Colombia, DR Congo, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan account-
ed for almost 40% of population displacement at the end of 
2015, and all have had major displaced populations for over 
10 years3. Many protracted crises have been at a regional 
scale. The main examples include the Syrian refugee crisis in 
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR (2016), “Global 
Trends. Forced displacement in 2015”, http://bit.ly/2aN0Lsz.
2 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre - IDMC (2016) “Global Report on 
Internal Displacement”, http://bit.ly/1WrJ9Wb.
3 IDMC (2016).
the Middle East (see A.29); the South Sudan crisis (see A.23 
to A.26); and the Lake Chad crisis (see A.18) in sub-Saharan 
Africa4.
In 2015 and 2016, the protracted crises in the Middle East had 
a major impact on the influx of refugees into the European 
area, with arrivals through the “Balkan Route” reaching peaks 
of 200,000 monthly in Greece in October 20155. Overview 
A.41 paints the picture of the migration flows towards Europe 
for those two years and focuses on the shelter response along 
the Eastern European route. Case study A.42 gives an exam-
ple of temporary reception facilities set up in Germany at the 
height of the crisis, to cope with the number of arrivals.
4 See the report “Lake Chad Unseen Crisis”, Oxfam 2016, http://bit.ly/2nssylX.
5 International Organization for Migration, 2016 (migration.iom.int/Europe). Data 
collated from national governments, IOM and UNHCR.
Figure 2. Number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence at the 
end of 2015 (source: IDMC).
Figure 1.13: Refugees and IDPs displaced by conflict and violence, 1990 to 2015
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Figure 1.14: Number of people inter ally displaced by 
conflict and violence as of the end of 2015 (millions)
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Figure 1.14: Number of people internally displaced by 
conflict and violence as of the end of 2015 (millions)
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NATURAL DISASTERS IN 2015 AND 2016
In 2015, there were 371 reported natural disasters (the high-
est value in the previous five years), affecting over 108 mil-
lion people (more than 2013 but less than 2014)6. However, 
the numbers of people affected is not the same as those with 
shelter needs. 
In terms of displacement, India, China and Nepal accounted 
for the highest numbers of internally displaced people caused 
by natural disasters during 2015 (3.7 million, 3.6 million and 
2.6 million respectively), mainly due to two floods and storms, 
three typhoons and a flood, and two earthquakes respectively. 
These were followed by the displacement caused by multiple 
typhoons in the Philippines (2.2 million displaced) and the im-
pacts of Cyclone Komen in Myanmar (1.6 million displaced)7.
As it has been shown with the Nepal earthquakes in 2015, the 
high numbers of people affected in the largest disasters in the 
world continue to represent a source of concern (see A.3-A.7). 
Figure 3 shows clearly that Asian countries are consistently 
the worst affected by natural disasters.
Tropical storms in the Pacific are the subject of several reports 
in this book (see A.14 and A.15), due to their large impacts 
relative to the total population size, with coastal communi-
ties being disproportionately affected. Other natural disasters 
covered in this edition include the floods in Malawi (ranking 
seventh in 2015 in terms of affected population after flooding
– see A.19-A.21) and the Ecuador earthquake (ranking first in 
terms of affected population after an earthquake for the year 
2016 – see A.39-A.40)8.
6 International Federation of the Red Cross - IFRC (2016), “World Disasters 
Report 2016”, http://bit.ly/2e3XOUy.
7 IDMC (2016).
8 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters – CRED, 
http://www.emdat.be/ [accessed March 2017].
Figure 4. This chart shows the cumulative number of households reached with the main modalities of assistance in response to the Nepal earthquakes (Source: Shelter 
Cluster Nepal). It can be observed how emergency shelter items and NFIs were distributed in significantly larger scale and sooner in the response, while recovery shelter 
items, training and cash took longer to be implemented, and with lower totals. Notably, cash-based assistance had a peak approximately eight months after the disaster.
Figure 3. Total people affected by natural disasters, in millions, from 2007 to 
2016 (source: CRED). Asian countries are disproportionately more affected.
Statistically, floods were the most common type of report-
ed natural disaster in 2015 (154) and 2016 (145). However, 
droughts affected a much larger population (over 400 million 
people in 2015 and 2016) than floods (over 46 million people 
in 2015 and 2016). Storms and earthquakes affected fewer 
people worldwide but, as the case studies show, the nature 
of damage to shelter and housing was different and required 
differing responses.
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MAJOR SHELTER RESPONSES IN 2015-2016
In 2015, the Global Shelter Cluster reported that 18.1 million 
people had been reached with shelter-NFI assistance, with 
a total of USD 509 million received by the sector worldwide9. 
The major shelter-NFI responses from the humanitarian com-
munity in 2015 were Nepal (see A.3-A.7), the Whole of Syria 
(see A.29-A.32) and Iraq (see A.33-A.36).
In 2016, 13.1 million people were supported, with a total of 
USD 478 million received for the shelter-NFI sector, and the 
major responses continued to be Iraq and the Whole of Syria, 
followed by South Sudan (see A.23-A.25), Yemen (see A.37) 
and Nigeria (see A.18), all conflict-a fected countries.
Figures 4 to 6 show the shelter / NFI assistance provided over 
time between different responses10.  From these analyses we 
can observe the following:
• Responses to rapid onset natural disasters tend to hap-
pen in a span of a few months, with a much steeper 
curve, and tend to decrease significantly and nearly run 
out after less than six months (see Fig 5).
• In protracted emergencies, the response increases over 
time, and the total is reached incrementally, with varia-
tions that can happen due to specific crises (see Fig 6)
• In natural disasters responses, there are clearer phases 
of assistance, and a greater variety of modalities, than it 
is the case for conflict crises (see Fig 4 and Fig 6)
9 Visit www.sheltercluster.org. These figures do not include refugee responses
10 For the comparison (Fig 5), we used the monthly cumulative data for four dif-
ferent responses in 2015 and 2016. We used cumulative percentages, instead 
of absolute values, in order to make different datasets comparable, both due to 
the fact that the responses have different scales and the definition of the modal-
ities of assistance vary between different countries. For Iraq, emergency shelter 
was defined as: provision of tents and emergency shelter kits / sealing-off kits 
(distribution of plastic sheeting or seasonal shelter items, either separately or as 
part of NFI kits, is not included). For the Whole of Syria: provision of tents, emer-
gency shelter kits or individual emergency shelter items (including cash/voucher 
for these items), rehabilitation of emergency spaces (in-kind, cash/voucher or 
physical repair). For Nepal and Ecuador emergency shelter figures are obtained 
using only distributions of tarpaulins and tents.
In response to the Nepal earthquakes in 2015, humanitarian organizations adopt-
ed a variety of response modalities, including distribution of CGI sheeting to repair 
damaged structures, particularly to prepare for the harsh winter season..
Figure 6. This chart shows the number of people assisted monthly in Iraq, in 2015 and 2016, with the three main modalities of assistance, as defined in the country 
(Source: Global Shelter Cluster). The chart highlights the different scale of the three modalities and some peaks in assistance, due to specific crises: between 
October 2015 and February 2016 (due to the Battle of Ramadi), in mid 2016 (due to the Battle of Fallujah) and towards the end of 2016 (due to the Mosul crisis).
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Figure 5. Comparison of emergency shelter cumulative assistance (percentage 
of the total) for four shelter responses in 2015 and 2016 (as per data reported 
to the Shelter Clusters in country). The start for natural disasters are set on the 
month before the crisis on the year of the disaster.
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RECURRING THEMES
This edition sees several themes emerging from the cases 
studies, including the shift towards non-material forms of assis-
tance (see A.14 and A.15; A.21, A.40), the importance of land 
and property issues (see A.22, A.38 and A.39), the increasing 
role of cash-based interventions (see A.2, A.7, A.17 and A.31) 
and a focus on protracted crises (including the Whole of Syria, 
South Sudan and Ukraine, amongst others). It also includes a 
significant amount of case studies where shelter is only one 
component of multisectoral approaches (see A.31, A.13, A.22 
and A.12). We summarize some recurring issues below.
SHELTER AS A PROCESS 
Shelter is “more than just a roof”, it is not just the structure 
that protects from the elements, but is the series of activities 
that a household undertakes to save and construct, adapt and 
expand a dwelling, as well as the range of continuing actions 
and livelihoods that people do in and around their home. All 
of the case studies spend many more words on the process 
used rather than on the technical details or specific designs, 
and key learnings generally come from these processes and 
the wider impacts of the projects.
DIVERSITY IN RESPONSES
Shelter programme design varies across countries and types 
of crisis, with phase of response, or amongst different organi-
zations within the same response. For instance, in this edition 
there are five case studies from the Philippines (A.9-A.13). 
Projects varied in duration, cost and scale, ranging from dis-
tribution of shelter kits (emergency or recovery) or vouchers 
for repairs, to construction of transitional shelters or houses, 
and multiphase, multisectoral, settlement approaches. If we 
look at protracted emergencies, such as the Syrian crisis with 
its regional effects (see A.29-A.32 and A.35) and the Iraq con-
flict (A.33, A.34 and A.36), a wide range of responses also 
took place. Projects in this region (from both this and past 
editions) ranged from cash and vouchers for housing repair, 
to collective centres upgrade, shelter construction or upgrade 
in camps and camp-like settings. Housing construction was 
extremely limited, yet some programmes supported rental and 
hosting arrangements. Some projects provided cash-based 
assistance, and/or included training components, though less 
than in post-disaster responses, such as in the Philippines.
PEOPLE AS FIRST RESPONDERS
One of the most common conclusions from the case studies 
is that affected people are the first responders after a disas-
ter, and most projects identify how to support them in finding
temporary shelter solutions, or in their self-recovery. There is 
a difference for what this means for those in protracted dis-
placement, compared to those who are able to rebuild where 
they have access to land to do so. For example, in the Pro-
tection of Civilians sites in South Sudan, where internally dis-
placed people seek refuge from armed conflict, “recovery” will 
not be possible until more durable options become available 
(see A.23, A.24 and A.25). Nonetheless, the populations there 
are not passive recipients of aid.
Often, in case studies described as successful, projects seek 
to support affected people to meet their own shelter needs. 
However, there are challenges that can affect the ability of 
projects to effectively support people to help themselves and 
limit community engagement. These include limited funding, 
limited time frames, the urgency of life-threatening situations, 
the flexibility of donors and issues in relinquishing control, 
based on concerns over structural safety. Examples of sup-
porting people in making their own decisions are projects that 
combine cash- or voucher-based modalities with awareness 
raising and training, as well as technical assistance, to en-
sure that standards are reached and safety is considered. For 
instance, projects such as A.11 and A.12 in response to Hai-
yan, as well as A.5 and A.6 after the Nepal earthquakes, all 
included delivery of materials or kits, coupled with technical 
assistance or training, to support affected people in their re-
covery as early as possible. Projects A.7 and A.13 used cash 
or vouchers as the main modality of assistance, accompanied 
by other programme components.
TARGETING OF ASSISTANCE
A consistent issue across case studies is the targeting or se-
lection of project beneficiaries. In general, project write-ups 
place less emphasis on the process for selecting areas of 
intervention than on detailed beneficiary selection within a 
site. Although the selection of project locations is often done 
by people who may not be present when projects are finally
written up, they are also often selected under time pressure 
and with limited information. Case studies where national co-
ordination is highlighted show the importance of assessments 
and coordination in trying to ensure area coverage and that 
location-level gaps are met. Within projects, the choice of who 
to target within a location can be a time-consuming process, 
but is critical to effective programming, with often limited re-
sources. For example, A.10, A.12, A.22 and A.30 show how 
an effective selection process requires multiple steps and sig-
nificant time and resources
SCALE VERSUS IMPACT
Disasters and displacements vary significantly in scale, and 
as a result so do responses. In many cases, there is simply 
not sufficient funding or capacity for organizations to provide 
the support that is needed. Case studies illustrate how shelter 
agencies often have to make difficult choices between provid-
ing higher-impact assistance to a limited number of families, or 
less support to a larger number. See opinion piece B.3 for a dis-
cussion of this issue, drawing from the projects in this edition.
Trainings of carpenters were organized on safer construction techniques in 
Nepal, after the two earthquakes in 2015.
People went to their damaged houses soon after the earthquake that struck Ne-
pal, to salvage materials and look for personal belongings.
©
 S
av
e 
th
e 
C
hi
ld
re
n 
N
ep
al
©
 J
os
ep
h 
A
sh
m
or
e
xiSHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
INTRODUCTION
Beneciary satisfaction
Community participation
(Large) ScaleTimeliness
Eciency
Eective coordination
Locally relevant
Multisectoral/holistic
Supporting return/decongestion Replicability
Protection
Durable solutions
Government-led
Meeting needs/targets
Maximizing choice
Cooperation
Adaptation of the project
Advocacy
Expandable/upgradable
Precedent setting
Flexibility
Preparedness
Accountability to beneciaries
Gender awareness
Lessons learned
Building local capacity
Complementarity
Eective targeting
Aordability
Eectiveness
Supporting early recovery
Addressing vulnerabilities
Building resilience
Family reunication
Improved living conditions
Environment
Behavioural change
Use of local resources
DEFINING SUCCESS
In this edition, we have asked contributors to define the main 
factors than influenced the success of the project described 
in the case study. From a total of 31 case studies, nearly 40 
different reasons for success were reported by contributors, 
with two thirds of them cited more than once. By looking at the 
responses, the most cited factors were “beneficiary satisfac-
tion” (cited in 29% of cases), “community participation” (19%), 
“timeliness” and “effective coordination” (both at 16%). These 
were followed by “scale” (16%, with one case reporting the 
limited – rather than large – scale as the reason for success), 
“locally relevant” and “precedent setting” (both at 13%).
Notably, certain factors for success are reported only in pro-
jects in response to natural disasters (such as “locally rele-
vant” and “use of local resources”), while others only in those 
in complex or conflict environments (e.g. “precedent setting”, 
“efficiency” and “expandable / upgradable solutions”).
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
There has been a lot of academic and practical debate sur-
rounding terminology used in the shelter sector. Additional 
confusions have been added by language translation. In par-
ticular, issues have been signifi ant in the different definitions
used for different phases of assistance. For example, the 
terms “emergency shelter”, “transitional shelter”, “T-shelter”, 
“temporary shelter”, “semi-permanent shelter”, and “incre-
mental shelter” have all been used in responses to define both 
the types of shelters and the processes used.
In this book we use the terms used in-country for each re-
sponse, and these may vary from country to country. In some 
cases, flexibility in terminology has helped projects to take 
place sooner.
INTERPRET AND CONTRIBUTE
In reading this book, or browsing different case studies, it is 
hoped that readers will be able to draw their own lessons and 
identify useful techniques and approaches.
Readers are encouraged to share this publication widely, and 
contribute their own project case studies for future editions. In 
this way, the humanitarian community can compile good and 
bad practices, and hopefully implement increasingly effective 
shelter projects in the future.
Contribute at:
www.shelterprojects.org
Contact:
info@shelterprojects.org
www.shelterprojects.org
View of the rows of communal shelters in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) site in Bentiu, South Sudan. These displacement sites have been growing around UN-
MISS bases since the start of the crisis in late 2013, and offer protection to the populations seeking refuge from the ongoing conflict affecting the countr .
This graphic shows the rate of responses to the question "How did you define success in your shelter project?". The larger the word size, the higher the number of contrib-
utors who reported the given factor as a reason for success, or a way to measure success. Colours refer to the type of crisis that the projects were responding to.
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this book and previous editions.
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ASIA - PACIFIC COMPLEX / MULTIPLEA.1 / MYANMAR 2013-2016 / COORDINATION
CASE STUDY
2014 2015 2016
JUN
MYANMAR 2013-2016 / COORDINATION
KEYWORDS: Coordination, Technical assistance, Advocacy, Training
CRISIS
Myanmar, multiple crises: 
• Internal conflict in Kachin/Northern Sha  
states (2011-ongoing)
• Inter-communal violence in Rakhine state 
(Jun and Oct 2012)
• Cyclone Komen floods (Aug-Dec 2015)
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
Rakhine: 145,000 displaced
Kachin/Northern Shan: 100,000 displaced
2015 floods: 1.7 million displaced 
150,000 people with moderately or severely dam-
aged houses (Myanmar Humanitarian Response Plan, 2016).
PROJECT
LOCATIONS
Myanmar country-wide, national and subna-
tional level.
PROJECT
OUTPUTS
Shelter/NFI/CCCM coordination provided 
at national and subnational level (2013-2016).
OUTCOME 
INDICATORS
100% of IDPs living in temporary shelters complying 
with internationally recognized standards.
100% of IDP camps with appropriate infrastructure 
supporting effective camp management.
CLUSTER COORDINATION SET-UP AND INITIAL RESPONSE FLOOD RESPONSE
2 3 5
Jan 2013: National Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster established.
Apr 2013: Rakhine State Government and Cluster Lead Agency agree 
on shelter design and standards (eight-unit long-houses).
Dec 2013: Completion of 2,843 eight-unit longhouses in Rakhine 
State (see A.16 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014).
Aug 2015: Deployment of Flood Response Coordination Team.
Dec 2015: Departure of Flood Response Coordination Team and hand-
over to national Cluster.
1 4
2 5
3
STRENGTHS
+ Adequate dedicated capacity since cluster activation.
+ 48-hour deployment of the Coordinator and continuity for 4 years.
+ Inclusive coordination mechanism for all partners.
+ Regular engagement with other clusters and sectors, at all levels.
+ Sustained advocacy contributed to high government involvement.
+ The merged Shelter/NFI/CCCM subnational Cluster facilitated 
operational partners agreement on common designs and guidance.
 
WEAKNESSES
- Over 200,000 individuals continued to be in a protracted displace-
ment situation.
- Delayed Cluster activation In Kachin/Northern Shan.
- Compromised design solutions did not reach minimum standards.
- The protracted crisis has not allowed constructive discussion on 
possible exit strategy or handover.
- Lack of durable solutions led to a constant and costly cycle of repair 
and maintenance.
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2017
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PROJECT SUMMARY   
The Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster in Myanmar has provided – and continues to support – coordination of shelter and CCCM 
agencies at national and subnational level through a decentralized approach, since January 2013. The national level pro-
vided overall direction, Information Management support and liaised with national authorities, donors and the Humanitar-
ian Country Team, as well as with the Global Shelter and CCCM Clusters; two subnational clusters were established for 
operational response. The overall goals were to provide emergency shelter and to seek durable solutions for populations 
affected by violence and disasters. This case study focuses on the coordination structures and how they evolved over time.
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ASIA - PACIFICCOMPLEX / MULTIPLE A.1 / MYANMAR 2013-2016 / COORDINATION
NATIONAL SHELTER CLUSTER
Before the Cluster was activated, the lead agency had been 
coordinating the shelter and CCCM response in Kachin 
(since 2011) and in Rakhine (since 2012). Support was re-
quested from the global level Clusters for response coordi-
nation, resource mobilization and scale up. In January 2013, 
the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster was formally activated to re-
spond to large-scale displacement in predominantly camp 
and camp-like settings across Rakhine and Kachin/North-
ern Shan states. While merged clusters are not preferred in 
IDP situations, in the case of Myanmar, Shelter and Camp 
Coordination partners overlapped to an extent that justifie  
bringing the two sectors together. Local organizations also 
expressed preference for one common forum.
The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) deployed an experienced, 
dedicated, national Coordinator within 48 hours of Cluster 
activation, to head the newly formed national Cluster team 
in Yangon. The Cluster aimed to ensure adequate temporary 
accommodation (according to agreed international stand-
ards and government requirements) using eight-unit shelters 
known as “long-houses”3.
SUBNATIONAL COORDINATION STRUCTURE  
The coordination team had to address two displacement con-
texts, in two different geographical locations, which called 
for a decentralized subnational coordination approach. A 
merged Shelter/NFI/CCCM subnational Cluster was es-
tablished in Kachin/Northern Shan states to coordinate the 
response across the 167 camps. Due to the highly volatile 
situation and the larger caseload in Rakhine, the subnational 
3 This is described in case study A.16 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014.
CONTEXT
Despite the internationally welcomed transition to democracy in 
2011, after decades of isolation, Myanmar remains one of the 
poorest countries in South-East Asia. The relatively low level 
of development and wide-spread poverty is often further ham-
pered by heavy monsoon rains and frequent natural disasters 
(such as typhoons Nargis in 20081 and Giri in 2010). Myanmar’s 
population make-up includes multiple ethnic groups which have 
long opposed the government’s policy of centralization.
SITUATION IN KACHIN/NORTHERN SHAN 
Fighting between the Myanmar governmental army and the 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) broke out in June 2011, 
after a 17 year cease-fire, which led to the displacement of 
an estimated 100,000 people, as of August 20132. In 2016, 
approximately 50% of IDP camps were located in non-gov-
ernment controlled areas, with limited access to services and 
international humanitarian assistance.
SITUATION IN RAKHINE STATE 
For more information on Rakhine State, see case study A.2.
Inter-communal violence between the Buddhist population 
and Rohingya Muslims in 2012 resulted in massive destruc-
tion of homes and displacement across the state. The main 
IDP caseload fled urban areas and settled into rural camps 
around Sittwe, with heavy restrictions on freedom of move-
ment and limited access to services outside the camps.
1 See case studies A.19-A.20 in Shelter Projects 2010 for projects in response 
to Typhoon Nargis.
2 Kachin & Northern Shan Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework, Sep 2013.
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Myanmar: IDP Sites in Rakhine State (Jul 2016)
Nearly 100,000 people were internally displaced due to violence, across many 
IDP sites in Kachin and Northern Shan States (UN OCHA, Aug 2016). 
In Rhakine State, internally displaced persons were living in many IDP sites 
coordinated by the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster (UN OCHA, Jul 2016).
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Cluster in Sittwe town was set up differently – separate Shel-
ter and CCCM/NFI Clusters – both under the coordination of 
the national Cluster Coordinator in Yangon. 
RESPONSE IN KACHIN/NORTHERN SHAN
The initial response was carried out by the local communi-
ty and faith-based organizations through the construction 
of temporary five-unit shelters in camp-like settings, 
evolving mainly around church compounds. While having 
distinct advantages (knowledge of the local context, access 
to non-governmental areas, extensive networks and posi-
tive relation with state and local authorities), the initial re-
sponse suffered from the organizations’ lack of technical and 
sectoral expertise, as well as limited donor confidence and 
support. Temporary shelters provided in the early stages of 
the emergency varied significantly across the 167 camps in 
terms of covered living area, quality of construction materials 
used, occupancy criteria and surrounding infrastructure.
By March 2013, there were 85,000 registered IDPs and an 
additional 35,000 individuals in need of humanitarian assis-
tance. The international community engaged late and ac-
cess to non-government controlled areas was limited. This 
caused a lack of basic data to support identification of gaps 
and inform shelter and camp management response. The 
Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster in Kachin piloted and support-
ed a substantial camp profiling exercise in March 2013, to 
gather baseline disaggregated data on IDPs. As of Septem-
ber 2016, five rounds of camp profiling have been coordinat-
ed by the Cluster and carried out by partners on the ground4.
The main challenge for the Cluster subnational team was to 
establish a formal coordination mechanism and help improv-
ing the response, 18 months after its start. The Cluster bene-
fited from a dedicated subnational Coordinator and a shelter 
technical expert supported by the Cluster lead agency.
The main objective in 2013 was to provide temporary shelters 
to meet the needs of an additional 10,000 IDPs. This was 
achieved through consultations with beneficiaries and local shel-
ter actors on culturally appropriate shelter designs and harmo-
nization, and provision of guidance on Build Back Safer tech-
niques. In July 2013, a technical working group (TWiG) agreed 
on a five-unit shelter design, which has been implemented by 
all partners since. In July 2016, the TWiG adapted the design 
to take into account feedback from beneficiaries and partners, 
4 Analysis of Camp Profiling Round 5 Kachin & Northern Shan, http://bit.ly/
2jK46LR
availability of local materials, minimum standards and other cul-
tural considerations. Additionally, the Cluster lead agency con-
ducted 12 trainings for approximately 300 Camp Managers, 
Camp Focal Points and Government actors, across 84 camps5.
Additionally, repairs had to be conducted on the shelters 
built in 2011. This was done through an owner-driven ap-
proach (supported by the Cluster), bringing existing shelters 
up to Sphere standards, to avoid overcrowding and improve 
privacy and protection. Temporary shelters have a life span 
of 2-3 years and require shelter actors in the area to engage 
in a constant and costly cycle of maintenance and repair, 
until durable solutions become feasible.
RESPONSE IN RAKHINE 
Immediately after the violence, emergency tents were pro-
vided, while the Cluster lead agency provided tarpaulins, 
rope and tents at the end of 2012. Additionally, after the 
second wave of violence in October 2012, the government 
completed 525 temporary shelters and “long-houses” for ap-
proximately 29,000 IDPs, across 10 townships. Some of the 
camps were established in 2012-2013, others were clusters 
of long-houses built within (or in close proximity to) the IDPs’ 
villages of origin.
In April 2013, the Cluster lead agency joined a high-level del-
egation to Rakhine, to clarify the maximum capacity of the 
international community and persuade the Rakhine State 
Government (RSG) to contribute to the shelter response. The 
initial design used by the RSG envisaged the construction of 
10-unit long-houses, providing a living space of only 2m2 per 
person. The Cluster advocated for the shelters to meet 
the Sphere indicator of 3.5m2 per person and managed to 
reduce the number of families per shelter from ten to eight. 
However, with an average of 5.5 family members, IDPs ended 
up occupying a space of 2.9m2 per person. On the basis of 
this agreement with the RSG, Cluster partners achieved 51% 
coverage of identified temporary shelter needs in June 2013 
and 99% by December6.
During 2013 and 2014, a TWiG co-chaired by the Department 
for Rural Development (DRD) agreed on minimum technical 
standards and designs for temporary and permanent 
shelter, and further developed an effective shelter and main-
tenance programme. The established co-chairing arrangement 
5 Kachin Response Plan Myanmar March-December 2013, http://bit.ly/2j8MjNK.
6 Rakhine State Shelter Cluster Strategic Framework, http://bit.ly/2iQlZKh.
Myanmar Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster Organigram, 2013-2015.
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allowed Cluster partners to develop strong professional re-
lationships with the RSG and improved the previously poor 
level of coordination between government departments and 
international organizations. Additionally, constructive govern-
ment engagement trickled down to the local level.
In 2014, the Shelter Cluster, both in Rakhine and at national 
level, renewed its advocacy efforts with the RSG to take the 
lead in addressing the protracted IDP situation through dura-
ble solutions. It also offered technical support on design and 
construction. In 2015, the RSG supported individual housing 
solutions through cash grants for 25,000 individuals7. Attain-
ing durable solutions and advocacy with the government 
remained key objectives in the 2016-2017 strategy. Since 
2013, both subnational Clusters have continuously engaged 
in preparedness activities, tracking of emergency stocks and 
local response capacity. Both have also advocated for early 
recovery and coordinated with relevant clusters and sectors 
(most notably Protection – to ensure protection mainstream-
ing – and WASH – to ensure sufficient links between shelter 
interventions and WASH infrastructure).
SITUATION AFTER THE 2015 FLOODS 
In July and August 2015, heavy monsoon rains, combined 
with the effect of Cyclone Komen on the region, affected nine 
million people across 12 of the country’s 14 states, causing 
heavy loss of homes, livelihoods, crops and food stocks. 
Floods and landslides killed 117 people and temporarily dis-
7 See case study A.2.
places 1.7 million. The Government reported that the highest 
numbers of affected people were in Ayeyarwady, Sagaing and 
Magway regions, while Rakhine suffered the highest number 
of destroyed homes. The Humanitarian Country Team agreed 
that the response to these floods would be coordinated by the 
existing Clusters, rather than creating new ones.
FLOOD RESPONSE 2015 
Given the extensive reach and impact of the natural disaster, 
the GSC co-lead agency for natural disasters deployed a co-
ordination team to support the subnational level. The two GSC 
co-leads agreed that the newly deployed team would coordi-
nate the response outside Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. 
The flo d shelter coordination team (FSCT) – consisting 
of two dedicated Coordinators and one information manag-
er – was set up to operate under the strategic guidance 
of the national Cluster. The FSCT organized shelter partner 
meetings at the same location and date of the regular national 
Cluster meeting, allowing agencies to attend both meetings.
The FSCT used and triangulated government data to coordi-
nate the shelter response in seven regions, developed a re-
porting mechanisms and a dedicated webpage8. It operated 
from Yangon, with field trips to affected locations, to assess 
housing damage, households’ needs and existing gaps in 
the response. By September 2015, Cluster partners provided 
emergency shelter to 9,525 households in all regions (outside 
Rakhine, Kachin and Stan states) through a combination of 
shelter repair kits, tarpaulins and tents9.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE CLUSTER IN MYANMAR 
The clear mandate and geographical separation of responsi-
bilities between the two Cluster lead agencies, as well as the 
close collaboration with the national Cluster team, ensured 
that the coordination of this response was successful. An 
agreement between the two global co-leads existed before 
the floods, and was further solidified and practically tested 
through the 2015 collaboration. This allows the timely deploy-
ment of coordination teams and development of Standard Op-
erating Procedures (SOPs) and technical guidelines.
8 www.sheltercluster.org/response/myanmar-floods-201 .
9 Myanmar Central Area Flood Response Situation Report #4, http://bit.ly/2jKy7ew.
Myanmar Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster Organigram, Aug-Dec 2015.
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Several areas were affected by the floods in 2015 (UN OCHA, 10 Aug 2015). 
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STRENGTHS
+ Adequate dedicated capacity since Cluster activation, 
and benefits from using the lead agency existing capacities. 
+ 48-hour deployment of the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Coor-
dinator (and continuity since then). This provided pre-
dictability, extensive knowledge on the context and the 
response, as well as strong personal and professional re-
lations with the wider international community, local partners, 
authorities and donors.
+ Inclusive coordination mechanism for all partners to 
engage, consult and disseminate best practices. 21 Cluster 
partners have been regularly attending meetings.
+ Regular engagement with other clusters and sectors, 
at all levels (especially Protection, WASH and Early Recov-
ery), as well as donors and relevant stakeholders.
+ Sustained advocacy from the Cluster lead agency and 
partners contributed to high government involvement in 
Rakhine State. Many shelters built by the government used 
Cluster-agreed technical standards and designs.
+ The merged Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster in Kachin/Northern 
Shan managed to bring local operational partners together, 
agree on a common shelter design and technical guidance, 
and create links with Protection and WASH.
WEAKNESSES
- More than 200,000 individuals across Rakhine, Kachin and 
Northern Shan states continue to live in situations of pro-
tracted displacement. As of 2016, the Cluster continued its 
advocacy for durable solutions.
- In Kachin/Northern Shan, the Cluster was activated 18 
months after the conflict-related displacement. Delayed ac-
tivation of clusters may lead local organizations to provide 
a sectorial response without the necessary technical 
guidance and coordination.
- The compromised solution reached on the final design 
and size of the long-houses implemented by the government 
fell short of the international standard of 3.5m2 per person.
- The Cluster has been active for four years, while needs 
have remained almost the same since 2013, which has not 
allowed for constructive discussion on possible exit 
strategies or handover. Clusters are, by definition, time-
bound and needs-based coordination mechanisms. Hand-
over of coordination responsibilities, or deactivation where 
needs cease to exist, should be discussed early on10. 
- Lack of durable solutions four years into the Cluster re-
sponse, led to a constant and costly cycle of repair and 
maintenance. This was due to the decision of the Cluster in 
2013 to explicitly focus on the provision of temporary shel-
ters, with a life-span of two years, to avoid contributing to 
permanent encampment of the affected populations.
10 IASC Reference Module for Cluster Coordination, http://bit.ly/2oseRYT.
The Cluster coordinated the construction of temporary shelters for people fleein  
inter-communal violence in Rakhine State (Ohn Taw Gyi IDP camp, May 2013).
People in an IDP site, coordinated and managed by merged Shelter/CCCM 
Clusters (Tat Kone Baptist Church IDP camp in Kachin State, Nov 2013).
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LEARNINGS 
• Early deployment of Cluster coordination team, adequate staffin  of key Cluster roles (Coordinator, Information Manager 
and Technical Support) and access to the Cluster lead agency’s existing institutional and human resources are es-
sential for setting up a functioning national Cluster.
• Coordination mechanisms should be as close to operational partners and beneficiaries as possible, to allow 
for adequate data collection, gap analysis, community engagement and operational response, as well as to encourage 
ownership, adequate exit strategies and sustainability.
• Pre-existing arrangements and close cooperation between Cluster lead agencies at the global level can ensure 
that coordination mechanisms are not duplicated, information is shared openly and that teams operate within a clear 
mandate and towards the same strategic objective.
• Coordination teams arriving late in the response should engage partners cautiously and prove the added value 
of coordination (including humanitarian standards, Build Back Safer approaches, and technical guidelines).
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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CASE STUDY MYANMAR 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
KEYWORDS: Individual housing, Cash assistance, Advocacy, Community participation, Protection
CRISIS Inter-communal violence, Rakhine, 2012.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
145,000 displaced due to 2012 violence 
(119,560 as of Nov 2016).
PROJECT
LOCATIONS
Rakhine State, Myanmar (Townships of Mrauk-U, 
Kyauktaw and Minbya, Rathedaung and Pauktaw).
BENEFICIARIES 25,000 individuals (approx.).
PROJECT OUTPUTS 4,737 beneficiary-led houses
SHELTER SIZE1 Min. 16.7 m2 (4.6m x 3.7m basic design).
SHELTER DENSITY Min. 3.4 m2/person (average 5 members per family).
PROJECT COST 
PER SHELTER
USD 1,000 (Labour cost = USD 160; Materials, Logis-
tics, Transport, etc. = USD 840).
OCCUPANCY RATE 100% (estimated).
RIO NAPO
CHINA
THAILAND
INDIA
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BAY OF 
BENGAL
KACHIN
SAGAING
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MAGWAY
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PROJECT SUMMARY   
This was a beneficiary-led, cash-based, project that allowed fami-
lies displaced due to inter-communal violence to vacate their temporary 
shelter and rebuild their houses. The project enabled the construction of 
4,737 houses for a marginalized group in a highly volatile environment, 
where some stakeholders were keen to use a contractor-driven ap-
proach. In fact, the more discreet owner-driven methodology, used in 
this project, proved highly effective.
Jan 2013: Activation of Shelter Cluster.
Mar 2015: Rakhine Government begins owner-driven housing con-
struction with own funding (Phase 1).
Jul 2015: Handover of Phase 1 completed.
Oct 2015: Rakhine Government, with funding support from Shelter 
Cluster partners, continued with further individual housing construc-
tion (Phase 2).
Apr 2016: Handover of Phase 2 completed.
1
2
3
4
5
STRENGTHS
+ Use of existing local markets.
+ Considerable donor interest and support.
+ Critical leadership of the government.
+ Active participation of community leaders and concerned families.
+ Continuity of cluster agency and coordinators over time.
+ Affordable and quick implementation.
WEAKNESSES
- Some IDPs could not return to their place of origin.
- Landowners were not properly compensated.
- Lack of adequate and timely WASH components in Phase 1.
PROJECT AREAS
2 43 5
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1 Note: families were free to increase the size or modify the 
house design according to their needs.
CONFLICT / VIOLENCE
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During attacks, villages were burnt (Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State). In response to the displacement due to the violence, makeshift emergency shel-
ters were set up (Sin Thet Maw, Pauktaw Township).
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2) Upgrading of existing temporary shelters in the IDP camps;
3) Individual housing solutions for IDP families to return to or near 
their place of origin or voluntary relocation to new site. This solu-
tion was selected and houses implemented in five townships
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARIES
The Shelter/CCCM Cluster and Protection Sector strongly ad-
vocated for the RSG to allow crisis-affected people to return 
to their place of origin or relocate to new sites. This project 
specifically targeted those who could return or voluntarily re-
locate. Through numerous field visits and meetings, consul-
tation and research were conducted with communities and 
authorities, to ensure a deep and wide understanding of the 
situation. The government selected suitable locations for the 
project with help from the Cluster lead agency, based primarily 
on safety and security and well-being of the beneficiaries
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION  
The concept and planning process started in the last quarter 
of 2014 and, once the project reached a momentum, advoca-
cy and technical support to the government were scaled up. 
This beneficiary-led housing project was implemented 
by the RSG through the General Administration Department 
(GAD) of each concerned District or Township, village, com-
munity leaders (construction committee) and the IDP fami-
lies themselves. The GAD authorities gave beneficiaries an 
initial cash lump sum through the community leaders. This 
ranged from 30% to 50% of a total of USD 1,000, depending 
on the township, and was intended to purchase construction 
materials. Skilled workers from the construction committee 
then helped families construct their houses. When houses 
were 60% to 80% complete, the GAD authorities gave the 
remaining amount for the final completion of construction  
This beneficiary-led approach differed significantly from 
other contractor-built houses that were implemented by 
the RSG and humanitarian agencies in Rakhine State. The 
scheme was for the stateless and extremely marginalized 
Muslims in Rakhine State. Any effort to support them was 
hugely challenging, not least being permitted to rebuild their 
houses, so this novel low-key approach proved highly ap-
propriate. One of the striking outputs was the speed that 
houses were constructed at. Over 3,000 houses were built 
in a six-month period, i.e. an average of 16 houses per day, 
seven days a week. Had contractors been used, particularly 
in many of these remote rural locations, outputs in terms of 
cost, speed and quality would not have been comparable.
SITUATION BEFORE THE CONFLICT
Rakhine State is the least developed state in Myanmar, char-
acterized by high population density and malnutrition rates, 
low-income levels, poverty and weak infrastructure. Condi-
tions are worsened by two cyclone seasons, with associated 
flash flooding and landslides, during the rainy season. There 
is a long-standing history of discrimination of the Muslim 
population in Rakhine State, with the two main ethnic groups 
in conflict with each other: the Rakhine (Buddhist) and those 
who call themselves “Rohingya” (Muslims), who lack any cit-
izenship and hence are stateless. 
SITUATION AFTER THE START OF THE CONFLICT 
Inter-community violence in parts of Rakhine State com-
menced in early June 2012, and flared once more in October 
2012, resulting in the deaths of 167 people and injuries to 223 
people. 10,100 buildings, including homes, churches and pub-
lic buildings were damaged or destroyed and approximately 
145,000 people were displaced (95% Muslim; 5% Rakhine). 
This generated two distinct IDP caseloads: those displaced 
from urban areas and those from rural areas2.
In 2015, approximately 25,000 people in rural locations were 
able to vacate their temporary shelter, assisted through this 
project. 60% reconstructed in their place of origin and 40% in 
new locations. This resulted in the number of camps (or camp-
like settings) decreasing from 67 to 36. However, at the time of 
writing, almost 120,000 IDPs still resided in camps. 
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY 
The goal of the Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster in Myanmar was 
to provide people affected by violence and conflict with safe, 
dignified and appropriate living conditions, as well as access 
to essential services, while seeking durable solutions3. In early 
2015, after 18 months without being able to move beyond 
temporary solutions, the Cluster (strongly supported by the 
international community) advocated heavily with the Govern-
ment of Myanmar, especially the Rakhine State Government 
(RSG). The aim was to convince the RSG to enact three 
possible options that supported individual housing solutions, 
as opposed to camps:
1) Repair and maintenance of existing temporary shelters 
(eight room long houses) in the IDP camps;
2 For more information on the Shelter Cluster’s mass temporary shelter response 
in 2013 see case study A.16 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014.
3 More information can be found on the website, www.shelternficccmmyanma .org.
Construction materials were supplied by the government to rebuild the houses of 
IDPs affected by the violence (Thi Kyar IDP Camp, Mrauk-U Township).
IDPs used old shelter materials to support the initial settlement back in their place 
of origin, before rebuilding their houses.
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The fact that the same agency led the Shelter/CCCM Cluster 
and the Protection Sector helped to deliver a consistency of 
messaging and clarity of the aims and objectives to the RSG. 
Throughout the process, the lead agency sought to consult 
and update regularly all relevant actors – including poten-
tial beneficiaries and all relevant quarters of the international 
community (at national or subnational level).
DRR AND PROTECTION 
In the same year, Myanmar also suffered unseasonal lev-
els of rain, cyclones and landslides. Documents used in 
the flood response were also beneficial to this programme4. 
Throughout the project, the Cluster promoted the eight key 
messages to build back safer, which were translated into My-
anmar language and distributed in hard copy5. 
Protection actors often visited project locations and dis-
cussed with the communities and local authorities, to gain a 
very intimate knowledge of each situation. The initial idea of 
using an owner-driven construction approach actually came 
from these discussions with the displaced communities, 
where they could voice how they wished to address their 
housing needs.
4 See case study A.1 and the webpage of the 2015 floods response:
http://bit.ly/2kWavnU.
5 See the Shelter Standards and Guidelines library of the Cluster: 
http://bit.ly/2kZ3zWa.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
In addition to implementation challenges, the working envi-
ronment posed a significant risk. There were security issues, 
such as attacks on UN and INGO premises and residences in 
March 2014, which resulted in a mass evacuation from Rakh-
ine State for a number of weeks, plus a highly tense situation 
between communities. This required a very conflict-sensitive
approach. One of the key reactions by the Shelter Cluster was 
to revert to the original suggestion that beneficiaries would 
receive a material package rather than cash, to reduce protec-
tion concerns. It was feared that the cash assistance to Mus-
lims could be used to pay traffickers to leave Rakhine State 
through illegal and highly dangerous means6. Despite this, the 
RSG continued favouring cash as a modality, since it allowed 
Rakhine traders to benefit from Muslims using the cash, which 
allowed a mutually beneficial economic exchange. This paved 
the way for a wider acceptance of cash assistance, which 
risk-adverse actors, including the clusters, were initially less 
willing to try.
MATERIALS
The cash grants were used to purchase the shelter materials, 
which included timber posts, concrete blocks, wooden planks, 
bamboos, iron sheets, nails and labour charges (skilled and 
unskilled). Most of the materials were sourced by the construc-
tion committee from local suppliers who were accredited by the 
Township GAD. This was vital for the displaced to access the 
required materials, given their limited freedom of movement, 
as opposed to a contractor-based approach, where contrac-
tors would supply all the materials and labour requirements, 
and would then be paid through progress billing.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
For the first time since the 2012 violence, some real progress 
towards durable shelter solutions was made, while until that 
point the situation for these displaced families had been total-
ly static. Where the global average for internal displacement 
stands at around 17 years, thanks to this project 20% of the 
total IDP population in Myanmar ended their displace-
ment within three years, either by returning home or finding
a new, safer, location to live. The number of camps and camp-
like settings also reduced significantl .
More widely, this showed that despite the enormously chal-
lenging context, progress was possible to find solutions 
for a highly marginalized population.
6 See, for instance, the Rakhine boat crisis of 2015, http://on.cfr.org/1HfDFni.
The relocation/return programme supported people to rebuild durable houses, through a beneficiary-led approach (township of Mr uk-U).
Contractor-driven approaches were tried and later rejected by IDPs and the 
Shelter Cluster (Nidin IDP Camp, Kyauk taw Township).
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STRENGTHS
+ The project relied on existing local markets for all mate-
rials needed, which supported local economies and allowed 
the programme to remain low-key, which was beneficia  
due to the sensitivity of the context. This was made possible 
by the local government, who ensured that displaced Muslims 
had access to purchase materials.
+ The Cluster maintained considerable donor interest and 
support for this initiative, and was coherent in preventing 
inappropriate construction in risk areas, after the initial case-
load was assisted. While there were some delays, due in part 
to the rainy season and the transition to being funded by the 
international community, lack of funds did not inhibit imple-
mentation.
+ Critical participation and cooperation of the government 
at state, district, township and village level with the Shelter 
Cluster, beneficiaries and crucially potential spoilers of the in-
itiative, which included other ethnic groups who might have 
resented the assistance to Muslims. The involvement and 
leadership of the government was crucial, mainly due to their 
authority, leadership and knowledge of the local situation.
+ Active participation of the community leaders and con-
cerned families in taking responsibility for constructing their 
own houses, resulting in often swift and high-quality construc-
tion, often with far better results than contractor-built houses.
+ Continuity of same lead agency and cluster coordinators 
for over three years meant highly effective and focused rela-
tionships between national and subnational levels.
+ Affordable and quick implementation. The typical individ-
ual owner-driven house could be completed in three to four 
weeks, costing between a half and a third than contractor-built 
houses in the same time frame. 
WEAKNESSES
- Some IDPs could not return to their place of origin and 
had to be settled in new locations, due to security and safety 
concerns.
- Landowners for relocation sites were not properly com-
pensated by the government, which in turn may lead to re-
sentment. The RSG has enormous authority and power to 
enact policies, regardless of the limited funding.
- Lack of adequate and timely water and sanitation com-
ponents. The RSG-funded programme did not include WASH 
facilities, in a state where hygiene and sanitation levels were 
extremely low. Toilets were subsequently provided, and were 
included in the internationally funded element of the pro-
gramme.  
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• The risks associated with the intervention were understood and progress was made in this regard. In fact, a backlash 
against the Muslim communities receiving assistance was feared. 1) It could spark further destruction of newly built hous-
es; and 2) the funds could be used for Muslims to pay trafficke s and leave the state by boat, instead of building houses.
• Need for active and continuous advocacy for peaceful co-existence between the different and potentially con-
flictual communities
• Tools and approaches used in other responses can be adopted to the benefit of other programmes (see the Build 
Back Safer messaging taken from the flood response in 2015)
• Proactive coordination with all the various concerned government departments was critical to ensure that the 
project was properly organized and functioned as planned.
PROPOSED FAMILY SHELTER MATERIALS
PACKAGE FOR IDPS7
Materials Unit Quantity
Timber posts: 4”x4”, 14ft and 10ft length
Girder: 5”x2”, 17ft length
Floor deck beam: 4”x2”, 16ft length
Floor joist: 3”x2”, 17ft length
Floor plank: 6”x1”, 30ft length
Tie Beam and Post Plate: 4”x2”, 16ft and 
17ft length
Rafter: 4”x2”, 22ft length
Purlin: 3”x2”, 23ft length
Roof Stud: 3”x2”, 8.5ft length
Eave Board : 6”x1”
Roof truss, 3”x2”
Ridge piece: 5”x2”, 17ft length
Wooden Stairs: Stringer (6”x2”, 4ft), Tread 
(5”x2”, 3ft)
Roofing: 30G C.G.I Sheets, 7’x2’-2
Ridge Covering: 30G GI plain Sheets, 3’x23’
Walling: Single Coarse Bamboo Mat
Walling: Beading, 3”x0.5”
Door frames and window frames
Mild Steel twisted plates for crossing points 
of rafters and purlins, of rafters and post 
plates
Roof nails
Assorted size common wire nails
Bolt-nut (5/8”, 5” length) and Tower bolt
Handles, Hinges and Hooks
Ready-made Concrete Footing (1.5’x1.5’x2’) 
with Mild Steel Plate (2’x0.25”x2”)
Brick pad for stairs landing in front and back
Sand
Stone
Cement
pcs
pcs
pcs
pcs
pcs
pcs
set
pcs
pcs
rft
set
pcs
pcs
pcs
rft
sqft
rft
pcs
pcs
kg
kg
pcs
pcs
pcs
brick
cft
cft
bag
3+6
4
4
16
30
2+2
5
10
16
90
5
1
2+6
51
23
536
280
2+6
40
6.5
19.6
18+20
18+32+20
9
80
0.2
0.35
3
7 Although this was a cash-based project, the Cluster recommended these 
materials for a 16’x15’ individual house.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
Two major earthquakes struck Nepal in April and May 2015, 
affecting around 6 million people. The government called for 
humanitarian assistance and the international community sup-
ported the response in the 14 most-affected districts, through 
three main phases: emergency relief, supporting self-recovery, 
and winterization. After the initial phase, characterized mainly 
by in-kind distributions, cash-based assistance became the 
preferred modality for this response.
NEPAL 2015 / EARTHQUAKE
CRISIS
Nepal earthquakes, 
25 April and 12 May 2015
TOTAL HOUSES
DAMAGED
604,930 fully damaged
288,856 destroyed
(Source: National Disaster Report 2015, 
Ministry of Home Affairs).
TOTAL PEOPLE
 AFFECTED
886,456 households affected
649,815 households displaced
HOUSEHOLDS 
SUPPORTED
Emergency phase: 700,000
Self-recovery phase: 600,000
Winterization: 244,158
RESPONSE OUTPUTS 
(households)
736,743 tarpaulins
402,070 blankets
484,765 Cash For Shelters
214,392 CGI Sheets Bundles
USGS Intensity Contours of both major
earthquakes (25/04 and 12/05)
overlaid on VDC (Admin 4) boundaries.
The maximum intensity was then
attributed to each VDC. Note that
whole VDC polygon is attributed with
the maximum intensity value and is not
averaged over its area.
The depiction and use of
boundaries, names and associated
data shown here do not imply
endorsement or acceptance by
MapAction.
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Mid-May 2015: Cluster coordination set up 
at national level.
Late Sep 2015: Blockade imposed by the 
Government of India.
Dec 2015: Shelter Cluster handover.1 2 3
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SITUATION BEFORE THE DISASTER
Nepal is significantly at risk to natural disasters, in par-
ticular climate change, earthquakes and floodin 1. Around 
25.2% of its population live below the poverty line2. High 
poverty levels, especially in rural areas, have led to signif-
icant migration of young men to cities and overseas (44% 
households have at least one absentee). This has also led to 
concerns about social and economic vulnerability of women 
left behind in the remote, hilly and mountain regions of rural 
Nepal that were most affected by the 2015 earthquakes. 
Politically, the country was struggling to meet demands 
raised by different interest groups in a peace process after 
a decade-long armed conflic . Political transition and at-
tainment of peace has overshadowed economic develop-
ment and humanitarian issues. Rapid and unplanned urban-
ization, migration of youth, frequent street demonstrations 
and strikes, and lack of law and order have added to the 
humanitarian challenges. The residual effects of the conflic  
were still to be solved with rapid change in political, social 
and economic situation of the country, and affected both the 
earthquake response and recovery operations.
In a country that has experienced humanitarian responses to 
both natural disaster and conflict, the Government of Nepal 
has invested significantly in institutional preparedness 
and coordination. At the sectoral level, this meant that shel-
ter agencies had a clear government partner and that there 
was overall government direction and ownership of the re-
sponse, especially through the Department of Urban Devel-
opment and Building Construction.
Prior to the 2015 earthquake, Nepal had worked to improve 
housing regulations, settlement and land rights, as well as 
promoting safer land usage and building practices through the 
introduction of land and building acts, codes and professional 
bodies. Despite this, the vast majority of houses in rural 
Nepal were non-engineered and self-built. 
1 Nepal country profile, http://bit.ly/2kvjzAl.
2 UNDP’s human development index.
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER 
On 25 April 2015, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal, 
with its epicentre 81km north-west of the capital Kathmandu. 
This was followed on 12 May by a 7.3 magnitude earthquake 
that struck the district of Dolakha, leading to further loss of 
life and building damage, and increasing the humanitarian 
needs. A total of 8,857 people died, around 6 million people 
were directly affected. 
Given the enormity of the destruction caused by the earth-
quakes and the threat of the coming Himalayan winter, a ma-
jor national and international response was mobilized, 
including the activation of the cluster system. More than 300 
organizations registered with the Shelter Cluster and the Ne-
pal Government and private sector organizations. These re-
acted quickly and at scale, focusing on needs in the 14 priority 
districts for which the government had requested internation-
al assistance, targeting 712,725 houses (or 80% of the total 
damage to housing stock)3.
The large-scale destruction of housing resulted from the 
seismic vulnerability of the predominant housing typol-
ogy, which consisted of unreinforced masonry, either low 
strength stone or brick masonry with mud mortar, without 
seismic-resilient features. Other common building types, such 
as cement-mortared masonry and reinforced-concrete frame 
buildings, were somewhat better off but still suffered signifi-
cantly, due to deficiencies in material, design, detailing and 
craftsmanship. The traditional housing typologies were built, 
upgraded and expanded by the households themselves, with 
limited knowledge of seismic-safe techniques and standards.
Female members were generally doing the majority of the 
unskilled tasks involving carrying the water, collecting con-
struction materials, mixing the mortar, digging the soil for the 
foundations or other housing components, while men or qual-
ified builders actually managed the construction process. Ac-
cording to the government’s Post Disaster Needs Assessment, 
3 For more on the Cluster set-up and coordination structure, see case study A.4.
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about 26% of the damaged houses belonged to female-headed 
households, 41% to Dalits (belonging to the lowest caste) and 
indigenous communities, and 23% to senior citizens. These 
groups were found to be disproportionately affected by the 
earthquakes and were identified as the most vulnerable, due to 
their low socio-economic status and limited capacity to contrib-
ute as workforce to the reconstruction process. Also, by being 
the larger grouping with limited ownership of land and housing, 
single women, Dalits and indigenous communities were indicat-
ed as more likely to face difficulties in accessing and benefitin  
from housing reconstruction programmes.
In particular, female-headed households were found more 
likely to report feeling unprepared for the forthcoming monsoon 
season, and less likely to have begun repair or reconstruction 
of their shelters, although they were often financially better off 
as they received remittances. In Nepal, the world’s second 
biggest remittance economy, women and elderly are often left 
alone to look after the children, livestock or crops, while adult 
men migrate to India or the Middle East to work in construction. 
Additionally, subsistence-based households in rural areas 
were particularly affected, as the disaster happened only a few 
weeks prior to the start of the rice paddy fields planting season.
SHELTER RESPONSE
A. EMERGENCY AND RELIEF SHELTERING
The initial phase aimed to respond to the immediate shelter 
needs of the population with damaged or destroyed houses, 
located in the affected locations, in each of the following cat-
egories: Hard to Reach, Rural, and Peri-Urban/Urban. Emer-
gency sheltering was seen as a first step to progressively 
contribute to self-recovery and more durable solutions (appro-
priate to the needs and context) through the provision of key 
in-kind shelter items, NFIs and/or cash-transfer programmes. 
Information, Education and Communication material, training 
and follow-up technical assistance were integral components 
of this phase and were essential to ensure effective and safe 
use of shelter materials4.
An emphasis in this response was the use of cash pay-
ments. While relief agencies and private sector responders 
often initially focussed on in-kind distribution, the govern-
ment response involved an initial disbursement of un-
conditional cash. This was later taken-up more and more by 
relief agencies, especially as supplementary winterization as-
sistance. Cash was also used as a substitute for in-kind items 
when the political dispute between Nepal and India resulted 
in border closures and agencies were unable to obtain fuel 
for distributions, or to import relief items from India. Cash al-
lowed affected families to choose how best they could start 
the process of recovery, by buying items they needed most. 
While some families used these funds to pay medical bills or 
to write off debts, around 80% of the unconditional emergency 
cash grants made at the beginning of the response were used 
to purchase shelter-related items.
In the emergency phase, an estimated 700,000 families 
received emergency assistance, consisting of cash and/
or tarpaulins and non-food items – more than 90% of the 
households in need of assistance in the 14 priority districts.  
B. SELF-RECOVERY
The overarching objective of this phase was for agencies to 
identify response options that supported self-recovery, to 
reduce disruption and ensure smooth transition for affected 
populations to rebuild5. The process for selecting response 
options had to consider recipient choice and the unique set of 
contextual circumstances and conditions. The products and 
assistance provided for temporary shelter needed to support 
4 See case study A.5 as an example of the emergency relief phase of the response.
5 See case study A.6 as an example of projects that supported affected people’s 
self-recovery.
Many people were forced to relocate temporarily due to the destruction caused by the earthquakes. In some cases, entire villages had to build temporary structures 
near their destroyed or damaged homes.
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a smooth transition to safe permanent reconstruction. Ideally, 
assistance should be reusable, re-saleable and transferable, 
upgradable or extendable. Specific interventions included 
CGI-sheets and toolkits (or their cash equivalents) and train-
ing, such as masonry training and community training around 
key Build-Back-Safer messages. In the self-recovery phase, 
approximately 600,000 families received corrugated iron 
sheets or the cash equivalent – again, more than 90% of the 
households that had been reported as fully damaged.
C. WINTERIZATION
Analysis of the population density above 2,000m, combined 
with damage data, inducted that there was a “population of 
concern” of about 200,000 households living above the snow-
line in temporary shelter. Consequently, a winterization pack-
age – and cash equivalent – was developed, focusing on per-
sonal insulation and ensuring a “one warm room” approach, 
by providing an insulated floo , wind-proofing wall and water-
proofing roof6. Approximately 244,158 households living in 
temporary shelter above 1,500m received winterization 
assistance.
CHALLENGES TO THE RESPONSE 
Political unrest in southern Nepal broke out in Septem-
ber 2015, following the parliament’s decision to pass a new 
constitution (foreshadowing wide administrative changes and 
affecting Indian political influence in Kathmandu). This seri-
ously impeded the humanitarian effort. A resulting blockade 
starting in late September 2015 and lasting six months led to 
a critical shortage of fuel and relief supplies, with queues 
at gas stations reportedly up to 5km long. In addition, the Ne-
pal Parliament’s failure to ratify a bill introducing the National 
Reconstruction Authority meant that there was no overall 
agency charged with managing earthquake recovery pro-
grammes. Delays in key policy decisions – especially around 
housing subsidies – further hindered the response.
There were significant logistical challenges in reaching 
remote and mountainous areas, where access to markets is 
limited. In these areas, organizations supplied relief items in-
kind, like tarpaulins, roofing materials, blankets, clothes and 
kitchen utensils. However, many switched to emergency cash 
distributions during the fuel crisis.
In certain high altitude districts like Gorkha, the response was 
particularly strong. These districts obtained greater attention 
owing to levels of damage, the numbers of NGOs working 
6 For an example of winterization project, see case study A.7.
there, as well as extraneous reasons, such as the connec-
tions with the British Army Gorkha Regiment. However, lower 
altitude districts and those stuck by the second earthquake 
received less assistance. Concerns were raised that the une-
venness of the early humanitarian response set the course 
for quicker recovery in some districts than in others.
As in all humanitarian responses, statistics are not always 
solid and while they can paint broad trends, they may be 
misleading if taken literally. Relatively high overall statistical 
percentages of households who received assistance masked 
the fact that some districts received more assistance than 
others, while needs in some areas were actually higher 
than the numbers initially estimated. Agencies on the ground 
continued to report humanitarian needs and gaps, even in the 
districts that had received the highest amounts of aid.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
While the overall humanitarian response to the Nepal earth-
quakes of 2015 was an effective one, with very high cover-
age, there are a number of lessons to be drawn. 
Firstly, cash-based assistance became a preferred mo-
dality later in the response7 – especially after the border clo-
sures – and it became virtually impossible to import or trans-
port relief items in-kind. While cash was better than nothing, 
it still came with significant limitations for those living in 
remote rural areas, and there was little overall cash coordi-
nation or market analysis done by any of the clusters.
Secondly, Nepal has a vibrant private sector. A mapping 
exercise conducted by the Shelter Cluster showed that – from 
a handful of organizations surveyed – the private sector had 
distributed an additional 20% of shelter-related assistance 
than that already tracked from more traditional humanitarian 
agencies. There is a clear need for the humanitarian sector 
to engage more closely with the private sector in Nepal. 
Thirdly, pre-existing coordination structures and rela-
tionships, developed during the preparedness phase, were 
crucial in ensuring good links between humanitarian 
agencies and the government, and it will be important to 
further invest in these connections for the future.
The case studies that follow focus on the coordination struc-
ture adopted in this response (A.4) and by showing some 
of the response modalities adopted by humanitarian organi-
zations in the emergency and transitional phases (A.5 to A.7).
7 See diagram on page viii, in the introduction.
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People salvaged personal belongings from destroyed houses. Houses were repaired also using the materials provided by humanitarian 
organizations, such as CGI sheets and timber.
www.shelterprojects.org
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CRISIS
Nepal Earthquakes, 
25 April 2015 and 12 May 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
604,930 fully damaged
288,856 partially damaged 
(National Disaster Report 2015).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
886,456 affected families 
649,815 displaced Families 
PROJECT LOCATIONS
14 most affected districts: 
Bhaktapur, Dolakha, Dhading, Gorkha, 
Kabhrepalanchok, Kathmandu, Lalitpur, 
Nuwakot, Rasuwa, Makawanpur, Sindhuli, 
Sindhupalchok, Okhaldhunga, Ramechhap.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The Nepal Shelter Cluster Coordination Team organized a system of district-level coordination focal points from operation-
al, cluster partner agencies. These focal points were able to liaise with local authorities, private sector, and implementing 
partners on issues unique to that geographic area, while communicating and influencing strategic information deriving from 
policies developed at the national level. 
STRENGTHS
+ Rapid deployment of coordination team (48hr).
+ Meaningful participation of local civil society and crisis-affected people.
+ Localized coordination, close to implementing actors and respon-
sive to local needs.
+ Major impact on the response.
WEAKNESSES
- Patchy subnational coordination and uneven distribution of re-
sponse agencies across districts.
- Subnational coordination could have been established quicker.
- Coordination gaps and high turnover of both cluster and govern-
ment staff.
- Lack of familiarity about cluster roles and responsibilities amongst 
some coordinators.
- Challenges in finding partnerships for local organizations to access 
resources and funding (especially in urban areas).
- Delay in the response in some districts, due to the government-led 
blanket approach.
- Proliferation of Technical Working Groups, which were sometimes 
slow to produce outputs and lasted longer than necessary.
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Mid-May 2015: Cluster coordination set up at national level.
Late Jun 2015: Subnational coordination set up and operating, with 14 
district focal points in place.
1
2
PROJECT OUTPUTS Coordination provided at national and subnational level (14 districts).
ROLL-OUT OF COORDINATION STRUCTURE
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The earthquakes caused massive destruction of public buildings and housing.
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which were coordinated via four hubs.
Given the timing of the earthquakes shortly before the start 
of the monsoon season, the Cluster advocated for the pri-
oritization of response in hard-to-reach areas, which would 
likely be cut off due to roads and trails conditions, as well as 
the increased risk of landslides.
COORDINATION STRUCTURE  
The aim of the Nepal Shelter Cluster was to decentralize the 
coordination role to the local level, to ensure that coordina-
tion services were more responsive to local needs and local 
emergency / recovery challenges could be quickly identified
and raised at national level. A combination of national NGOs 
and international agencies took on district coordination roles, 
with one agency leading each district. These agencies were, 
in turn, supported by four full-time Hub Coordinators, from a 
range of international partners with experience in coordinat-
ing natural disasters, who oversaw three districts each. This 
ensured that there was consistent coordination support – fo-
cusing on technical standards, needs and gaps, and response 
prioritization – that immediately addressed local needs. The 
decentralized coordination system also ensured closer rela-
tionships with the implementing arms of the local government, 
which had a significant role in the response
District level coordination was also extremely important, owing 
to multiple layers of government agencies involved in manag-
ing the response (the Department of Urban Development and 
Building Construction, Ministry of Urban Development and the 
Ministry of Home Affairs were highly influential)
The localization of coordination developed out of emerging 
practice and lessons learned from past responses (especial-
ly the Haiti earthquake, Pakistan floods, South Sudan con-
flict, and the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan response1). In part, 
the roles of District and Hub Coordinators also arose from the 
needs to provide effective coordination across a very wide 
and geographically challenging area in the Himalayas. 
1 See A.4 in SP2010, A.22 in SP2010, A.23 in this edition and A.23 in SP2013-
2014 respectively.
THE ROLE OF THE SHELTER CLUSTER IN NEPAL
See overview A.3 for more on the situation pre and post 
the 2015 earthquakes, and the shelter response.
The Shelter Cluster is a global coordination platform endorsed 
by the UN General Assembly that works with governments to 
manage shelter and housing response following disasters. It 
had existed before in Nepal, having been convened following 
the 2008 Koshi Floods in the South of Nepal. Key relation-
ships with the government as well as preparedness activities 
for managing humanitarian response at the national level had 
been developed since then.
In response to a request for international assistance by the 
Government of Nepal, the Shelter Cluster was convened in 
the immediate aftermath of the first earthquake, in April 2015. 
Its three core roles were: 1) identification of appropriate tech-
nical guidance for emergency and early recovery response 
in the shelter/housing sector; 2) identification of humanitarian 
needs, gaps and priority communities or areas for assistance; 
3) strategy development to guide and inform an effective re-
sponse. Over 300 organizations worked together to support 
the timely and effective delivery of humanitarian shelter assis-
tance, including NGOs, INGOs, Civil Society Organizations, 
UN Agencies, Government Departments, Private Sector, Do-
nors and Diplomatic Missions.
In the context of a political transition, which preoccupied 
national government decision-making, the challenging ge-
ographical conditions across the Himalayas and the grow-
ing importance of engaging local actors, the Shelter Cluster 
adopted an extensive subnational coordination system, at the 
district level. This case study focuses on what this meant in 
practice and some of the successes and challenges of localiz-
ing coordination in a major natural disaster.
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY
Following the two earthquakes, the government identified
14 priority districts for response, where 80% of the national 
damage occurred. For this reason, Cluster partners were en-
couraged to target shelter efforts within these priority districts, 
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In many cases, due to remote locations (hard to reach and at high altitudes), winterization kits were dispatched by air. However, helicopters were expensive and 
had limited carrying capacities, adding to the challenges faced by organizations in timely assisting affected populations.
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A criticism of past responses has been that coordination can 
be excessively focused at the national level, where politics, re-
lationships and concerns can be a long way from specific local 
needs2. In line with a key change in development and human-
itarian thinking, the Cluster sought to reinforce and promote 
the role of local actors and civil society organizations 
(CSOs) in the management of the shelter response, by allocat-
ing key districts coordination roles to them. NGOs and CSOs 
were formal members, or actively involved in, the Cluster’s de-
cision-making structure at district, hub and national level.
At the national level, the government requested a split between 
the Coordination Support Group (CSG) and the Strategic Advi-
sory Group (SAG). The former had previously met and included 
representatives from government, donors, UN agencies, NGOs 
and INGOs. This was intended to be a representative sample of 
the Shelter Cluster, to provide strategic direction and oversight 
of the response. In practice, government partners preferred the 
SAG to consist of the senior Nepali-speaking representatives 
from key agencies, with whom they had a longer-term relation-
ship. The decision to have a separate CSG more focused 
on operations occurred six weeks into the response, after mul-
tiple earlier meetings of the bigger group, and was intended 
to make discussions and decision-making more streamlined. 
Meetings of the CSG were conducted in English (although con-
tinued to involve NGOs and CSOs) and recommendations 
were passed up to the SAG for endorsement.
2 For challenges of this kind, see overview A.39, about the Ecuador 2016 earth-
quake response.
INVOLVEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE  
Response coordinators were closer to crisis-affected popu-
lations and each district took on the complexion of the local 
response community. As most organizations in some dis-
tricts were local, or “local international”, meetings were held 
in Nepali, encouraging the ownership and participation of lo-
cal actors. Additionally, in predominantly urban districts in the 
Kathmandu Valley, IDP representative groups and CSOs were 
key players in district-level clusters. Urban IDP representative 
groups also participated in the Cluster’s coordination work as 
formal district coordinators and through membership in the 
SAG. Crisis-affected people consequently played a direct co-
ordination role at both the local and national levels. 
MAJOR COORDINATION ASPECTS   
The Cluster at both national and district level focused mainly 
on the following3: 
• Development of standard, cluster-wide, packages for 
emergency response and recovery (both in-kind and their 
cash equivalents); 
• Advocacy around winter preparedness, including map-
ping and identification of priority intervention areas, an  
a winterization package; 
• Analysis of gender and protection issues relating to shelter 
in Nepal, including the development of beneficiary selec-
tion criteria, to target the most vulnerable individuals and 
households. While this was officially endorsed at nation-
al level, local governments at district level often preferred 
blanket approaches to distribution. A major role of hub and 
district coordinators was to reach an agreement with local 
governments around the implementation of the response 
strategy, without compromising humanitarian values;
• Fundraising and advocacy through the UN Appeals process, 
as well as directly with donors and diplomatic missions; 
• Inter-sectoral coordination supporting links between shel-
ter, WASH, livelihoods, protection, as well as the cash 
working group. Logistics was an immensely important 
component, as a political crisis between Nepal and India 
resulted in border closures and ongoing fuel shortages. 
Finding the best use of common logistics assets became 
increasingly important as the response progressed. 
• Establishment, support and funding of the Housing Re-
covery and Reconstruction Platform (HRRP), to take on 
the longer-term recovery coordination role.
EXIT AND HANDOVER 
Discussions started early on about the appropriate duration of 
the Shelter Cluster in Nepal. By June 2015, it was agreed by 
cluster partners, government, SAG and CSG that a separate 
body would be established to take on coordination and techni-
cal guidance needs, focusing on longer-term recovery. In order 
to support this process, a Recovery Working Group was es-
tablished (under the Cluster), co-led by the two agencies that 
would take on the role of longer-term recovery coordination, 
once the Cluster phased out. The Shelter Cluster was replaced 
by the HRRP and resources were made available to the two co-
lead agencies. The Cluster itself wound down on 31 December 
2015, after nine months leading the response, and continued 
in a much reduced form, focusing on preparedness activities.
3 More information and several documents are available on the Nepal 2015 
Earthquake page of the Shelter Cluster website: http://bit.ly/1GuSykV
National Coordination Architecture, showing the membership of decision-
making groups.
The Shelter Cluster in Nepal had four hubs to coordinate the activities in the 
14 affected districts.
Dhading Rasuwa Kavre
SHELTER CLUSTER HUB COORDINATION STRUCTURE
Western Hub
Gorkha
Makwanpur Nuwakot
Central Hub
Kathmandu / 
Lalitpur / 
Bhaktapur
Eastern Hub (2)
Ramechhap / 
Okhaldhunga
Sindhuli
Eastern Hub (1)
Sindhupalchowk
Dolakha
SHELTER CLUSTER PARTNERS
Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)
Coordination Support Group (CSG)
Technical Working Groups
Established as needed, with TORs, 
time-bound, clear outputs Led by an IO with SC support
Established as needed, with TORs, 
time-bound, clear outputs
Government Agencies and International Organizations
International Organizations,  International and national NGOs
Recovery and Reconstruction 
Working Group
R&R Technical Working Groups
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STRENGTHS OF THIS APPROACH
The Nepal Cluster provided a model for the localization of 
coordination and set a precedent for participatory and 
collaborative leadership among cluster members. When it 
worked well, district and hub-level coordinators supported 
each other and provided an immediate forum to address 
needs and gaps, support local government, and provide tech-
nical advice to agencies and beneficiary groups in the field.
Additionally, more than 20 different organizations took on a 
formal coordination roles at the local level, meaning that the 
strength of the cluster was reinforced through participa-
tion and ownership at all levels. Strong local coordination 
services also meant that the national level cluster was in a 
more powerful position to address needs and advocate at a 
policy-level through constant information flow and feed-
back. While the national level was more responsive to the 
politics of managing a humanitarian response, coordination 
at hub and district levels was able to address specific
needs of implementing partners and work closely with local 
government and local civil society groups.
This experience reinforced the importance of coordination, 
especially for large emergencies. While many agencies based 
themselves out of higher-profile districts, others were respon-
sive to Cluster calls to spread the response more evenly 
and donors underpinned the Cluster strategy. This sought to 
target areas that were under-served and adopted a “winter 
race” approach of targeting higher altitudes and remote lo-
cations that would be vulnerable and inaccessible during the 
coming winter. Additionally, the Cluster developed common 
technical standards to ensure measurable impact and con-
sistent implementation across the many agencies delivering 
humanitarian assistance.
The Cluster was able to ensure key partners – the govern-
ment, the Humanitarian Coordinator and major donors – were 
provided with a reliable overview of the situation and chal-
lenges and were able to provide resources, influence, policy 
direction and high-level advocacy, based on this information.
CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED
The main challenges were around consistency and availability 
of coordination staff at the local level. While there were many 
devoted and talented coordinators, during the overall lifespan of 
the cluster there were gaps when positions went unfilled, espe-
cially in the first months. Further, district focal points were work-
ing mainly on their own organizations programmes, meaning that 
the coordination role sometimes took a distant second 
place in work priorities. Finally, many coordinators who vol-
unteered were new to the cluster and so greater support 
and familiarization was required from the national cluster.
Initially, coordination was most effective where there were 
also inter-sectoral platforms, with offices to support such coor-
dination efforts. However, these were only established in two 
locations and ended by late September 2015.
Ensuring an evenly spread coordination structure did not nec-
essarily ensure an evenly spread response. Relief agencies 
flocked to high-damage, high-profile districts (especially Gorkha 
and Sindhupalchowk, which had been badly hit during the April 
earthquake). For much of the response, the media continued 
to refer to the event as the “Gorkha earthquake”. Once settled, 
relatively few agencies moved operations, despite ongoing ad-
vocacy from the cluster that these two districts had been well-
served, while significant gaps remained elsewhere. Almost 
no agencies worked in the highly urbanised Kathmandu 
Valley, despite the finding of the Post Disaster Needs Assess-
ment that 25% of damage was in urban areas. Finally, while an 
international emergency was declared for 14 districts, 23 
districts were affected in total.
The Cluster addressed some of the challenges by holding fre-
quent “retreats” where all members of the coordination team 
were brought together to share experiences, challenges, re-
sources and to train local coordinators. The appointment of 
full-time, devoted, hub coordinators (each with 3 or 4 districts 
to support) meant that there was additional support for over-
worked district coordinators and guidance for those who were 
new. Donors were encouraged to fund agencies for coordina-
tion roles, and embraced the idea in key districts.
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
•  Reinforced the importance and effectiveness of inclusive, collaborative cluster leadership in which agencies have 
clear opportunities to engage meaningfully in decision-making. The cluster functions through the legitimacy and 
influence of establishing consensus, so when agencies were able to participate and take on significant coordina-
tion roles, this became easier. Participation also helped with the identification and adherence to appropriate technical 
packages of assistance, the development of a common strategy, government endorsement, and donor support.
•  The need to provide support and training on the job for agencies and individuals new to the role.
•  Engagement of donors is crucial at both the strategic level, as well as in developing cluster coordination structures. 
Donor involvement in decision-making meant support for localization and additional resources to make this happen. 
•  Importance of increased engagement with local government. Local coordination ensured a more effective response.
•  A major innovation and opportunity was the participation of crisis-affected people and local civil society organi-
zations in the coordination role itself. This was primarily an urban phenomenon (Kathmandu Valley). As the response 
focused on supporting rural recovery, there were insufficient resources to build on urban participation beyond the 
immediate emergency period. Providing a greater platform for participation in this case did not necessarily result in 
greater access to resources. Mutually beneficial partnerships with better-resourced organizations should be a 
priority for local civil society in future responses.
•  At the subnational level, the full cluster set-up was difficult, but partner agencies filled the gap wherever possible and, in 
some districts, coordinators rotated. As a preparedness effort, it is useful to identify agencies operating in major dis-
tricts with a longer-term presence as cluster focal points. This can be advocated through the government lead agency.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, Transitional shelter, NFI distribution, Training, Gender mainstreaming, GBV 
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CRISIS
Nepal Earthquakes, 
25 April 2015 and 12 May 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
604,930 fully damaged
288,856 partially damaged 
(National Disaster Report 2015).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
886,456 affected families 
649,815 displaced Families. 
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Sindhupalchok, Dhading, 
Gorkha, Lamjung districts.
BENEFICIARIES 20,000 households (100,000 people).
PROJECT OUTPUTS Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods support to 20,000 households.
SHELTER SIZE Min. 20m2 of covered area by using the two bundles of 9’ CGI sheets as roofing.
SHELTER DENSITY Min 3.5m2.
MATERIALS COST USD 150 per household (including labour, in line with Shelter Cluster recommendations).
PROJECT COST USD 200
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project provided emergency shelter supplies to help earthquake-affected households establish temporary shelters, 
and/or make urgent repairs to their house, with high-quality and durable materials, before the beginning of the monsoon 
season. The coordination of shelter and WASH relief distributions, and the integration of a gender sensitive approach 
to the emergency response, enabled a comprehensive and context sensitive delivery of essential household NFIs, inte-
grated to address challenges for women and girls.
STRENGTHS
+ Rapid Gender Analysis, carried out at the onset of the emergency.
+ Local partners effectively mobilized the community and sensitized 
on GBV mitigation.
+ The shelter package provided choice to the beneficiaries
+ Linkage between shelter, WASH and gender.
+ Priority lines and transport support at distribution points.
+ Complaints mechanism and community-based approach.
WEAKNESSES
- Delays in the logistics pipelines meant that some areas were 
reached too late.
- Staffing shortages, due to poor monitoring process combined with 
extreme weather conditions.
- Low shelter- and disaster-response capacity of local partners.
- Poor coordination with local authorities led to exclusion of vulnerable 
people who were not recognized as households.
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Sindhupalchok
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Nuwakot
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Nepal Earthquake
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4 May 2015
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Analysis uses data from:
Multi-National Military and Coordination Centre 
   (to 4 May)
Ministry of Home Affairs (to 3 May)
National Population Census (2011)
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PROJECT AREAS
PLANNING  
PHASE 1: SHELTER KITS PHASE 2: NFIs
PDM TRANSITION TO RECOVERY
1 2 3 4 5
25 APR
2015
12 MAY
2015
8 May 2015: Rapid Gender Analysis report issued.
16 May - 3 Jun 2015: Inter-agency shelter and settlements vulnerability 
assessment.
22 May - 10 Jun 2015: Post Disaster Needs Assessment led by the 
National Planning Commission.
Aug 2015: Emergency shelter kit distributions completed.
Nov 2015: NFI distributions and Post Distribution Monitoring completed.
1
2
3
4
5
T
IM
E
L
IN
E
SINDHUPALCHOK
GORKHA
LAMJUNG
DHADING
KATMANDU
NATURAL DISASTER
20 SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
A.5 / NEPAL 2015 / EARTHQUAKEASIA - PACIFIC
The rapid gender analysis, conducted at the outset of the emergency, highlighted gender-related norms and inequalities that were considered during project design. 
MAIN PROJECT COMPONENTS
• Capacity-building, through training local partner staff on 
shelter, emergency distributions, gender and gender-based 
violence (GBV) awareness and referral;
• Shelter and household NFI distributions, based on a 
government-led blanket approach for the first distribution, 
but prioritizing the most vulnerable groups and then pro-
viding them additional support in the second phase of 
distributions (households with a completely destroyed 
house, female-headed and elderly-headed households, 
people living with disabilities, socially and economically 
poor families);
• Key messaging and community awareness raising to 
promote more resilient shelter, GBV risk mitigation and 
prevention, and protection (including Housing, Land and 
Property rights).
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER
See overview A.3 for more background information.
RAPID GENDER ANALYSIS
A Rapid Gender Analysis was carried out, in the aftermath 
of the earthquake, to provide an overview of the gender 
relations in Nepal before the event and how the crisis had 
affected those dynamics. The background secondary infor-
mation was integrated with primary data, which was gath-
ered by the field assessment team through key informant 
interviews and separate focus group discussions. These 
were led by male and female staff, and helped develop in-
itial recommendations for gender-sensitive responses for 
all sectors. The team conducted the assessment in com-
munities that were residing in some of the areas where the 
local partner was established prior to the earthquake, in or-
der to better compare pre- and post-disaster information on 
gender roles and cultural norms. The feedback received 
by the different community groups led to significant im-
provements in terms of safety and appropriateness of 
project designs, as well as including protection and gen-
der mainstreaming for the implementation of distribution 
activities and post distribution monitoring.
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Many constructions affected by the earthquake were masonry buildings. The 
project provided materials to make urgent repairs to damaged homes, or build 
temporary shelters.
Gender considerations: 
Due to the extensive labour migration, there was a high percent-
age of female-headed households in the affected region (25.7%). 
Additionally, the practice of isolating menstruating or post-par-
tum women for 5-6 days per month is still common in the far- 
and mid-Western regions of Nepal. This was an additional 
psychological stress for women and girls, having to also face 
the impact of the earthquake and the lack of adequate hy-
giene and sanitary items.  
Almost half of the population gets married between the ages of 
14-19 and girls leave home to live with in-laws after marriage. 
In some areas, marriage occurs as early as age 10. Consid-
ering the practice of early marriage, shelter programmes had 
to be aware of the number of child-headed households in the 
affected communities.
Widows often face exclusion and persecution, as they are 
blamed for their husband’s deaths, ostracized and seen as 
a burden on their family – particularly in rural areas. With the 
high death toll caused by the earthquake, their vulnerability 
had increased.
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TARGET AREAS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
The project targeted four of the most affected districts prioritized 
by the government. The organization signed agreements with 
the government to be able to respond to the emergency, and 
with the District Disaster Response Committee upon agree-
ment of target groups and locations. Through meeting with the 
appointed disaster coordination officials, the shelter and local 
partner staff collaborated with the local authorities to obtain the 
existing beneficiaries lists and prioritize the most affected areas 
and, among those, the most vulnerable groups and individuals. 
These lists were then verified through community mobilizers
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
The project was implemented by shelter technical teams and 
the local partner’s technical team and social mobilizers, sup-
ported by one logistics office , one distribution officer and a 
GBV and protection office .  
In order to ensure safety and security, accessibility and ap-
propriateness of distribution activities, the field teams coordi-
nated with district authorities, village leaders and community 
volunteers, to establish the following at each distribution point:
• Access for vehicles, for transportation of goods (close 
to large roads, but not on the road, so as not to interfere 
with traffic or pedestrians);
• Site enclosure, with different designated areas, so as 
to facilitate crowd control and create space for arriving 
beneficiaries  
• Access to basic facilities (water and sanitation facilities, 
covered area, first aid, etc.);
• Proximity to the village to reduce the travel time for the 
beneficiaries;
• Distance from unsafe locations for women and girls 
(e.g. hidden and narrow forest paths).
Female staff members in particular mentioned that fe-
male-headed households would have little time left after 
their domestic chores and child care to reach the distribu-
tion points, and other groups would not be able to wait for 
a long time in line. A priority line was therefore set up for 
the elderly, pregnant and lactating women and people with 
disabilities, to reduce waiting times and avoid any potential 
tensions or violence while waiting.
People with limited mobility or capacity to carry weights 
were provided with extra support to carry the items 
home from the distribution point. This was done either by 
providing wheel barrows to be shared among groups of 
households, by employing paid porters, or through help 
from village volunteers.
Distribution sites were set up in such a way to maximize 
crowd control, for example by organizing distributions at 
different time intervals, to avoid long waiting times; or by 
controlling the flow of people through different steps of the 
process.
 
 
 
Pictorial diagram showing the distribution process.
Team leader
Legend:
1. Awareness sessions;
2. Queuing (priority lines for most 
vulnerable individuals);
3. Entry point to the distribution area;
4. Verification desk
5. Help desk;
6. First station of the distribution;
7-8. Second and third stations;
9. Exit point;
10. Transportation services, includ-
ing support for those in need;
11. Complaints mechanism.
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COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT  
Affected people were engaged throughout the programme. 
The information gathered from rapid needs assessments and 
the “gender in brief” report1 enabled the inclusion of the most 
culturally appropriate items in the relief kits (NFIs and dignity 
kits in particular). The community leaders were consulted to 
verify the lists of beneficiaries received for each village from the 
government authorities, and any cases of beneficiaries being 
left out were identified and addressed (e.g. split households, 
extended households, numerous families, etc.). This included 
a number of single women or female-headed households, 
who were not recognized as separate from the former hus-
band’s family and were therefore cut out from the assistance.
Pre-distribution sessions were held, to register beneficiarie  
and provide orientation on the materials to be distributed and 
their appropriate use, as well as to assess security and acces-
sibility issues for the distribution site and its surroundings. Due 
to the large-scale landslides occurring as a consequence of 
the heavy monsoon rains, major transport routes were affect-
ed, making it often impossible to reach the affected villages. 
In those cases, the beneficiary households were consulted in 
focus group discussions, directly through the volunteers work-
ing with the local partner organization and living in the villages. 
The results were then relayed back to the sub-office
Complaints mechanisms were put in place, including a hot-
line, complaints boxes, and an assistance desk, during and af-
ter distributions, to allow benefi iaries to voice their concerns 
individually and confidentiall . Post-distribution monitoring 
was also carried out, through door-to-door surveys and gen-
der-segregated group discussions.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
The geography of the affected areas and the imminent 
rainy season posed a complex challenge to the project. Due 
to the remoteness of most of the affected areas and the un-
predictability of weather conditions, the emergency team fo-
cused on identifying the most suitable locations and times 
for the distributions, according to beneficiaries  availability, in 
relation to livelihood practices and especially for women and 
girls; assessing transportation needs and accessibility routes; 
and whether it was relevant to set up a forward warehouse (in 
the higher areas) or storage in the affected villages.
National and local agreements on the contents and target-
ing of shelter emergency distributions also caused problems. 
For example, lower-quality CGI sheets were easier for people 
to transport, as they could be rolled, although it meant that they 
would not meet the standards set by the Shelter Cluster at na-
tional level. Transport challenges were especially relevant to 
women and girls, who were often sent to the distribution points 
1 Available at http://bit.ly/2iftT0c.
to collect the relief items, which were heavy and cumbersome. 
The size of separate distribution packages were thus organized 
to be easier to transport, and female staff (trained in gender in 
emergencies) were present at all distributions.
The Nepali communities and local authorities were con-
cerned that all distributions should be blanket coverage 
– in contradiction to the approach of many INGOs to support 
the most vulnerable. Humanitarian agencies agreed that first
distributions would follow an equitable approach, while sec-
ondary distributions would focus on alleviating the risks for the 
most vulnerable, through a more targeted and equality-driven 
approach. Despite this blanket approach however, existing 
social norms concerning women, caste, and age based 
inequalities still made certain groups invisible or exclud-
ed from the recovery and reconstruction activities. There was 
evidence that single women (unmarried, separated or wid-
owed) were not recognized by the village committees as el-
igible to receive the Earthquake Victim Card, and therefore 
were excluded from relief cash grants and items distributions. 
This created tensions between extended households and, to 
some extent, exposed women to GBV from male members 
of the extended family. The organization mediated with the 
district authorities for the integration of the women who had 
been overlooked, so that they could receive the relief items. 
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
The organization developed a construction training compo-
nent and awareness raising sessions for both women and 
men, in an effort to promote gender equality and women’s em-
powerment. This was integrated into the longer-term recovery 
strategy, so as to enable the largest number of female-headed 
households to be involved in building and construction super-
vision activities, during the owner-driven reconstruction pro-
cess initiated by the government.
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After the rapid gender analysis, the project consulted the communities, engaged 
women in construction activities, and aimed to meet specific gender needs in 
both distributions and construction (here, on a building site in Barpak).
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STRENGTHS
+ The Rapid Gender Analysis – carried out at the onset 
of the emergency – helped understanding gender relations 
and traditional practices that make women and girls subjects 
of discrimination. This was used to take account of gender 
sensitive considerations and include a GBV mitigation 
strategy in relief distributions.
+ The local NGO partners effectively mobilized information 
volunteers in each village, for better community mobiliza-
tion and GBV mitigation, prevention and sensitization, as 
well as providing support in implementation and monitoring 
of relief distributions in remote locations. Gender and GBV 
trainings were delivered to the organization’s technical staff, 
the local partner staff and the community volunteers.
+ The standard shelter package provided a choice for 
households to rebuild according to their needs and capacities, 
and did not impose a single shelter design or option. Most 
of the households combined salvaged and new materials to 
build larger or multiple shelters.
+ WASH and shelter distributions were coordinated, ena-
bling more efficient monitoring and community mobilization 
activities for the local partner. The linkage between shelter, 
WASH and gender interventions enabled the distribution 
of combined emergency kits, comprising both shelter-relat-
ed NFIs and hygiene/dignity kits, including items particularly 
needed by women and girls.
+ The most vulnerable groups had a priority line and a 
“safe passage” at distributions, and those with limited mobili-
ty, or feeling more vulnerable for carrying valuable items, were 
assisted to do so.
+ The complaints mechanisms (suggestion boxes and a 
complaints mobile number to receive calls and texts) and the 
community-based approach helped address inequalities in 
the assistance, by allowing beneficiaries to individually voice 
concerns and provide feedback directly to field teams
WEAKNESSES
- The switch from tarpaulin to CGI distributions caused delays 
in the logistics pipelines, due to limited local supplies and 
increased taxes on importation. As a result, some areas were 
reached too late to meet the immediate shelter needs. This 
led to a large number of households to build their emergency 
shelter with salvaged materials, and then use the additional 
shelter materials for secondary purposes (e.g. cattle sheds, 
food/grain storages).  
- The construction monitoring process was not as robust 
as it could have been, due to the remoteness of the assisted 
areas, contributing to shelter staffing shortage at any given 
time, as staff was so dispersed. Due to the monsoon season 
and subsequent landslides and road blockages, technical 
staff were unable to visit project areas as often as planned, 
to assess whether shelter materials were used properly.
- The local partners had a very good knowledge of the com-
munities, the culture and the needs of the population, but most 
of them had low capacity in terms of shelter programming 
and little or no experience of major disaster responses. Shelter 
training and capacity-building at the beginning of the project 
would have been beneficial
- Poor coordination with village leaders and district au-
thorities to identify gaps and duplication in the provision of 
assistance. Despite best efforts, some vulnerable people 
were excluded from distributions.
www.shelterprojects.org
Materials in the Shelter kit Qty Cost (USD)
Corrugated Galvanized Iron (CGI) sheets, 
bundle of 9 sheets 2 118
Shelter toolkit
1 x Handsaw, for timber, 550mm, wooden handle
0.5kg roofing nails, galvanized with rubber washer, 
umbrella type
1 x Shovel, round point with Y handle
1 x Hoe, with long handle, large type
1 x Machete, wooden handle
1 x Shears, straight, for metal sheet, semi-hard, 250mm
1 24
Shelter fixing kit
1 pair of gloves, 1x 25m aluminium wire
0,5 kg timber nails, 75mm 
0,5 kg timber nails, 40mm 
1x Tie Wire, galvanized, diam. 1.5mm, 25m, roll
1 x Rope, polypropylene, black, 12mm diam., twisted, 
bundle 30m
1 8
Materials in the NFI kit
Kitchen set 1 38
Mattress (synthetic chatai) size 4x6 feet 2 4
Woollen Blanket, woven, 65% wool, 1.5x2.25m, 2kg 5 8
LEARNINGS 
• The Rapid Gender Analysis could have been more regularly updated and supplemented with information from field
assessments, focus group discussions and key informant interviews, to better capture the rapidly changing context.
• A stronger collaboration with the local authorities on beneficiary cross check and prioritization of vulnerable 
groups would have ensured a more efficient registration and distribution process for the most vulnerable cases, in par-
ticular to avoid minority groups (certain castes, single women and the elderly) being side lined. This was taken 
into account and addressed during the following recovery and reconstruction process.
•  Information on the specific shelter needs and preferences of women and girls, in terms of safety and privacy, should 
have been incorporated into the recommendations of the rapid gender analysis. This would have better informed the 
emergency shelter distributions and key messaging, including tips on safe space arrangements (e.g. partitioning, light-
ing) for acceptable privacy, safety and security of all household members.
• Community consultations during needs assessment are key to receive primary information on the specific
needs of the affected households, and make sure that all groups (including marginalized individuals, women and girls) 
have the possibility to raise their concerns and preferences over the design of shelters.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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WEAKNESSES
- The earthquake directly affected the organizations’ local staff.
- Lack of clearly defined internal procurement procedures
- Medium-term disaster response staff shortages.
- The assistance provided focused too heavily on a set design.
TSK PHASE 1
1 3
25 APR
2015
12 MAY
2015
2 May 2015: Rapid assessment completed.
26 - 31 May 2015: First distribution of Transitional Shelter Kits for 228 
families in Kavrepalanchok district.
1
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1 - 8 Jun 2015: Transitional Shelter Kit distribution in Kavrepalanchok 
district completed (606 families).
15 - 30 Jun 2015: Distribution of Transitional Shelter Kits to 617 
families in Sindhupalchowk district
3
4
31 Jul 2015: Procurement of 3,000 additional kits completed.
31 Aug 2015: Distribution of Transitional Shelter Kits to 2,207 families 
in Lalitpur and Dhading districts completed.
5
6
1-15 Sep 2015: Distribution of Transitional Shelter Kits to 1,407 families 
in Gorkha, Sindhupalchowk, and Nuwakot districts completed.
30 Sep 2015: Transitional Shelter Kit intervention completed and final
monitoring and reporting started.
7
8
STRENGTHS
+ High community participation.
+ Rapid project implementation and at scale.
+ The coordination with local government and like-minded organiza-
tions leveraged resources.
+ Production and distribution of instruction manuals on various 
options for temporary shelters.
CRISIS
Nepal Earthquakes, 
25 April 2015 and 12 May 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
604,930 fully damaged
288,856 partially damaged 
(National Disaster Report 2015).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
886,456 affected families 
649,815 displaced families 
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Sindhupalchok, Gorkha, 
Dhading, Lalitpur, Nuwakot, 
Kabhrepalanchok districts.
BENEFICIARIES 5,065 households, including 350 people with disabilities, 1,000 single female-headed 
households and 100 single elderly individuals.
PROJECT OUTPUTS 5,065 Transitional Shelter Kits distributed.
SHELTER SIZE 16.7m2 (according to sample design).
SHELTER DENSITY 3.4m2 per person (based on average household size of 4.88, from 2011 census).
MATERIALS COST Approx. USD 200 per household (NPR 21,484), including labour, and transport.
PROJECT COST USD 250 per household (estimated).
OUTCOME INDICATOR 93% of households used the kits to build temporary shelters within the first month of distribution.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project targeted more than 5,000 families – whose houses had been damaged or destroyed – with the distribution 
of transitional shelter kits to make basic repairs, or build a temporary shelter. Training was provided to demonstrate the 
design of a suitable shelter that could be constructed with the supplied materials. In so doing, the project aimed at facil-
itating the early start of people’s self-recovery.
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Volunteers from local communities were actively involved 
in beneficiary registration, distribution and transportation of the 
materials at the household level, assisting families who could 
not transport the materials. The project was implemented 
with local partners, enabling a higher number of vulnerable 
families to be served, in a shorter period. 
EXISTING PARTNERSHIPS AND COMMUNITY 
PARTICIPATION  
The relationships developed in almost two decades operat-
ing in the country were a fundamental strength in mobilizing 
resources after the disaster. For example, pre-established 
women’s groups supported distributions, whilst engineering 
students (engaged before the disaster) became key inform-
ants to develop culturally appropriate shelter solutions.
Community participation was encouraged throughout the 
project cycle, with beneficiar es being active in identification,
selection and verification processes, communication channels 
related to distribution information, crowd management during 
distributions, trainings on shelter set-up, transport of the kits 
from distribution sites, as well as post-distribution monitoring 
and feedback. More than 1,000 community volunteers were 
mobilized, significantly supporting an increase in social ties 
and motivation for self-recovery.
POST-DISTRIBUTION MONITORING   
An independent team (seven trained M&E staff and volun-
teers) was deployed to conduct Post-Distribution Monitor-
ing (PDM), to determine how the distributed shelter materials 
were used, their relevance and effectiveness. Within weeks of 
the first distributions, the PDM team carried out field visits to 
eight different distribution areas and interviewed more than 329 
households using a mobile app. 
The results showed that 93% of households used the mate-
rials for constructing temporary shelters, within the firs  
month of the distribution. Among them, 63% followed their 
own design, normally including the use of salvaged materi-
als, whilst 30% used the design suggested by the organization. 
For non-displaced populations, transitional shelters provided a 
basic starter home, to be upgraded, expanded to permanent 
shelters or replaced, over time and as resources allowed. Final-
ly, only 7% did not construct any shelters within a few weeks, 
as they had other key priorities, including food, livelihoods and 
agriculture, as the project started during the harvesting season 
(June-July). In addition, some female-headed households were 
waiting for additional help from their relatives and local volun-
teers, in order to construct the shelter.
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER
See overview A.3 for more information on the background 
and the national shelter response.
After the earthquake, many families were sleeping in open 
areas without adequate cover, suffering cold night-time con-
ditions and rain. The monsoon season (mid-June to early 
September) further exacerbated the existing shelter situation 
for thousands of families whose homes were damaged or de-
stroyed. The monsoon arrived a few weeks after the second 
earthquake and people had to rely on emergency shelters, 
built with salvaged materials, plastics and tarpaulins, to with-
stand the heavy rains. Apart from shelter, people also needed 
a place to store their materials, crops, agricultural products 
and cattle. The need for early recovery solutions – that could 
protect families and assets – was high.
ASSESSMENTS AND PRE-DISTRIBUTION PLANNING
The organization deployed its experienced disaster response 
personnel to Nepal within 48 hours of the disaster, to support 
the Nepal office in resuming office functions, as well as initi-
ating disaster response activities. Rapid assessments were 
conducted in collaboration with the Shelter Cluster and gov-
ernmental agencies (at national and local levels), to determine 
the appropriate shelter interventions and identify areas most 
in need of support. 
For the distribution of the Transitional Shelter Kits, the pro-
ject targeted six of Nepal’s most severely affected districts. 
The beneficiary selection process focused on both a blanket 
approach for entire communities devastated by the earth-
quake (85% households affected), as well as targeting of 
specific vulnerabilities, using the following criteria: disability, 
single female-headed families, those who suffered casualties 
during the earthquake and low-income families. Kits were also 
distributed through the Nepal Blind Association and the Na-
tional Handicapped Association, in various earthquake affect-
ed districts.
Beneficiary selection was completed in consultation with 
local government officials  and lists were verified by com-
munity leaders and local partners on the ground. Staff con-
ducted field visits, direct observations and interviews to avoid 
duplication. 
Simultaneously, the organization did internal planning and 
preparations for budgeting, procurement, warehousing, trans-
portation, other logistics preparedness and detailed distribu-
tion planning. In the early stages of the response, regional 
and global experts were brought in to guide the technical 
specifications of the kit. Several similarities emerged with the 
response to the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, prompting to 
adopt a similar shelter design. The Pakistani response was 
similar in context, with the mountainous area, supply chain 
challenges, and frigid winter temperatures. The design was 
adjusted to incorporate locally available materials.
DISTRIBUTION PHASE  
The organization mobilized five staff (one international and 
four nationals) and eight trained volunteers, to distribute the 
kits, as well as to provide orientation and training to the com-
munity, on how to use these items to prepare temporary shel-
ters using a Build Back Safer approach, suggesting to use 
a recommended semi-circular design or the beneficiary s 
own preferred one. Based on need, other staff was chosen to 
support functions such as procurement, warehousing, trans-
portation, communications and post-distribution monitoring. 
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Some people used the materials provided to build temporary shelters according 
to the organization’s design.
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The PDM team also set up a beneficiary communication 
and feedback mechanism, and the organization established 
a quality-assurance monitoring system, to support real-time 
adjustments of the materials being procured. This process 
was managed by senior disaster-response staff and logistics 
personnel, through random inspections. An additional level 
of oversight was obtained through field visits and community 
meetings, which were facilitated by senior staff. The organiza-
tion likewise supported the monitoring of all local partners 
involved in the distribution.
MATERIALS SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS 
All materials were procured nationally, following competitive 
bidding processes. The first lots of items were delivered within 
the stipulated timeframe, allowing the distribution to start with-
in the fourth week after the disaster. This local procurement 
was efficient, contributed to the local economy and kept 
the costs low, while adhering to quality criteria as per Clus-
ter specifications. However, the procurement of the second 
lot of CGI sheets took longer than expected, as the demand 
increased drastically two months after the disaster. Consid-
ering the distribution plan, the logistics and procurement 
staff decided to temporarily warehouse all the kits at cen-
tral locations in Kathmandu, then dispatch them to distribu-
tions points in targeted districts, following recommendations 
by the distribution team. The staging and distribution points 
were decided in consultation with representatives of affected 
communities and local authorities, who carried out logistical 
surveys of targeted distribution points. However, there 
were not enough suppliers that could provide the required 
specifications and stocks. Consultations were carried out 
with likeminded organizations and experienced team mem-
bers from the regional office, regarding market surveys and 
different procurement processes.
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND DRR  
The organization provided two main types of technical sup-
port. Firstly, by disseminating Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Build Back Safer key messages during pre-distribution orien-
tations. Secondly, by providing direct technical construction 
support. Local engineers were trained on how to construct the 
temporary shelter units according to the design, and took on a 
training role during the installation of the kits. This methodolo-
gy included building a demonstration unit prior to distribution. 
The beneficiaries were also informed about the different de-
sign options that could be utilized, and a low-literacy instruc-
tional guide was distributed during the demonstration.
The communities were also encouraged to listen to govern-
ment’s radio and other public service announcements, that 
broadcasted the 10 key messages developed by the Shelter 
Cluster.
MAIN CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED  
GEOGRAPHIC AND WEATHER CHALLENGES
During the monsoon season, several landslides occurred due 
to the cracks made by the earthquakes. Further, floods in the 
seasonal and perennial rivers, due to the heavy rains, made 
roads impassable. In view of this, the organization mobilized 
highly trained and committed staff to the distribution sites and 
extra precautionary measures were taken for safety and logis-
tics within each local context. The teams stayed in the remote 
villages for the duration of the distributions.
LACK OF INFRASTRUCTURE
In certain distribution sites, damaged electricity and mobile 
networks created challenges in communication. As such, the 
team had to carry additional equipment and communication 
tools, including power banks for charging mobile phones. The 
organization also coordinated with local authorities and part-
ners, to ensure emergency communications.
During implementation, there were protests and strikes due 
to disagreements on the newly issued constitution. This ham-
pered distribution planning, as in certain areas there were 
road blockages. The organization had to proactively coordi-
nate with all stakeholders, including government and commu-
nities, to overcome this challenge.
CONTINUOUS AFTERSHOCKS
Strong aftershocks were felt for a long period, even during the 
distributions. In view of this, all volunteers and staff were orient-
ed on safety and personal preparedness measures. 
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
Apart from providing an immediate repair, the temporary shelters 
also became a stepping-stone for families to transition to 
permanent housing solutions. The types of housing construc-
tion that were hardest hit by the earthquakes – those constructed 
out of mud, stone and timber – were also those where salvaged 
materials could be used, in conjunction with the Transitional 
Shelter Kits, to rebuild.
Additionally, the design adopted in this response, adjusted from 
the experience in Pakistan, proved to be extremely effective in 
Nepal. Through coordination, this solution eventually in-
spired a standard supported by the Cluster and adopted by 
numerous other organizations.
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Although a set design was provided by the organization, many people adopted their own designs, using the materials provided with the kits, along with salvaged 
materials, to meet their own specific needs
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WEAKNESSES
- The earthquake directly affected the organizations’ lo-
cal staff, who could not resume functions quickly. Custom-
ized disaster response trainings (specifically on shelter inter-
ventions in emergencies) should have been provided to key 
staff and volunteers involved in shelter response activities.
- Lack of clearly defined, internal, procurement proce-
dures caused a delay in the start-up phase of the project. 
Internally, different organizational stakeholders had varying 
degrees of understanding of what processes needed to be in 
place, prior to procuring relief materials. This breakdown in 
communication resulted in materials being procured too slow-
ly, as non-emergency processes were being utilized.
- Shortage in medium-term disaster response staff. The 
organization had an experienced disaster-response team in 
the region, which deployed immediately after the earthquake 
to set up a response framework and mobilize the national 
team. However, longer-term field positions took months to 
be fille . This was due to slow HR processes and waiting for 
longer-term funding to be secured. This delay caused initially 
deployed staff to become burned out, and delayed the scale-
up of programming.
- The assistance provided focused too heavily on a set 
design. After about two months, people had recovered to a 
certain level with whatever resources were available, and they 
were capable to build contextually better shelters than the 
semi-circular ones promoted by the organization. Regardless, 
the same kit continued to be distributed and the same design 
recommended, rather than broader advice and support to build 
safe structures of different kinds. This would have been more 
appropriate, given that M&E findings showed that the majority 
of the families built the shelters with their own designs.
STRENGTHS
+ High community participation. More than 1,000 commu-
nity volunteers were mobilized for the distribution of the kits. 
Partner organizations, local youth clubs, social mobilizers 
and community leaders partook in the distributions.
+ Project implemented rapidly and at scale, particularly 
for the first batch of kits, which were distributed in less than 
three months after the first earthquake
+ Coordination with local government and like-minded 
organizations leveraged resources, avoiding duplications 
and strengthening networks, therefore creating opportunities 
for longer-term recovery efforts.
+ Produced and distributed 5,000 instruction manuals on 
various options for temporary shelters to affected com-
munities. Furthermore, families were provided with technical 
assistance for temporary shelters, through orientations on 
various construction techniques and safe reuse of materials.
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
•  Programmes should be designed according to social, cultural, religious, infrastructural and geographical 
factors of the affected areas. The shelter design and materials distributed in the emergency phase should enable 
the affected population to construct durable shelters, using other local/salvaged materials.
• The situation changes very quickly during the disaster response period, hence the team needs to be flexibl  
and proactive, making necessary adjustments to the programme accordingly. Flexibility can be integrated by im-
proving damage and needs assessments, incorporating secondary information and joint shelter assessment reports.
• Feedback mechanisms reported an interest in cash-for-work activities, as a way to increase community participa-
tion and ownership.
• Blanket targeting of most-affected areas was easier in certain communities, though more prioritization exercises 
were needed in partially affected areas.
• It is very important to manage communities’ expectations, so as not to create aid dependency, but rather building 
on each community’s own strengths and resources. In some instances, the communities demanded more materials than 
they required. Community-led, transparent, beneficiary selectio , verification and control mechanisms can manage this
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
Materials Units Quantity
CGI sheets 0.35mm thick, 12ft long pcs 10
Steel reinforcing rod (re-bar)
12mm diameter, 24ft long pcs 4
Steel pipe, 15mm diameter, 20ft long pcs 8
Galvanized iron wire, 16 gauge kg 1.5
Roofing nails, Umbrella type kg 1.5
Nails, large (75mm) and medium (40mm), galvanized kg 1.5
Tin Snips pcs 1
Pliers pcs 1
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Temporary shelters, built with the materials provided, bridged the gap during 
reconstruction of more permanent houses (here, in Kavrepalanchok district).
The level of community participation in the project was very high.
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KEYWORDS: Winterization, Cash/Vouchers, NFI distribution, Shelter upgrades, Protection
WEAKNESSES
- Issues in controlling prices in local markets.
- Lack of proper communication on the modality led to hesitation 
amongst local traders.
- Poor accessibility of distribution points.
- Lack of transportation support for some beneficiaries
- Delays in the winterization kits response.
- Non-replicability of the e-voucher system developed.
- Online monitoring system had issues due to poor connectivity.
IMPLEMENTATION
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Oct 2015: Market assessments carried 
out in seven affected areas.
1 2 26 Nov 2015: End of state of emergency.3
STRENGTHS
+ Effectiveness of the e-voucher modality, accountability, and learning.
+ Cash grants and e-vouchers enabled families to prioritize their 
winterization needs.
+ Effective targeting of the most marginalized communities.
+ Community participation ensured 90% of items were as requested 
by beneficiaries
+ Promotion of local economy and support to recovery.
+ Coordination with local authorities and use of pre-existing systems.
CRISIS
Nepal Earthquakes, 
25 April 2015 and 12 May 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
604,930 fully damaged.
288,856 partially damaged.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
886,456 affected families. 
649,815 displaced families.
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Sindhupalchok, Gorkha, Dhading, 
Nuwakot and Dolakha districts.
BENEFICIARIES 15,480 households. Females 51%; Chil-
dren 45% - Adults 35% - Elderly 20%. 
PROJECT OUTPUTS
(households)
7,801 vouchers for winterization
2,510 cash grants for shelter enhancements
5,169 winterization kits
MATERIALS COST 
USD 126 (for e-vouchers and cash grants).
USD 130 (for winterization kits).
PROJECT COST USD 160 per household (including staffing 
costs, air lifting and road transportation).
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project provided winterization sup-
port in high and remote areas to 15,480 
vulnerable and marginalized households 
in five of the worst affected districts, 
through the delivery of e-vouchers for 
winter and shelter enhancement, cash 
grants for shelter enhancement and win-
terization kits (clothing and shelter mate-
rials).
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Nov 2015: Focus group discussions with children 
and women. Community meeting and consultations 
with local government to identify key needs.
CONTEXT
See overview A.3 for more information on the country back-
ground and overall shelter response.
Geographic and climatic conditions in Nepal vary greatly, and 
temperatures can reach -10°C in high mountainous regions, 
with heavy snowfall from December to February. Remote com-
munities in these areas are several walking days from district 
capitals, and are accessible only by porters or via air transport.
In general, communities living in high altitude regions are well 
prepared for harsh winters and use a number of coping mech-
anisms to withstand the cold temperatures. These include in-
sulating their homes (e.g. thick wall construction, insulating 
their roofs using locally sourced materials), space heating 
(e.g. coal burning stoves, electric and gas heaters) and wear-
ing warm clothing (traditional woven Yak and Wool clothing). 
In terms of housing supply, owner-built is the predominant 
mode, which makes quality control critical. Furthermore, a 
significant proportion of this stock is inadequate to withstand 
extreme weather conditions.
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SELECTION OF DELIVERY MODALITIES   
The key factors influencing the selection of modalities were 
geographical location, availability of materials in markets 
and recognition that affected communities have pre-ex-
isting knowledge and strategies to withstand cold winter 
temperatures. If markets were functioning, the use of cash 
grants and e-vouchers were deemed more appropriate than 
in-kind assistance, as they contributed to strengthen existing 
supply chains and therefore stimulate recovery. Cash grants 
and vouchers also gave benefic aries the flexibility to choose 
according to their own diverse needs and priorities what best 
supported their household2. Cash grants were used in com-
munities with access to banking facilities and where it was 
less likely that this modality would be misused. On the other 
hand, when communities were in hard-to-reach areas (above 
3,000m), or markets were not functioning or accessible, the 
distribution of a winterization kit was used instead.
E-VOUCHER SYSTEM 
The e-voucher system was implemented using a simple smart 
phone application, partnering with the service provider Hello 
Paisa for technical support and the Civil Bank for transactions.
As part of the framework agreements with traders, specific -
tions were set and agreed (as per national and international 
standards). Traders were then provided with a list of potential 
items that beneficiaries were likely to purchase, enabling them 
to stock accordingly.
A PIN card with ten secret digits was provided to beneficiaries
who showed their identity card and Earthquake Victim Card 
number. Beneficiaries were provided with training and infor-
mation on the markets where they would be able to redeem 
the vouchers. The selected merchants were also trained on 
the use of the App and how to upload their purchases through 
a simple mobile network. As this was a new system in Ne-
pal, beneficiaries and merchants were supported during 
the process by staff members, who were present in the 
markets daily and accessible through a telephone hotline.
The e-voucher system allowed the beneficiaries to choose 
from a list of 36 pre-agreed items divided in three categories:
• House and personal insulation materials: CGI sheets, 
ridge sheet, tarpaulins, insulating p-foam, mattress, mat, 
woollen or fleece blankets, etc
• Winter clothes: sweater, jacket, woollen caps, socks, 
shoes, underwear, and children and women’s clothes.
• Kitchen utensils: vacuum flask, cooker, heating stoves, 
cooking stoves, etc.
2 See opinion piece B.2 in Shelter Projects 2011-2012, on cash-based assis-
tance in shelter programmes.
SITUATION AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE
Following the powerful aftershocks, large-scale landslides oc-
curred in multiple locations, three months after the initial earth-
quake, and many families were still living in temporary shelters 
or in their damaged homes. These temporary solutions were 
not sufficient to protect against the severe monsoon rains, nor 
did they provide adequate protection from the approaching 
winter months. Dalits and other minority groups were particu-
larly affected in comparison with other communities.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
The five selected districts were some of the worst affected 
by the earthquakes, with almost all homes having been de-
stroyed. A preliminary assessment for the selection of Village 
Development Committees (VDC)1 and beneficiaries for win-
terization support was conducted in coordination with relevant 
government authorities and the Shelter Cluster. The commu-
nities for winterization and shelter enhancement support were 
selected based on the altitude (above 1,500m) and other vul-
nerability criteria (women, children, elderly households, per-
sons with disabilities, number of children, status of the house, 
marginalized groups and income). Continuous coordination 
with VDC officials, local stakeholders and partner NGOs was 
crucial during this data collection process. Pre-selected bene-
ficiaries were then verified with the vulnerability criteria and a 
scoring tool. The final lists were approved by the local govern-
ment and committees involved.
Due to accessibility challenges, the initial implementation 
method was modified to a dual approach of cash/e-vouchers 
and distribution of kits.
MARKET ASSESSMENTS AND CONSULTATIONS  
Market assessments were conducted in the nearest markets 
to working VDCs by the logistics team, programme team and 
casual labour that was trained to support the activity. The pa-
rameters for the assessment were the following:
• Accessibility: walking distance from the nearest func-
tioning market (3 days walk was considered inaccessi-
ble) and the altitude of the affected community (more 
than 3,000m above sea level was deemed inaccessible).
• Capacity: market ability to supply and meet the demand.
• Willingness of the suppliers and beneficiaries to engage 
in the process.
• Quality of materials: assessed by Shelter Cluster tech-
nical team, with the support from the organization and 
the affected people as well. Government guidelines and 
organizational quality check benchmarks were used.
A meeting was called for all interested merchants and the 
process, provision, rule and regulation of the e-voucher sys-
tem was explained, allowing all interested merchants to fill in 
a form. Further on, community sessions were held in order 
to identify the most pressing item needs for redeeming the 
e-vouchers. A survey of the market and prices was carried 
out and the selected merchants were verified in their capacity 
of stocking and restocking, and in their legal registration with 
the chamber of commerce.
After this process, five out of the seven markets were included 
in the process and framework agreements were established 
with 28 merchants in Gorkha and 50 in Sindhupalchok.
1 VDCs are the lower administrative parts of the Ministry of Federal Affairs and 
Local Development.
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Many areas were accessible only by several days of walking.
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CASH GRANTS  
An operations booklet was produced in conjunction with ben-
eficiaries and distributed with the cash grants, outlining clear 
do’s and don’ts regarding the use of the grant. Post distribution 
monitoring indicated that 96% of the households who received 
cash grants spent it on shelter enhancement. 
IN-KIND WINTERIZATION KITS  
Comprehensive consultations were carried out with children, 
women, the wider community and local authorities to estab-
lish needs and items required. Once the information was 
compiled across the different communities, in collaboration 
with the Shelter Cluster and the government, a standardized 
kit was agreed upon, meeting Sphere standards and IFRC 
guidelines. Kits were then compiled and distributed by vehicle, 
on foot or by helicopter. The items included a combination of 
thermal clothing, blankets and heating items.
PROJECT MONITORING
The organization established three types of monitoring:
• On the spot, real time: monitoring committees were 
formed consisting of community representatives, techni-
cal staff from the organization and representatives of the 
local authority. Their main role was to monitor transac-
tion-related activities, solve issues and complaints and to 
check the quality and price of materials.
• Online system: all the transactions were monitored 
online through a portal which was specifically designed 
by the local service provider. The system monitored the 
number of transactions, quantity of materials and other 
procurement parameters. Whenever an item was pur-
chased, an SMS was sent to the portal, and these were 
then compared with manual records, allowing for greater 
transparency and the ability to analyse purchasing pat-
terns. Once a transaction was verified, a payment au-
thorization was made 36 hours later. This ensured quality 
of materials at competitive prices. Those suppliers who 
failed to adhere to these standards were suspended from 
the framework agreements for a period of time.
• Post Distribution Monitoring: PDM was conducted one 
month after distribution, in coordination with local admin-
istration, Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industries and representatives of the suppliers. 
Variations in the use of e-vouchers between districts were 
identified. For example, 72% of the targeted beneficiaries in 
the district of Gorkha prioritized construction materials, where-
as 58% of those in Sindhupalchok prioritized personal insula-
tion items/clothes. This indicated that the e-voucher system 
allowed better targeting of needs.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION   
During the winterization programme, communities were en-
couraged to participate in the planning of activities through 
briefing meetings that explained the programme and mapping 
exercise, group discussions and participatory prioritization ex-
ercises that were used to identify community and household 
priorities for winter and shelter enhancement items. Over 90% 
of the items identified by the community were included in the 
winterization kits, were used for the markets assessments and 
formed part of the items on the voucher programme.
COORDINATION   
Coordination at the national and district level was important 
for beneficiary selection and avoiding duplication. The values 
of the e-vouchers, cash grants and winterization kit were joint-
ly calculated to meet minimum requirements and agreed with 
the Shelter Cluster, Nepalese Government and VDCs.
MAIN CHALLENGES  
A key challenge was due to the impact of fuel shortages. In 
September 2015, the Government of India imposed a blockade 
that lasted until February 2016, leading to substantial shortag-
es of fuel, construction materials and other essential supplies 
across Nepal. The subsequent fuel crisis caused delays in the 
distribution and affected the households who received e-vouch-
ers, as few local suppliers had the ability to restock items.
Inflation also affected the procurement of winterization 
kits and the cost of the items that could be redeemed with the 
vouchers. However, allowing beneficiaries to choose and bar-
gain for the their selected items helped mitigate this challenge.
Initially, the majority of beneficiaries who received e-vouchers 
were unable to purchase items at competitive rates, de-
spite agreements with traders. To overcome this issue jointly, 
a monitoring committee was formed consisting of representa-
tives from the Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce 
and Industries, local administration, a community representa-
tive and the organization’s technical staff.
In terms of accessibility challenges, the organization coor-
dinated with government authorities to access fuel supplies 
for the humanitarian response and received support from the 
Logistic Cluster for the transportation of kits. Helicopters were 
used to distribute kits to particularly hard-to-reach communities 
before the winter started, as well as assisting the communities 
served with e-vouchers to transport redeemed materials from 
the suppliers. This was not needed for those who received 
cash grants, as their communities had functioning markets.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT   
• The project reached about 19% of the vulnerable fami-
lies in need of winterization support nationally. After this 
intervention, the government also distributed cash 
amounts of USD 100 to the remaining families.
• The distribution of e-vouchers and cash grants (equivalent 
to USD 1.7 million) was injected directly into local markets, 
supporting the local economy. This cash flow helped 
local suppliers to rebuild and expand their business and 
ultimately supported recovery of the worst hit areas.
• The e-voucher system is now established as a mo-
dality for future support. It was the first time this system 
was used in the area, so the Organization trained both 
beneficiaries and traders, providing a level of prepared-
ness in case of future emergencies.
The winterization kits were distributed in high-altitude communities, where lack 
of markets and/or poor accessibility made the use of cash not viable.
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STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
WEAKNESSES
- Issues in market monitoring. Initially, most beneficiaries
were unable to redeem the e-vouchers at competitive rates. 
Good coordination with relevant stakeholders later solved this.
- Poor dissemination of information on the modality. Local 
traders were initially hesitant to participate in the e-voucher pro-
gramming as the modality was new. This could have been miti-
gated with better dissemination of information about cash-trans-
fer programming and processes, e.g. through local media.
- Accessibility of distribution points. Post-Distribution Mon-
itoring indicated that beneficiaries had to walk for approx. 
2.5 hours to reach the distribution point. Walking distances 
could have been reduced if distribution points were at different 
VDCs/wards (or at a central location chosen with the commu-
nities). This could have been achieved through better commu-
nity engagement at planning and implementation stages.
- Support for transportation. 52% of households reported 
that they did not receive any support for transport of materials. 
Transport support for beneficiaries was considered, but due to 
the costs only about half of the total beneficiaries were prior-
itized for this assistance.
- Delays in the response. As part of the PDM feedback, ben-
eficiaries suggested they would have benefited more from the 
winterization kit if it had been distributed approx. 45 days earlier.
- Non-replicability. The phone application developed and 
used was not open source and therefore could not be utilized 
by others. However, the app developer has since partnered 
with other organizations to develop an e-voucher app to deliv-
er humanitarian assistance in Nepal.
- Online monitoring mechanism. Poor internet connections 
at times made it difficult to monitor transactions
STRENGTHS
+ Effectiveness. Using the e-voucher modality allowed for 
effective and efficient data collection and analysis, hence for 
greater accountability, transparency and learning. The ability 
to capture purchase patterns, prices and suppliers’ details 
enabled the organization to have a better understanding of 
beneficiaries  priorities and the local context.
+ Empowerment. Cash grants and e-vouchers enabled 
families to prioritize their winterization needs.
+ Targeting marginalized communities. Effective vulner-
ability targeting ensured 80% of beneficiaries reached were 
from Dalits and other marginalized communities, including 
550 households with persons with disabilities.
+ Participation. Consulting vulnerable community members 
for improved programme design and delivery: effective com-
munity participation ensured 90% of winterization items dis-
tributed were as requested by beneficiaries (excluding com-
pulsory children’s clothing).
+ Supporting recovery. Promotion of local economy, by in-
jecting USD 1.7 million into the local market. This cash flo  
helped local suppliers to expand their business and ultimate-
ly supported recovery and reconstruction phase.
+ Cooperation with local authorities to ensure full support 
for the project modalities
+ Utilizing pre-existing mechanisms and systems, such 
as Earthquake Victim Cards issued by the government as a 
source of verification for beneficiarie  eligibility.
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In remote regions, winterization kits were provided to the most vulnerable 
households. As there were no other means of transportation, the kits were 
airlifted and dispatched.
Winterization kit components Quantity
Gloves, size small 2
Thermal coat (suit and trousers), child: 1 small + 1 medium 2
Wool cap, 2 child + 1 adult 3
Scarf for children 2
Thermal socks, 2 small child + 2 medium child 4
Leggings, 1 small child + 1 medium child + 1 adult 3
Solar sweater, free size for adult 2
Scarf, for adults 1
Thermal socks (pair), for adults 4
Fleece blanket (high quality) 2
Woolen blanket (army) 2
Fleece jacket 1
Thermos for warm beverages (1 litre) 1
Logoed carrying bag 1
LEARNINGS 
•  Beneficiaries choice. Beneficiaries are active responders after a disaster and are best placed to decide what their 
household needs are. Therefore, cash-based assistance should be considered over in-kind were appropriate.
• Efficiency and support to recovery of cash vs in-kind. Cash grants and vouchers can be faster to distribute (espe-
cially at scale) and more cost-efficient (eliminating logistical and import costs) than in-kind. In addition, this modality 
can stimulate local markets, helping the recovery of trade and local economy, therefore benefitting more than the 
direct recipients.
• Conditional cash. Conditional cash allows for quality and technical restrictions to be placed, for effective shelter and 
NFI outcomes. However robust monitoring tools are needed to ensure that the value for money and the quality in 
construction and shelter-NFI outputs are achieved.
• Distribution committees. The formation of distribution committees is a vital method for effective mobilization, secu-
rity and solving distribution-related issues at community level.
OVERVIEW
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) made landfall on 8 November 2013 and was one of the largest typhoons ever recorded. While 
the main government response consisted of subsidies for housing reconstruction or repair, humanitarian agencies used a range 
of approaches which included cash- or voucher-based interventions, but also training and construction of transitional, core or 
permanent shelters. Particular issues in this response included the lack of support for secure tenure, the lifespan of transitional 
shelter solutions and the poor quality control, particularly in regards to coco-lumber.
PHILIPPINES 2013 / TYPHOON HAIYAN
CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES
DAMAGED1
1,012,790 houses (518,878 partially dam-
aged and 493,912 totally destroyed).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED2 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
RESPONSE OUTPUTS3
National Housing 
Authority (NHA)
29,661 houses as of October 2016 (206,488 planned).
Department of Social 
Welfare and Develop-
ment (DSWD)
966,341 cash transfers and material vouchers distributed.
Humanitarian 
organizations
551,993 households assisted with emergency shelter.
497,479 NFI packages distributed.
344,853 households assisted with incremental solutions. Map highlighting the path of typhoon Haiyan and the most affected regions, including: Eastern Visayas: Biliran, Leyte, 
Southern Leyte, Samar, Northern Samar, Eastern Samar. 
Central Visayas: Cebu, Bohol. Negros: Negros Occidental, 
Negros Oriental. Western Visayas: Aklan, Capiz, Iloilo, An-
tique, Guimaras. Mimaropa: Palawan, Occidental Mindoro, 
Oriental Mindoro, Romblon. Bicol Region: Masbate, Sorso-
gon. Caraga: Dinagar Islands, Surigao del Norte, Camiguin.
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1 Philippines Shelter Cluster, late 2014, Analysis of Shelter Recovery, http://bit.ly/2kZgHvA.
2 National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), Update 17 April 2014, 
http://bit.ly/1B6MMl1.
3 Sources for these figures are the documents used as references throughout this overvie .
11 Nov 2013: State of Calamity is declared by the Government of the 
Philippines. Shelter Cluster is activated.
6 Dec 2013: Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation 
and Recovery (OPARR) is established. 
Feb 2014: Emergency shelter assistance reaches 500,000 households.
Jun 2014: Recovery Shelter Guidelines are distributed by the Shelter 
Cluster.  
4 Jul 2014: The government declares the humanitarian phase over and 
coordination is officially transferred to O ARR clusters.
15 Jul 2014: Typhoon Rammasun (Glenda) hits the Eastern Visayas.
Oct 2014: Shelter Cluster is de-activated with nearly 350,000 house-
holds receiving incremental shelter assistance from humanitarian 
organizations.
3 Dec 2014: Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) hits the Visayas.
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For projects in response to Typhoon Haiyan, see: 
In Shelter Projects 2013-2014:
A.24, on shelter kits and WASH.
A.25, on cash and vouchers for materials, plus training.
In this edition:
A.9, a multiphase shelter and WASH programme.
A.10, on core shelters with latrines.
A.11, on a large scale programme on recovery shelter kits with 
reused coco-lumber.
A.12, on emergency and recovery shelter kits within a larger 
community-driven programme.
A.13, on a multisectoral, community-led resilience programme 
using shelter as an entry point.
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INTRODUCTION
Overview A.23 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014 should be re-
ferred to for information on pre-disaster conditions, the effects 
of the typhoon, and emergency and early recovery shelter in-
terventions. This edition of Shelter Projects includes projects 
undertaken in response to Typhoon Haiyan, though the major-
ity were completed or were due to be completed shortly, and 
describe recovery or multiphase shelter interventions.
RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS 
In consultation with shelter partners, the Shelter Cluster be-
gan work in early 2014 to categorize shelter interventions 
being implemented by organizations and provide guidance 
on best practices. The subsequent Recovery Shelter Guide-
lines4 were widely distributed by the Cluster beginning in June 
2014 and included guidance on supporting households using 
a range of shelter approaches, from temporary to permanent 
solutions. There was a particular focus on the inclusion of 
build back safer outreach and training.
Many humanitarian agencies focused on the following:
• Repair and retrofi  for damaged but not destroyed hous-
es or retrofit for houses built post-disaster but that did not 
incorporate build back safer measures.
• Permanent houses that include at least one bedroom, 
one living space, and dedicated WASH and cooking areas.
• Core shelters that provide households with the core of 
their future house; one safe room or the frame of a per-
manent house.
• Temporary or transitional shelter.
• Training of carpenters and other skilled construction 
workers.
• Build Back Safer awareness workshops.
• Provision of technical assistance.
4 Philippines Shelter Cluster (PSC), 06 Nov 2014, http://bit.ly/2lAG9ux.
Tie old rebarTie thick galvanized 
steel wire 
Nail timber Nail galvanized 
steel straps 
Strong StrongestStronger 
Nail timber and 
galvanized steel straps 
Brace each wallA
WHAT CAN I USE TO BRACE MY HOUSE?
Brace below the roofB Brace between roof trusses or raftersC
When on stilts, brace 
between the postsD
Full bracing both ways 
from strong point to 
strong point!
E Brace at 45°. No less than 30° and more 
than 60°
45° is 
best60° 
30° 
F
Brace around doors 
and windows - strong 
point to strong point!
G
BUILD BACK SAFER K Y MESSAGE 3 of 8
Brace against the storm
Strong bracing stops your house being pushed over or 
pulled apart by the wind. Bracing needs to be strong 
against being crushed along its length or pulled apart. 
Brace between the strong points of your house.
V1.1
The 8 build back safer key messages5, a comprehensive set of 
shelter technical guidelines, was used extensively throughout 
the recovery phase. This Disaster Risk Reduction Information 
Education and Communication (IEC) material represented 
one of the most important outputs for other responses (includ-
ing in Nepal and Ecuador6), and has so far been reused in a 
number of other responses in the Philippines and the broader 
Asia-Pacific regio 7.
5 PSC, 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages, http://bit.ly/2lANU3F.
6 See A.3 and A.39, overviews of the Nepal and Ecuador earthquakes respons-
es respectively.
7 See A.14 and A.15, overviews of the responses to Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu 
and Cyclone Winston in Fiji.
Poster of one of the 8 Key Messages developed for the Haiyan response (Source: Philippines Shelter Cluster and DSWD).
Many people rapidly started to build shelters after Typhoon Haiyan (here in 
Tacloban, December 2013).
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CLUSTER TARGETS AND RESPONSE
From the onset of the response, the Cluster strategy was to 
provide 1) emergency shelter assistance, 2) support for shel-
ter self-recovery, 3) transitional/core shelters, and 4) support to 
families living in collective centres.
In its strategic framework for transition8, the Cluster committed 
to provide: 
• “Immediate life-saving emergency shelter in the form 
of tarpaulins/plastic sheets (and fixings) and tents with 
supporting NFI solutions” to 300,000 households; and 
• “Support for household self-recovery through incre-
mental housing solutions using consultative, participa-
tory processes” to 500,000 households.
The target for emergency shelter was met – even exceeded 
– within the first 100 days of the response, with an estimated 
500,000 households receiving emergency shelter assistance 
and 470,000 households receiving NFI packages. As of August 
2014, cluster partners expected to support 344,853 households 
with repair/retrofit and new construction shelter assistance9, 
reaching only 70% of the initial target of incremental housing 
solutions. While there is limited data on the final number of 
households assisted by humanitarian organizations after the 
deactivation of the Cluster at the end of 2014, documentation 
from organizations suggest that final projections were met within 
the first three years of recover .
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
Government assistance under the “Emergency Shelter Assis-
tance” (ESA) programme consisted of PHP 30,000 (or approx. 
USD 600) for totally damaged houses and PHP 10,000 (or 
approx. USD 200) for partially damaged houses. As of August 
2016, disbursement to 966,341 households had been under-
taken10 and was still ongoing. Although disbursement of the 
government funds did not start until late 201411, more than a 
year after Typhoon Haiyan made landfall, this was still earli-
er than many recovery shelter programmes commenced and 
there were reports of beneficiaries withdrawing from agency 
programmes so that they remained eligible for the ESA funds.
8 PSC, 03 March 2014, Strategic Operational Framework for Transition 
Post-Yolanda, http://bit.ly/2l6JFfy.
9 PSC, late 2014, Analysis of Shelter Recovery.
10 DSWD, 04 Nov 2016, Where did the Emergency Shelter Assistance (ESA) 
funds for “Yolanda” survivors go?, http://bit.ly/2lAPS3T.
11 DSWD, 24 November 2014, Guidelines for the Implementation of the Emer-
gency Shelter Assistance (ESA) Project [...], Memorandum Circular 24.
SITUATION IN 2016 
The National Housing Authority (NHA) and Social Housing 
Finance Corporation (SHFC) continued to undertake signifi-
cant resettlement construction projects in the regions affect-
ed by Haiyan. NHA alone had plans to construct 205,128 
houses on relocation sites, however as of November 2016 
only 29,661 of these were completed12. Construction was 
slowed down due to regulatory issues, longer-than-expected 
planning, and difficulty acquiring land. Further, the lack of 
access to services, such as electricity and water, hindered 
households’ transition to newly completed housing units.
The Philippines continues to suffer significant typhoon 
damage, although no typhoons have occurred which have 
caused damage to the scale of Typhoon Haiyan in recent 
years. Since the Haiyan response, the government of the 
Philippines has been wary to call for international assistance, 
fearing that there would be a large influx of international 
agencies. This has hampered responses to small typhoons 
since then. At the close of 2016, there was a low likelihood of 
international assistance being called for, even in significan  
disasters, and this will severely hamper agencies’ ability to 
respond to disasters. Nevertheless, there were signs that the 
government has streamlined its ability to more rapidly deliver 
Emergency Shelter Assistance cash support.
12 National Economic and Development Authority, 2016, “Yolanda Updates Oc-
tober 2016”, http://bit.ly/2knL7pm. 
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In some projects, materials were treated to improve the durability of the 
shelters.
Multiple programme options were encouraged in response to Typhoon Haiyan, one of them being the construction of transitional or core shelters.
35SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
ASIA - PACIFICNATURAL DISASTER A.8 / PHILIPPINES 2013-2016 / TYPHOON HAIYAN OVERVIEW
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE HAIYAN RESPONSE 
SUPPORTING SELF-RECOVERY
In comparison to other disasters, recovery following Haiyan 
progressed rapidly and many households started to take 
initial steps toward self-recovery within days. A number of 
organizations used cash transfers, shelter repair kits, and 
technical training to address this rapid pace of recovery, 
however many others remained focused on the delivery of 
products (e.g. transitional or core shelters). The use of cash 
for work and cash transfer schemes were particularly effective 
in supporting the rapid pace of reconstruction being pushed 
by households. These cash-based approaches injected funds 
into local economies that stimulated recovery, supporting 
early livelihood restoration. These programmatic efforts high-
lighted the ability of shelter partners to support the evolving 
response landscape, as their effectiveness relied on shifting 
from reactive response to anticipating needs.
HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES
Despite these successes, there was largely a missed op-
portunity for organizations to support Housing, Land, 
and Property (HLP) rights. Extensive guidelines on HLP 
were developed by the Shelter Cluster during the first six 
months13, but few organizations incorporated this guidance 
into programming. Most notable was the principle that shel-
ter response should be free from discrimination and ensure 
rights of the most vulnerable. Many organizations required 
secure land tenure from households as a requisite for shel-
ter assistance, resulting in the exclusion of marginalized and 
vulnerable populations within communities. The role of HLP, 
in particular land security of informal settlers, should be 
more fully integrated into future shelter interventions in 
the Philippines and other contexts where land has been iden-
tified as an ongoing challenge
TRANSITIONAL SHELTERS’ LIFESPAN
As with past disasters in the Philippines, temporary or transi-
tional shelters were built by a number of agencies. However, it 
is not believed that many of the households will progress 
13 PSC, March 2014, HLP Guidance Note on Relocation for Shelter Partners, 
http://bit.ly/2kC7FUr.
to more permanent housing within the design life of these 
shelters (typically less than five years). Although not officially
reported, it is known that some “transitional” shelters in the 
Philippines have failed in subsequent typhoons and many 
were still in use a number of years after they were built. This 
has particularly been the case for transitional shelters which 
used coconut lumber for the main structural elements of the 
shelter, such as corner posts.
COCO-LUMBER AND QUALITY CONTROL
Most shelter programmes relied on coconut lumber as 
the predominant building material during recovery, draw-
ing from the large number of trees downed in the typhoon. 
Many households noted that the quality of lumber produced 
and distributed during recovery was of mixed quality. Despite 
distribution of technical guidance on selecting appropriate 
cuts of coconut lumber by the Cluster, robust quality control 
was difficult for many organizations. Degradation of poor 
quality lumber was prevalent in shelters, occurring as soon 
as one year after construction. In future responses, technical 
guidance should seek to develop more robust measures for 
shelter partners to implement quality control measures.
INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIPS AND COORDINATION
In addition to technical lessons, there were also gaps in in-
stitutional partnerships within the shelter sector. In Decem-
ber 2013, the President created the Office of the Presidential 
Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) to act 
as the “overall manager and coordinator of rehabilitation, re-
covery, and reconstruction efforts”14. Under this office, fiv  
clusters were established to manage recovery, including 
infrastructure, resettlement, social services, livelihood, and 
cluster support. Despite similar objectives, the internation-
al clusters and the government office functioned largely 
in parallel, with limited collaboration. A number of shelter 
partners noted that earlier, and more integrated, coordina-
tion with local governments was needed.
14 National Economic and Development Authority. 01 August 2014, Yolanda 
Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan, http://bit.ly/1Rvzwia.
www.shelterprojects.org
HOW CAN I PREPARE MYSELF AND COMMUNITY FOR A DISASTER?
EVACUATION COMMUNICATION GRAB BAG
Make a plan and practice it
Decide early if you will evacuate or 
stay in place
Prepare safe evacuation route
Know where the evacuation sites 
are
Know what transport you can use
Know the disaster warnings signals
Know how you can receive information 
about a disaster 
Inform your relatives and friends where 
you will evacuate to
Know how you will communicate with 
relatives and friends after disaster
Know how and who it inform of your 
situation after a disaster
Know where to find information on 
missing persons  
Prepare a waterproof ‘grab bag’ prior 
to a disaster
Make the ‘grab bag’ easy to carry and 
include:
medical kit
extra clothing and safe shoes
batteries 
torch and matches
basic food 
cooking equipment
basic tools 
important personal records/ID
Don’t forget some water
Typhoon?
Floods?
Tidal surge?
Tsunami?
Earthquake?
Landslide?
Volcano?
A WHAT ARE THE 
HAZARDS IN MY 
LOCATION?
C WHEN A DISASTER IS 
COMING WHAT CAN I 
DO TO MY HOUSE?
B OVER TIME WHAT CAN I DO TO PREPARE MY HOUSE? 
Add bracing 
Add shutters to windows and openings
Create wind breaks
Prepare strong ‘safe room’
Remove large trees close to house
Tie-down house
Protect windows and 
openings
Elevate valuable items 
during floods
Secure loose items so they 
won’t be blown away 
Turn off or unplug all 
appliances
BUILD BACK SAFER KEY MESSAGE 8 of 8
Be prepared
Preparedness is critical because it is the main way to 
reduce the impacts of a disaster. It is important to 
start taking actions and prepare now. 
V1.1
Poster of one of the 8 Key Mess ges developed for the Haiyan resp nse (Source: Philippi es Shelter Cluster and DSWD).
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KEYWORDS: Multiphase, Core shelters, Sanitation, Training, Community participation
CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
518,878 partially damaged
493,912 totally destroyed
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS Selected communities in Leyte island. 
BENEFICIARIES 4,302 households (17,200 people).
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
 
As of Feb 2017
2,007 Core Shelters (target: 2,280).
2,019 Shelter Repair Assistance.
2,280 Household Toilets with septic tank (target: 3,030).
OTHER
OUTPUTS
Over 200 local carpenters and masons trained, 26 communities (more than 3,000 households) reached with 
community workshops on safe shelter practices, over 10,500 coconut trees planted.
SHELTER SIZE 22m2 (expanded from previous programmes, based on community consultations).
SHELTER DENSITY 4.4-5.5m2 per person (the average family size in Leyte is 4.1, according to a government census).
MATERIALS COST 
USD 1,972-2,101 per core shelter with toilet (USD 1,207 for materials, USD 381-510 for toilet, USD 384 for labour).
USD 337 per household for Shelter Repair Assistance (USD 121 for materials, USD 256 cash grant).
PROJECT COST USD 2,240 per core shelter with toilet.  //  USD 397 per household for Shelter Repair Assistance.
OCCUPANCY RATE 99.4% of shelters occupied at the time of post-construction monitoring.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This multiyear project included an emergency phase, followed by transitional and recovery phases. In the first phase, CGI sheets 
and cash grants were provided for shelter repair, and core shelters were constructed with latrines. In the second phase, a partici-
patory approach was used to strengthen community resilience and safer construction practices, within an integrated programme, 
which provided opportunities for people to take ownership on cross-cutting issues.
STRENGTHS
+ Skills enhancement and engagement of local work-force.
+ Culturally appropriate design solution.
+ Cost effective design and implementation.
+ Community involvement in decision-making and construction.
+ Promotion of self-help approaches for long-term resilience.
+ Local procurement and prefabrication workshop set-up.
WEAKNESSES
- Long organizational procurement and logistical processes.
- High need of coco-lumber for the design, and use of untreated lumber.
- Lack of sufficient competent local sta f.
- Lack of flexibility of the design
- Septic tanks were only a partially safe sanitation solution.
EMERGENCY PHASE
ASSESSMENT PHASE 1
PLANNING PHASE 2
EARLY RECOVERY PLANNING
SHELTER REPAIR IMPLEMENTATION
CORE SHELTER IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1
1 2 3 4
8 NOV 2013
Jan 2015: 2,019 Shelter Repairs with technical assistance and dis-
semination of Safe Shelter Awareness messages completed.
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TYPHOON HAIYAN
Mar 2016: Phase 1 target of 1,400 core shelters completed. 275 iden-
tified individual households assisted with relocation in host families
Aug 2016: 20 communities reached with PASSA and Shelter Phase 
2 - community workshops on Safe Shelter Awareness.
Feb 2017: 2,007 core shelters and 2,280 toilets completed in total. 
Project is still ongoing.
CORE SHELTER IMPLEMENTATION 2
PASSA IMPLEMENTATION
JAN MAR AUG FEB
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with water points randomly installed around the settlement 
and congested dwellings, findi g an appropriate sanitation 
solution was a sensitive topic; the team studied various de-
sign options and adopted a two-chamber septic tank design, 
adjusting the elevation depending on specific site conditions 
and ground water level.
During the planning stage, the project team conducted com-
munity consultation workshops to configure a feasible 
strategy. There was a wide agreement amongst the affected 
population that an owner-driven approach would put more 
stress on vulnerable target groups, and would also cause im-
plementation challenges with regards to market supply and 
quality assurance. It was decided that the beneficiaries would 
join the construction team and the organization would manage 
the material delivery, technical support and overall monitoring.
Secure land tenure, site safety and adequacy were the 
prerequisites for construction. Beneficiaries without land were 
supported for relocation to willing host families, or smaller 
group resettlements in communal plots identified by the local 
stakeholders.
Due to various delays and a slight overestimation of imple-
mentation capacity, the construction extended long into 
the late recovery phase. Therefore, a significant part of 
the shelters were built when most beneficiaries had already 
recovered. Thus, instead of being an entry-point for further 
improvements by the beneficiar es (as intended by the Core 
Shelter concept), the shelters often ended up substituting pre-
vious self-help efforts, though with a higher quality.
INVOLVEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE AND CARPENTERS
In the beginning, the organization found it difficult to active-
ly involve the affected people, as they were in a distressed 
state. However, as the project progressed, it managed to 
build strong cooperation with the community by means of 
participatory activities and focus group discussions.
For the Core Shelter construction, the project recruited local 
carpenters and provided on-the-job training. Since very few 
skilled carpenters and masons were available in the com-
munity, the pilot phase focused on training and skills en-
hancement. Each team consisted of two skilled carpenters 
and two unskilled workers, supported by one beneficiary or 
representative. A trained monitoring team conducted several 
interactive sessions at community level to impart knowledge 
on safer construction, identify problems and make improve-
ments on the construction details and process. 35 carpenter 
teams and 25 mason teams were trained over a period of 
time, both on-the-job and through formal trainings by an of-
ficial institute
SITUATION BEFORE THE TYPHOON
For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, 
and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shel-
ter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.
The project targeted coastal areas comprising households 
who were dependent on farming and fishing. The settle-
ments evolved in the last hundred years from informal 
groups of houses and farms that expanded as clusters and 
villages around paddy fields, plantations and along coast-
lines, replacing the tropical forest. The socio-economic 
status of the population was generally weak, with a large 
portion being either tenant farmers or daily workers with 
lower income, living in semi-permanent houses with limited 
access to basic facilities, often settling in no-build zones. 
Unsafe construction practices, using light materials and 
lack of technical knowledge on safer construction, made 
the community more vulnerable against typhoons.
SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON
More than 80% of buildings, houses and vegetation in the 
area were flattened by the typhoon. Immediately after the dis-
aster, most inhabitants were temporarily displaced, but soon 
returned to their original dwelling sites and started constructing 
makeshift shelters. The key concern in terms of shelter was to 
overcome insecure construction practices that were dominant 
in the region, mainly due to lack of knowledge and the weak 
socio-economic status of the population.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION
The project area was selected based on regional and munici-
pal level coordination between local governments and shelter 
actors. The priority was to reach severely affected communi-
ties with limited access to external assistance.
Based on commonly agreed selection criteria between cluster 
partners, the team collected an initial list from the Local Gov-
ernment Units. To avoid disparities, “recovery committees” 
were established at community level, to verify the information 
based on the selection criteria, followed by household visits 
and validation. The team needed to be aware of community 
dynamics and required technical capacity to evaluate struc-
tural damage and categorize its level. Thanks to an early rec-
ognition of these limitations and challenges, the assessment 
was interrupted to train the team first, before reforming the 
recovery committees.
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1  
The project had three main objectives, strategically staged in 
two phases. The first phase focused on a) immediate Shel-
ter Repair Assistance and b) Recovery support through Core 
Shelter reconstruction, while the second adopted a broader 
approach towards improving community resilience.
EMERGENCY: SHELTER REPAIR ASSISTANCE
Immediately after the disaster, the need to quickly repair par-
tially damaged houses was very high. The Shelter Repair 
Assistance supported affected families with cash grants and 
distribution of CGI sheets. This phase was completed in four 
batches over nine months.
TRANSITION: CORE SHELTERS AND SANITATION
The Core Shelter construction was executed in several 
batches to allow certain learning and development, and 
minimize risks. Each Core Shelter included a household toi-
let. Since the project area was mostly on a high water table, 
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Core shelters and latrines were built to a set design, which was presented at 
community meetings to explain its features and receive feedback.
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IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2: RECOVERY 
The second phase used the PASSA approach1 in order 
to more actively involve communities and strengthen their 
knowledge, attitude and practices. Beneficiaries actively par-
ticipated in focus group discussions and PASSA interactive 
sessions, which contributed to develop a sense of owner-
ship, captured learnings and resulted in small improvements 
during the implementation. This phase emphasized disability 
inclusion, environmental regeneration, site risk mapping and 
mitigation, backyard gardens and facilitation of formal train-
ing for skilled carpenters and masons. Moreover, post-con-
struction monitoring and face-to-face sessions with ben-
eficiaries were conducted, followed by community walks to 
facilitate discussion around good and bad practices. Com-
munity workshops were also organized on various integrat-
ed topics such as roof tie downs, safe shelter extensions, 
construction of improved cooking stoves, wall upgrading and 
mitigation of fire risks
COORDINATION  
Considering the scale of the disaster and the difficulties faced 
by the government to coordinate with several agencies, co-
ordination at Shelter Cluster level played a very vital role 
for this project, through the production of technical messaging 
and data, as well as for decision-making, identifying gaps in 
the assistance and optimizing organizational resources.
However, the coordination also had some weaknesses. On 
one hand, the focus on reconstruction came relatively late, 
as relief operations were a priority. After the deactivation of the 
Cluster, the partners still needed provincial and national level 
cooperation. On the other hand, the lack of a clear govern-
ment policy on the complementing shelter assistance and 
selection criteria led to disparities at the local level. More than 
1 Participatory Approach to Safe Shelter Awareness, a participatory method of 
Disaster Risk Reduction related to shelter safety and facilitated by volunteers, 
which guides community groups through several activities: http://bit.ly/2lqQBUA. 
See also case study A.13 (Haiti) in Shelter Projects 2011-2012.
250 of the originally assessed beneficiaries opted out from this 
project to profit from the government’s cash assistance. How-
ever, the project managed to expand to other communities.
SHELTER DESIGN AND DRR 
The wooden core shelter design had been previously imple-
mented by several partners after past disasters in the country, 
with 18m2 covered space. During the initial consultation, the 
design received high cultural acceptance by the communi-
ty. Subsequently, certain improvements were made to in-
crease the covered living space to 22m2 and to adjust the 
structural design for a higher wind speed as a “one size fits
all” progressive core shelter. The design was developed using 
local materials, particularly coco-lumber.
The project was designed with Disaster Risk Reduction as 
an integrated crosscutting theme. The design concept of 
the elevated core shelter and toilet aimed at mitigating the risk 
of flood ng, and its structural design was made to withstand 
200km/h winds. During the first phase, both the Shelter Repair 
Assistance and Core Shelter interventions were accompanied 
by safe shelter awareness inputs, through knowledge-shar-
ing sessions with the communities. However, the PASSA ap-
proach was only effectively adopted in the second phase.
Core shelters were built in several batches by construction teams that included the beneficiaries. Material supply and monitoring were managed by the organization.
In the second phase, the project used a community-led approach to analyse 
different hazards and their impact on the communities (PASSA approach).
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PREFABRICATION WORKSHOP APPROACH 
For the construction of the core shelters, certain components 
were prefabricated to ensure the quality of construction and 
to standardize the design. The workshop also provided sup-
port for evaluating various small improvisations in design 
and technical solutions. This set-up was new in the area, 
but was quickly adopted. As the construction progressed, 
the project downsized prefabrication and most construction 
was executed directly in the field, by skilled local carpenters. 
However, for quality purposes, the fabrication of key compo-
nents like structural footing and wall panels continued to be 
done in the workshop.
LATRINE DESIGN 
An innovative latrine design was introduced through this pro-
ject, which if properly constructed improves the effluent quality 
significantly and thus helps reducing groundwater pollution. 
This is especially a problem in dense rural settlements that 
still rely on shallow hand-pumps as their primary source of 
drinking water. In fact, this goal was only partially achieved, 
due to limits in quality of labour, materials and monitoring of 
construction quality below ground.
MAINTENANCE AND TERMITE PROTECTION 
“Care and maintenance” were discussed in various focus 
groups. The project included the use of a treatment (solig-
num) in the lower exposed portion of the structure, to en-
hance termite protection and prevent decay; a concrete 
footing, to increase the distance of the wooden post from 
the soil; and a galvanized iron sheet above the concrete, to 
protect the edge of the wooden post.
MATERIALS 
The design of the core shelter used both natural and indus-
trial materials available in the local market. The natural 
materials included coco-lumber, bamboo, sand and gravel, 
which were sourced through licenced suppliers that operate 
under the Department of Environment and Natural Resourc-
es. The shelter also used woven bamboo to produce wall 
panels, which was sourced from the neighbouring island, 
where bamboo is planted in large scale. 
Coco-lumber was available in large quantities soon after 
the disaster, because plenty of trees were uprooted during 
the Typhoon2. Moreover, Leyte Island is identified as a hub 
for the supply of coco-lumber by the Philippine Coconut Au-
thority. Although the use of coco-lumber was encouraged, 
due to limited local capacity less than 30% of the fallen trees 
were recovered for construction before rotting. Because of 
the high demand of coco-lumber in reconstruction, prices 
rapidly increased in the local market (up to 111% in two 
years), also due to the taxations imposed by the authorities 
on extraction and transport. As a result, the project experi-
enced several supply challenges. This was mainly due to the 
lack of any obligation by the agencies to control the market 
price. The idea to support the local suppliers was discarded 
once it was clear that they could not compete with the exter-
nal large suppliers, who ended up dominating the market.
To address the issue of environmental impact, the project 
collaborated with the Coconut Authority to support 
mass coconut plantation linked to livelihoods activities.
2 See case study A.11 for an example of a large scale response utilizing the 
fallen coconut trees.
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Some of the core shelters included ramps to improve accessibility.
Aerial view of one of the areas where the project was implemented. The shelters with red roofs were built by the organization, while other structures were self-built.
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STRENGTHS
+ Skills enhancement and engagement of local con-
struction work force. This was a slow process that required 
very close monitoring and regular feedback sessions. Though 
very resource- and time-intensive, this paid off by the level of 
quality and standards reached, and the monitoring effort that 
were significantly reduced
+ Culturally appropriate design solution, which was wide-
ly accepted and occupants reported they felt safer in it.
+ Cost effective design and implementation. Although the 
time frame was extended slightly, increasing the overhead 
costs, the savings generated by the cost-effective project ex-
ecution managed to increase the targeted number of benefi-
ciaries, without requesting any cost extension.
+ Involvement of community in decision-making and con-
struction processes, which helped the organization to build 
a strong relation with the community at an early stage. During 
phase II, the project was highly participative and effective in 
increasing community knowledge on Shelter and Settlement 
Safety and thus building community resilience.
+ Promotion of self-help approaches for longer term com-
munity resilience. Focus group discussions identified issues 
around shelter and settlement by mapping key factors that 
lead to the risk of disaster. The discussions also encouraged 
community groups to develop action plans for mitigating those 
risks. This was allowed by the extended time frame of the pro-
ject, which made possible follow-up visits and linkages with 
integrated sectors.
+ Local procurement released the burden from the project 
logistical chain and optimized resources. 
+ The prefabrication workshop contributed to the quality of 
the construction and supported the carpenters and the work-
force in the field to maintain standards and e fectiveness.
WEAKNESSES
- Long organizational procurement and logistical pro-
cesses caused delays.  
- High need of coco-lumber for the design, as well as use 
of untreated coco-lumber for construction, and lack of ap-
propriate substitute procurement measures. The wood-
en Core Shelter design was based on the assumption that a 
large quantity of trees were available, though large quantities 
of fallen logs got rotten and additional felling and supply of 
untreated lumber continued. The project could have generat-
ed livelihoods and liaised with the government to establish a 
coordinated management of coco-lumber for reconstruction.
- The programme faced a constant shortage of competent 
local personnel, and in particular of soft skills needed to per-
form effective communication. This was partially due to limited 
organizational support and internal HR policies that restricted 
hiring of staff with the skills required.
- The “one size fits all” solution came with certain limita-
tions and inflexibility to adapt to the context and also to re-
act to the changing market situation with alternative solutions. 
While the shelters offer a significantly higher safety against 
typical typhoons, its flexibility and overall perceived utility-val-
ue was somewhat limited by the elevated design and other 
related features common in the region. A concern was also 
that the woven-bamboo wall panels do not offer sufficient pro-
tection against water during heavy rains. These factors have 
resulted in some shelters being less used.
- Septic tanks were only a partially safe sanitation solu-
tion. Although the improved design was identified as the 
most suitable solution, emptying septic tanks and an environ-
mentally friendly sludge disposal and management are often 
expensive services and require active commitment of local 
governments. After three to five years, the effluent quality will 
deteriorate quickly and pose a pollution risk to the groundwa-
ter. The coverage of desludging services was still very low and 
the high costs posed a constant challenge.
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• Heavy top-down decision-making for a construction project ends up with compromised corners. Decision-mak-
ing should be consultative and flexible to complement technical recommendations. The transfer of knowledge and learn-
ings from one project to the next is crucial.
• Collaborative rather than competitive approach. At the onset of the project, the focus lay more on achieving the 
targets indicated in the project log-frame, and thus overlooked quality indicators. A sense of competition was developed 
across sectors and agencies, which was not necessarily healthy.
•  Interest and motivation are important factors to be considered while identifying the project team. The project 
configured the need for capacity-building but did not succeed in engaging motivated and suitable project staff for specific
tasks. As a result, at a certain point the project team felt over-burdened. 
•  Timeliness in delivering assistance is critical in addressing the needs and ensuring effectiveness. The shelter 
repair assistance could have been rolled out significantly faster and better if it had been already planned and prepared 
during the emergency phase. However, the actual market supply during the first months of the recovery might require a 
switch to more direct material provision rather than cash.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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Safer building practices were promoted, such as strapping of roof structures, bracing and proper detailing of the foundations (raised and made of reinforced concrete).
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KEYWORDS: Core housing, NFI distribution, Training, Disaster Risk Reduction, Community participation
CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
518,878 partially damaged
493,912 totally destroyed
21,005 houses damaged and 26,515 destroyed in the 
project areas.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
PROJECT LOCATIONS 10 municipalities in Samar. 
BENEFICIARIES 22,310 individuals.
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
4,462 core shelters built, with latrine. 
1,071 carpenters trained.
SHELTER SIZE 18m2
SHELTER DENSITY 3.6m2 per person (average household size of 5).
MATERIALS COST 
USD 1,086 per shelter (+10% when trees had to be 
purchased). USD 1,596 per shelter (with septic tank).
PROJECT COST USD 2,424 per shelter.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The organization built 4,462 “core shelters” to 
a standard design with accompanying sani-
tation in 18 months, using local labour and a 
highly systematized approach. The project also 
included a significant training component. The 
case study highlights detailed learnings related 
to construction management for an agency-led 
construction project, working with the communi-
ty and local authorities.
STRENGTHS
+ Speed of the response.
+ Previous knowledge of the area and the communities.
+ Strong logistical capacity.
+ Cooperation with local partners.
+ High standard of quality of materials and solutions adopted.
+ Strong accountability to the affected communities.
WEAKNESSES
- MoUs with municipalities should have been signed earlier.
- Assessment and data collection teams needed more training.
- Poor post-implementation monitoring to assess long-term impacts.
- The sanitation component should have been included from the start.
PLANNING PHASE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2
1 2 3 4 5
8 NOV 2013
Mar 2014: Pilot construction of demo-houses.1
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Jul 2014: Extension of the project to the west side of the island.
Dec 2014: Completion of the 4,462 shelters.
Dec 2014: Launch of sanitation phase: construction of toilets starts.
Jun 2015: Completion of construction of all the latrines.
CONTEXT
For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, 
and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shel-
ter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.
The organization had established an office in Tacloban in 
2008 and had focused on Samar with its partner organization, 
working with conflict-a fected communities.
The region was one of the poorest in the country, largely de-
pendent on agriculture and fisheries. Eastern Samar is ranked 
the third poorest province in the country, with fishermen and 
farmers being the poorest groups.
SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON
According to official figures, in the 10 municipalities targeted 
by the project, over 40,000 houses were damaged, of which 
more than half were totally destroyed. The most heavily affect-
ed houses were those of lower quality, with a damage pattern 
reflecting the poverty map in Samar. The typhoon damaged 
timber structures much more than concrete ones – with many 
communities being registered with 100% damage. 
The organization established two field offices in Samar within 
one month of the typhoon.
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Roof: Hurricane Straps / Tie wire
installed using pliers and hammer, 
nails from bottom.
a second verification exercise was conducted. In some 
cases, a structural review of the house by an engineer 
was conducted to determine if it was partially or totally 
damaged.
4. A community meeting was organized with all validated 
households to explain the reason for non-selection. In 
case of disagreement or doubt, cases were discussed 
and revisited when necessary. These meetings proved 
the most important stage of beneficiary validation
5. Officials signed a final beneficiary li
6. The final lists were shared with the municipality and MoUs 
were signed with the barangays to confirm commitments 
and mutual responsibilities.
In the most remote areas where access was difficult, but a 
decision to intervene was taken due the high vulnerability, 
combining assessment with beneficiary validation process 
saved time. For remote and low-populated barangays, a de-
cision to assist all people was made, even if the number of 
beneficiaries was small
Taking time with a rigorous yet time-consuming selection 
process, enabled smooth implementation and a very low rate 
of complaints later on.
SHELTER DESIGN  
The shelter model was based on the original model used in 
the response to Typhoon Bopha and consultations were made 
with local communities in urban and rural areas. Two samples 
were initially built next to the organization’s offices, for training 
and display purposes. Afterwards, the first houses built in each 
barangay were used as models involving carpenters from the 
community. Upgrades were made to improve hurricane resist-
ance, such as hurricane straps, an additional truss, alignment 
of windows, use of galvanized nails and better CGI sheets.
BENEFICIARY ORIENTATION 
Orientations were conducted with selected communities and 
beneficiaries. It proved to be important for barangay officials
to be present as they were responsible for resolving issues in 
the community related to land ownership. In most of the cas-
es, landowners allowed beneficiaries to build a house on their 
land and to stay for at least five years for free or for a small 
renting fee. In other cases, the barangay captain intervened 
and found a relocation site.
The donation certificate stated that the beneficiary remains 
THE ROLE OF COORDINATION
The organization was not a member of the Shelter Cluster, 
but did coordinate with other agencies working in the same lo-
cations. The organization also used and respected principles 
and technical standards that had been set by the government 
and the Cluster. 
The agency assessed the different programme options pro-
posed by the Cluster and decided to build core houses with 
a training component, as this was in line with its general ap-
proach to improve resilience of the typhoon affected people.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT  
At the outset of the project at each location, meetings were 
held with the authorities and a meeting was held with all the 
community members to explain selection criteria and ben-
eficiary roles and responsibilities, to ensure that the pro-
cesses were clear and those most in need were not left out. 
In the meeting, beneficiary declarations and land agreements 
were explained and collected.
During the inception community meetings, the responsibilities 
of the barangay were explained as part of the programme to 
avoid local politics impacting on the implementation.
A hotline was set up for beneficiaries to ask questions and 
a volunteer would take care of treating each case individually. 
This allowed great transparency with the beneficiaries as well 
as to better focus or adjust the programme when needed.
SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES 
Geographical selection was needs-driven, based on access 
and damage. Harder-to-reach areas were prioritized, as the 
organization had more logistical capacity than other agencies, 
those communities tended to have lower income levels and 
more houses using local materials, which showed higher lev-
els of damage. The agency therefore chose to work in remote 
locations where many other organizations would not engage.
Household selection was conducted in the following steps – 
with all data being entered into a database, containing bene-
ficiary and barangay data
1. The list of totally damaged houses was collected from the 
local authorities (both barangay captains and municipal 
sources).
2. Each household was then verified by a house to house 
visit conducted by volunteers of the local partner.
3. Using agreed criteria, lists of eligible and non-eligible 
households were established, with pictures and data from 
the verification visit. Lists of cases to be reconfirmed due 
to absence of or incomplete data were also prepared, and 
The project had a strong focus on safer construction techniques.
In the aftermath of the typhoon, affected people built makeshift shelters.
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the owner of the materials even after they have left the land. 
Agreements were in the local language, read out during the ori-
entations and followed by a session for questions and answers.
CHAINSAW OPERATORS AND TIMBER QUALITY 
Wood was requested from the beneficiaries as contribution. 
This worked for 82% of the cases. When this was not possi-
ble, it was mainly due to specific vulnerabilities (1%) or phys-
ical unavailability of trees, particularly in areas far from coco-
nut plantations (17%). 
Local labour was used as much as possible. Chainsaw 
operators from other regions might be involved only as a 
temporary solution in the early stage of the programme. Af-
ter some negative experiences, purchase orders were given 
out to the same chainsaw operator only if the previous order 
had already been completed.  Wherever possible, the best 
chainsaw operators were retained to train the new ones. 
In hindsight, project staff should have been better trained on 
technical quality control of timber.
Beneficiaries had the responsibility to sign for receipt of the 
timber and to replace anything missing.
It was found that middle managers in the programme cre-
ated more challenges than convenience. Chainsaw opera-
tors and carpenters had a tendency to form groups in order to 
survive financiall , yet working through a middle manager did 
not allow skilled labourers to be directly contracted and ac-
countable for their work. The one who received the purchase 
order should have effectively done the work, especially for 
quality control purposes.
MATERIALS SOURCING AND PREFABRICATION
Materials were sourced as follows:
• Local procurement from project areas: wood and ag-
gregates.
• National procurement: cement, iron bars, tie wire, hinges, 
post straps, amakan walling (traditional woven bamboo).
• International procurement: CGI sheets, flat iron sheets, 
hurricane straps, galvanized nails.
A central workshop was established to pre-cut and bend roof 
ridges and footing bars. Twisted umbrella nails with rubber 
seal increased construction efficiency and neater finishes,
compared to the application of seal paste on every roof nail.
MATERIALS KITS 
Overall, logistical challenges of the 500kg kits of materials were 
significant, given the massive area with complicated delivery 
needs. As a result, a flexible approach was established
• For easily accessible areas, start small and plan for con-
tinuous supply.
• For areas difficult to access, deliver in bulk and plan for 
storage. In instances like island or far upland, delivery 
needs to be direct and in almost full quantity. Sufficient
time needed to be given for hauling of materials from de-
livery at the last reachable point, and cash was required 
to pay for the “last mile” of transport, as part of livelihoods 
programming. Additional buffer stocks were required and 
smaller numbers of kits should have been pre-positioned 
in advance of anticipated poor weather.
Involving barangay councils in material distributions proved to 
be important for community mobilization and security reasons.
TRAINING OF CARPENTERS AND COMMUNITIES 
Initially, the team came with technical plans, drawn by com-
puter and in units not used locally. Craftsmen could therefore 
not interpret them, so they needed to be re-formatted into a 
simpler booklet.
Attendance in the training course was an obligatory step for 
carpenters to be contracted. The best carpenters were re-
tained for ongoing work in the project. During the programme, 
a total of 1,071 carpenters were trained. At the same time, the 
whole community learned about good construction practices. 
The largest long-term impact of the project was in the training 
for affected people that it enabled.
CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTERS 
The preparatory steps (selection of beneficiaries, delivery of 
materials, cutting of wood, procurement of local aggregates, 
training of carpenters) took much longer than the actual house 
construction, which was about four to five days
It proved better to distribute orders to carpenters at the begin-
ning of the week, to avoid work during weekends, when mon-
itoring teams (one monitor per barangay) were not present. 
The agency found best results when they selected carpenters, 
rather than letting beneficiaries choose their carpente . 
More systematic approaches should have been conducted for 
safety. Contracted carpenters were not always insured and 
systematic insurance was not in place.
POST-IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW 
Shortly after the implementation of the project, another ty-
phoon hit the affected area. In a review of the houses, it was 
found that only four had failed, three of which due to the use 
of young coco-lumber and one due to a land-slide.
The project built core shelters according to a set design and with a highly systematized approach.
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TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
Foundations
Six concrete foundations are used to support each 
of the six individual columns. With 1:2(cat) mix of 
concrete and steel reinforcement, the foundation is 
strong enough to support the structure above the 
expected load even if using heavier good-lumber 
in the construction. Foundation is also shaped in 
STEP (reverse T) type to increase uplift resistance.
Truss
The trusses for the roof are designed to create a 
hipped roof shape with two original full trusses, six 
half trusses covering the roof ends, and an addi-
tional middle truss.
Floor
The floor is made from coco-lumber boards provid-
ing better and steady floor supported by three long 
and 14 short floor joists
Wall
Made from the amakan sheet clipped with wall 
studs from the inside and wall clips from the out-
side in 600mm grid creating a grid-like finish on 
the outside.
Openings
The shelter design provides three windows and 
one door for opening and access. Supported by 
double hinges at 2mm thickness the durability of 
the opening is guaranteed to last.
Bracing
Diagonal bracing was placed in wall. One bracing 
is also placed in the roof structure connecting all 
the trusses into single structure. Although it is ad-
vised to use longer bracing in full wall short diag-
onal bracing was used to allow full modification of 
the opening across the wall and flexibility of further 
extensions.
STRENGTHS
+ Rapidity of the response. Early decision to engage in 
shelter after the typhoon hit the area and very quick activation 
of the programme before the end of the emergency phase.
+ Previous knowledge of the area and of the communi-
ties affected. The organization was present in the area be-
fore the emergency for its protection and assistance activities 
and remained after the response.
+ Logistical capacity. The mobilization of resources from the 
organization was very fast also thanks to the existing logistical 
set-up in the country with an additional deployed logistics team.
+ Cooperation with local partners. The national partner or-
ganization has an extensive coverage of all parts of the country.
+ High standard of quality. Within the framework set by the 
government guidelines (including adaptation to the environ-
ment and sustainability), all solutions adopted and materials 
provided through this project were of high quality.
+ Strong accountability. The beneficiary feedback system 
(hotline) allowed the beneficiari s to raise concerns and the 
programme to be adjusted where needed.
WEAKNESSES
- MoUs with municipalities should have been signed early 
in the process to facilitate the next steps in full transparency.  
- More effort should have gone into training the field teams 
working in assessment and data collection, to ensure con-
sistency.
- Although there was a signific nt training component, there 
was little or no consistent follow up on the impacts of the 
training in terms of safer construction outcomes in the broad-
er community. More attention should have been given to 
post-implementation monitoring, to assess short and long-
term impacts.
- The sanitation (and hygiene promotion) component 
should have been included in the project from the outset, 
instead of having to conduct a secondary follow up to install 
sanitation. This would have simplified the operations
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• A full set of recommendations from the project 
were learnt and compiled in a single document for 
future use by the agency. Overall, the project was 
deemed to have been positive by the agency and 
a model for future interventions in similar contexts. 
The various templates and manuals produced were 
of particular interest to the agency.
• Starting small through pilot projects and then 
scaling up can be a successful approach.
•  A combination of high quality hardware and soft-
ware components is essential for project success.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
The project used locally available materials (e.g. the amakan sheet, left) and safe construction techniques, including bracing, strong trusses and roof strapping.
Local carpenters didn’t understand technical drawings, so concepts had to be 
explained through simpler and more intuitive ways, and a booklet was produced.
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KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, Transitional shelter, Procurement and logistics, Local materials, Training
CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
518,878 partially damaged.
493,912 totally destroyed.
21,005 houses damaged and 26,515 destroyed in 
the project areas.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
PROJECT LOCATIONS Guiuan, Roxas, Ormoc, Tacloban.
BENEFICIARIES 64,113 households.
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
52,096 NFI Kits 
33,994 Emergency Shelter and NFI kits
58,062 Recovery Shelter kits
3,500 Transitional Shelters 
72,956 Individuals trained in DRR (51% women)  
640 Timber Houses built in Leyte
SHELTER SIZE 
18m2 for recovery shelter kits (minimum, variable, size)
23-24.7m2 for transitional shelters.
SHELTER DENSITY
3.5m2 per person (for Recovery Shelter Kits).
5m2 per person (for Transitional Shelters). 
(based on five-person-average household size)
MATERIALS COST 
USD 300 for Recovery Shelter Kits.
USD 1,190-1,860 for Transitional Shelters. 
PROJECT COST
USD 385 for Recovery Shelter Kits.
USD 1,960 for Transitional Shelters.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This was a large-scale programme, using 
a “Debris to Shelter” approach, to support 
typhoon affected households to repair or 
rebuild their damaged or destroyed homes. 
Almost 20 million board-feet of lumber were 
salvaged, corresponding to an estimated 
number of almost one million trees. Through 
97 vendors in all affected areas, lumber was 
provided for more than 62,000 shelter inter-
ventions. Disaster Risk Reduction and Build 
Back Safer trainings were given to local car-
penters and shelter beneficiaries, promoting 
safer construction against future disasters.
STRENGTHS
+ Speed of the response.
+ Flexible procurement and implementation methodologies.
+ Local market approach, supporting livelihoods.
+ Removal of fallen or damaged trees helped clear the land.
+ Build Back Safer messaging targeted a range of stakeholders.
PLANNING
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Nov 2013: First distribution of Emergency Shelter and NFI kits.1
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Mar 2015: End of Recovery Shelter Kit distributions.
Jan 2014: First Recovery Shelter Kit distributions and Disaster 
Risk Reduction training.
Mar 2014: First transitional shelters installed.
Apr 2015: Closure of two offices (Ormoc and Roxas)6
7 Dec 2015: Completion and handover of Timber Houses.
WEAKNESSES
- Choice of coco-lumber was not always appropriate.
- DDR training prioritized measures to strengthen roofs.
- Difficult to forecast eventual reductions in coco-lumber availabilit .
- Some field offices were less adept at establishing partnership
- Under-calculation of needs for logistics, procurement and finance
systems.
4 Jun 2014: All four field offices implementing transitional shelters, 
including in relocation sites in Tacloban.
RECOVERY SHELTER KIT
NOV
TIMBER HOUSES
MARMARJAN JANFEB FEBMAY MAYJUL JULAUG AUGSEP SEPOCT OCTAPRAPR
ORMOC
ROXAS TACLOBAN
TRANSITIONAL SHELTER
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number of families whose homes had been damaged signifi-
cantly, but could still be repaired. These households already 
had land available – in most cases their customary plot.
TRANSITIONAL SHELTERS 
The transitional shelters were built in smaller numbers and 
were targeting two groups of people: those whose houses had 
been completely destroyed and those whose previous homes 
had been in the coastal No Build Zones, and therefore had to 
relocate. 
In some cases, these shelters were constructed individually, 
on plots identifi d by the beneficiary and in negotiation with 
the owner of the land and the local barangay2 chief. In a small 
number of cases, shelters were installed in groups, on larger 
plots of land identified by the local municipal authorities, but 
then evaluated for their suitability by the project staff from the 
organization and other partners (with activities in the same 
location).
Designs for the transitional shelters were adapted by each of-
fice, but were generally based upon those in previous respons-
es. The predicted lifespan of the coco-lumber was 3-5 years.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION  
Local barangays were engaged and consulted during the bene-
ficiary-selection process, and also through the Build Back Safer 
information campaigns which accompanied the distributions. 
The communities were mobilized by the local leaders to sup-
port and participate in the assistance process, either during 
the distribution of the kits or in the construction of the tran-
sitional shelters. In the absence of a warehouse, the mate-
rials for the construction of the shelters were handed over to 
the families. All of the carpenters and their assistants came 
from the local communities and participated in cash for work 
schemes, which were a valuable source of income.
Through the establishment of a hotline and the dissemination 
of the respective phone number, beneficiaries provided feed-
back and issued complaints regarding the assistance received. 
COORDINATION 
The Coco-lumber Technical Working Group of the Cluster pro-
vided clear guidance on the permission pathway and technical 
issues for the collection and use of coco-lumber for shelter, as 
agreed nationally with the PCA. More generally, the Cluster 
2 Neighbourhood administrative units.
For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, 
and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shel-
ter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.
THE USE OF COCO-LUMBER BEFORE HAIYAN
In the Philippines, coco-lumber (wood from coconut trees) is 
a recognized traditional construction material, although with 
fewer uses than hardwoods. Since 2011 (Tropical Storm Sen-
dong response), coco-lumber has been recommended by 
Shelter Clusters in the country. Since 2012 (Typhoon Bopha 
response), there has been a clear policy from the Government 
of Philippines Coconut Authority (PCA) on the collection and 
use of fallen or damaged coconut trees for post-disaster shel-
ter, as well as a clear pathway for permission to do so, includ-
ing the use of licensed chainsaws and chainsaw operators, 
and a visual grading system for the selection of the lumber. 
Moreover, the implementing organization had already been 
using coco-lumber for shelter before its Haiyan response.
SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON
Approximately 33 million coconut trees were fallen, or had 
been damaged beyond productivity by the typhoon, with an 
estimated 13 million trees1 which might be accessible and us-
able. Replanting was not possible until fallen trees were re-
moved and there were concerns that if they were left on the 
ground for too long, the rot would promote damage or insect 
infestation to the remaining healthy trees in the area.
PROJECT OVERVIEW
A number of different shelter interventions were chosen. In 
the first weeks, the organization distributed over 86,000 Emer-
gency Shelter Kits (plastic sheeting, fixings and tools) and NFI 
kits, however the main part of the programme centred on two 
different shelter types: Recovery Shelter Kits and complete 
Transitional Shelters, both reusing the available coco-lumber.
RECOVERY SHELTER KIT  
The Recovery Shelter Kit was an upgrade from the Emergen-
cy Shelter Kit, replacing the plastic sheeting with corrugated 
galvanized iron sheets, roofin  nails and the coco-lumber. 
Technical trainings and cash grants were added, but contin-
uing to include the construction hand tools and some of the 
other fixings. The main target of this shelter type was the large 
1 This quantity was enough for more than 1 million Recovery Shelter Kits (at an 
estimate of 20 board-feet of lumber per tree, and approximately 220 board-feet 
of lumber needed per kit – the amount necessary to provide safe support for 12 
CGI sheets for roofing repairs)
The project used a flexible approach to reuse fallen coconut trees to set up a 
large-scale shelter response. Most of the milling was done by licensed chain-
saw operators, directly where the coco-lumber was sourced.
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In a few cases, transitional shelters were built in resettlement sites, such as 
this one in Tacloban, rather than on people’s original plots.
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strategy of prioritizing recovery in a varied and incremental 
approach, provided a clear framework for the organization’s 
own palette of shelter options.
Coordination had a less obvious positive impact upon the pro-
vision of WASH support to complement the shelter activities. 
At the subnational level, it was not always possible for the or-
ganization to find partners who could provide latrines for those 
with transitional shelters, for instance, despite the fact that the 
local WASH Cluster was approached in several cases.
Beyond cluster coordination, the organization developed 
important relationships with the local municipalities and ba-
rangays, with the PCA at both the national and local offices,
and with the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
Due to the frequency of natural hazards in the country, the 
organization adopted a DRR approach, and the training which 
was given to its technical workers and to beneficiaries was fo-
cused around the 8 Key Messages, developed by the Shelter 
Cluster3. Post-programme interviews showed that beneficia -
ies used more DRR measures for their roofs than for the walls 
or foundations. This was due to the higher costs of materials 
for the latter and the practical challenges of “punching into” an 
existing foundation, as well as the fact that most houses had 
the largest damage in their roofing
MAIN CHALLENGES
The greatest challenge was to scale up the “Debris to 
Shelter” approach, whilst remaining efficien , and to re-
spect commitments made to the various beneficiary commu-
nities, once the supply of materials became harder, or more 
time-consuming. Ensuring that the local vendors could re-
spond to the demand of this programme was also a key issue. 
The flexibility to scale up the operation in five sub-office , 
use different kits, and to re-assess the methods of the lumber 
preparation, was key to addressing these challenges. 
In order to implement the projects, the organization had to 
establish and recruit over 200 staff for four new field offi -
es, as well as to maintain the necessary balance between 
flexibility and rapid-decision-making at the field level, with 
needs for both support and accountability from the nation-
al office, wherein the project was managed
3 Philippines Shelter Cluster, 8 BBS Key Messages, http://bit.ly/2lANU3F.
COCO-LUMBER SUPPLY 
In the first weeks of the response, the organization sought 
to persuade beneficiary communities to provide fallen coco-
nut trees free of charge, whilst the organization would then 
take responsibility for processing them. However, by February 
2014, it became apparent that many other shelter actors were 
already paying locals for the fallen trees and that this would 
help kick-start the local economy. The organization thus 
started to pay for the lumber, from that point onwards.
As the local vendors and lumber producers did not have 
the capacity to respond to the demand yet, the organization 
worked with other humanitarian actors, who took on the 
responsibility of hauling and milling the coco-lumber. Howev-
er, in less than two months, these partnerships also came to 
a halt and the local market started to show signs of recovery, 
driving the organization to use direct procurement.
Implementing at a large scale, through small-scale sup-
pliers (often without formal business documentation), ini-
tially proved a challenge for the organization’s procurement 
department, who had experience with more formal tendering 
processes, often at a national or international level. A system 
was established based on the “pakyaw” Philippine custom-
ary supply-chain methods, whereby payment for the lumber 
would be made to one representative of a group of smaller 
suppliers. This reduced the number of individual payments, 
and accordingly the amount of paperwork to process, as well 
as consolidated the lumber deliveries in the field
After the first months, the fallen or damaged trees near ve-
hicle roads had already been taken and competition had 
increased from other shelter actors and the private sector. 
Although there was still large availability, these issues created 
delays in delivery and an upwards pressure upon the price. 
In some cases, in order to meet deadlines, some of the pro-
curement was done through larger commercial suppliers. The 
field offices had their own warehouses to aid the integra-
tion of this national and international large-bulk supply chain, 
with the local, myriad, supply chains for the coco-lumber.
PROCESSING OF THE COCO-LUMBER
For the Recovery Shelter Kits, the coco-lumber was milled in 
only one dimension (2”x3”), to speed up the milling. The tran-
sitional shelters required a wider range of lumber dimensions, 
amongst a range of industry standard sizes. Much of the mill-
ing of the lumber into its final dimensions was done using 
chainsaws. The organization relied primarily upon special-
ized “scalers”, recognized by the PCA, to grade lumber from 
different parts of the coconut trees, according to density and 
strength. However, this grading was done visually and was 
not aided by any machine. 
The organization used a variety of processing approaches:
• Initially, the lumber was processed in the locations 
where it was sourced.  
• After March 2014, when fallen coconut trees were no 
longer available near roadsides, suppliers were paid to 
bring the trunks to a central milling site.
• Later, suppliers were contracted to undertake all of the 
collection, preparation, milling and delivering to site of the 
lumber.
Overall, this project was innovative in its “Debris to Shelter” 
approach, as well as its scale-up using multiple sources, solu-
tions, and flexible approaches to supply and milling
Transitional shelters were used as a basis to recover. Families would person-
alize the shelters and add small stores and other temporary structures outside 
the shelters, which served as places for livelihood activities.
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STRENGTHS
+ The organization acted quickly to establish four fiel  
offices, each with the flexibility and authority needed
+ Flexible procurement and implementation methodol-
ogies were created, so that the local coco-lumber, collected 
by small-scale suppliers in irregular quantities, could become 
one of the main materials for a large-scale programme.
+ Local market approaches were adopted with many local 
suppliers, giving livelihoods support to a wide range of com-
munities.
+ The removal of the fallen or damaged trees was also a 
massive and necessary boost to the farmers and cooperatives 
seeking to clear the land, in order to replant new coconut trees, 
as quickly as possible.
+ Disaster Risk Reduction and Build Back Safer messag-
ing was provided for a wide range of actors in the reconstruc-
tion process: beneficiaries, local carpenters and contractors
WEAKNESSES
- The choice of coco-lumber, with its shorter lifespan, 
was not always appropriate for the shelters with a lifespan 
of longer than five years.  
- Disaster Risk Reduction trainings tended to prioritize 
only measures for strengthening roofs, rather than giving 
equal emphasis to all parts of a house.
- It was difficult to forecast eventual reductions in the 
availability of the coco-lumber, leading to delays in delivery 
in the later months of the programme.
- Some field offices were less adept at establishing part-
nerships, leading to a lack of WASH support for some shel-
ter beneficiaries
- Under-calculation of the needs for logistics, procure-
ment and finance systems and staff, during the programme 
scale-up, meant that these support departments were often 
playing catch-up after the field implementation teams
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• Flexibility is the key to scaling up solutions to 
meet needs, after large-scale natural disasters.
• Talking in terms of wider livelihood impacts can 
go a long way during engagement with a range of 
different national and local authorities, as well as with 
the beneficiary communities themselves
•  Assisting the affected communities and local au-
thorities in their recovery, working in partnership, 
enabled the organization to effectively deliver the as-
sistance in a timely manner.
• There was a significant gap in documentation 
and knowledge management, although the organi-
zation had extensive experience in disaster response 
prior to Haiyan, including in the shelter sector. Based 
on this experience, the organization developed de-
tailed Standard Operating Procedures to guide 
future shelter programmes.
•  Adding small quantities of other, thicker, dimen-
sions to the kit, (e.g. 2”x4” or even 2”x6”) might be 
appropriate for future versions. In fact, some benefi-
ciaries have re-used lumber from the kit for other pur-
poses, including the bracing of walls or the construc-
tion of toilet superstructures.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
Local people cut fallen coconut trees into planks with chainsaws (Guiuan).
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Materials in the Recovery Shelter Kit Units Quantity
Framing kit, coco-lumber, 2”x3”
Board
feet4 230
CGI sheets (roofing) pcs 12
Ridge rolls (roofing) pcs 3
CW nail #2 (fixing kit) kg 1.5
CW nail #3 (fixing kit) kg 1.5
Umbrella nails (fixing kit) kg 3
GI wire #16 (fixing kit) kg 2
Nylon rope, diameter 10mm (fixing kit) m 30
Claw hammer, 13” (tool kit) pcs 1
Combination plier, 8” (took kit) pcs 1
Aviation snips, 10” (tool kit) pcs 1
Crow bar, 18” (tool kit) pcs 1
Handsaw, 20” (tool kit) pcs 1
PVC pail, 12L (tool kit) pcs 1
Shovel pointed #2 (tool kit) pcs 1
Elasto-seal (tool kit) pcs 1
4 The board foot is a specialized unit of measure for the volume of lumber, and 
it equals 1ft x 1ft x 1in.
The project distributed timber from fallen trees for various shelter interventions.
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CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
518,878 partially damaged
493,912 totally destroyed
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS
566 barangays in 48 municipalities in 6 provinces in Central, 
Eastern and Western Visayas: Leyte, North Cebu, Iloilo, 
Aklan, Antique and Capiz. 
BENEFICIARIES
19,550 households (Relief phase).
16,585 households (Recovery phase, shelter support, 
plus 13,450 individuals with awareness and training in shel-
ter and Build Back Safer).
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
19,550 shelter relief kits (tarps + ropes), 6,313 kitchen sets, 47,875 NFI kits (blankets, mosquito nets, mats).
15,700 shelter recovery kits and materials for latrine construction.
885 transitional shelters built with latrines.
160 workshops on Build Back Safer and 450 carpenters trained and received tools.
SHELTER 
SIZE 
19.4m2 (size of the transitional shelter).
SHELTER
DENSITY
3.9m2 per person (Based on national average household 
size of 5).
MATERIALS 
COST 
USD 400 per household for the shelter recovery and tool kit.
USD 3,500 per household for the transitional shelter (excl. 
latrine, incl. labour).
PROJECT 
COST
USD 460 per household, for the relief phase.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The shelter programme spanned from re-
lief to recovery within an inter-sectoral re-
sponse. It assisted people across a wide 
geographical area, with activities such as: 
material distribution (shelter relief items, 
NFI kits and shelter recovery materials), 
transitional shelter and latrine construc-
tion, community awareness raising, tech-
nical assistance and certified training for 
carpenters.
STRENGTHS
+ High participation and accountability to affected populations.
+ Build Back Safer trainings were well received.
+ Construction trainings to carpenters enhanced their skills and in-
come opportunities.
+ Effective management of beneficiary data
+ Particular attention and response to vulnerabilities.
WEAKNESSES
- Limited coverage.
- The recovery capacity of communities could have been strengthened.
- Only 50% of beneficiaries actually used the materials received for 
repairs after four months from the distribution (source: PDM).
- Recruitment difficulties delayed implementation
- The integrated approach was not implemented very effectively.
RELIEF PHASE PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT RECOVERY SHELTER KITS DISTRIBUTION
1 2 3 4 5 6
8 NOV 2013 3 DEC 2014
31 Dec 2013: Shelter relief items distribu-
tion completed.
1 2 3
4 5 6
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PROJECT AREAS
MALAYSIA
MANILA
1. ANTIQUE 
2. AKLAN
3. CAPIZ
4. ILOILO
5. NORTH CEBU
6. LEYTE
1
2 3
4 5
6
TYPHOON HAIYAN
Jan 2014: Shelter recovery strategy developed, market 
assessments and decision on direct procurement. 
Feb 2014: Shelter kit defined
Apr 2014: Beneficiary selection process 
and Build Back Safer trainings completed.
May 2014: Temporary shelter design completed Jul 2014: Carpenter training completed.
HAIYAN HAGUPIT
TRANSITIONAL SHELTER CONSTRUCTION
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BENEFICIARY SELECTION 
Selection criteria were developed in consultation with commu-
nity leaders and members and validated by the organization. 
A participatory and inclusive approach in the selection was 
adopted to reduce tensions and not to exacerbate existing 
problems amongst community members, as not all affected 
households within a barangay could be assisted. 
Priority was given to the following groups: the elderly, wom-
en, people living with disabilities, female- and child-headed 
households, internally displaced people and those with totally 
damaged houses, along with additional vulnerability criteria.
Once compiled, the barangay committees displayed the bene-
ficiary lists for community evaluation and addressed the feed-
back through several rounds of consultation, to ensure that all 
were largely satisfied with the process
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND TEAM STRUCTURE
The operational area was divided into zones where similar 
activities were implemented, and the same organizational 
structure was used in each area. The relief-phase blanket 
distribution was directly handled by the Supply Chain Man-
agement and Accountability teams. Then, during the recovery 
phase, a sector expert (Reconstruction Manager) coordinat-
ed three international construction specialists (designated to 
each zone), who were managing hardware sectoral interven-
tions (shelter/WASH/infrastructure). Each zone had a team 
of engineers and architects who, based on experience, were 
assigned responsibility as municipal focal points or technical 
officers. Each zone had a minimum of six personnel in the 
shelter team, all reporting to the construction specialist.
Overall, approximately 25 engineers were working in the im-
plementation team for the benefi iary selection process, mate-
rial distribution, transitional shelter construction and technical 
assistance phases. Throughout the recovery phase, the sec-
tor technical team (both in the field and headquarters) were 
supported by the Supply Chain Management and Accountabil-
ity teams. Engineering Design and structural calculations for 
the transitional shelters were carried out by professional vol-
unteers, deployed by an engineering non-profit organization
LAST MILE MOBILE SOLUTIONS 
The organization adopted an innovative digital technology for 
the registration and tracking of all beneficiary data for distri-
butions, which provided real-time tracking, remote data col-
lection and management, significantly reducing registration 
times and inefficiencies, along with systematizing reporting 
processes5. This technology was used to issue a barcoded 
ID card for each head of household and was adopted for all 
distributions. The organization had in-house expertise with the 
system, so it was easier to roll out, build capacity and get the 
required equipment.
5 For more information, visit http://bit.ly/1TzqD8K.
SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON
For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, 
and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shel-
ter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.
At first, typhoon-affected families settlement options were 
classified as follows: (1) remaining in damaged homes; 
(2) host families; (3) evacuation centres; and (4) formal or 
informal camps. In an initial displacement survey, close to 
90% of evacuees reported their willingness to return home 
if provided with assistance, demonstrating that resource 
provision for self-reconstruction could be a quick way of de-
congesting displacement sites and accelerating recovery. 
Notably, many families had no legal land title or right to 
reside where they lived.
Shelter was a priority need both in the relief and recovery 
phase, followed by livelihoods and food, as shown in a base-
line survey conducted by the organization. Particularly, 77% 
of surveyed households reported that receiving materials for 
repairs was their preferred solution to shelter needs, followed 
by daily labour opportunities (19%), longer-term employment 
(16%) and land tenure security (9%) amongst others.
PROJECT PHASES AND COMPONENTS
Using shelter as an entry point for a wider inter-sectoral ap-
proach, this programme covered both the emergency relief 
phase (mainly with distribution of shelter and NFI kits) and 
the recovery phase, where the response focused on two ma-
jor outcomes: shelter – delivered mainly through distributions 
and technical assistance – and livelihoods, through certified
trainings1. These further tied into the integrated approach of 
the response, where target communities benefited from train-
ings and multisectoral interventions in areas such as WASH, 
Health and Education.
COORDINATION
The organization was actively involved in inter-agency assess-
ments2. The Liaison Officers and Sector Specialists continued 
to represent the organization at the national, provincial and 
municipal coordination meetings, wherein sharing of technical 
information and 4W data3 facilitated decisions on the nature of 
responses and operational areas.
TARGETING OF LOCATIONS  
Municipalities and barangays (villages) were selected based 
on organizational tools4, which used the following formula:
Need = extent of damage x intensity of damage x pre-typhoon 
vulnerability. 
The tools relied upon publically available data, allowing the 
response team to gain a clear picture of the areas in need 
and how resources should be allocated. After shortlisting the 
locations, consultations were held with local authorities due 
to their local knowledge, as well as using data from the Clus-
ter on other organizations’ activities, to avoid duplication of 
efforts.
1 Trainings were certified by the Technical Education and Skills Development 
Authority, http://www.tesda.gov.ph/.
2 Namely, the Multi Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (http://bit.ly/2lXnXvv) and 
Children’s MIRA (http://uni.cf/2kB9mFC).
3 The 4W is an information management tool capturing What activities are im-
plemented, by Whom, Where and When during a humanitarian response.
4 The Overview of Affected Municipalities (OAM) and the Barangay Prioritisation 
Tool (BPaT).
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The project prefabricated trusses and built transitional shelters.
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LAND OWNERSHIP 
The majority of beneficiaries had lived in the same location 
for many years, in some cases across generations, based 
on informal agreements. Thus, consultation was held with 
community members, barangay leaders and beneficiaries, to 
ensure there would not be threat of eviction. Many landown-
ers expressed no problems with beneficiaries rebuilding in 
the same location, as long as the structures were not perma-
nent. Barangay leaders undertook the responsibility of 
resolving issues and negotiating on behalf of the beneficia -
ies, should any land issues arise. MoUs were also signed 
with the municipalities, barangays and beneficiaries  
indicating the leaders’ responsibilities and that should a ben-
eficiary relocate, they would disassemble the structure and 
reuse the materials elsewhere. As a result, during the imple-
mentation period, minimal complaints were received on land 
issues.
INVOLVEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE 
Affected people were engaged from the assessment up to the 
evaluation stage. They identified their top priorities and ways 
of addressing them through participatory workshops. The ben-
eficiary selection and feedback mechanism allowed the whole 
community to engage with the project processes. Storage 
spaces for the materials during distribution and construction 
was provided by the barangay, and the community as a whole 
was responsible for the safety of the materials. Beneficiarie  
monitored the progress of construction of their own transitional 
shelters, ensuring any contracted labour completed the work 
to standard. Barangay members were allocated the respon-
sibility of monitoring the overall self-reconstruction progress 
across the villages, for those using the shelter kits.
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION COMPONENTS 
Most of the affected population resided in geographical loca-
tions which are prone to natural hazards, such as river banks, 
the coastal belt and areas subject to flooding. As a result, DRR 
and climate change adaptation was a focus throughout 
the response and local authorities and relevant partners were 
actively engaged. The Build Back Safer training and messag-
ing were made available at the barangay halls for further refer-
ence to all community members, not only direct beneficiaries  
The design of the temporary shelter was developed in close 
consultation with community members, and pilot shelters 
were first constructed directly by the organization, to show 
best practices and serve as a model to be replicated. Spe-
cific guidance was also provided on land selection and site 
planning, to encourage people living in unsafe areas to be 
informed on how to identify and negotiate for safer locations.
The Build Back Safer principles that were most common-
ly adopted by the beneficiaries during the repairs were: con-
struction of a simple-shaped shelter (77%), identification of a 
safe location (71%), use of strong joints (62%), bracing (60%) 
and good roofing (53%)
Additionally, a local-level advocacy approach was used to 
increase dialogue between ordinary citizens and relevant gov-
ernment entities which provide services to the public, aiming 
to improve the implementation of national DRR policy at the 
municipal level.
MAIN CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED
LOGISTICS AND QUALITY CONTROL. The logistics team was 
stretched due to the widely spread operational areas and the 
extent of the shelter response, as well as that of the other sec-
tors’ activities. In addition, materials’ quality control required 
extensive commitment and resources. It was initially difficult to 
find sta f with appropriate skill sets to meet these challenges.
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT. The slow recovery of local 
businesses, the high demand of construction materials and 
climatic conditions affecting the transport route, all impacted 
the overall delivery of the programme. In addition, a shortage 
in supply of good coco-lumber and bamboo strips further af-
fected the programme.
AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES. Although the programme 
was designed in close consultation with community leaders 
and beneficiaries, not all families managed to rebuild their 
damaged homes with the assistance provided, mainly be-
cause they lacked necessary materials. For those who were 
unable to build by themselves, the main challenge was to 
find the resources required to hire skilled labour or to pur-
chase additional material. This was mainly due to a lack of 
alternative funding options, particularly because of the delay 
of the government’s cash assistance, which was originally an-
ticipated to complement the shelter initiative.
CLIMATIC HAZARDS. In December 2014, Typhoon Hagupit 
made landfall just north of Leyte, followed by series of others 
storms. Vital roadways were blocked by landslides, road 
slips, or washed-away bridges. The damage to infrastruc-
ture, coupled with the staff being deployed to other emergen-
cy responses, caused resources to be stretched and generat-
ed delays in this programme.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
In the later stages of the response, the barangay disaster 
management committee and the trained carpenters were 
provided further Build Back Safer training, so that they could 
continue to deliver similar trainings in their communities and 
monitor the building of houses and structures. These train-
ings served as a replicable approach that could be used 
in other communities.
Safety measures for construction workers were empha-
sized throughout the programme, and all staff with access to 
beneficiaries were briefed on Child Protection and Preven-
tion of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse protocols. Commu-
nity briefings on contractual obligations of contractors and 
workers and site protection measures (such as site demar-
cation to avoid children wandering around the construction) 
were also carried out, so that there would be a base for com-
munity monitoring and mutual accountability. Although new 
in the communities, it was agreed that this approach would 
be adopted for future construction activities.
©
 W
or
ld
 V
is
io
n
The project included distributions (North Cebu, left) and built model structures 
for Build Back Safer trainings delivered to communities (right).
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STRENGTHS
 
+ High community participation and accountability to 
affected populations. The exhaustive community consul-
tation ensured that all voices were heard and responded 
to. The feedback received was also used to refine interven-
tions and take corrective actions when needed, regarding 
scheduling of activities, quality of materials and workmanship.
+ The Build Back Safer trainings were well received by 
all sections of the community, who participated actively and 
were interested to learn more. Further, carpenters from the 
community were involved in developing the model structures 
and trainings, which gave them an opportunity to demonstrate 
their newly acquired knowledge and skills.
+ Construction trainings provided to carpenters substan-
tially enhanced their skills and their income generation oppor-
tunities, as they were certified by a government authorit .
+ Effective management of beneficiary data from registra-
tion to delivery, monitoring and timely reporting, thanks to the 
use of the digital Last Mile Mobile Solutions technology, which 
allowed a streamlined multisectoral response.
+ Particular attention and response to vulnerabilities. For 
example, latrines were constructed in such a way that privacy 
and security were guaranteed for all users: no gaps in the 
lower portion of the walls, provision of locks and within close 
proximity to individual shelters. During distributions, vulnera-
ble persons, such as the elderly and women with nursing chil-
dren, were the first to receive provisions
WEAKNESSES
- Limited coverage. As the response targeted only totally 
damaged houses, entire populations were not reached. On 
one hand, the needs of the most vulnerable in the selected 
barangays were largely met, despite limited resources. On 
the other, there was the potential for a wider impact in the 
communities if the organization had advocated through the 
cluster for other agencies to support the families who were not 
reached by this programme.  
- The communities’ existing capacities were not well iden-
tified early on and incorporated into the programme. There 
were regional variations in the rate of recovery, demonstrating 
the absorptive and adaptive capacity of different communi-
ties and revealing the need for contextual interventions. This 
transformative capacity could have been strengthened 
through increased collaboration with community members or 
advocacy with local government and NGOs. This was con-
firmed in the monitoring and evaluation phases, wherein ba-
rangays with community mobilizers had a higher percentage 
of houses repaired or rebuilt.
- Despite the target beneficia ies having totally damaged 
houses, post-distribution monitoring found that only 50% 
of them had actually used the materials received to carry 
out repairs on their homes (four months after the distribution), 
while the rest mainly stockpiled the materials. Additionally, the 
majority of materials for latrine construction (for those where 
works were pending or on-going) were stockpiled or used for 
shelter repair, whilst a number of beneficiaries who sold la-
trine materials, used the proceeds to buy additional materials 
for shelter repair. The organization assumed that the govern-
ment’s emergency cash assistance would facilitate material 
purchases and payment of labour, though this did not happen 
in a timely manner. Increased advocacy with the govern-
ment (through the cluster) on the complementarity of re-
sponses would have helped.
- The integrated approach was not implemented very ef-
fectively, requiring multiple assessments, beneficiary lists 
and numerous rounds of distributions and community meet-
ings, due to the limited understanding of how to operationalize 
such approach to meet shelter, livelihood and food security 
needs. Ultimately, it was not clear how the multisector inter-
vention contributed to overall recovery.
www.shelterprojects.org
Items in the shelter recovery kit Unit Quantity
Tools
20” or 22” Handsaw, Claw hammer, Tape measure 
(3m), Shovel, Machete, Hoe or Pick Mattock, Crow 
bar, Tin snips, Chisel.
pcs 1 each
Gloves pair 2
Shelter materials
10ft length, 4mm Corrugated Galvanized Iron sheets;
10ft length, 4mm CGI ridge roll, 18” wide;
4”, 3” and 2” common wire nails;
Umbrella nails, twisted shank;
4”x4”x12” Coco-lumber;
2”x4”x12” Coco-lumber; 
1/2”x4’x8’ marine plywood.
sheets
pcs
kg
kg
pcs
pcs
sheets
12
2
3 + 2 + 3
2.5
4
12
6
LEARNINGS 
• To ensure a timely shelter response, adequate planning for the pre-positioning of goods and contracts, streamlining 
procurement and administrative processes, and improving distribution systems must be undertaken, particular-
ly in contexts where disasters are likely to happen cyclically.
• It is important to allow sufficient time for the roll out of shelter activities, so that continued technical assistance 
can be provided to households and closer integration of shelter and WASH interventions ensured. Operations 
could have been more effective if distribution, technical assistance, monitoring and site planning were carried out as a 
single unit.
•  Managing expectations. While trying to achieve programmatic objectives, engagement and communication with 
households who were not selected for support was necessary. 
• Cash-based and livelihood programming can enable income generation, which can then be invested in asset building. In 
this case, better complementarity of the livelihood programme with the shelter component would have facilitated 
the reconstruction efforts.
•  In terms of community level cohesion, it was noted that capitalizing on the “bayaninhan” system of community 
support and cooperation was vital to the effectiveness of the programme.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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CRISIS Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda), 8 November 2013.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
518,878 partially damaged
493,912 totally destroyed
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 3,424,593 households (16,078,181 persons).
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS
11 barangays spread across two distinct regions:
Guiuan (Eastern Samar) and Coron (Palawan). 
BENEFICIARIES 3,197 households (16,209 people).
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
1,028 houses (668 new houses and 360 repair).
505 individuals trained in hazard-proof construction.
744 houses with improved sanitation.
OTHER
OUTPUTS
41 community managed projects, which included: an estimated 100,000+ paid labour days for implementing 
community projects; 49 livelihood groups capacitated; 20 livelihood projects funded; 72 water interventions constructed; 
6,000km2 cultivated for vegetable production; 42 community registered organizations continuing beyond programme life.
SHELTER SIZE 11.5-23m2 (sizes varied as beneficiaries could choose from different designs).
SHELTER
DENSITY
Average of 4m2 per person (Based on national average household size of 5 and average shelter size of 
20m2. Yet size/densities were ultimately determined by community needs based on direct consultation).
MATERIALS 
COST 
USD 2,250 per household on average, including a latrine (Most families also contributed salvaged materials 
or other resources to expand upon the basic core shelter design).
PROJECT COST USD 2,550 per household on average.
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This community-led resilient recovery programme supported remote indigenous communities on sectors including shelter, 
infrastructure, livelihoods, WASH and Disaster Risk Reduction. The projects adopted an integrated approach, taking shelter 
as an entry point for area-based programming and then expanding to a broader programme of community resilience-building. 
The different offices were given flexibility on implementation within a common principle of maximizing communities’ agency. 
Communities were allowed to manage their own funds, planning and implementation of the activities.
STRENGTHS
+ Adaptable and contextual programme.
+ Communities and households were given full control.
+ Capacity-building and technical advice supported the owner-driven 
approach.
+ Recovery programming successfully transitioned into development 
issues.
+ Early projects that served the whole community won their trust.
WEAKNESSES
- The development of new methodologies was not adequately docu-
mented.
- Alignment of programmes in distant areas proved challenging.
- Engagement with the local government was difficult
- Recruitment difficulties delayed implementation
- The scope of the programme could have been expanded to cover 
more communities.
EMERGENCY PHASE
EARLY RECOVERY PHASE RECOVERY / RESILIENCE PHASE HANDOVER
1 2 3 4 5
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Apr 2014: Households assessments begin1 2 3
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LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
The geographic regions were chosen strategically, to cov-
er a broad sweep of contexts and to eventually pull in different 
sources of funding. Within those regions, early assessments 
helped target a combination of hard-hit and inherently vulner-
able communities. Within each community, the whole pop-
ulation was then targeted for the integrated resilience ap-
proach, with projects such as health centres, water systems, 
sea walls, etc.
Detailed social and technical assessment determined 
which portion of the population was more or less affect-
ed by the typhoon and, specifically in regard to the shelter 
programme, those who qualified for housing assistance (de-
stroyed or severely damaged home). Within these, the final
selection was made by applying vulnerability criteria (de-
fined by community groups during workshops) and voting. 
This process varied for each community. Broadly, facilitators 
aimed for the establishment of criteria by the community (e.g. 
elderly, single headed household, etc.) and then summed the 
voted scores for each potential beneficiar . However, in some 
cases, decisions were taken outside of this rigid framework. 
Transparency meetings were established to follow up on 
selection appeals, among other activities. Contentious selec-
tions did occasionally arise, usually due to pre-existing social 
conflicts within communities. In these cases, inclusive com-
munity meetings usually provided the best forum to resolve 
differences and reach consensus.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
After initial distributions of emergency NFIs through local 
partners, the organization focused on developing the re-
silient recovery programme for a two year recovery phase, 
building on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) methodologies.
Shelter and community infrastructure needs were iden-
tified through early assessment and begun in the first year. 
This was then broadened out into integrated programming 
including Livelihood, WASH, DRR and Health. 
Livelihood programming in particular became very important 
in addressing the impacts on the fishing communities and 
building towards longer-term economic resilience – both di-
rectly (e.g. Market Hub, Seaweed Cooperative, Rice/Fish/
Fuel Resellers) and indirectly (e.g. community labour and 
logistics for all construction projects, local procurement of 
materials, boat landings to enhance trade). These projects 
were all implemented alongside existing activities, during the 
second year.
The organization was determined to use a participatory 
approach, granting communities agency and sense of 
ownership over the project outputs. Therefore, the entire 
CONTEXT
For an overview of the situation before and after the disaster, 
and the national shelter response, see overview A.23 in Shel-
ter Projects 2013-2014 and overview A.8 in this edition.
The communities targeted by this programme spread across 
distinct geographic regions of the country, encompassing a 
variety of contexts, including regions affected by recurrent 
extreme weather, marginalized indigenous communities 
and remote small island communities. All were known to be 
impacted by climate-induced hazards.
SITUATION AFTER THE TYPHOON
Needs varied by region. The town of Coron was not severely af-
fected, so supply lines were established rapidly and those who 
could afford them purchased basic items in town. Two months 
after the disaster, the market was almost back to normal.
The organization conducted a Multisector Initial Rapid As-
sessment in Coron immediately after the typhoon, determining 
that 18% of houses were destroyed and 23% were severely 
damaged. In another early assessment, community members 
indicated that they were not familiar with resilient construction 
techniques (due to the significantly less frequent occurrence 
of typhoons in the western regions). In addition, they were 
observed to suffer from a number of small-island development 
issues, ranging from poor access to education, to water short-
ages and coastal livelihoods threatened by climate change.
Most affected were the coastal fishing communities, whose 
means and sources of income had been destroyed or dam-
aged to a large extent. Also the physical damage to houses, 
schools and other communal facilities was greater in coastal 
communities, which were already in vulnerable positions be-
fore the typhoon.
RESILIENT RECOVERY APPROACH
The programme followed a “resilient recovery approach”, us-
ing and strengthening available capacities in the communities 
as much as possible. This focuses on organizing the commu-
nities around the common goal of resilience building, beyond 
strengthening their physical environment (e.g. shelter and in-
frastructure) and including livelihood groups, new knowledge 
and increased social capital and organizational capacity.
The approach allows for local people to exchange knowledge 
and encourages the community to analyse why buildings col-
lapse and how to make them stronger. Ultimately, it encourag-
es programme design to take place together with its “clients”, 
in order to properly meet their needs – involving communities 
in meaningful decision-making, engineering shelters together 
with local builders and not forcing a “one size fits all” design
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NATURAL DISASTER
55SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
A.13 / PHILIPPINES 2013-2015 / TYPHOON HAIYAN ASIA - PACIFIC
programme was designed to be delivered through con-
ditional cash transfers, with community and households 
taking an active role in managing the projects, while being 
supported by capacity-building and technical guidance 
from the organization.
HOUSING PROJECTS  
For the housing project, a variety of contextual methodol-
ogies were trialled in each different area. In the harder-hit 
eastern part of the Philippines, the projects focused more on 
meeting shelter needs, including the implementation of a re-
pairs programme, while in the western areas the lesser ur-
gency allowed for greater diversification of programming and 
funds.
In one project area, architects from the organization sat with 
each family and customized each house design based on the 
beneficiaries  preferences. In another, several housing types 
were designed based on community consultation, and the 
beneficiaries could choose from them. All house designs were 
drawn by a combination of architects and engineers, making 
sure to adhere to local vernacular design, while meeting 
technical standards. In particular, wind resistance required 
different standards between the East and West of the country, 
based on building codes and variance in typhoon wind speed.
Additionally, some areas employed a cluster-based manage-
ment of housing projects: entire groups of families would 
progress through the cash tranches together, while in other 
areas beneficiar  families were treated separately. This varie-
ty was experimental, but ultimately helped to contextualize the 
project for each area.
Once the projects begun, communities and households 
would handle an unprecedented level of responsibility, 
managing all the project funds, handling material procure-
ment, record keeping, organizing logistics, hiring and paying 
their own labour force and managing construction. A strict 
upholding of the cash tranche conditions ensured that 
beneficiaries would follow the technical guidelines of the or-
ganization’s engineers and build according to their typhoon 
resilient standards and designs. In the case of deviation from 
these conditions, or misuse of the funds, individual projects 
(or in some cases housing clusters) would have their tranche 
payments suspended. However, this turned out to be very rare 
(less than 5% of cases) and successful resolutions were al-
ways found.
Additionally, a master-builder programme (practical train-
ing and on-site mentoring) was established, to support the 
housing projects through to completion. Experienced local 
carpenters and masons were trained and contracted to man-
age housing clusters.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
To make all this possible, the organization had to support the 
communities with a rigorous set of capacity-building work-
shops, including on financial literacy, bookkeeping, man-
agement, construction and leadership. The organization put 
significant resources into hiring many community organizers 
and technical staff, as well as partnering with a local commu-
nity-development organization to capacitate the staff.
Additionally, a Transparency Strategy established tools 
and mechanisms to manage feedback and complaints 
Examples of the houses built through the programme. Each household was free to adopt a different design, and manage the construction directly.
In early risk assessments, communities were facilitated to an-
alyse their own risk, develop their own risk-proofing strategies, 
write their own project proposals and submit them to the organ-
ization for review and approval. For some elements of program-
ming, such as infrastructure, communities were even given deci-
sion-making power over their total budget, deciding themselves 
which projects to invest in based on their value for money and 
impact towards resilience-building. 
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within the community and resolve issues internally, while 
maintaining accountability. Features included regular com-
munity meetings, an anonymous suggestion box for deal-
ing with potentially contentious issues, and notice boards 
to expand communication of messages (and in some cases 
even construction receipts) beyond those who attended meet-
ings. When issues arose, they would first be dealt with at 
community level, and under certain circumstances escalated 
up, eventually to the organization’s regional level, for external 
judgement. Only a few dozen cases ever reached this level, 
and supplementary facilitation was provided to avoid potential 
conflict
Each project had community-assigned management 
teams with respective responsibilities, usually including a pro-
ject manager, construction site foreman and treasurer. Roles 
were identified based on advice from the engineers and avail-
able funds within each project. Later in the programme, some 
large community infrastructure projects even experimented 
with establishing community auditing teams. This was par-
ticularly well received and led to less management problems 
and smoother running of the projects.
RACIAL DIVISION CHALLENGES 
In Coron, indigenous leaders initially refused to work with the 
migrant communities. In the end, dialogue workshops and 
suspension of the programme worked to resolve differenc-
es and allow access to the whole population. However, this 
required the organization to adopt a more interventionist ap-
proach than usual. This reflects the conflict that sometimes 
arises between participatory approaches and organizational 
control.
KEY MESSAGES AND DESIGN SOLUTIONS 
Building on the Shelter Cluster 8 Key Messages1, design 
details and safe building location were emphasized and 
demonstrated through the construction features and site lo-
cation of each house, rather than through a single prescriptive 
design, aiming towards replication by the larger community. 
In partnership with an international construction NGO, these 
features were codified and made obligatory through a 
checklist that was distributed to beneficiarie 2. Compliance 
was checked through inspection by the primary organization’s 
engineers and linked directly to cash tranche releases.
Following vernacular construction practices, all shelters were 
designed to be core houses that could be expanded over 
time. Supported by the livelihood components of the project, 
in time benefici ries could raise the resources necessary to 
extend the structure, as is traditionally performed. While it is 
hard to control the quality of future extensions, the core house 
itself was designed to resist in the case of another typhoon, 
leaving each family with a hub from which to build back from.
While a better understanding of resilient building details was 
established, the replication of such details outside of the 
1 See overview A.8 and find the 8 Key Messages online at http://bit.ly/2lANU3F.
2 Some of the contextually new features introduced to local communities in-
cluded bolts on major connections (e.g. columns to trusses), bracing and cross 
bracing in the walls and roof, minimum numbers of nails for each connection, 
poured concrete pad foundations (as opposed to the less durable timber post 
foundation used locally), connecting the timber column dry footing to the foun-
dations to withstand wind uplift forces, nailed blocking to fasten purlins to joists, 
and timber treatment for termite protection.
programme was seen to be limited, in light of the economic 
circumstances of each family. For example, while some people 
could afford extra nails to strengthen important connections, 
few were willing to invest in the relatively expensive bolts.
MATERIALS SOURCING AND TRANSPORT 
Being set in areas where markets were still functioning, the 
projects granted responsibility to beneficiaries to pro-
cure locally, according to pre-agreed specifications (included 
in the agreement between the beneficiary and the organiza-
tion) and transport their own materials to site. By outsourc-
ing the procurement and logistics burden, the beneficiary
communities were given more choice and agency over the 
project and its implementation. This worked especially well in 
Coron where, spread across remote islands, community man-
agement of logistics utilized local knowledge of the waters 
and transport routes, making great savings in costs and ef-
ficiencies in the process
The only point of concern was the rare occurrence of illegal 
timber use from local forests. Because of the superior qual-
ity compared to local timber markets, some beneficiaries were 
occasionally tempted to cut down forest timber, also to save 
on costs. In the end, this risk was mitigated by coordination 
with the government forestry department and local adminis-
tration. The organization played its role by the fast and trans-
parent suspension of projects where such cases arose, and 
warning against the practice of illegal procurement.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
Improvements were made in community organization and pro-
ject management, safety of houses, new and rebuilt communi-
ty infrastructure, increased knowledge, income diversification
and the re-establishment of local businesses. The involve-
ment of affected people in the programme ultimately ena-
bled the communities to be safer and more resilient to ty-
phoons than before. The approach also helped communities 
organize preparedness plans supported by the Local Govern-
ment Unit, national policies, laws and financing arrangements.
With the appropriate adjustments, and largely based on expe-
riences from this programme, the organization’s Resilient 
Recovery Approach was used again, most notably in Nepal 
after the earthquake of 2015.
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STRENGTHS
+ Adaptable and contextual programme that remained 
relevant in a changing environment, allowed by a flexibl  
funding.
+ Communities and households were given full control 
over implementation funds and took on much of the responsi-
bilities, allowing them to truly lead and take ownership of the 
project.
+ The focus on capacity-building and technical advice 
supported the owner-driven, community-managed, approach 
to become a success.
+ Recovery programming successfully transitioned into 
development issues and became the basis for long term 
community development programming.
+ Winning the communities’ trust with early projects that 
served all, smoothed the way for participation and coopera-
tion later on.
WEAKNESSES
- Time and resources to properly document the development 
of new methodologies were not adequately allocated.  
- Alignment of programmes on different sides of the coun-
try proved challenging in some areas. Because ultimately 
the programmes developed quite differently, some systems 
and structures designed for one context could not be easily 
adopted for the other.
- Engagement with the local government was difficult, due 
to their limited capacity and the organization’s community-fo-
cused, bottom-up, approach.
- Recruitment difficulties early on, specifically in relation to 
specialized roles such as engineers, delayed critical paths to 
implementation.
- In hindsight, the scope of the programme could have 
been expanded to cover more communities without compro-
mising on quality. In balancing the quality vs. scale dilemma, 
smaller scale interventions were chosen, to maximize impact 
in the selected communities.
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• Conditional cash transfers can be an effective tool for strengthening the owner-driven approach in shelter construc-
tion, while retaining quality control for the organization.
• Communities can be capacitated to take on more responsibilities in shelter implementation. Areas such as 
logistics and procurement can be managed by the beneficiaries, if training is provided and markets are functioning
• In supporting self-recovery, shelter programming should be used as a platform to promote broader learning about 
resilient construction techniques and look beyond traditional shelter outputs.
•  Resilience Programmes require “smart baselines” in order to evaluate beyond the programmatic outputs. Baselines 
should include elements of social assessment and aim to reflect knowledge, attitudes and behavioural change
• Elements of typhoon-resilient house design will not be replicated if the materials go beyond the usual budget of home-
owners (e.g. bolts vs. nails). Sometimes, weaker (yet cheaper) alternatives should be used, in order to aspire 
towards replicability and ultimately engender behavioural change.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
The programme led to a variety of community-wide infrastructure projects and communal facilities, led by the communities themselves.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
On 13 March 2015, Category 5 Tropical Cyclone Pam 
struck the archipelago of Vanuatu. The government and 
various national and international organizations first re-
sponded with the delivery of emergency shelter items: tar-
paulins, shelter tool kits and kitchen sets. The response 
then moved to supporting self-recovery and strengthening 
resilience through safe shelter awareness and fixing kits. 
The Shelter Cluster, activated for the first time in Vanuatu 
for this response, then remained active for preparedness 
as part of the Vanuatu clusters platform.
VANUATU 2015 / TROPICAL CYCLONE PAM
CRISIS
Tropical Cyclone Pam,
Vanuatu, 13 March 2015.
TOTAL HOUSES
DAMAGED
16,256 houses: 
8,155 damaged; 8,101 destroyed.
TOTAL PEOPLE
AFFECTED 188,000 people. 
PEOPLE SUPPORTED 26,304 households.
RESPONSE OUTPUTS 
(households)
26,304 tarpaulins. 
13,420 shelter tool kits. 
8,215 safe shelter awareness. 
6,783 fixing kits. 
EFATE (Rural)
Agencies
AAR Japan, ADRA, ADRA (w/ HfH), Caritas, 
Disability Desk, The Salvation Army, VRC/IFRC, 
VRC/IFRC (w/ IOM), VRC/FRC, World Vision, Act 
for Peace
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 1,276
- Shelter Tool Kit: 1,513
- Tarpaulin: 6,481
EFATE (Port-Vila)
Agencies
AAR Japan, ADRA, ADRA (w/ HfH), Caritas, 
Disability Desk, NDMO, Save the Children, 
VRC/IFRC, VRC/IFRC (w/ IOM), World Vision
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 1,493
- Shelter Tool Kit: 944
- Tarpaulin: 4,372
TANNA
Agencies
CARE International, Caritas, Samaritan's Purse, 
The Salvation Army, VRC/FRC, World Vision
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 5,384
- Shelter Tool Kit: 8,101
- Tarpaulin: 9,673
ERROMANGO
Agencies
CARE International
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 0
- Shelter Tool Kit: 576
- Tarpaulin: 504
ANEITYM
Agencies
Samaritan’s Purse
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 247
- Shelter Tool Kit: 0
- Tarpaulin: 247
MATASO
Agencies
VRC/IFRC, Act for Peace
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 20
- Shelter Tool Kit: 20
- Tarpaulin: 60
MALEKULA
Agencies
VRC/FRC, Butterfly Trust
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 54
- Shelter Tool Kit: 54
- Tarpaulin: 74
MAKIRA
Agencies
VRC/IFRC
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 41
- Shelter Tool Kit: 41
- Tarpaulin: 35
EMAU, LELEPA, MOSO, 
NGUNA, PELE
Agencies
Disability Desk, VRC/IFRC, NDMO, World Vision
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 753
- Shelter Tool Kit: 790
- Tarpaulin: 789
AMBRYM
Agencies
ADRA, Save the Children
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 0
- Shelter Tool Kit: 0
- Tarpaulin: 1,338
ANIWA
Agencies
Care International
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 0
- Shelter Tool Kit: 138
- Tarpaulin: 138
BUNINGA
Agencies
VRC/IFRC
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 8
- Shelter Tool Kit: 8
- Tarpaulin: 8
TONGARIKI
Agencies
VRC/IFRC
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 55
- Shelter Tool Kit: 55
- Tarpaulin: 55
TONGOA
Agencies
Caritas, Save the Children (w/ 
IOM) , VRC/IFRC, Act for Peace
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 102
- Shelter Tool Kit: 568
- Tarpaulin: 835
EPI
Agencies
Caritas, Save the 
Children (w/ IOM)
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 322
- Shelter Tool Kit: 527
- Tarpaulin: 1,105
IFIRA
Agencies
NDMO
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 0
- Shelter Tool Kit: 0
- Tarpaulin: 1
Data sourced from 
SC 3W Reports
Map sourced from
UN OCHA COD
Shelter Cluster Vanuatu – HAP/Cluster Objective 1 (as of 31 July 2015)
AMBAE
Agencies
VRC/IFRC (w/ IOM)
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 14
- Shelter Tool Kit: 14
- Tarpaulin: 28
PENTECOST
Agencies
VRC/IFRC, World 
Vision, Caritas
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 260
- Shelter Tool Kit: 1
- Tarpaulin: 561
PAAMA
Agencies
Vanuatu Red Cross
No. of Households
- Kitchen Set: 0
- Shelter Tool Kit: 70
- Tarpaulin: 0
AUG
EMERGENCY RESPONSE RECOVERY
14 Mar 2015: Deployment of Shelter Cluster Coordinator to support 
the Government of Vanuatu for the shelter response.
22 Mar 2015: First distributions of emergency shelter materials.
4 May 2015: Humanitarian Action Plan target of 18,000 households 
reached with tarpaulins.
15 May 2015: Shelter & Settlement vulnerability assessment completed.
31 Jul 2015: End of the humanitarian phase, clusters coordination plat-
form ended and transitioned to the Recovery Framework.
17 Aug 2015: Shelter Cluster response evaluation to inform the effec-
tiveness of the shelter operational response and the recovery and pre-
paredness strategies following Cyclone Pam.
1
4
2
5
3
6
Map of shelter and NFI activities implemented by location, as of 31 July 2015 
(Source: Shelter Cluster Vanuatu). The tropical cyclone cause extensive damage 
in several provinces, including Efate Island, where the capital Port Vila is located.
1 2 43 5 6
T
IM
E
L
IN
E
The cyclone affected public buildings as well as private ones.
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CONTEXT
Vanuatu is a Y-shaped archipelago in the Pacific, with more 
than 80 islands and a population of 262,691 people – 80% of 
whom live on their land from generations and follow vernacular 
practices. It is among the countries with highest risks of natural 
hazards including cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic events and 
climate change1. The archipelago sits along a volatile seismic 
strip called the “Ring of Fire”. The tropical cyclone season in 
Vanuatu normally runs from November to April. Throughout this 
period there is a high risk of strong winds and heavy rains with 
associated flooding, landslides and road closures
In Vanuatu as elsewhere in the Pacific, traditional coping 
mechanisms help to significantly lessen disaster impacts. For 
example, the understanding of weather patterns and forma-
tion of clouds over the island, or the observations of sea birds, 
indicate impending strong winds, helping to alert local people 
to prepare adequately. Such local response capacity has 
been reinforced through provincial disaster committees 
based in remote islands, offering coordination and support 
at a more local level. Many Vanuatu inhabitants (ni-vans) 
are skilled at building or repairing their own dwellings and, 
therefore, a large percentage of the population live in self-built 
houses, made of natural materials that are available locally.
Recognizing its status as one of the most disaster-prone 
countries in the world, Vanuatu has set up a national struc-
ture for disaster preparedness and emergency operations. 
The cluster coordination mechanism was adopted by the Na-
tional Disaster Management Office (NDMO) and the Vanuatu 
Humanitarian Team in 2011. The NDMO had contacted the 
lead agency of the Shelter Cluster within the Pacific Humani-
tarian Team three weeks prior to Cyclone Pam, to support the 
establishment of a Shelter Cluster, which did not exist within 
the existing cluster coordination platform in Vanuatu.
In some communities, NGOs have been working in partner-
ship with NDMO to establish Provincial and Community Dis-
aster Committees in order to facilitate the necessary training 
to enable them to monitor hazards (e.g. using cyclone track-
ing maps), mobilize or evacuate communities and conduct 
an initial assessment of the effects of the disaster.
SITUATION AFTER THE CYCLONE 
The cyclone caused widespread damage across five prov-
inces, its eye passing close to Efate Island in Shefa Prov-
ince, where the capital Port Vila is located, with winds around 
250km/hr, and gusts peaking at 320km/hr. According to the 
Government of Vanuatu, 188,000 people were affected by 
the cyclone. Various elements, such as community disaster 
preparedness, traditional coping mechanisms, early warning 
systems and access to evacuation centres, helped to pre-
vent a higher death toll, with only 11 fatalities reported. Nev-
ertheless, the cyclone had a devastating impact on many 
government and community buildings, infrastructure, forests, 
agriculture, water supply systems, and particularly housing. 
The Post Disaster Needs Assessment, conducted in June 
2015, estimated that 8,101 houses were totally destroyed 
and 8,155 were partially damaged. Damage to housing rep-
resented one third of total monetary damages. On some is-
lands, more than 90% of houses were reported as dam-
aged or destroyed. Thousands of people were temporarily 
displaced to makeshift evacuation centres such as schools, 
churches and community buildings. 
1 Vanuatu ranks first in the WorldRiskIndex 2014 for its exposure to natural 
disasters: http://bit.ly/2hQXgTz,
Unsurprisingly, the buildings that suffered the most dam-
ages were those outside traditional communities – mainly in 
informal settlements – that were made of mixed tradition-
al and modern materials and incompatible construction 
systems. After Cyclone Pam, many of these were being re-
built the same way as before, thus recreating (when not ex-
acerbating) the same hazard vulnerabilities, due to a lack of 
proper materials, building know-how and financial resources2. 
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY AND RESPONSE
Due to the impact of the disaster (almost 70% population af-
fected), the National Disaster Committee, following receipt of 
damage assessment reports, decided that relief efforts had to 
be applied at all times on a fair and equal basis (according to 
needs), and to adhere to the government’s “self-help” concept 
wherever possible. The use of cash to support self-recovery 
was not encouraged, due to cultural acceptance, weak mar-
kets in Port Vila, limited stock in country or a non-existent mar-
ket on outer islands. Shelter and housing recovery had started 
rapidly, showing once again the resilience of ni-vans. 
The Shelter Cluster became officially active for the first time in 
Vanuatu after the Prime Minister’s Office assigned the Public 
Works Department to lead it with the support of the international 
agency identified before the cyclone. The Department of Local 
Affairs, the National Disaster Management Office and another 
international agency were closely supporting the Cluster, re-
flecting the inter-relatedness of humanitarian shelter and long-
term housing issues. At its peak, the Shelter Cluster consisted 
of 23 partner agencies.
In response to Pam, the main goal of the Shelter Cluster was 
to support self-recovery through the provision of appropriate 
tools, materials and technical assistance. This was achieved 
primarily through the distribution of tarpaulins (to 26,304 
households) and tools (to 13,420 households) during the re-
lief phase. In addition, safe shelter awareness was provided 
to 8,215 households, fixing kits and construction materials to 
6,783 households to complement the initiatives of the affected 
households to repair, retrofit or rebuild their dwellings, and 
make them more resilient to future cyclones and other natural 
hazards, by mainstreaming the Build Back Safer approach3. 
2 For a similar situation see A.39 (Ecuador earthquake response overview).
3 For more on technical specifications http://bit.ly/2iIliE2
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VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE AND TRADITIONAL 
COPING MECHANISMS
A significant part of the resilience of Vanuatu is founded on 
vernacular shelter- and settlement-related knowledge, prac-
tices and coping mechanisms. These include specific con-
struction materials, techniques and typologies that are a part 
of the traditional building culture, social organization and 
familial safety net that have been established over time. A 
household in Vanuatu does not refer to one nuclear fam-
ily living under one roof, but generally to an extended 
family, i.e. consisting of a number of family members (par-
ents and children) and relatives such as grandparents, aunts 
or uncles living in a number of buildings in a communal 
setting. Accordingly, the “house” is not just one building; it 
is composed of at least two dwellings with different purpose 
and design, usually centred around a communal kitchen, and 
it includes a garden. For example, in Tanna island the com-
munity kitchens or meeting places are usually designed 
and maintained to be used as safe shelters when cy-
clones strike. Men and boys hold down the wooden structure 
to add strength to the building, thus protecting women, chil-
dren and other vulnerable community members. To promote 
and preserve the ni-van resilience, the government strongly 
supported the retention and promotion of this knowledge and 
practices. 
In respect of the “do no harm” principle, humanitarian agen-
cies did not build houses, but instead provided safe-shel-
ter awareness and materials that explored ways in which 
modern construction can learn from, and be strengthened 
through, the lessons from the past. This also aimed to reacti-
vate the fading knowledge for the new generations. 
When a community chief in Tanna was asked about the major 
challenge that his community was facing with housing, he re-
plied “the introduction of western materials”. When one agency 
provided safe shelter awareness to a remote community, based 
on agreed key messages by cluster partners and government, 
the elders told the youngest: “you see, we told you”.
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Households are composed of at least two dwellings, and include shared kitchens and communal gardens. Recovery had to take into consideration all these 
elements, not only one shelter.
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Cluster partner agencies conducted Build Back Safer shelter awareness 
sessions across communities, such as this one in Tanna.
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Most of the housing in Vanuatu was built according to vernacular techniques.
LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY FORWARD
An inter-agency baseline assessment was completed fiv  
weeks after Cyclone Pam and an evaluation of the shelter 
response five months after the emergency, at the end of the 
humanitarian phase.
68% of households reported that they had received some 
kind of assistance.
76% were able to recover shelter materials from debris.
85% completed substantial repairs or reconstruction works 
to their shelter.
60% had made changes to their shelter-building techniques.
66% took preparedness measures to ensure that their shelter 
was safer in the event of another crisis.
The changes to building techniques most commonly reported 
by the households were the general strengthening of the build-
ing (46%), addition of bracing (32%), a change in the location 
of the shelter (31%), and changes to the foundation (31%).
 
Despite the demonstration of their strong resilience and capac-
ity to self-recover from the cyclone, communities’ vulnerability 
to potential new hazards remains high, as the recovery has 
been hampered by the impact of El Niño4 and the subsequent 
significant time needed for the re-establishment of stocks of 
natural building materials, as well as political instability and 
the recent disruption to the tourism industry (due to substand-
ard airport infrastructure).
Lessons from the response to cyclones Pam in Vanuatu and 
Winston in Fiji5 demonstrate that promoting Build Back 
Safer is critical to strengthen long-term resilience to 
4 The El Niño Southern Oscillation (ESNO) cycle is a scientific term that describes 
the fluctuations in temperature between ocean and atmosphere in the east-central 
Equatorial Pacific, with El Niño being the warm phase. These deviations from 
normal surface temperatures can have large-scale impacts not only on ocean 
processes, but also on global weather and climate. Source: http://bit.ly/1guBq5x
5 See overview A.15, Fiji.
natural disasters, and this approach should be at the core 
of shelter response and preparedness. It would also help to 
learn from and support the reactivation of traditional knowl-
edge, that is eroding due to a combination of factors, such 
as migration, urbanization and the passing away of elders.
These two responses in the Pacific context also demonstrate 
that the means to support affected populations’ self-recovery 
and reconstruction should differ on a contextual basis and 
follow the “do no harm” principle. Resilience could in fact 
be hampered by inappropriate response, as for the case of 
cash-based interventions or the introduction of new materi-
als and technologies to Vanuatu. 
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The Shelter Cluster had a Technical Working Group focusing on Build Back 
Safer awareness and developing a training framework with Vanuatu voca-
tional training institutions.
Shelter Cluster Vanuatu Cyclone Pam response branding. This illustrates 
the impressive resilience mechanism to cyclones and how it transfers to the 
response and coordination (Source: Shelter Cluster Vanuatu).
www.shelterprojects.org
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20-21 
FEB 2016
SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
Tropical Cyclone Winston hit Fiji on 20 February 2016. The 
emergency shelter response started with the distribution of 
shelter items by the government and various national and inter-
national organizations. The government response then moved 
to the dispersal of vouchers to access selected construction 
materials through hardware shops. Humanitarian agencies 
focused on training carpenters and homebuilders. The Shel-
ter Cluster was re-activated, to help the coordination of the 30 
organizations that contributed to the shelter response and the 
development of the Build Back Safer framework. Following the 
response, the government institutionalized the cluster system 
as a permanent mechanism for disaster management.
FIJI 2016 / TROPICAL CYCLONE WINSTON
CRISIS
Tropical Cyclone Winston, 
Fiji, 20 February 2016.
TOTAL HOUSES
DAMAGED
31,200. 19,700 (63%) damaged, 
11,500 (37%) destroyed.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
350,000 people 
(Source: Government of Fiji).
PEOPLE SUPPORTED 36,609 households.
RESPONSE OUTPUTS 
(households)
36,609 emergency shelter items 
24,505 vouchers for construction 
materials 
1,671 safe fixing kits, construction 
material or repair assistance 
110 core or transitional shelters 
19,765 emergency safe shelter 
awareness
450 semi-skilled builders and car-
penters trained on Build Back Safer
JUL SEPAUG OCT NOVJUNMAYAPRMAR
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS PHASE
20-21 Feb 2016: Tropical Cyclone Winston impact on Fiji and decla-
ration of State of Natural Disaster.
27 Feb 2016: The Government of Fiji activates the Shelter Cluster.
28 Feb 2016: Deployment of Shelter Cluster Coordinator.
3 Mar 2016: Flash Appeal released requesting USD 5.3 million for the 
Shelter Cluster for a target of 112,800 people.
21 Mar 2016: Release of the Shelter Cluster Humanitarian Action Plan. 
9 Apr 2016: Launch of the government “Help for Homes” initiative.
10-12 May 2016: Shelter Cluster “Training of Trainers” pilot on Build 
Back Safer.
30 Jun 2016: 24,000 households received e-cards and ordered con-
struction materials.
8 Jul 2016: Shelter Cluster lessons learned workshop.
14 Aug 2016: Release of the Build Back Safer framework including 
the 7 key messages.
14 Sep: Release of the Build Back Safer tips booklet, deactivation of 
the Shelter Cluster and handover to new co-leads with preparedness 
focus.
30 Nov 2016: Build Back Safer training for 450 carpenters and home-
builders completed, through construction of more than 110 core 
and transitional shelters in 77 of the most affected communities.
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Storm Track and Housing Damage after Cyclone Winston (© Shelter Cluster Fiji).
Traditional housing construction was studied and included in posters and mate-
rials that informed the response and the subsequent preparedness phase (From 
Country Profiles/Fiji, produced by CRAterre for the Global Shel er Cluster).
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CONTEXT
Fiji is an archipelago of 332 largely mountainous islands of 
volcanic origin, of which 110 are inhabited low-lying atolls. 
Spread over 18,300km2, its population resides primarily on 
the two largest islands, Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. Fiji is often 
in the path of tropical depressions and cyclones. While it 
is seen as a refuge from rising seas for the populations of 
low-lying neighbours, Fiji itself is not immune to the impact 
of climate change. Much of its population live on the coast-
al fringe, and all major cities and towns are either ports or 
seaside locations. Thirty-one per cent of the population lives 
below the national poverty line and around 140,000 people 
live in informal settlements – often in poor quality housing, 
with inadequate service provision, in environmentally mar-
ginal areas and with no legal security of tenure.
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER
The cyclone swept through the Fiji Islands as a Category 
5 Storm, with wind gusts up to 325 km/hr. The government 
reported the cyclone had affected more than 350,000 peo-
ple (40% of the population) across all four administrative di-
visions, damaging or destroying more than 31,200 houses. 
Shelter was identified as an immediate priority during the 
relief phase, when extremely strong cyclonic winds and mul-
tiple tsunami-like storm surges caused widespread damage 
and destruction. The government led the response and called 
for international assistance. A Flash Appeal was launched, but 
remained poorly resourced, with only two agencies funded 
for the shelter response, through the UN Central Emergency 
Response Fund, supporting only the delivery of emergency 
shelter items. 
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY AND RESPONSE 
To coordinate the shelter response, the Shelter Cluster Fiji was 
activated, after having first been activated for Cyclone Evan in 
20121. The Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Environ-
ment led the Cluster, with the support of an international agency 
as co-lead. A coordination team was deployed to support the 
1 See A.07 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014, for an example of a project in re-
sponse to Tropical Cyclone Evan.
Ministry and the coordination of the 30 organizations that were 
contributing to the shelter response. The goal of the Shelter 
Cluster was to support owner-driven recovery by investing 
in disaster preparedness and risk reduction, while prioritiz-
ing the most vulnerable communities, families and individuals, 
with three objectives: 1) Provision of emergency shelter and 
Non-Food Items; 2) Support of self-recovery to repair and re-
build damaged houses with hardware or cash/voucher equiv-
alent, and 3) Provision of technical Build Back Safer training, 
along with information, education and communication materials 
for skilled/semi-skilled carpenters and homebuilders2.
By mid-September 2016, cluster partners, including the gov-
ernment, reached over 36,600 households with emergency 
shelter materials, including tents, tarpaulins, shelter kits and 
shelter tool kits; 19,765 households with emergency shelter 
awareness; and 24,505 with cash grants under the “Help for 
Homes” initiative. Due to the impact of the initiative and the 
lack of funding, cluster partners shifted their priority and 
activities from objective (2) to objective (3) of the initial 
strategy, which drove the response to technical assistance 
complementing the government’s programme. Nine months 
after the cyclone, 450 carpenters and homebuilders were 
trained on Build Back Safer, through the construction of more 
than 110 core and transitional shelters in 77 of the most affect-
ed communities.
THE “HELP FOR HOMES” INITIATIVE
Two months after the cyclone, the Prime Minister launched 
the “Help for Homes” initiative, a USD 34 million voucher pro-
gramme for affected households to access free shelter and 
construction materials. This programme provided financial
assistance to more than 24,500 homeowners to help rebuild 
their homes themselves, including informal settlers. While this 
initiative was in line with objective (2) of the Cluster’s strategy, 
it did not include any technical assistance component, and 
was only a push towards recovery. 
The selection of eligible households was based on the dam-
aged houses master list provided by the National Disaster 
2 See the cluster factsheet at http://bit.ly/2hrHFIS. 
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Build Back Safer trainings were the key component of the Shelter Cluster strategy.
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Management Office; targeting the affected Fijians house-
holds earning less than USD 24,000 a year. The Ministry 
of Women, Children and Poverty Alleviation took the lead 
role in the distribution of the pre-paid electronic cards across 
the affected areas, with the support of the Ministry of Fi-
nance and the Planning Office. The Shelter Cluster provided 
awareness on Build Back Safer through banners at distribu-
tion points and posters included in the information booklet 
that all households received.
The pre-paid electronic cards were provided with a set amount 
and a pin number to purchase building materials from hard-
ware stores selected by the government. The following four 
grants categories were defined:
1) USD 720 for partial roofing damage;
2) USD 1,440 for serious roofing damage;
3) USD 2,880 for almost and completely destroyed houses;
4) USD 720 for families living in informal settlements in the af-
fected areas, who had their homes totally or partially destroyed.
This assistance was only providing some construction ma-
terials, therefore labour and other additional costs had to be 
borne by the family. This programme allowed the selected 
households to order their construction material before the 
end of June 2016, but the hardware shops were facing under-
standable challenges to timely supply and deliver at commu-
nity level such massive amounts of materials.  
BUILD BACK SAFER APPROACH AND TRAININGS
Two months and a half after the cyclone, the main Fijian 
humanitarian shelter agency and the Shelter Cluster ran a 
three-day pilot Build Back Safer “Training of Trainers”. 
This event allowed 20 staff and volunteers from humanitar-
ian organizations and NGOs, church groups and vocational 
education institutions, to improve their skills on safer build-
ing techniques, as a preparedness effort for future disasters. 
This event also helped partners to discuss and understand 
what trainings at community level should encompass and 
what information and communication material to develop. 
Carpenters’ and homebuilders’ understanding of safer con-
struction methods was enhanced through “learning by doing”, 
around the construction of a transitional or core shelter for one 
household in the village. The trained community members 
would then be better able to support other households in 
the reconstruction of resilient shelters, when they received 
their construction material from the “Help for Homes” initiative. 
While some households might have wrongly interpreted that 
the grant was sufficient to support the total cost to repair or re-
build their house, the trainings also aimed to highlight how not 
to sacrifice safety by stretching out partial assistance. Rein-
forced connections, bracing and protection of openings were 
the minimum essential components covered by the training.
During the three-day training, trainees (20% were women) 
completed the construction of a cyclone-rated core house. 
One vulnerable beneficiary was selected by the community 
to receive the house, on the understanding that the struc-
ture was to remain as a practical example for all community 
members to continue learning from. These trainings were 
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The Shelter Cluster Fiji conducted Build Back Safer training of trainers.
Tips to Build Back Safer
8 9
WHAT CAN I USE TO TIE DOWN MY HOUSE? STRONG WINDS COMING?
3. Tie down from bottom up & use 
strong joints - Nails are not enough
Tie down when strong winds come  
Strapping should be long enough to hold four (4) nails on each side. Note that the 
diagonal bracing is stretched tight and is wrapped around the frame at the ends. Note 
also the double top-plate to support the roof frame.
Rope or nylon 
fishing wir
Thick galvanised wire 
(multiple layers)
Timber Cleats Galvanised metal strap
Ensure that you have strong connections at all joints - the 
roof material to the roof timbers, the roof to the walls and the 
walls to the foundations.
Each joints of your house must be reinforced with more than 
nails.
Build every joint so it can’t be pushed or pulled apart. Nails 
alone are not sufficient to hold joints together when subjec
to cyclonic forces. Strong connections can be made with 
cyclone straps, rope and wire.
A booklet was produced by the Shelter Cluster, including tips to Build Back Safer after natural disasters, presented through posters of key messages.
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accompanied by educational material that portrayed in a 
graphic and clear fashion how to construct a stronger house, 
and remained in the community after the end of the train-
ing. The “hands-on training” was targeted at local carpenters 
and builders, many of whom had no formal qualifications, but 
nevertheless may have wide experience and work to a pro-
fessional level. Within the framework of communal building, 
which is widespread in Fiji, these local builders have signifi-
cant influence. Workshops conducted in one village can thus 
reach builders from all the surrounding villages.
KEY MESSAGES AND BOOKLET
Based on the pilot training and the outcomes of the Technical 
Working Group, the Shelter Cluster agreed on a Build Back 
Safer framework around training principles and seven key 
messages: 1) Site your house safely; 2) Build on strong foun-
dations; 3) Tie-down from the bottom up and use strong joints 
– nails are not enough; 4) Brace against the storm; 5) A good 
house needs a good roof; 6) Leave nobody behind, and 7) Be 
prepared. While most of these messages were similar to other 
disaster responses3, the sixth was specifically addressing 
accessibility for people with physical impairments.
Using existing and new posters, these messages were in-
cluded in a new “Tips to Build Back Safer” booklet4. The first
edition of the booklet (in English) was printed in more than 
9,000 copies and disseminated to households and communi-
ties through trainings and other activities, such as distribution 
of construction materials. By the end of 2016, the booklet was 
also translated in Taukei and Fijian Hindi/Hindustani languag-
es, to inform the ongoing response, as well as for countrywide 
preparedness.
3 See A.3, A.8 and A.39 for other responses that adopted the same approach.
4 The booklet was developed with the contribution of the Ministry of Housing, 
Fiji Institute of Engineers, main humanitarian shelter agencies, key donors, and 
representatives of the Fiji Business Disaster Resilience Council (including some 
of the hardware stores involved in the “Help for Homes” initiative). It is available 
at http://bit.ly/2igK37y.
LESSONS AND WAY FORWARD
It is recognized that, in the Pacific context, shelter responses 
to natural disaster should focus on promoting Disaster Risk 
Reduction in support of affected populations’ self-recov-
ery efforts. For Cyclone Winston, the Government of Fiji 
demonstrated its capacity to implement a large, shelter-fo-
cused, voucher programme at scale, supporting more than 
75% of the households with a damaged or destroyed house, 
allowing them to access construction materials provided by 
the private sector. It is noteworthy that this programme in-
cluded support to informal settlers.
Although it was swiftly implemented, this programme would 
have benefited from more investment and support in market 
analysis, at country and regional level, to support the timely 
delivery of materials, as well as for post-distribution, impact 
monitoring and learning for future disaster responses in Fiji 
and in the Pacific
This type of approach requires complementary investment in 
technical assistance, in partnership with Shelter Cluster part-
ners through Build Back Safer trainings and safe-shelter aware-
ness. It should also include support from other sectors, such 
as WASH and livelihoods, along with considerations on acces-
sibility, protection, logistics and other cross-cuttings factors.
Learning from the response to Cyclone Winston, the shelter 
sector in Fiji is now better prepared to respond to future 
natural disasters, with new technical guidelines and an agreed 
framework, including key messages, trainings and the booklet 
(available in the three main local languages). Based on the 
lessons learned from this and other recent natural disasters, 
the government took the decision to make the Fiji clus-
ters system permanent in the disaster management cycle, 
as part of its new humanitarian policy, building on the suc-
cessful Shelter Cluster transition from this response towards 
preparedness. 
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In this response, there was also a focus on how to retrofit exi ting structures to better withstand future hazards.
www.shelterprojects.org
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KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, Host family support, Cash assistance, NFI distribution, Gender mainstreaming, 
GBV prevention and risk mitigation
CRISIS Benin Floods, September 2010.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED 55,000
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 680,000 people.
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Benin, six communes: Aguégué, Dangbo,
Adjohoun, Bonou (Ouémé department), Zang-
nanando and Ouinhi (Zou department).
BENEFICIARIES 5,072 households.
PROJECT OUTPUTS
5,072 Emergency shelter kits distrib-
uted.
31 Demonstration shelters built.
SHELTER DENSITY 3.5m2 per person (Average household size is 5).
MATERIALS COST
USD 83 (Average per household + USD 30 cash 
distribution in parallel).
PROJECT COST
USD 90 per household (including organizational 
overheads).
NIGER
NIGERIA
TOGO
GHANA
BURKINA FASO
SEP 2010
WEAKNESSES
- The response team did not include gender or GBV technical experts 
and field teams did not include gender officer
- The beneficiary selection process delayed the operation  
- Lack of Housing, Land and Property knowledge.
- Lack of background information on cultural norms, gender relations 
and understanding of gender issues.
- Poor consultation and participation of village committees.
STRENGTHS
+ Assistance focused on self-recovery to avoid aid dependency.
+ Kits were designed to best suit the local context.
+ GBV assessment was undertaken.
+ Complaints mechanism was used to report cases of GBV.
+ Training on GBV awareness for community mobilizers and provision 
of referrals to service providers.
+ Shelter activities were complemented by WASH activities.
PLANNING EMERGENCY (KITS) SHELTER RECOVERY
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PORTO NOVO
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project assisted over 5,000 flood-a fected households in two phases, with a specific focus on reducing vulnerabilities 
of women and girls. In the emergency phase, shelter repair kits were distributed to support returns and host families, along 
with unconditional cash grants. The longer-term recovery phase involved a range of multisectoral interventions to support 
returnees to rebuild their villages, including cash for work, technical training on Build Back Safer, and dissemination of key 
messages on land tenure, WASH activities and awareness of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) issues.
PROJECT AREAS
OUÉMÉ
ZOU
Oct 2010: Rapid needs assessment conducted Nov 2010: First DRR/construction training 28 Feb - 3 Mar 2011: Assessment of GBV 
in target areas
1 2 3
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Flood waters damaged housing, land and other properties, and caused displacement of affected people to temporary sites and host families settings.
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CONTEXT
Many villages in Benin regularly face flooding due to the rise 
of the Niger River, especially in areas where low-income 
housing structural vulnerability is very high. Homes are tradi-
tionally built with mud and wood, using designs and materi-
als that have low resistance to water. 
Nearly half of the population of Benin is under the age of 15, 
and major challenges are to be addressed in the improve-
ment of the legal and political status of women in the country. 
Polygamy is a common practice, implicating around 35% of 
households in the flood-a fected area.
Gender-based violence (GBV) is a widespread and deeply root-
ed problem in Benin1, and can be exacerbated during times of 
crisis. According to a survey conducted by the Benin Ministry of 
Family and National Solidarity in 2009, up to 70% of women and 
girls in Benin have experienced some form of GBV. The most 
common forms of GBV in Benin include intimate-partner vio-
lence, forced and early marriage, rape and sexual harassment2.
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER 
Although there is regular annual flooding, the floods of Sep-
tember 2010 were the worst since 1963. They destroyed 
an estimated 55,000 houses and affected 680,000 people 
(8% of the population). Housing damage was largely caused 
by standing water, not the first impact. Most of the existing 
housing materials were not carried away by the flood  
Many people were forced to leave their homes to find shelter 
in collective centres or with host families, either outside of their 
villages or in non-affected areas. Three self-settled camps 
were also formed, where families built make-shift shelters.
GBV RISKS
As part of planning for the recovery phase, an assessment of 
the initial emergency distributions was carried out, to inform 
the long-term programming objectives. The  results revealed 
a relationship between GBV risks and the vulnerable shelter 
conditions of the displaced populations.
1 Benin GBV report July 2011, http://www.alnap.org/resource/10249.
2 The Empower Project: Fostering Alliances For Action Against Gender Based 
Violence in Benin http://bit.ly/2j7poW7.
Loss of resources and livelihoods (especially women’s) 
and the lack of safe and dignified living conditions height-
ened the vulnerability of affected populations and GBV risks. 
Other GBV risks were reported, linked to the incidences of ex-
cessive alcohol consumption, inter-family tensions, lack of safe 
spaces for girls and overcrowding. In addition, women in the 
camps reported an increase in intimate-partner violence and 
marital rape. Additionally, there was a general lack of knowl-
edge about where survivors of GBV could go if they were 
abused, especially in more remote communities. Fear, shame, 
social stigma and distance to services also prevented survivors 
from seeking help and reporting cases of violence.
AREAS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
The project targeted flood-a fected populations displaced in 
collective centres, host families, and self-settled or planned 
camps. The areas of intervention were selected because of 
their high level of vulnerability, existing relationships with the 
communities and the on-going work of local partners. The 
initial lists of eligible beneficiaries were submitted to the vil-
lage committee (composed of the chief of village, elders and 
women groups) for revision, correction and validation.
Priority was given to households which had suffered the 
greatest housing damage and had the least access to food, 
with particular attention to: pregnant and lactating women; 
the elderly; female-headed households; children under fiv  
years old; and people living with disabilities.
Technical criteria were also used to target those people who 
had lost their houses and had little resources to repair or 
rebuild them. The families in collective centres were initially 
targeted with cash, due to the unsuitability of these buildings 
to provide safe shelter and to allow the school year to recom-
mence. For families whose houses were located in flood risk 
zones, supporting reconstruction was not immediately pos-
sible, therefore there were many people in collective centres 
who did not want to leave.
EMERGENCY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
The emergency assistance phase, implemented with local 
partners, lasted for six months. Households were provided 
with unconditional cash support (through a local Micro Finance 
Tented camps were established for displaced people, near their villages of origin.
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based in each village. The cash-for-work activities were in-
tended to engage the affected people in the recovery of their 
communities. However, they also diverted a target amount of 
the population from their daily income-generating activities.
The organization implemented a Build Back Safer in-
itiative in six communes of intervention. Several model 
homes were built and community members were trained on 
improved building techniques. Additionally, selected staff 
and authorities were trained on Emergency Preparedness 
Planning and Disaster Risk Reduction. Unfortunately, fam-
ilies living in some of the flood risk area could not return 
home to rebuild, and it was unclear what rights they had to 
their original land and property, or what they could expect as 
compensation or where they would be asked to relocate to.
MATERIALS
Shelter kit materials were procured and stocked locally in 
a warehouse. Households were provided with a voucher to 
collect their kits at the warehouse within five days, and were 
responsible for the transport of materials to their homes. Com-
munity mobilization was particularly effective for the most vul-
nerable, such as pregnant women, the elderly and people with 
disabilities, who were not able to carry the materials them-
selves. Other beneficiaries and members of the same com-
munities helped them with transport on a voluntary basis.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
It was logistically challenging to reach the affected popu-
lations at the planned times. For this reason, the distribution 
of shelter kits was re-planned to target specific geographical 
areas during set dates, to ease the logistical load, as well as to 
make reporting more organized and comprehensible.
GBV incidents related to cash distributions. During the 
monitoring of the shelter project, incidents of GBV were re-
ported through a complaints mechanism. Unconditional cash 
grant distributions were conceived to give maximum flexibility
and choice to the households to cover their priority needs. 
However, many households who practised polygamy were 
considered as one unit, despite the fact that they were made 
up of an extended family, with children from multiple wives, 
yet the cash and NFIs were only given to one woman in the 
household. These distributions were reported to not sufficien -
ly provide for the second wife and her children, raising con-
cerns over favouritism and exclusion. Subsequent GBV inci-
dents were related to the tensions between wives and their 
husband, including verbal and physical abuse. One year on, a 
study was made of the gender-related impacts of the project.
Institution) and distributions of shelter repair kits (building ma-
terials and NFIs). The kits were adapted to best suit the repair 
and reconstruction needs of each of the three main housing 
typologies (houses built on riverbanks, in valley regions and in 
the highlands), and responded to two central priorities:
• To support return and to repair and rebuild their dam-
aged or destroyed homes;
• To help ease the burden of hosting families by sup-
porting displaced families to construct a temporary 
shelter on the land of the host family.
The unconditional cash grants of USD 30 were intended to 
support people in leaving their emergency shelter and returning 
home where possible, and were subdivided in two tranches. 
The grant was given to the woman in the household who was 
seen as best placed to spend the money to meet basic needs of 
the family. Although not implicitly given for shelter support, the 
cash meant it was easier for families to restart their lives and 
could be spent on shelter materials, if this was a priority.
The shelter project was part of an integrated approach that in-
cluded education, water, sanitation and hygiene activities. Hy-
giene promotion was provided though a Child-to-Child system in 
schools and 20,473 households (95% of the affected) received 
WASH kits. There were also social mobilization activities around 
hand washing and access to drinking water, which led to com-
munity behaviour changes in drinking and hygiene practices.
PROJECT TEAM STRUCTURE 
An Emergency Response Team was set up and coordinated by 
a team leader, with short term support from technical specialists 
for WASH and Shelter in the emergency phase. A logistics and 
a monitoring and evaluation officer were part of the team for 
a period of six months. Each field team consisted of two pro-
ject managers, two project assistants and six field supervisors. 
Each field supervisor was assigned to a commune and sup-
ported by a distribution team managed by the local partner. The 
country office of the organization also had an on-going commit-
ment to work on gender and GBV in their projects.
RECOVERY SUPPORT 
During the second phase of the response,  support was pro-
vided to housing and infrastructure rehabilitation, with the 
construction of demonstration houses in each commune as 
models for replication; livelihoods reinforcement and regen-
eration (community-based microfinance and food security, 
cash-for-work); hygiene promotion, gender awareness and 
GBV prevention, with the support of community mobilizers 
The programme distributed kits during set dates, and people were responsible to 
transport the materials home.
Unconditional cash grants disbursed through this project were reported to gen-
erate tensions in polygamous households, as only one wife received the cash. 
Both men and women should have been better consulted during project design.
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NATURAL DISASTER A.16 / BENIN 2010-2011 / FLOODS AFRICA
LEARNINGS 
• Context analysis must go beyond sex and age disaggregated data and look at existing gender dynamics in 
a society. For instance, polygamy in Benin communities is a common occurrence, yet it was not taken into account 
in relation to the quantities of NFIs and amounts of the cash grants. Both cash and shelter kit distributions were 
eventually adapted, so that the support reached all members of the family, including the second wives with their chil-
dren, who were then considered as independent households with equal needs.
• An analysis and mapping of services available to GBV survivors in flood-prone areas (e.g., medical, psychosocial, 
legal, security, shelter) from the pre-planning phase would have been beneficial
• Increased knowledge and capacity of staff on HLP issues. During the recovery phase, it was highlighted that the 
Shelter support staff should have taken into consideration the concerns of the community around the location of their 
homes, especially for those that needed to relocate out of the risk areas.
• More collaboration and support to existing community-organized women’s groups would have created oppor-
tunities for women’s inclusion in the shelter programme and better integration of survivor support. 
• Gender and GBV mainstreaming should have been integrated from the planning stage, and orientation ses-
sions for staff should have been accounted for as part of this response and delivered by GBV/gender specialists, 
due to the high probability for field sta f to witness cases of GBV, while performing door-to-door shelter monitoring. 
• Consideration on who should receive the grant in the household, how decisions on expenditures are made based on 
the existing gender dynamics, and identification of issues that create or exacerbate tensions and GBV risks should be 
conducted, before implementing cash-based programmes. It should not be assumed that men cannot make good decisions 
regarding the needs of the household, and both men and women should be engaged equally in consultations.
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STRENGTHS
+ The project reviewed the risks of long-term dependen-
cy caused by providing emergency support to planned and 
self-settled camps, and re-oriented its assistance towards 
self-recovery solutions. 
+ The shelter repair kits were designed to best suit the lo-
cal context, according to the three major traditional housing 
types to be reinforced or repaired with slightly different tool-
sets or materials1.
+ A GBV assessment was undertaken at the end of the 
emergency phase, allowing the project to better address GBV 
risks in the rehabilitation phase and ensure better prepared-
ness and risk mitigation.
+ The complaints mechanism in place was used to report 
cases of GBV (for domestic disputes related to cash distri-
bution). The project included the training of community mobi-
lizers to promote awareness of GBV at community level, and 
provided referrals to service providers. 
+ Shelter activities were complemented by WASH activi-
ties at household and community level.
1 Contents of the three repair kits can be found in the shelter strategy, available 
at http://bit.ly/2hA08Vb.
www.shelterprojects.org
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
Shelter repair kits and cash grants were provided to support return to areas of 
origin after the floods
WEAKNESSES
- The Emergency Response Team did not include gender 
or GBV technical experts during the programme planning 
and implementation. 
- Field teams did not include gender officer  to ensure 
GBV prevention throughout all stages of the emergency 
shelter response.
- The beneficiary selection process took longer than ex-
pected, delaying the operation. 
- Lack of Housing, Land and Property (HLP) knowledge. 
Field staff did not have the background knowledge, aware-
ness or socio-cultural sensitivity to properly advocate and give 
programmatic support to communities and village councils on 
HLP issues (relating to flood risk zones and displacement)
- Lack of background information on cultural norms, gender 
relations and understanding of gender issues in the emer-
gency context, and how the crisis had affected those dynamics. 
- Consultation and participation of village committees 
could have been stronger (including the traditional and reli-
gious leaders and the women’s groups).
THREE TYPES OF SHELTER REPAIR KITS
Types of kits Cost
Emergency shelter repair kit type 1
Riverbanks house (on stilts)
Emergency shelter repair kit type 2
Valley house (rammed earth slab)
Emergency shelter repair kit type 3
Highlands house (monolithic adobe walls)
USD 64
USD 87
USD 99
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CASE STUDY DR CONGO 2008-2016 / NFI VOUCHER FAIRS
KEYWORDS: Non-food items, NFI voucher fairs, NFI distribution
A.17 / DR CONGO 2008-2016 / NFI VOUCHER FAIRS
STRENGTHS OF THE FAIRS
+ Beneficiary preference, as they choose their own items
+ Reinforcing beneficiary dignity as actors in their own assistan e.
+ Cost savings in logistics, transport and warehousing. 
+ Supporting local economies.
+ Speed in setting up, when vendors are familiar with the approach.
 CHALLENGES / WEAKNESSES
- Smaller scale than in-kind distributions.
- Dependence on market capacity.
- Dishonest vendors can take advantage of beneficiaries
- Lack of formal registration and tax documents can limit the partici-
pation of small vendors.
- Challenges in using the vouchers for some users.
CRISIS
Multiple conflicts / Complex, two dec-
ades long and ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
DISPLACED AND 
RETURNED1
2.82 million people (new displace-
ments in 2016: 922,000 people).
LOCATIONS DR Congo, country wide.
VOUCHER FAIRS
BENEFICIARIES2
3,950,530 persons (790,106 house-
holds) in the period 2009-2016.
IN-KIND DISTRIBUTION 
BENEFICIARIES2 4,471,250 persons (2009-2016).
UN. REP. 
OF TAN-
ZANIA
ZAMBIA
GABON
BURU-
NDI
RWA-
NDA
CAMEROON
UGA-
NDA
ANGOLA
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
CENTRAL 
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
SOUTH 
SUDAN
1 2.2 million IDPs between 2009-2016; 620,000 returnees since July 2015 (Source: 
OCHA 2016 IDP factsheets, http://bit.ly/2nhgaEX. 
2 The number of people is calculated on an average of five person  per household.
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PROJECT AREAS
SUMMARY  
Since 2008, the NFI sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DR Congo) has undergone a dramatic transformation from a re-
sponse strategy dominated by in-kind distribution of basic household, 
personal and hygiene items, to the use of cash-based vouchers. The 
NFI voucher fair approach has allowed families to select items based 
on their own priorities, while also supporting local economies. By 
2013, over 50% of all NFI beneficiaries in DR Congo were assist-
ed using the NFI voucher fair approach. Since the first pilots in late 
2008, local and international humanitarian actors have reached over 
790,000 families – nearly 4 million people – using this approach.
Organizations’ staff explain the use and different values of coupons to benefi-
ciaries before they enter the fair (Mutarule, South Kivu province).
Map showing the provinces where the NFI voucher fairs approach has 
been used between 2009 and 2016 in four shades of colour according 
to the number of households (HH) assisted (lighter to darker:  0-4,000 
HH; 6,500 – 14,000 HH; 40,000 – 60,000 HH; 90,000 – 350,000 HH).
Key: 1. North Kivu (349,872 HH); 2. South Kivu (138,762 HH), 3. Ituri 
(94,225 HH); 4. Haut Katanga (59,296 HH); 5. Tanganika (57,927 HH); 6. 
Maniema (40,142 HH); 7. Haut Lomami (13,704 HH); 8. Haut Uele (13,635 
HH); 9. Equateur (6,528 HH); 10. South Ubangi (3,893 HH); 11. Lualaba 
(3,289 HH); 12. Kasai (2,636 HH); 13. Tshopo (2,464 HH); 14. Kasai Ori-
ental (1,438 HH); 15. Bas Uele (1,399 HH); 16. North Ubangi (896 HH).
Source: NFI-Shelter Cluster DR Congo.
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NFI VOUCHER FAIRS
In 2008, some of the NFI actors in DR Congo began to look at 
cash-based options to meet the NFI needs of affected popula-
tions. This shift happened primarily for two reasons: 
1) NFI needs of affected populations varied widely. Highly 
divergent and varied needs made the typical one-size-fits-all
kit approach of standard NFI assistance less appropriate.
2) Markets were quite dynamic for imported and locally pro-
duced NFIs in DR Congo, and supply chains seemed ro-
bust, flexible and able to respon  to increased demand.  
Food security actors in DR Congo had been using seed fairs 
since the early 1990s. Based on this model, NFI actors began 
to conduct pilot NFI cash-voucher fairs.
HOW THE FAIRS WORK  
The approach since the initial pilots is to invite beneficiary
families to an organized, artificial, market place or “fair” (us-
ing the same targeting criteria as direct in-kind distributions). 
Each family receives cash-valued coupons – an average of 
USD 75 – which they can exchange for goods3. A selected 
number of vendors – both larger wholesaler and smaller local 
traders – offer a wide array of NFIs for sale, just like in a regu-
lar market. The range of items can be as limited or unrestrict-
ed as determined by the organization managing the fair, who 
sets the “rules” on what items can be sold. 
A typical fair includes dozens, even hundreds, of different 
types of NFIs – sandals to soap, clothing to locally produced 
cooking pots, foam mattresses to plastic basins, farming tools 
3 The initial choice of USD 75 for a family of 4-6 persons was based on the cost 
of items and transport of the recommended standard family NFI kit in DR Congo.
BACKGROUND
For over two decades, the eastern provinces of DR Congo have 
been plagued by the humanitarian consequences of multiple 
conflicts, involving dozens of militia groups and government 
forces. Although often described as a protracted emergency, 
eastern DR Congo is characterized by a series of distinct, 
acute, crises, spread across a landscape of continually shifting 
zones of violence, displacement and insecurity, and areas of 
relative stability, where return and recovery are possible. 
At the end of 2016, OCHA estimated that there were 2.2 mil-
lion Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in the country; 922,000 
of these people were newly displaced in 2016. Additionally, 
there were hundreds of thousands of returnees. Nearly 80% 
of displaced families lived in the homes and compounds of 
local host families who, although often extremely vulnerable 
themselves, are the first to provide assistance
One of the most critical needs of families on the move is ac-
cess to essential non-food items (NFI) to carry out daily ac-
tivities. These activities include: clothing oneself, preparing 
and serving food, collecting and using water for washing and 
cleaning, carrying out livelihood activities, storing belongings 
and sleeping. The ability of displaced families, returnees and 
even some host families, to undertake these essential activ-
ities in dignity and security, is undermined by lack of access 
to essential items. NFI needs are particularly acute in conflict
areas, where families flee with very few belongings and – al-
though host families may share some of their resources such 
as food or cooking utensils – other items such as clothing and 
bedding are less likely to be shared.
Vouchers are exchangeable at the fairs for selected NFIs, including locally made pots, clothing and blankets. Posters show photos and price ceilings of the most 
popular items (Mangina, North Kivu province).
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to flashl ghts. Depending on the total number of families to be 
served, the organizing agency sets up several days of fairs in 
a row, with anywhere between 300 and 700 families partici-
pating each day.
Where there might be concerns about vendors charging un-
fair prices, the organizing agency can set price ceilings on 
certain key items with representatives of the beneficiaries and 
vendors; however, bargaining is always encouraged. Selected 
vendors have to sign an agreement that lays out rules and 
responsibilities, including no guarantee of sale, respect of 
price ceilings (and sanctions should these not be followed) 
and modes of payment. In some instances, a complementary 
distribution of items such as plastic tarpaulin, jerry-cans, or fe-
male hygiene kits, is included, particularly in areas where the 
market is limited (in quality or quantity) or where the vendor 
prices for these items are too high.
In line with recommended Cluster practice for direct NFI dis-
tributions, adult women in the household are registered as the 
family’s primary beneficiary to attend the fair – although it is 
encouraged that she come with her spouse or another family 
member, to help transport the purchases home.
SCALING UP 
Since the pilots, the NFI community in DR Congo has scaled 
up the use of the NFI voucher fair approach. Initially, human-
itarian actors and the NFI-Shelter Cluster believed that while 
fairs were an innovative alternative to direct distributions, their 
scope would remain limited due to market capacity. This con-
cern proved to be unfounded, as traders were able and willing 
to travel to remote areas to participate. They were also often 
more effective and resourceful than the best NGO logistics op-
erations (renting small trucks, motorcycles, and even bicycles) 
in moving supplies to areas where a direct distribution would 
have been impossible. In addition, the smaller vendors often 
pooled resources to transport their merchandise to the fairs. 
The NFI-Shelter Cluster actively promoted response anal-
ysis to inform programming by hosting multiple training and 
learning events, as well as by accompanying partners on the 
ground through “coaching visits”. Each year, provincial and 
national cluster coordinators and NGO co-facilitators conduct 
field visits to NFI fairs and the distribution sites of different or-
ganizations, to provide feedback and coaching on their activi-
ties. While direct distribution remains an essential part of NFI 
response in DR Congo, the Cluster has helped in training and 
supporting organizations to use the fair approach, reaching 
a point where all major international and national NFI actors 
now use voucher fairs, for at least some portion of their re-
sponse.
EVOLUTION OF THE APPROACH 
In the last few years, NFI actors have made significant progress 
in areas such as: 
• Collaborating with food aid actors on joint NFI and food 
fairs; 
• Improving market and purchasing pattern analysis to 
better determine an appropriate voucher value for affect-
ed zones, as well as to consider simultaneous distribu-
tions of certain items; 
• Promoting inclusion of locally made NFIs; 
• Integrating new technologies for improved data collec-
tion and analysis – particularly of purchasing patterns; 
• Piloting the use of electronic vouchers;
• Setting fair price ceilings;
• Experimenting with using vouchers in existing mar-
kets (open market vouchers). 
Another, more recent, improvement (which some of the major 
NFI actors have adopted) is adjusting the value of the vouch-
ers by family size. Instead of the standard USD 75 per family, 
these NGOs now have three different voucher values: 
1) USD 55 for families of 1-3 persons; 
2) USD 75 for families of 4-6 persons; 
3) USD 90 and up for families of 7 or more persons. 
Post-fair monitoring has shown significant improvement in NFI 
Score-Card vulnerabilities, by using this approach, compared 
to the standard one. 
Some actors have started looking at the option of moving to 
direct cash to meet NFI needs. Purchasing pattern analyses 
of organizations using unconditional cash transfers typical-
ly reveal 40%-50% of cash being used on NFIs. While un-
conditional cash to address NFI needs remains an option to 
explore, it may not be the best in all settings. A 2010 study 
of 1,688 families revealed that, in terms of availability, over 
66% of benefici ries indicated that items they purchased at 
the fairs were not regularly available at the markets where 
they would typically purchase NFIs. Indeed, vendors travelling 
from significant distances of over 100km to participate in the 
fairs, are often providing a range of choice that families would 
not find in their local markets
Vendors can sell multiple items based on an agreed list, and beneficiaries can 
haggle and discuss prices under a set ceiling (Kalele, South Kivu province).
NGO workers register vendors’ merchandise at the fairs to ensure quality and 
that no prohibited items have been brought (Aboro, Ituri province).
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STRENGTHS
 
Driving the transformation was the recognition of the fair ap-
proach as a “win-win-win”: for affected people, for humani-
tarian organizations and for the local economy.
+ Beneficiary preference. Monitoring visits with assisted 
families have shown a signific nt preference for fairs over 
distributions. Having choice over one’s own assistance rein-
forces the dignity of beneficiari s, and was continually cited 
as an overwhelming advantage of the fairs. The concern that 
vendors might not be able to provide the quality and quantity 
to meet needs proved unfounded. In the same 2010 study of 
1,688 families beneficiaries stated that 96% of items bought at 
the fairs were of very good or acceptable quality.
+ Cost savings. With savings on logistics, transport, and 
warehousing, the fair approach is cheaper per family than an 
in-kind distribution. It also reduces the risks for implementing 
organizations, who are no longer responsible for the ware-
housing and security of NFIs before and during distributions. 
Recognizing the value for the beneficiaries of dignity and 
choice, as well as the value for money of their contributions, 
donors were also a catalyst behind the transformation. Hu-
manitarian donors in DR Congo no longer accept proposals 
of a traditional distribution approach, if the organization has 
not demonstrated why a cash-based approach is not possible.
+ Local economy. Thousands of local traders and produc-
ers of locally made NFIs have benefitted from participating 
in the fairs. Since the first pilots in late 2008, over USD 59 
million has been injected into the local Congolese economy, 
by organizations using the fair approach. Monitoring with ven-
dors shows how this secondary “impact” of fair programmes 
has created new employment, opened markets in new areas, 
and increased the capital and diversified merchandise of local 
traders. 
+ Speed. As the fair approach became more common, hu-
manitarian organizations were also able to increase the speed 
of implementation, particularly in areas where they were able 
to draw upon vendors with previous experience in fairs. As of 
2016, vendors in some areas were able to access NFIs for 
fairs and organize their logistics within less than a week (this 
can take up to three weeks in cases where vendors are not 
familiar with the fair approach). 
CHALLENGES AND LEARNINGS
- Scalability. One important limitation of the fair approach is 
the scale. Experienced organizations can do a fair for up to 
700 families in a day. This mainly depends on the time families 
are allowed to “shop” and the need to count the vouchers that 
vendors received, at the end of the day. Fairs normally happen 
between 10am and 3pm for these two reasons. Organizations 
usually do 3-4 days of fairs in a row, depending on the number 
of families to be reached. A well-organized distribution, on the 
other hand, can reach two to three times as many families in 
a day. Therefore, NFI distributions are still an essential part of 
the response in DR Congo – particularly for large-scale inter-
ventions, or in new areas, where there are few vendors with 
experience in the fair approach. 
- Market capacity. While the dynamism and reach of the 
markets in DR Congo has surpassed expectations, there are 
areas where markets are not able to provide the quantity, 
scope, and quality of items needed. Strong market and re-
sponse analyses are needed to enable NFI actors to choose 
the best modality between fairs, distributions, or a combina-
tion of the two.
- Dishonest vendors. Vendors may attempt to take advan-
tage of beneficiaries, despite agreements and monitoring by 
staff, by not respecting price ceilings, or working with other ven-
dors to fix a price and not allowing beneficiaries to negotiat
- Smaller vendors. Local / smaller vendors, local producers 
and artisans sometimes do not have the legally required reg-
istration and tax documents. This can be mitigated by encour-
aging vendors who do have all their registration papers with 
authorities, to team up with smaller vendors and producers of 
locally made NFIs, to sell these items at their stands.
- Restricted items. There has been much discussion on 
when and how to put limitations on the types of items permit-
ted at fairs, or whether organizations should set  price caps 
on certain items, so as to ensure that they remain focused on 
basic needs – for example permitting items such as shoes, 
but not shoes which are priced over a certain amount. Mon-
itoring has shown that families tend to spend vouchers on 
the same types of items as those found in a standard NFI kit. 
However, questions are raised on whether items like radios, 
plastic chairs, or small solar panels can be considered essen-
tial household NFIs. While the Cluster has developed some 
guidance, it ultimately remains an issue for each organization 
to examine with their donors and the communities they are 
serving, in consideration of the objective of their programme.
- Use of the vouchers. A small minority of beneficiaries have 
reported having difficulties in using the vouchers. This is par-
ticularly true for the elderly, or illiterate. It is critical to ensure 
that these beneficiaries are encouraged to come to the fairs 
with someone who can assist them. The organization should 
also have workers who can help accompany such beneficia -
ies at the fairs. The learning in DR Congo has been that there 
is never too much education and information sharing about 
using the vouchers.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
www.shelterprojects.org
People are able to purchase pre-selected items using e-vouchers in the NFI 
fairs (Market of Sake, North Kivu province).
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KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, Site planning, Collective centres, Infrastructure, Protection
CRISIS
Conflict (Boko Haram insurgency),
2014-ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
14.8 million affected (HRP 2016)
1,878,205 displaced, mainly by Boko 
Haram (Source: DTM, Aug 2016)
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Several displacement sites in Maiduguri, Bor-
no State
BENEFICIARIES 3,433 households (20,480 individuals)
PROJECT
 OUTPUTS
1,000 Emergency shelters (Bama).
1,269 Reinforced shelters (Bakassi). 105 
for one large family and 1,164 for two small 
families.
RIO NAPO
CAMEROON
NIGER
CHAD
BENIN
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project built emergency and reinforced shelters for over 3,000 internally displaced households across ten sites, 
using a common design that took into account the needs of different family sizes, cultural practices, as well as climate 
considerations. The shelter project was part of a broader coordinated effort of the humanitarian community to meet min-
imum standards while decongesting existing sites, particularly schools.
STRENGTHS
+ The project enabled the reopening of schools.
+ Capacity-building of local contractors and labourers.
+ Climate and culturally appropriate design.
+ Various types and sensible allocation of shelters.
WEAKNESSES
- Construction began too close to the rainy season.
- Recruitment challenges.
- Lack of site planning technical expertise.
- Different pace of delivery across sectors.
LAGOS
ABUJA
JULAPRJAN FEB MAROCT SEPJUNSEP NOV DEC AUGMAY
2014
BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY
PROJECT PLANNING
IMPLEMENTATION
SHELTER SIZE 16.2m2 (4.5x3.6m – emergency shelters) / 28.8m2 (4x7.2m – reinforced shelters).
SHELTER DENSITY
3.2m2 per person (Emergency shelters, maximum five persons per shelter).
4.1m2 per person (Reinforced shelters, maximum eight persons per shelter).
MATERIAL COSTS
USD 158 for Emergency shelters (including labour and transport).
USD 845 for Reinforced shelters (including labour).
PROJECT COSTS USD 564 per household, on average.
2016 OCT 20162015
T
IM
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 91
2014: Insurgency begins in 2009. It escalates seriously in 2014 when 
Boko Haram starts to seize territory, and spreads to neighbouring 
countries.
Nov 2015: CERF Proposal is made while mapping of available spac-
es for shelter constructions is carried out. A location is provided by 
the government for 2,500 shelters.
Dec 2015: Biometric registration starts.
May 2016: Existing IDP sites receive shelter upgrades, deconges-
tions, and rainy season preparedness (i.e. drainage improvements).
Mid-May 2016: Shelter construction begins in Bakassi camp.
Jul 2016: Inter-Agency multi sector assessments reveal dire needs in 
new locations and the programme is adjusted. Emergency shelters 
are used to intervene in these locations.
30 Sep 2015: High Powered Committee For The Re-opening of 
Schools Within State Capital approaches the UN and INGOs to as-
sist with the relocation of IDPs to alternative sites.
2015: Over 20 IDP sites formally established in Maiduguri and Jere. 
Nearly half of which are schools, occupied for over two years.
Oct 2015: Humanitarian community commits internal funding to start 
the relocation process.
1 5
6
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4
PROJECT AREAS
MAIDUGURI
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government buildings, and unfinished construction pro-
jects. Usually, these were communal and high-density types 
of shelters, with overcrowding and persistent health risks. The 
use of schools as displacement sites since 2014 severely 
hampered education in the area, especially in Maiduguri.
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY  
The Shelter-NFI Sector Working Group, led at the time by the 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the 
implementing organization, defined several objectives in the 
Humanitarian Response Plan 2016: 
1) Raising shelter standards in formal and informal 
camps to meet Sphere indicators through provision of rein-
forced emergency shelters.
2) Maintaining an adequate pipeline of minimum emer-
gency shelter kits and NFI kits for distribution to the most 
vulnerable – in particular, newly or secondarily displaced peo-
ple, including new arrivals in the camps.
3) Extension of support into host community settings, 
which had received little to no response at the end of 2015, by 
adding and/or repairing available covered space where there 
was severe overcrowding.
4) Reinforced emergency shelter or repair upon return, 
where conditions were conducive (e.g. security-wise), target-
ing the most vulnerable whose houses had been destroyed.
The strategy emphasized sustainability, including bene-
fit to local economies through use and sourcing of locally 
available materials, and with cash and vouchers to be used 
wherever appropriate. The sector also sought to mainstream 
protection, including through the provision of solar lights and 
fuel-efficient stoves, and the prioritization of female-headed 
households.
SCHOOL CAMPS PHASING-OUT PLAN   
Eight school buildings in Maiduguri were occupied by approx-
imately 38,145 IDPs for more than a year and a half. In late 
2015, the government began to work towards the reopen-
ing of educational institutions, and the Ministry of Educa-
tion and the humanitarian community formed a Taskforce, 
which created timelines for phasing out the School Camps 
into relocation sites identified by local authorities. Once space 
in or surrounding existing displacement sites was identified,
the Taskforce worked with different sectors on site plan-
ning to expand and decongest such camps, as well as up-
grading and adding shelters in other sites.
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The project took place in the context of major displacement into host community sites, most of which were spontaneous (left), and into temporary collective centres, 
including schools (right), which needed to be reopened for children to resume their education.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The north-eastern part of Nigeria has witnessed an increase 
in violence since the beginning of 2015, causing a major 
humanitarian crisis. The Islamic fundamentalist group Boko 
Haram initiated their insurgency in 2009, with attacks against 
government targets in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. 
In 2014, the insurgency ramped up in scale and brutality, with 
Boko Haram capturing large swathes of the North-East and 
turning their violence to civilian targets. Massive displacement 
followed, and persisted throughout 2015-2016.
More than two years after the crisis began, over 1.8 million peo-
ple remained displaced and would continue to be throughout 
2017. Displacement was concentrated mainly in Borno State, 
with Adamawa, Yobe and Gombe States also hosting displaced 
people. The Nigerian Military regained territory but Boko Haram 
remained active, forced back into the use of terrorist tactics. 
The humanitarian response in 2017 would cover all four states, 
though access to large territories remained very limited, in par-
ticular in Yobe and Borno, with high security concerns.
Nigeria’s North East has a predominantly tropical dry cli-
mate, and the rainy season spans between June and Sep-
tember, with heavy rain and high winds. The rest of the year 
is hot and dry, with temperatures climbing as high as 40°C. 
The Harmattan dry wind affects the region with fine dust from 
November through March.
SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS  
Before the crisis, people in urban and peri-urban settings in 
the North-East lived in concrete or block dwellings with roofs 
constructed of corrugated iron sheets or comparable material. 
In rural areas, mud and thatch dwellings were typical. The ma-
jority of the IDPs found shelter within host communities, 
sharing with relatives or friends, or renting. Around 9% of the 
total displaced people lived in camps or camp-like settings. 
The camp populations were generally the poorest among 
the affected communities, those who left only at the point of 
violence, because they lacked the resources or networks to 
find their own alternative accommodation
Some sites were open field  where temporary shelter had 
to be erected, shelter conditions ranging from makeshift shel-
ters (usually domes built of grass or other readily available 
materials in vernacular style) to tents and emergency shelters 
constructed with plastic sheeting provided by aid agencies.
The majority of the camps and camp-like settings were 
collective centres – pre-existing buildings such as schools, 
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PROJECT GOALS    
The main goals of this project were to establish new sites for 
the relocation of IDPs hosted in schools and the deconges-
tion of other overcrowded camps; and support family reuni-
ficatio  (as displacement sites were often gender segregat-
ed). The shelter project was part of a broader coordinated 
effort of the humanitarian community to meet minimum stand-
ards, as most of the camps in Maiduguri had been quickly set 
up during the onset of the emergency as lifesaving centres. 
Amongst other issues the sector focused on the standardiza-
tion of shelter designs, proper site layout for mitigation of fire
risks, and ensuring access to a full range of basic services.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION    
The bulk of the project firstly targeted the people living in 
schools in Maiduguri. The remaining shelter capacity was used 
to decongest the most overcrowded sites with worst shelter 
conditions.
Shelter needs, as well as other priorities and disaggregated 
demographic data, were collected through assessment teams, 
which developed site profiles for all school locations based on 
the following criteria: 1) family reunification; 2) site population; 
3) family size. Biometric registration was used to identify and 
register families, and biometric cards were used for relocation, 
allocation of shelters and distribution of NFIs at household level.
PROJECT LOCATIONS AND SITE PLANNING    
A government-owned undeveloped plot of land of over 
650,000m2 was initially allocated and agreed with local au-
thorities for the extension of the existing Bakassi camp, next 
to housing estates which were being constructed for civil serv-
ants. Further government land allocations were then granted, 
including extensions of other existing camps. All proposed 
sites were assessed for hazards and risks, and were agreed 
in collaboration with humanitarian actors.
The main site planning considerations for the Bakassi camp 
expansion were to maximize the use of available space, miti-
gate against flooding risks, ensuring minimum standards and 
providing infrastructure and basic services. These included 
clinics, kitchens, drainage, water and sanitation facilities, 
schools, livelihoods spaces, as well as distribution, registra-
tion and camp management points. The whole area was occu-
pied and no further evolution or phasing out plans were made 
at the time of project planning and implementation.
Additionally, seven other sites were upgraded, decongested 
and drainage was improved. In informal camps, where dis-
placed people had spontaneously settled (usually on private 
land), written agreements with land owners were sought and 
secured.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
The project was implemented with contractors to speed 
up site preparation, thus facilitating a swift relocation of the 
IDPs from the schools. The organization also benefited from 
a partnership with NEMA, whose contribution to the project 
comprised of roofing sheets, aggregate, cement and water 
trucking for about 1,000 shelters, through the different phases 
of the project.
The shelter team was composed of five members: one shel-
ter manager, one shelter office , and three engineers (WASH, 
shelter and site planning).
As implementation started just before the rainy season, 
road access to the building sites became almost impossible 
and all camps were flooded, slowing down construction signif-
icantly. Moreover, as soon as the initial relocations were car-
ried out (as this was done in phases), people began disman-
tling the unoccupied shelters to use the timber for firewood.
Coordination was undertaken to ensure sufficient access to 
fuel and security for unoccupied shelters, which were also be-
ing repaired in preparation for their coming occupants.
Shelters were then handed over to NEMA, and the allocation 
was carried out together with camp managers from the organi-
zation. NFI distributions were conducted by inter-agency relo-
cation teams, and the NFI kit was part of the shelter package 
distributed when the families moved into the shelters.
During project implementation, the programme was adapted to 
provide an additional 1,000 emergency shelters to the affected 
population in newly accessible areas (Bama and Gwoza).
ENGAGEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE    
At the sector level, affected people were engaged in focus 
group discussions, to define a shelter design that would 
meet their needs, as well as being climate and culturally appro-
priate. Different designs, proposed by various organizations, 
were validated with the displaced families, to reach an agree-
ment over one prototype to be used by all actors. Two models 
were finally adopted, one for emergency response and one 
with a longer life span of two years (reinforced shelters).
During this project, affected people were further engaged 
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The agency worked on government-allocated land to build improved shelters. For the Bakassi camp, the land was next to housing estates for government workers.
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The shelters were built by contractors, with the condition that they hired workers locally including IDPs, who received on-the-job training.
Shelters were of different sizes and it was agreed that, for polygamous rela-
tionships, one shelter would be allocated to each wife.
Two models of shelter were agreed upon by all agencies: one for emergency 
response and one with a longer lifetime (two years anticipated).
in a variety of ways, such as in beneficiary selection, floo  
mitigation measures and basic repairs at the household level, 
community messaging on relocation or available services.
Cash-for-work was also used to engage IDPs in the con-
struction of the shelters and support households with a daily 
income to meet other needs. This was included as a condi-
tion in the contractual terms with the contractors, although one 
challenge faced by all partners in the area was the poor quality 
of local labour. Locally hired workers required on-the-job 
training and constant supervision to ensure use of proper 
techniques and consistency. The Sector Working Group pro-
duced infographics to support training, and the capacity-building 
component actually turned out to be one of the most success-
ful outcomes of the project. However, the construction-related 
activities did not engage women, who instead were involved 
mainly in community activities and messaging.
SHELTER DESIGN AND ALLOCATION    
The original design presented by the Sector Working Group 
featured a raised roof and an open space under the eaves 
for ventilation. The design had to be quickly adjusted to include 
concrete foundations and metal strips to lock all trusses to the 
beam, to prevent the entire structure from being lifted by 
strong winds. Backfilling in all shelters was also undertaken, 
to raise the plinth to prevent water coming into the shelter.
The design proposed internal partitions to allow for increased 
privacy, diversified use of space and adjustment to the needs of 
families. Following consultations with the communities, all po-
lygamous families were given one shelter per wife, which was 
important to ease tensions and allow for family reunification  
Shelter allocation was also based on the family size, primarily 
the number and age of children. The different shelter sizes 
allowed to cater for different family structures and respect 
minimum international standards.
MATERIALS SOURCING    
Almost all materials were purchased locally, for cost effec-
tiveness and for the indirect benefit of the local economy. The 
only item brought from outside was plastic sheeting, as suffi-
cient quality was not attainable in local markets.
Several actors were building shelters at the same time, resulting 
in a serious shortage of building materials, including timber, 
nails and roofing sheets, and slowing down the construction 
process significantl . For roofing materials, this was somewhat 
mitigated by purchasing directly from local manufactur-
ers (rather than vendors), though delays of up to two months 
were still experienced. This was not possible for timber, which 
was sourced from merchants around town. The high demand 
affected both availability and prices. Moreover, the quality of 
timber decreased towards the end of the project as there 
were too many actors buying from few vendors. Although those 
who benefited the most were larger vendors with the capaci-
ty to stockpile large quantities and source from neighbouring 
states, also small businesses profited, as large vendors would 
usually source materials from them.
Finally, both timber and firewood trade have had a significan  
environmental impact, with areas suffering desertification  
and the risk of this spreading to former conflict areas that be-
came gradually accessible for harvesting.
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Camp management staff, authorities, and community representatives were all involved in the shelter allocation process.
Shelters included specific details, such as mosquito nets in th  open gap 
beneath the roof, which was intended for ventilation.
Shelters were numbered to facilitate the allocation process.
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STRENGTHS
+ The project enabled hundreds of children to go back 
to school as a result of the relocation of IDPs from the school 
buildings.
+ Capacity-building of local contractors and their la-
bourers in technical construction skills, many of whom were 
IDPs. There were clear and definite improvements in the con-
tractor’s skill and workmanship over the course of the project. 
+ Shelter design was climate and culturally appropriate.
+ Type and sensible allocation of shelters allowed fam-
ilies to be reunited after living separated for more than a 
year. This was particularly relevant for polygamous families.
WEAKNESSES
- Construction began late, too close to the rainy season, 
causing problems. Delays were caused by multiple factors, 
including slow agreement on allocation of responsibility for dif-
ferent camps and locations between some partners.
- Procurement challenges also contributed to the delay on 
the project. At the time, Nigeria’s emergency was under-rec-
ognized, which contributed to challenges in securing appropri-
ate and timely human resources. Subsequent prioritization of 
the emergency through internal L3 designation by UN agen-
cies (in October 2016) enabled to build up the capacity.
- Lack of site planning technical expertise across agen-
cies, when it was most needed during the emergency.
- Different pace of delivery across sectors, such as shel-
ter and water and sanitation.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Ground works must be initiated as early as possible, and locations coordinated effectively amongst implementing 
actors; early procurement, warehousing and storage of materials are essential.
• The construction of model shelters and trainings on construction techniques and skills are extremely valua-
ble, particularly where the local skills base is low. This is true both to check and adjust the climactic and cultural appro-
priateness of the design (prior to large scale implementation) and to identify common technical mistakes early.
• A coordinated effort should be made to identify local and regional procurement and supply possibilities, and 
to plan accordingly for maximum benefit to local markets, minimal delay, and adequate and consistent quality. This is 
especially relevant when the scale of the intervention is likely to saturate local market capacities.
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
The floods in Malawi in 2015 led to displacement and widespread damage to housing in the affected areas. Displacement sites 
were set up in public buildings (such as schools) during the emergency phase, and assistance was provided primarily in these 
sites. After the first few months, the focus shifted towards relocation and supporting return to IDPs’ places of origin, in order to 
enable collective centres to go back to their functions, and facilitate early recovery. According to data reported to the Shelter 
Cluster, emergency shelter support consisted mainly of distribution of tents and tarpaulins, while repairs assistance was primar-
ily in the form of tool kits and/or materials, coupled with trainings.
MALAWI 2015 / FLOODS
CRISIS Malawi floods, January 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED 523,347 houses affected. 356,643 completely destroyed1.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
1,101,364 individuals affected1.
336,000 individuals displaced (230,000 in displacement 
sites; 106,000 in host sites)2.
RESPONSE 
LOCATIONS
15 districts affected (the most affected were Chikwawa, Nsanje and 
Phalombe).
RESPONSE 
OUTPUTS
(as of August 2015)3
Approx. 50,000 households served with NFIs (70,000+ planned).
Over19,000 households assisted with emergency shelter (32,000+ planned).
Over 2,000 households assisted with repairs and retrofits (5,000+ planned .
MULANJE
1 Malawi 2015 Floods Post Disaster Needs Assessment Report, Gov. of Malawi, March 2015, http://bit.ly/2ogiYqQ.
2 UNDAC Assessment Report, 6 February 2015.
3 Data reported to the Shelter Cluster 4W by humanitarian organizations. Note that this data may not be 100% accu-
rate nor complete (it does not include the figures of the overall response)
13 Jan 2015: Declaration of Sate of Disaster by the Government of 
Malawi.
22 Jan 2015: Shelter Cluster released Preliminary Response Plan. 
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clared on 13 January 2015. As a result of the prolonged, 
heavy, rainfall, the Shire River reached its highest level in 30 
years, bursting it banks in multiple areas. 
SITUATION AFTER THE FLOODS 
The extreme rainfall event and resulting flooding led to dis-
placement, with many affected households evacuated to col-
lective centres (schools, churches and mosques). As these 
naturally (and in some cases enforcedly) disbanded after the 
first two months, affected households with no long-term shel-
ter solution constructed simple emergency shelters, or stayed 
with host families.
Properties sustained damage through a combination of rain 
and high winds. The most affected communities were more 
EMERGENCY RELIEF
CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
80% of the population of Malawi live in rural areas. The 
economy is primarily agricultural, which accounts for 90% of 
export revenues. National GDP per capita is one of the low-
est globally and the economy has experienced low growth. 
Malawi is also heavily reliant on investments from global fi-
nance institutions. A lack of trust in the Malawian Govern-
ment by these institutions (since 2013) has led to a reduction 
in investments, further stagnating economic growth.
Malawi experienced above-average rainfall throughout De-
cember 2014 and January 2015. The Southern Region of 
Malawi received 400% more rainfall than the Long Term 
Mean for the region. 15 of the country’s 28 districts expe-
rienced significant flooding, with a state of emergency de-
2 Mar 2015: Rapid joint assessment released by Shelter Cluster.
End of 2015: Deactivation of Malawi Shelter Cluster.
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vulnerable to the disaster, as a result of their shelter and settle-
ment typologies. Many of the inhabitants of the flooded rural ar-
eas resided in one-storey houses, constructed using traditional 
techniques and materials, such as sun-baked mud-bricks and 
thatched roofs. The flooding, rainfall and wind caused homes 
to disintegrate and roofs to blow off. There appeared to be a 
correlation between the degree of damage sustained and the 
construction techniques used. As shown by the Rapid Joint As-
sessment (March 2015), 47% of houses built with fired bricks 
and CGI roofs reported damage, compared to 71% of those 
built with sun-baked bricks, and 78% of wood and mud houses.
EMERGENCY SHELTER PHASE
The Shelter Cluster, led by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Development, was activated shortly after the emergency, and 
a Rapid Joint Damage Assessment was undertaken by vari-
ous clusters4.
The international organization co-leading the Cluster quickly 
established a large shelter pipeline, and the first significant
shelter distributions took place in early February, with tents 
and shelter kits being airlifted to areas on the east bank of 
the Shire River that had been completely cut off by the floods
During the emergency phase, the government promptly erect-
ed tents in the most critical displacement sites, in order to clear 
the public facilities, particularly schools. The sites were selected 
without sufficient planning and the tents set up hurriedly, lead-
ing to challenges such as overcrowding and gaps in WASH and 
Protection. Additionally, the distribution of humanitarian aid was 
reported to create a draw to these sites, partially driven by the 
underlying poverty and also by the food insecurity, created by 
flood damage to crops and livelihoods. A further challenge in the 
response was that initial assessments and distributions tended 
to neglect IDPs in host communities, which increased the draw 
to displacement sites and complicated coordination efforts.
4 The Assessment is available at http://bit.ly/2jbPHqw 
The Shelter Cluster’s initial strategic objective was to relo-
cate all people from collective centres into planned camps 
or resettlement areas5. Expected outputs and impacts of the 
emergency response were:
• 31,636 households provided with tents and NFIs.
• Assessments conducted in all the 15 districts for strate-
gic positioning of camp sites.
• Displaced people in the camp sites to be trained in con-
struction, for dignity and Disaster Risk Reduction.
• Resettlement areas properly laid out.
EARLY RECOVERY PHASE 
By early March, the government prioritized the closure of 
camps and the return of IDPs. This change in approach led 
to a swift re-focusing from emergency operations to early re-
covery planning within the humanitarian community. As part of 
these efforts, the Shelter Cluster led the process of preparing 
a “Durable Solutions Framework” and, where feasible, orien-
tated its own efforts towards providing shelter support in are-
as of return. Supporting the ability to return was essential 
to encourage livelihood recovery and to allow collective 
centres to return to their proper use. The Cluster aimed to 
provide adequate shelter in the camps, whilst also strengthen-
ing the capacity of the displaced population for early recovery, 
through training on good construction methods and through 
the provision of construction materials. 
The Cluster and the government promoted the use of fired
bricks (as opposed to sun-dried bricks) for reconstruction, so 
that buildings would be more resistant to disintegration6. How-
ever, a lack of availability of wood to fire the bricks (or financial
resources to purchase fired bricks) led to many households 
resorting to unsafe traditional building approaches. Some 
households received shelter assistance from government 
and NGOs in the form of shelter kits (tools and tarpau-
lins), tents, or materials to construct temporary timber 
and plastic-sheet shelters. In assessments conducted by 
humanitarian organizations, communities expressed a prefer-
ence for basic materials and tools, to repair or construct core 
dwellings supplemented by local materials, including earth 
blocks and grass thatching. This was considered an appro-
priate and durable solution to their immediate and longer-term 
shelter needs, which would also allow them to focus on their 
priorities, i.e. food security and livelihood recovery.
The case studies that follow show two approaches taken by 
humanitarian organizations. While the first (A.20) was a short-
term project focused on the emergency relief and early re-
covery phase, the second (A.21) was a longer-term recovery 
programme looking at housing reconstruction, with significant
training and Disaster Risk Reduction components.
5 Preliminary Response Plan, released on 22 January 2015 (http://bit.ly/2i0oiKI).
6 Key Shelter Safety Messages - 2015 Malawi Floods and Storms.
After several weeks of heavy rains, the Shire River reached the highest level in the past 30 years, burst its banks in several locations and caused widespread flooding
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Displacement site at Bitilinyu. These collective centres were the initial option for 
those who had to leave their homes and caused a significant dra , due to the 
distributions of aid (and relative neglect of IDPs in host settings). These sites 
were also particularly overcrowded and had gaps in protection and hygiene.
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CRISIS Malawi Floods, January 2015
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED 523,347 houses (Source: Gov. of Malawi).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
DISPLACED
230,000 in displacement sites 
106,000 displaced in host sites 
(UNDAC assessment report, 6 February 2015).
PROJECT LOCATIONS Chikwawa, Zomba, Mulanje.
BENEFICIARIES 1,874 households.
PROJECT OUTPUTS
1,224 tents with household NFI kits 
650 shelter kits
500 tarpaulins
960 solar powered lamps
20 packs of classroom materials
OUTCOME INDICATORS
100% of shelters distributed were verified as received. 
67% of respondents living at their (or a new) home site at 
the time of ex post evaluation (Oct 2015), compared to 4% 
at time of distribution.
9 JAN 2015
STRENGTHS
+ Reduced issues and risks related to overcrowding in collective 
centres.
+ Facilitated the return to areas of origin / own plots.
+ Responded at scale with different modalities.
+ Supported early recovery.
WEAKNESSES
- The recovery capacity of affected households was not properly 
understood.
- Lack of appropriate technical training to some recipients of the kits.
- Tarpaulins distributions did not include fixing kits
- Detailed Post-Distribution Monitoring was not undertaken after the 
relief distribution.
EX POST EVALUATION 
EMERGENCY RELIEF DISTRIBUTIONS
RELIEF AND EARLY RECOVERY PHASE
PROJECT SUMMARY 
This project had a relief-oriented and a recovery-oriented outcome objective. Through the provision of tents and shel-
ter-related NFIs, it aimed to meet immediate shelter needs and enabled affected households to move out of gender-seg-
regated collective centres, supporting return and easing overcrowding. In order to support early recovery, tarpaulins and 
fixing kits were distributed to build or repair shelters, coupled with basic training and tools to assist with reconstruction 
or earning a livelihood.
22 Jan 2015: Shelter Cluster released Preliminary Response Plan. 
22 Feb 2015: Distributions of tents completed.
23 Apr 2015: Distributions of tents to new caseload with totally de-
stroyed home completed. Distributions of shelter kits and tarpaulins to 
households with partially destroyed homes completed.
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SHELTER SIZE 1 Tent = 18.5m2 SHELTER DENSITY 3.6 m
2 per person (based on national 
average household size of 5.1).
MATERIALS COST USD 313 per household. PROJECT COST USD 550 per household.
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CONTEXT
For more background information, see overview A.19.
Extreme rainfall in Malawi during January 2015 caused wide-
spread displacement, forcing households to seek immediate 
shelter in collective centres. In rural areas, the flooding also 
led to the destruction of harvests and damage to water sourc-
es, further exacerbating food-security issues. This created an 
additional draw to collective centres. Displacement sites be-
came crowded, with a lack of basic services, such as water, 
sanitation and hygiene, prompting concerns about the out-
break of diseases. The shelter sector was urged to respond 
in a way that provided immediate lifesaving shelter (alongside 
appropriate services) and increased the affected community’s 
capacity for early recovery.
RELIEF PHASE
During the initial phase of this intervention, the organization re-
sponded to the immediate shelter needs at collective cen-
tres. Due to severe overcrowding, there were concerns about 
Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and child protection issues, as 
well as health issues resulting from a lack of basic services. 
People were living in gender- and age-segregated rooms, and 
in some instances men were required to sleep outside. Tents 
and NFI kits, all imported over several rounds, were distributed 
to households verified as having a totally destroyed home
The organization aimed to support households as part of 
a return scheme, motivated by the government’s desire to 
decongest overcrowded collective centres. For those house-
holds who did not want to return to their previous site due to 
flood risks, the team worked with the local Traditional Author-
ity, the District Government and beneficiaries to identify safer 
areas of land. In some cases, most notably in the district of 
Zomba, water inundation prevented households from re-
turning home. In such situations, tents were distributed and 
implemented in spaces surrounding the collective centres. 
Due to land restrictions, the number of tents that could be dis-
tributed was limited, when compared to the caseload at the 
centres. In such cases, the organization identified beneficiary
families based on agreed vulnerability criteria. As the levels 
of rainfall dropped and waters receded, distribution teams 
worked with beneficiary households so that tents could be re-
located and families could return to their home sites. 
EARLY RECOVERY PHASE 
After the initial emergency phase, the project shifted em-
phasis towards supporting early recovery. In Zomba and 
Mulanje, shelter kits or tarpaulins were distributed to house-
holds with a partially destroyed home. Beneficiary house-
holds were able to use tarpaulins and fixing kits to repair 
and weatherproof shelters, until access to resources allowed 
them to seek a more durable solution. As part of the distri-
bution, a basic level of training was provided on how to use 
the items to improve structures. Repairs included fixing dam-
aged external walls and replacing roofs that had blown off. 
In Mulanje, during the later stages, households with totally de-
stroyed homes, that were still in collective centres or with host 
families, were also provided with a shelter kit. In such instanc-
es, households received lumber and made basic shelters on 
their home site. During the ex post evaluation, all interviewed 
families had completed – or were in the process of improving 
– their structures. Many of these households also reported 
they wished to reuse the tarpaulins as roof of the new shelter.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION 
The organization focused its efforts in more remote regions and 
rural communities, where fewer humanitarian actors were op-
erating and gaps in the response were soon identified. Com-
munities were selected in coordination with the government-led 
Cluster. The district government identified the worst-affected 
communities that had not yet been reached by other actors, 
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Some structures sustained significant damage due to the flood
Tents were used to clear the overcrowded collective centres during the emergency relief phase. By doing so, this project managed to address some of the issues faced 
by the displaced people in those sites, including family reunification and reduction of hygiene and protection concerns.
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understand the selection criteria, and felt that targeting was 
political in nature.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
The distribution of humanitarian aid created a significant pull 
factor towards collective centres. Identifying the benefi-
ciaries who genuinely required shelter assistance – from 
those who were trying to access other items – proved problem-
atic. Flooding in Malawi had washed away crops, exacerbat-
ing underlying conditions of poverty, and since food and other 
items were being distributed at collective centres, it was felt that 
some households had registered in order to qualify for food aid.
This exacerbated problems associated with severe over-
crowding. Sanitation was insufficient, families were forced 
to split, and there were incidences of skin and other commu-
nicable diseases. The urgency of lifesaving assistance was 
stressed in the preliminary response plan, along with the deci-
sion to encourage return by supporting families at their home 
sites, which helped to reduce the draw to collective centres.
Due to underlying resource deficiency and also the scale of 
the crisis, there was a lack of access to sufficient lumber 
in the emergency phase, for shelter kits to be easily deployed 
to a large percentage of the affected population. The deploy-
ment of tents enabled rapid distribution, allowing the im-
mediate easing of collective centres. Households could erect 
them on their land quickly. Where water inundation prevented 
return to home, tents could be erected temporarily on land 
adjacent to the collective centres. As the ground began to dry 
out, tents were moved to beneficiaries  home sites.
A significant number of families who did not qualify for tents 
(according to the beneficiary criteria) had a severely damaged 
house, therefore being exposed to rainfall and high daytime 
temperatures. These households remained without adequate 
shelter, as many did not have the resources to make simple 
improvements and repairs in a timely fashion. This influenced
the decision to distribute shelter kits alongside basic training 
in the second phase, and helped to reduce the issues of ineq-
uity felt by those who had not received any assistance.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
A government representative commented that by promoting 
return to home – and distributing at people’s home sites or 
assisting with relocation – this project allowed to clear a 
number of the collective centres and their timely return 
to their normal uses. This had a positive impact on the wid-
er relief effort, beyond the shelter sector, and supported the 
early recovery of communities following the flood events
making assessments available to field teams. Assessment and 
distribution teams would then work with a local representative 
for the community, often a camp coordinator. The camp com-
mittees, appointed by the district government, would generate 
a beneficiary list based on agreed criteria: totally or partially de-
stroyed home and, in some situations, additional vulnerabilities. 
The organization’s assessment team cross-referenced the lists 
with data compiled by the regional government and also under-
took key informant interviews, to verify that the criteria had been 
applied appropriately and to mitigate selection bias.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION TEAM 
This project was managed a by a full-time project manager 
based in Blantyre, with coordination and strategic responsibili-
ties. This role was filled by a series of overseas staff posted for 
around four weeks at a time. Two sub-teams (each comprising 
four staff and volunteers from the organization’s roster) were 
located in the target districts, to manage the implementation 
and coordinate with the district government and other actors 
operating in the same region. Overall, 40 overseas staff and 
volunteers were involved in the response. At the field level, 
teams used a high number of local staff and volunteers to 
assist with the implementation. Some of these were drawn 
from other organizations, while others were recruited direct-
ly from the affected communities, and worked as translators 
and enumerators, assisted with distributions, training and tent 
erection. In some instances, agreements were formalized 
through the creation of MoUs with the appropriate organiza-
tion. However, in situations where this did not happen, the lack 
of signed documentation caused issues during the implemen-
tation. For instance, newly posted staff or volunteers were 
not always clear on the agreed per-diem rates for distribution 
teams. Consequently, the organization became stricter in the 
formalization of working relationships. 
ENGAGEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE  
Distribution teams from the local community were trained in 
the erection of tents and were tasked with assisting benefi-
ciary households. These teams also assisted with the reloca-
tion of tents from collective centres to households’ home sites.
Although the organization coordinated well with the camp 
committees, more efforts should have been made to work 
more closely with the wider affected communities, particularly 
in terms of communication and sensitization with non-ben-
eficiary groups. Several cases were uncovered, during the 
ex post evaluation, where community members had not ful-
ly understood the organization’s goals and mission. In these 
instances, families who did not receive assistance did not 
By pitching the tent on their home site, people were able to start to rebuild their 
damaged houses. Supporting return was essential for enabling early recovery. 
Tarpaulins from the shelter kits were used, amongst other purposes, to seal off 
damaged parts of the houses.
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STRENGTHS
+ The project provided a mechanism for rapidly reducing 
the problems associated with overcrowding at collective 
centres, with the distribution of tents and selected NFIs. It did 
so by 1) Reducing exposure to vector and water transmit-
ted diseases; 2) Improving privacy; 3) In many cases facili-
tating the return home and therefore reinstating livelihoods 
and supporting early recovery; 4) Mitigating risks associ-
ated with GBV and child protection, as well as enabling the 
reformation of the family unit, with parents better able to 
watch over minors. Qualitatively, beneficiaries reported this 
to be an important outcome of the intervention, as certain 
aspects of normal household behaviours could commence.
+ The organization was able to reach a greater number of 
households and reduced the potential for inequity resulting 
from the distribution of tents alone, thanks to the distribution 
of shelter kits or tarpaulins for those with a partially dam-
aged house. This also yielded further positive outcomes 
in terms of supporting early recovery.  
WEAKNESSES
- Vulnerability assessments did not inform an under-
standing of the self-recovery capacity. Early elements of 
the response were focused almost solely on immediate relief, 
and failed to consider the longer-term recovery needs of the af-
fected population. Whilst some beneficiaries were able to use 
the provision of emergency shelter as a platform for recovery, 
others were unable to transition towards a more durable shel-
ter within the life cycle of the tent. As tents cannot be easily 
adapted, this raised concerns that some beneficiaries would 
become exposed to shelter-related issues at a later date. 
- Adequate technical training on the use of the shelter kit 
was not always provided to beneficiaries  This was due, in 
part, to the general lack of understanding (by implementing 
teams) of techniques associated with the shelter kit. Following 
the completion of this project, shelter kit trainings were rolled 
out across the organization’s network of staff and volunteers.
- Tarpaulins were not distributed with a fixing kit, except 
when part of the standardized shelter kits. Although there 
were many cases were benefi iaries were still able to use 
these items to good effect, in some instances tarpaulins were 
used for non-shelter purposes – such as drying food. This is-
sue may have arisen because beneficiaries did not receive 
the fixings required to utilize tarpaulins as intended, or due to 
a lack of training.
- The early emergency phase did not include detailed 
post-distribution monitoring. This further affected the or-
ganization’s understanding of the barriers to early recovery.
www.shelterprojects.org
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Limited availability of food, inflated prices and a reduction in livelihood activities had a significant impact on the ear-
ly recovery capacity of affected households. If access to food and livelihoods is a known issue, this should be recognized 
and included in assessments. In this response, evidence suggested that many households were drawn to collective centres 
as a result of damage to crops, thus the linkages between shelter need and food poverty could be assumed from the outset.
• Vulnerability and capacity assessments should include pre-disaster secondary data, as well as post-disaster 
secondary and primary data, and this should be factored into any resulting project design. Providing a household with 
emergency shelter and NFIs can often provide the appropriate platform to begin the process of self-recovery. How-
ever, there are contexts when the pre-disaster conditions significantly inhibit the ability of the affected communities 
to engage in self-recovery. Early, vulnerability-driven, emergency shelter, distributions need to be followed 
by further capacity assessments and, if appropriate, an additional recovery-oriented component1. Although this 
intervention provided immediate support for those at greatest risk as a result of the displacement, there should have 
been more recognition of the impact of vulnerabilities on the capacity of households to recover. 
• Detailed post-distribution monitoring should be undertaken to recognize specific vulnerabilities early on, and 
enable the organization to provide an additional level of assistance, or link the most vulnerable beneficiaries with other 
shelter actors. Although some informal checks were undertaken in the days following distributions, these were carried 
out with the aim to identify any immediate gaps in provision, or to address aid-related issues. However, the evidence 
gathered during an ex post evaluation showed that, due to underlying conditions of poverty, many households lacked 
the material, financial or physical resources to transitio  towards a more durable form of shelter.
•  Shelter kit interventions that do not include the appropriate level of technical training have a significantly lower 
chance of yielding positive shelter related outcomes (both short- and long-term).
1 This approach was taken in project A.40 in response to the Ecuador earthquake.
MATERIALS LIST
Materials Quantity (per HH)
Total 
Quantity
Unit Cost 
(USD)
Family Tent 1 1,224 276.9
Shelter kit (IFRC 
specification 1 650 51.5
Tarpaulin (IFRC 
specification 1 500 11.8
Household water filtration 1 500 32.3
Solar light 2 3,408 9.5
Blanket 5 6,120 7.3
Kitchen set 1 1,224 23.2
Mosquito nets 2 2,448 4.4
Jerry can (10l) 2 2,448 3.5
Tool kit 1 1,224 14.1
CASE STUDY
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CRISIS Malawi Floods, January 2015
TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED 523,347 houses (Source: Gov. of Malawi).
TOTAL PEOPLE AFFECTED 1,101,364 people (Source: Gov. of Malawi).
TOTAL PEOPLE DISPLACED 336,000 people (UNDAC assessment report).
PROJECT LOCATIONS Zomba, Phalombe and Machinga districts.
BENEFICIARIES 1,090 households.
PROJECT OUTPUTS
1,090 houses benefited from emergency re-
pair and reconstruction activities. 
9 model homes built in different communities, 
to be replicated.
109 cash-for-work grants provided to vulnera-
ble households (10%).
Training provided to local builders and staff (in-
cluding 66 building supervisors, and three Trainings 
of Trainers with 30 builders and 8 programme sup-
port staff).
Development of a training curriculum for 
builders.
SHELTER SIZE 22m
2 and 16.5m2 (Size of house dependent on fam-
ily size, assumed at 3.5m2 per person).
SHELTER DENSITY 3.5m2 per person.
MATERIALS COST USD 200 per household.
PROJECT COST USD 552 (inclusive of training and dissemination).
OUTCOME INDICATORS
The majority of affected households returned to the 
site of their original dwellings, where possible.
9 JAN 2015
STRENGTHS
+ Increased technical skills of local communities in the construction 
of durable houses.
+ The programme provided an affordable housing solution.
+ Resources were used directly for housing recovery, accelerating 
the overall process of recovery.
+ Model houses provided a reference for locals to replicate.
+ The programme recognized traditional skills and knowledge.
+ Capacity-building of local partners.
WEAKNESSES
- The project did not cater for all income levels.
- Lack of organizational experience in shelter projects.
- Poor planning led to delays in beneficiary selection
- Lack of adequate market assessment led to procurement challenges.
PLANNINGFLOODS IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT SUMMARY 
The programme aimed to assist flood-a -
fected people to return to their homes, 
through the repair and reconstruction of 
houses. This was done through the supply 
of tools, materials and technical training. It 
also included training and information shar-
ing to the community on more durable and 
resilient housing-construction methods.
Jun 2015: Initial discussions with community
Jul 2015: Beneficiary selection, shelter workshops with local build-
ers, development of shelter designs and training curriculum
Aug 2015: Training roll-out
Aug 2015: Distribution of tools and materials 
Sep 2015 onwards: Continued technical support for reconstruction
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CONTEXT
See overview A.19 for background information.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION 
The organization selected the three target districts due to the 
high level of damage and the continued flood risk. Additionally, 
the local partner had a strong presence in these districts and 
good relations with the communities.
Priority was given to areas at greatest risk of future flooding
(confirmed by flood risk data), where most houses were dam-
aged or destroyed, and that had substantial loss of crops and 
livelihood and fewest alternative income opportunities.
Household selection was carried out in partnership with the 
government District Offices and Traditional Authorities and fur-
ther verified by household visits. Priority was given to the most 
vulnerable households, based on criteria including: single- and 
child-headed households, elderly, disabled, households affected 
by HIV and low-income families with children under 5 years.
The project aimed to advance gender equality and female 
empowerment against cultural discriminatory norms, involving 
women in masonry and building workshops.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Overall, the project was implemented with 52 staff members 
and builders from a local partner which undertook work at the 
community level, while the organization provided a total of sev-
en national and international staff for logistical support, coordi-
nation and overall supervision.
An initial shelter and housing assessment was undertak-
en, highlighting that a number of proposed house designs were 
not affordable and, if adopted, would only support a limited 
number of families. Given the prevalence of flooding and the 
need to maximize the scale of the project with the available 
funds, the organization aimed at supporting families to recon-
struct their permanent dwellings, using low-cost, locally availa-
ble materials, supplemented with in-kind assistance. Technical 
training and support were also provided to identify and build 
upon existing best local building practices, and to share this 
information with the whole community. In order to do so, a se-
ries of workshops were held at central locations in the target 
communities. Two builders from each community in the area 
joined the workshop along with women and local government 
staff. The workshop included theory, discussion, site visits and 
practical exercises, to identify best construction practices. At 
the end of each day, the learning was recorded and used to 
develop a training curriculum for other builders and to share this 
with their whole community. During the week, a complete core 
house was constructed, along with the provision of a curriculum 
and supporting communication materials.
The builders were then engaged to construct houses for 
the most vulnerable families in each of their communities, 
which also provided a further training opportunity and model for 
demonstration. Partner field staff and the builders also provided 
technical support to families during the construction.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
In order to build upon existing knowledge and practice, the or-
ganization worked in partnership with communities and local 
builders, who were engaged from the outset in helping to re-
fine the affordability of the programme and then share their lo-
cal knowledge on construction practices and building materials.
Throughout the programme, the organization maintained this 
collaboration through local and traditional authorities, focus 
groups, workshops and household-level support.
COORDINATION
The project worked closely with the Shelter Cluster to agree on 
the areas where the organization and its partners could work, 
and to ensure that the approach was in line with Cluster proce-
dures. The Cluster Coordinator attended training sessions and 
assisted in parts of the training programme. All the materials 
developed during the programme were shared with the Cluster. 
District government and traditional authorities were involved in 
identifying the communities, and communication was carried 
out through them. The communities were then actively involved 
in deciding the approach for the project.
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Workshops were held in target communities to identify best practices and devel-
op contextualized training for the community.
People were given technical trainings and built model houses as part of the project. Here they are working on setting out the foundations of a model house..
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The project provided technical solutions, including refin -
ments to traditional house design, so that the roof could con-
tinue to be supported by the veranda posts, should the earth 
walls collapse. During the workshops, emphasis was given 
to soil selection for making adobe bricks and the correct 
brick-making processes. The reason why many buildings 
collapsed was due to the insufficient thickness of the walls, 
therefore the improved design increased this width (from 10 
to 15cm) so that the walls were more stable. It also ensured 
that internal walls had proper foundations and were connected 
to the outside walls, to further strengthen the structure.
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 
The communities were prone to heavy rains, high winds and 
flooding. Therefore, Disaster Risk Reduction was very strong-
ly embedded throughout the programme. Community saf-
er-building information was disseminated to educate, inform 
and provide examples. Other strategies were also encour-
aged, including planting trees to protect against driving high 
winds and rain. Trees could also be used as building materi-
als or for firewood. Information was provided on Safer Earth 
Building for Floods and Rains, as a simple booklet and train-
ing curriculum for builders. This included information on haz-
ards, appropriate site selection and construction techniques 
to reduce floodi g in houses, as well as appropriate protection 
and maintenance of houses and the environment.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
The organization needed to convince government person-
nel, politicians and other organizations that houses con-
structed from local materials could provide a sufficientl  
durable solution. This challenge was overcome mainly by 
building model houses that demonstrated this potential.
Additionally, extra technical support was brought in during 
the implementation process, to strengthen the local part-
ner’s capacity.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
The programme explored and built upon existing local 
knowledge and practices, which enhanced the ownership 
and commitment of the residents and ensured that any rec-
ommendations were site-appropriate. The resources and 
information produced were shared with the Shelter Cluster, 
so that other actors could use them. Ultimately, this ap-
proach provided a practical, inexpensive and replicable 
model to respond to similar flood events, in this and other 
parts of the country.
MATERIALS 
All materials were purchased from within Malawi, largely 
through local markets. Timber supplies came from other dis-
tricts where trees were available for construction use, so as 
not to damage the local environment.
Materials such as burnt bricks, cement and corrugated iron 
sheet roofing were beyond the financial means of the poorest 
households. Therefore, for wider impact, assistance had to be 
focused on building solutions using local materials that were 
affordable, replicable and achievable by the most vulnerable 
and at-risk households.
While earth for brick-making and grass for thatching were lo-
cally available, other materials and tools had to be purchased. 
Communities were offered restricted cash to purchase ma-
terials that were not freely available, but there was an over-
whelming request for in-kind support due to the distances to 
markets, the capacity of markets, the cost of transport and the 
needs of families to focus on agricultural activities. 
HOUSING DESIGN AND TECHNIQUES 
Many houses had survived with little or no damage, even after 
weeks of standing water, including those constructed using 
earth brick and render. This is because these traditional hous-
es had raised platforms that protected the core structure from 
erosion, and the veranda and large roof overhangs ensured 
that the gables and walls were protected. This design, devel-
oped over centuries, provided protection from the elements 
and, other than some minor repairs to the veranda and walls, 
allowed many families to return to their homes once the floods
had subsided.
Model homes were built, according to traditional designs. Additionally, materials 
were provided and cash-for-work grants for the 10% most vulnerable households.
Trainings included the identification of good soils and mixing f r block making.
Many of the traditional houses withstood the floods, as they were built with con-
textually appropriate features, such as roof overhangs and raised platforms.
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STRENGTHS
+ Increased technical skills of local builders in construc-
tion of durable houses, thanks to workshops conducted at the 
community level.
+ The programme allowed for a more durable emergen-
cy response, using an affordable solution that would help 
withstand future flood risks, yet was accessible by the poorest 
and most vulnerable households.
+ Resources were used directly to support housing re-
construction, accelerating the overall recovery process, 
instead of providing emergency or transitional support first
+ Model houses provided a reference for locals to replicate. 
Communities have started building houses using the safer 
building guiding principles based on the model houses, which 
therefore had a wider impact by providing a reference for other 
members of the community.
+ The programme recognized traditional skills and knowl-
edge as an affordable and effective means of coping with 
heavy rains and floods, managing to convince locals that 
these traditional methods were a good alternative to more 
expensive materials, such as burnt bricks or concrete blocks.
+ Increased capacity of the local partner. 
WEAKNESSES
- The programme did not cater for all income levels, as it 
only provided a low-cost solution and did not consider those 
who could have afforded more durable housing.
- Lack of experience in shelter projects of the organiza-
tion’s country programme and local partners meant that this 
had to be developed during implementation.
- Delays in beneficiary selection and verification process 
caused by poor planning slowed down the implementation.
- Lack of adequate market assessment. There were some 
logistical challenges in finding doors and windows, as no 
large supplier could be found.
www.shelterprojects.org
MATERIALS LIST PER MODEL HOUSE
Ref Details Unit Quantity Unit cost (MK) Unit cost (USD) Total cost (USD)
1
2
3
4
5 
6
7
8
9
10
11
RIDGE POLES
RAFTER POLES
WALL POST POLES
BATTENS
BLACK PLASTIC PAPER
TIE WIRE
3” NAILS
TIMBER FOR DOOR (Inc fittings)
TIMBER FOR WINDOWS (Inc fittings)
EARTH BRICKS 
THATCH 
Pcs
Pcs
Pcs
Pcs
Part Roll
Roll
Kg
Pcs
Pcs
Pcs
Pcs
6
30
10
80
1
1
2
1
2
2,400
1
1,000
800
500
200
6,000
2,000
1,000
6,000
2,000
3
9,000
2.30
1.84
1.15
0.46
13.79
4.60
2.30
13.79
4.60
0.01
20.69
13.79
55.17
11.49
36.78
13.79
4.60
4.60
13.79
9.20
16.55
20.69
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Visible sections of the programme distract from 
wider goals. The hard components of the pro-
gramme, such as the distribution of materials and 
the construction of model houses, have the poten-
tial to dominate the programme and divert from the 
wider objective of supporting the whole community 
(by encouraging safer building practices and sup-
plying relevant information).
• Importance of strengthening the organization’s 
capacity in varying sectors. The organization’s 
preparedness needed to be reviewed to better re-
spond to future disasters, particularly with regards 
to technical support, number of staff, as well as in 
conducting beneficiary surveys to be used during 
the identification and selection processes
• Multisectoral programming, beyond shelter. 
The programme should have also covered aspects 
such as restarting livelihoods and food security, to 
address family needs of those who were keen to 
return home earlier than others.
Local materials were provided, as listed in the BoQ below.
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KEYWORDS: Permanent housing, Resettlement, Advocacy, Infrastructure, Community participation, Land tenure
CRISIS
Complex: Drought (July 2011 - June 2012) 
and armed conflict. The project started at the peak 
of the drought in the Horn of Africa.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
3.7 million people affected by drought and 
famine crisis (Source: OCHA, 2011).
1.4 million internally displaced people (ibid.).
PROJECT LOCATIONS Garowe and Burtinle, Puntland region, Somalia.
BENEFICIARIES 1,200 households (8,400 individuals).
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
1,200 permanent shelters built
1,800 individuals benefitting from cash
for work (masons, unskilled labourers and carpenters).
Other outputs include: access road, one health centre 
and one borehole in Garowe, water systems in both 
sites, child-friendly space, public area and police post 
in Garowe, 14 sex segregated toilet blocks.
SHELTER SIZE 16m2 (4x4m) one room shelters (10x10m plot).
SHELTER DENSITY 2.7m2 / person (average household size of 5.9 persons).
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2 HANDOVER PHASE
20122011 DROUGHT
AND FAMINE
2013
OCT
2013
MAY
2010
RIO NAPO
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
DJIBOUTI
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This was a two-year, multidonor, multisectoral, project aimed at providing a sustainable shelter solution by building 1,200 
permanent houses for IDP households in two relocation sites. The shelter programme was linked to Livelihoods, WASH, 
Health, and Education. The project adopted holistic settlement as well as community-led construction approaches. The 
organization managed to secure the land and receive additional funding for complementary activities, including infra-
structure, facilities and common spaces.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Jan 2012: Beneficiary selection and verificatio
Feb 2012: Recruitment of staff completed.
Apr 2012: Typology design agreed and start of land titles negotiations.
Apr 2012: 45 pilot houses completed in Burtinle.
Jun 2012: Land acquisition granted from local administration and 
Ministry of Interior.
Oct 2012: 80 pilot houses completed in Garowe (delayed by resolving 
land issues).
May 2013: All 1,200 shelters and related facilities constructed, land 
titles processing completed.
Jun 2013: Commissioning of settlements and start of handover of 
houses and land titles.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
STRENGTHS
+ Achievement of tenure security and establishment of durable sites.
+ Continuous engagement of all stakeholders.
+ The selection criteria were established and agreed upon by all.
+ Owner-driven approach, transparent and accountable systems.
+ Settlement approach, linkages with vocational training and sav-
ings groups.
 
WEAKNESSES
- Staff turnover and lack of flexibility of internal systems
- Limited female participation and lack of gender analysis.
- The project provided only one-room shelters, that were too small 
to meet cultural needs.
- Beneficiaries had to be incentivized to participate in the construction.
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MATERIALS COST
PER SHELTER USD 1,693 including labour.
PROJECT COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
USD 3,493 including site works, WASH 
facilities and organizational overheads.
OUTCOME INDICATORS 100% occupancy rate of shelters in both sites. Secure land tenure obtained in both sites.
PLANNING PHASE
INDIAN
OCEAN
GULF OF
ADEN
PUNTLAND
GAROWE
BURTINLE
PROJECT SITES
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a minimum kit, that would be locally procured and stockpiled 
by Cluster partners in strategic points in Somalia and Kenya. 
Transitional shelter was provided to stabilized IDP settlements 
(in Puntland and Somaliland). Interventions ranged from shel-
ter kits, to houses with corrugated iron roof sheets. The third 
pillar supported voluntary relocation, or return to the place 
of origin. Due to the presence of returnees from Yemen and 
Kenya, the Cluster adopted an equality approach, wherein 
IDPs, returnees and urban poor groups could be integrated. 
Although this project was initially conceived to fit under the 
second pillar, it ended up providing permanent shelters with 
secured land tenure, due to its longer engagement process.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
The project was implemented by a contracted team (Finance 
office , Accountability office , Supply chain office , Project en-
gineers) and with additional staff, brought in on a need basis, 
including shelter engineers and humanitarian accountability 
facilitators. A community-based construction approach was 
adopted, whereby beneficiaries received construction materials 
and technical support to build their houses. They were likewise 
responsible for identifying the skilled labour and providing the 
unskilled labour. Each shelter unit was constructed by an aver-
age of five labourers (two masons and three unskilled workers).
BENEFICIARY SELECTION
The project aimed to provide shelter to people displaced from 
their homes due to conflict and drought, as well as the urban 
homeless from host communities. The organization engaged 
all stakeholders (regional government, elders, religious lead-
ers, community members) in the selection of beneficiaries  
The Accountability Officer invited committee representatives 
from more than 15 IDP settlements in Garowe, explaining the 
shelter and vulnerability criteria, as well as the selection pro-
cess. The local authorities were tasked to work with settlement 
leaders in identifying the most vulnerable residents, based on 
agreed-upon criteria. Leaflets and posters were distributed in 
CONTEXT
Food security in Somalia had been deteriorating since 2010, 
with almost all southern regions being affected; famine was 
declared in the Bay region, for a total of 6.4 million affected 
people (more than half of the Somali population). Due to this, 
and the instability and fighting within the country, the number 
of IDPs in Somalia was estimated to be 1.4 million1. The pro-
ject areas were hosting the majority of IDPs in the Puntland 
region, which is primarily inhabited by people from the Somali 
ethnic group (and of Muslim faith). Despite its relative stability, 
the region had also endured armed conflict
SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS 
In the wake of a severe drought and the resulting famine in 
2011, the population density in Puntland further swelled, due 
to the influx of IDPs who were fleeing violence in South-Cen-
tral Somalia, concentrating around Garowe and Burtinle, and 
some of the long-term IDPs who had settled in Garowe. Dis-
placed people were searching for life-saving assistance, due 
to limited access to water, food, health care services, and ad-
equate shelter. The influx of IDPs led to increased tensions 
between the host community and the new arrivals, as they 
competed for limited employment, access to state services 
and scarce resources. In Garowe, there was insufficient or 
substandard shelter to meet their needs1. Additionally, the IDP 
settlements were unplanned and congested, due to the in-
flux caused by the ongoing drought. In Burtinle, all respond-
ents from a rapid assessment (conducted in two IDP camps) 
reported that the shelters were inadequate to protect from the 
weather. The houses were primarily buuls (huts made from 
sticks, cardboard, old rugs and tents), offering little security.
SHELTER CLUSTER STRATEGY
The Cluster response strategy in 2012 contained three pillars: 
1) Emergency response, 2) Transitional shelter, and 3) Durable 
solutions. For the emergency response, the Cluster designed 
1 Humanitarian gaps assessment coordinated by OCHA, 2011
The project built 1,200 permanent houses with accompanying infrastructure across two new sites (here, the site in Garowe).
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the settlement, wherever possible, to inform the inhabitants on 
these criteria, which included:
• People displaced by the insurgency within the target areas. 
• Drought-affected people who had lost their livestock and 
had no shelter.
• Rural self-settled: those outside the urban or peri-urban 
areas and those settled individually in small family groups 
on unoccupied land.
• Households hosting and supporting displaced people 
with housing challenges.
On top of these, the vulnerability criteria included age, dis-
abilities, homeless widows, female-headed households, large 
families, diseases, and no access to livelihoods.
The organization carried out an independent verification
exercise once the beneficiary lists were submitted. Although 
most beneficiaries were accepted, a few cases had to be 
changed in order to include the most vulnerable households. 
The verified families were issued with a beneficiary ID card, 
containing the information about their households.
COORDINATION AND PARTICIPATION OF 
DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS 
The organization held a series of meetings with all stakehold-
ers, to explain the implementation process. Firstly, awareness 
meetings were conducted with government officials. A design 
workshop was then initiated to share information with govern-
ment officials from the Ministry of Interior, Regional Governor 
and Local Districts, IDP representatives, landowners and clan 
elders. Different shelter design options were presented, ad-
vantages and disadvantages were analysed, and the groups 
were requested to make recommendations to improve each 
design. The coordination throughout the project avoided 
unnecessary conflict  with the communities and other stake-
holders, such as clan elders, local authorities, and NGOs.
The coordination with cluster members contributed to en-
sure that basic standards were maintained, based on cluster 
guidelines. Effective coordination and information sharing 
with other sectors, particularly the WASH Cluster, enabled 
the organization to learn from partners’ experiences and 
achieve project goals successfully.
BENEFICIARY ENGAGEMENT 
During construction, the beneficiaries were responsible for 
ensuring that the houses were built according to their expecta-
tions, as well as for receiving and taking care of the construction 
materials. The community was also able to provide feedback 
through suggestion boxes in each site. Regular monthly 
meetings were held with the government and beneficiaries to 
discuss project progress, achievements, challenges, areas of 
improvement, as well as follow on the feedback received.
LAND TENURE SECURITY 
The organization advocated from the beginning of the 
project to secure land tenure for IDPs, as a precondition for 
building the shelters. One of the challenges was that the bene-
ficiaries in most cases were from different clans than the land 
owners. It was decided that these households should be pro-
tected and have access to secure land tenure. Government 
officials agreed to provide titles, as long as the organization 
would cover the registration costs. The organization publicized 
the contents of land documents to all stakeholders and further 
worked with the media to create public awareness, that the 
shelter units provided under this project were not for rent or 
sale. The Ministry of Interior reposed any shelter unit that was 
being sold or rented and re-allocated them to other people 
still living in the IDP camp. This aimed at discouraging people 
from infiltrating the system with the aim of making profi
However, the process to obtain tenure security was 
lengthy and delayed the project, especially in Garowe. There-
fore, the team decided to separate the issues of Burtinle and 
Garowe, in order to not delay the whole project. 
In Garowe, the government was forced to stop the con-
struction of houses after the organization indicated that per-
manent houses could not be implemented on land with unsecure 
tenure. The government was then requested to secure freehold 
land for the IDPs, if these houses were to be implemented as 
per the agreed design. A meeting was held and broadcast 
on television, with different sectors of the government, hu-
manitarians, elders, and influential businessmen in the town, 
during which the government pleaded to allocate special land 
for the resettlement of IDPs. This resulted into a piece of land 
The project established two relocation sites (here Jilab Village, Garowe). Settlement planning included public spaces.
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measuring 1,000m by 150m being allocated to the organiza-
tion for the shelter project, which was further subdivided into 
plots of 10m by 10m for each household.
In Burtinle, the process was smoother, as the organization was 
permitted to build on three existing sites that were identifie  
for the upgrading of makeshift shelters into permanent houses. 
Ultimately, the project’s ambitious goal was achieved in both 
locations, with land allocated without time limitations and 
relevant legal titles, signed by the Ministry of Interior and 
issued to each beneficiar , as part of the handover process. 
In particular, the titles were legal documents recognized by 
the society and the sharia courts, and MoUs were signed with 
the organization. Notably, the project also included women as 
household title holders.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
Apart from general security and access constraints for in-
ternational staff, one of the major challenges was related to 
staffin , as it was hard to recruit local engineers. The organ-
ization therefore suggested to hire engineers from Somali-
land, but faced stiff oppositions from the Ministry of Labour. 
This delayed the employment process, though ultimately lo-
cal engineers were identified
Another challenge was to uphold humanitarian account-
ability principles, given that the government tended to as-
sume they would take the lead in communicating with the 
communities, instead of the organization. More advocacy on 
the importance of accountability to all stakeholders should 
have been factored in from the start.
MATERIALS AND SUPPLY 
All the construction materials were procured locally. The sup-
pliers were provided with information on the beneficiaries  
including the resettlement site and plot number. The mate-
rials were then distributed to and received directly by the 
beneficiaries, using supplie ’s vehicles.
While the local market in Garowe was able to accommodate 
the higher demand, the project in Burtinle was partially de-
layed due to lack of materials. The project team held meet-
ings with suppliers and government officials, in order to have 
the neighbouring businesses to assist, even though this was 
initially objected.
Due to the high demand, the price of materials rose. Meet-
ings were held with the settlement leaders and the govern-
ment officials, to explain that the project budget was fixed by 
the donor, thus higher prices would mean less beneficiaries  
Additionally, in order to reduce the costs, the organization 
suggested to order goods directly from manufacturers. In 
the end, both suppliers and government officials agreed to 
keep the prices stable, unless it was demonstrated that the 
increase was due to external factors.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
The long-term engagement with the regional government 
served not only to build the capacity of the government but 
also to legitimize its efforts and the goals of the overall project, 
particularly on land tenure issues. The organization helped to 
establish the government as a credible voice and partner in 
the well-being of Puntland residents. Reciprocally, the govern-
ment formally recognized the site in Garowe as “Jillab Village”.
One of the most striking discoveries in the impact evaluation 
was the dramatic reduction of crime from the IDP camps 
to the resettlement sites. In both sites, village elders re-
ported only a handful of petty crimes within memory. Wom-
en, men and youth unanimously reported feeling safe in all 
parts of the compounds. Additionally, the evaluation indicat-
ed a reduction in gender-based violence, according to the 
elders and settlement leaders, to which they credited locka-
ble windows and doors in the new shelters.
Finally, the lessons learned from this project were applied 
in another shelter project that the organization started in 
Dolow.
Households received construction materials and technical support, had to identify skilled labour and provide unskilled labour themselves.
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STRENGTHS
+ Achievement of tenure security and establishment of a 
community in the targeted areas. Positioning the Housing, 
Land and Property focal point to coordinate with the govern-
ment contributed to the strategic engagement and capacity- 
building of the authorities.
+ Continuous engagement of all stakeholders to explain 
the beneficiary selection and the implementation process. 
This was found to have signific ntly contributed to managing 
the expectations of suppliers and local authorities, as well 
as reduce rumours of theft and misappropriation of project 
assets and materials.
+ The selection criteria were established and agreed 
upon by all stakeholders. Beneficiaries were able to under-
stand and explain the reasons why they qualified for assis-
tance; the same was true for those who were not selected. This 
shows how effectively the information was shared amongst 
the community, and how transparent the system was.
+ Continued engagement of beneficiarie  and owner-driven 
approach to construction. This included the transparent and 
accountable systems that were established for the benefi-
ciaries, to be in control of the materials received and accept-
ed. For instance, beneficiaries refused to accept the supply of 
blocks when these did not meet the agreed upon standards.
WEAKNESSES
- Staff turnover and lack of flexibility of internal systems 
and processes impacted the project timeline. For example, 
the regional accountant and his deputy resigned during the 
implementing period and no replacement was found for long. 
This affected the timely processing of financial reports and 
delayed the procurement approval process, as some deci-
sions had to be referred to Nairobi.
- Limited female participation. Gender inclusion in Somalia 
is bound by cultural and religious considerations, which af-
fect the ability to engage female staff and beneficiaries to the 
same extent as males. Programmatic gender analysis is 
necessary and should be built into monitoring systems, in 
order to tease out power relations and influence biases, fla  
the level of women participation in the project, and inform 
actions to improve equitable participation.
- Although in Somalia the common practice is to build several 
single room shelters (tukuls) for one household, which offer 
privacy for parents, children, relatives and can accommodate 
large families, this project provided only one-room shelters. 
These could not meet these family needs, however, houses 
could be further expanded on the plot allocated to each family.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• Beneficiaries had to be incentivized to participate in owner-driven construction. This required a good understanding 
of the local context and skilled community motivators. As the interest in participating in manual construction work was 
low, the project team advised beneficiaries that they would be giv n priority if they provided labour.
• Being clear and consistent from the beginning on the mandate of the project, and sharing the objectives with relevant 
authorities, forced them to identify a suitable piece of land.
• The settlement-based approach allowed the team to consider the root causes of vulnerability in this region and 
to avoid the “bandaid after bandaid after bandaid” situation. The organization has embedded disaster risk reduction and 
resilience building into its development and humanitarian practice, ever since.
• Linking the programme to vocational training and saving groups helped people to build new skills and earn 
money.  Offering options is important, as it allows community members an opportunity to exercise choice, helping 
to ensure that they are more than passive actors in the process and can thus find solutions tailored to their needs
MATERIALS LIST FOR ONE HOUSE (ESTIMATED BEFORE COMPLETION)
Description Unit Quantity Rate (USD) Tot. Cost (USD)
Stones
Aggregates for concrete (gravel)
Sand
Portland cement (50kg)
Blocks (40x15x20cm) made from 1:7 mix cement-sand
Stirrups, 6mm mild steel diameter, 6m long
Steel reinforcement 10mm diameter, 12m long
Roofing Nail
Wire nails - assorted
Galvanized iron sheets, 2.4m long of 28 gauge thickness
Galvanized iron ridge caps of 30 gauge thickness
Roofing timbe , 2”x2”, 3.9m long
Roofing timbe , 2”x3”, 3.9m long
Formwork timber, 1”x6”, 3.9m long
Steel door complete with frame, hinges, locking system – 1x2.2m
Steel window complete with frame, hinges, locking system - 0.85x1m
Formwork timber 1”x2”, 3.9m
m3
m3
m3
Bags
No
No
No
Kgs
Kgs
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
4.4
0.5 
1.3 
16 
700 
8 
6 
3 
6 
18 
1 
9 
15 
8 
1 
2 
2 
6.25 
10.50 
6.25 
8.00 
0.65 
2.50 
12.00 
2.50 
2.20 
9.00 
9.00 
5.00 
6.00 
6.50 
60.00 
30.00 
2.50 
27.50 
5.25 
8.13 
128.00 
455.00 
 20.00 
 72.00 
  7.50 
  13.20 
162.00 
9.00 
45.00 
90.00 
52.00 
60.00 
60.00 
5.00
Labour costs  Lump sum  343.00
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
The complex emergency in South Sudan – after the breakout of 
violence in December 2013 – created massive displacement and 
required a flexible approach to planning, coordination and imple-
mentation. The response focused primarily on meeting immediate 
needs through emergency NFI distributions. As the crisis contin-
ued, increasing efforts were made to include more durable (emer-
gency) shelter support options for individuals in protracted dis-
placement, particularly within Protection of Civilians sites (PoCs).
SOUTH SUDAN 2013- 0  / COMPLEX
CRISIS
Complex, 2013 onwards
Conflict, economic decline and foo  
insecurity provoking protracted internal 
and cross-border displacement.
TOTAL PEOPLE IN NEED
OF HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE
10 million
(approx. 88% of the total population)
TOTAL DISPLACED 
PEOPLE 1.83 million1
SOUTH SUDANESE
REFUGEES IN NEIGH-
BOURING COUNTRIES
1.17 million1
TOTAL PEOPLE 
SUPPORTED
(shelter-NFI)
748,430 households2
(Dec 2013 - Nov 2016)
SHELTER-NFI
RESPONSE OUTPUTS
(households)
569,422 non-food items 
146,917 shelter solutions
32,091 shelter-related NFIs
15 Dec 2013: Conflict starts in South Sudan
Feb 2014: Humanitarian response scaled up.
Sep 2014: 1.43 million people internally displaced; 470,000 refugees 
in neighbouring countries3.
31 Dec 2014: 267,573 households assisted with shelter-NFI.
May 2015: Emergency airlift operation in Greater Upper Nile begins. 
17 Aug 2015: Agreement on the resolution of the conflict
Sep 2015: Population in PoC sites reaches about 196,000 individuals.
15 Dec 2015: 1.66 million people internally displaced; 646,000 refugees 
in neighbouring countries. 6.1 million people in need of humanitarian 
assistance4.
31 Dec 2015: 491,943 households assisted with shelter-NFI.
11 Jul 2016: Battle in Juba and resuming of hostilities.
30 Nov 2016: 748,430 households assisted with shelter-NFI.
1
6
2
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3
8
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11
Cumulative figures of households served with shelter and NFI assistance, Dec 
2013-Nov 2016: (Source: Shelter-NFI Cluster South Sudan). The pie charts repre-
sent the percentage of assistance for each state (Blue = Household NFIs, Green = 
Shelter, Pink = Shelter-related NFIs).
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1 South Sudan Humanitarian Update, 24 Jan 2016, http://bit.ly/2kRPmLn. 
2 Data reported by the Shelter-NFI Cluster.
3 Humanitarian Response Plan 2015, http://bit.ly/2krYDfp. 
4 Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016, http://bit.ly/2kh9uqe. 
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BACKGROUND
Following its independence on 9 July 2011, South Sudan 
was the world’s newest state, with high hopes for the future. 
However, civil conflict started on 15 December 2013 and led 
to massive internal and external displacement of citizens, 
with extreme violence, harassment, and the deliberate de-
struction of community and civil infrastructure. Since then, 
South Sudan has been experiencing a complex crisis: politi-
cal, economic and security-wise.
The situation in certain locations, such as Greater Upper 
Nile and Jonglei, continued to decline throughout 2014-
2016. Other areas that were considered stable, such as the 
Equatorias and Greater Bahr el Ghazals, have experienced 
intense periods of fighting. Rising food insecurity and the ef-
fects of conflict on trade and crop planting have further im-
pacted displacement dynamics and mobility shifts. 
The August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Con-
flict was set-back after major conflict episodes in 2016. Cru-
cially, in July 2016, a major battle in Juba killed hundreds 
and led to thousands fleeing in fear. This led UN, Embassies 
and NGOs to evacuate or relocate staff.
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS SITES
Prior to the conflict, the United Nations Mission in South Su-
dan (UNMISS) bases had hosted civilians under threat of 
physical violence, with limited humanitarian response. The 
continual violence from 2013 on caused people to flee to 
Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites and stay there for far 
longer than ever before. International debate has arisen over 
the sustainability of these sites; resources have continually 
been stretched and it has become obvious that IDPs in PoC 
sites require long-term assistance.
Initially, response was difficult, as many organizations were 
development-based and did not have the capacity or security 
protocols to respond to a quick-onset emergency. Shelter pro-
vision has been, for the most part, in concentrated IDP sites, 
such as the PoC sites in UNMISS bases, and the towns of 
Mingkaman and Melut – where large numbers of displaced 
people settled. While the majority of NFI response has taken 
place along the same lines, people in need across each state 
have been assisted with NFIs, since the beginning of the crisis.
SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS 
There has been little satellite mapping or systematic collection 
of housing and construction data in the country, nor on the 
type of and damage to residential dwellings that have been 
destroyed. Additionally, South Sudanese people normally mi-
grate between different localities, depending on the season 
or movements of livestock. Sections of certain towns were 
assessed post-conflict, however the lack of baseline data 
complicates assessing damage and, therefore, the collection 
of information is ad hoc. South Sudan is mostly rural, with un-
derdeveloped infrastructure and roads, which have also been 
damaged through season weather patterns, conflict or ne-
glect. People have generally been assisted in areas far from 
their homes, where this type of information would be more 
easily collected. Thus, the focus of assistance in South Su-
dan has not necessarily been to rebuild shelters, but to pro-
vide new emergency shelters in areas of displacement, 
where people fleeing their homes have found relative safet .
SHELTER-NFI RESPONSE
The Shelter-NFI Cluster has been in existence since 2011, 
when it had been assisting returnees from Sudan to the new-
ly independent South Sudan. Returnees had differing shel-
ter and NFI needs, according to the stage of their journey, 
and whether they were returning to rural or urban locations. 
The Cluster Strategy emphasized development and sustain-
ability interventions, which took into account local context 
and community dynamics, such as disaster risk reduction for 
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Large-scale displacements in South Sudan led to a significant m nority of hundreds of thousands of people seeking refuge in and next to UN bases. These sites were 
known as Protection of Civilians sites, or PoCs.
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flooding, livelihoods support and cash transfers, linked to the 
intended three-year Humanitarian Response Plan.
In the first months after the 2013 crisis, operations were scaled 
up to respond to the vast increase of needs and scope.  At a 
certain point, the mobile team increased from three members, 
to more than ten. Further, the team employed four technical 
experts and engineers in shelter design and site planning, to 
advise on shelter interventions in concentrated sites.
Given the changing and diverse contexts, a flexibl  
approach to response, coordination and strategy was 
needed. During 2013-2014, the focus was on emergency 
shelter designs. Due to the protracted displacement and 
continued conflict, focus then shifted to more durable solu-
tions. This included developing robust designs and re-en-
forcing existing shelters, with complementary framing sup-
port to enhance structural strength. With the extreme space 
limitations and increasing populations flowing into the PoCs, 
communal shelter designs were introduced to ensure 
space efficienc . At locations where this was not an issue, 
the Cluster advocated for individual shelters. However, pro-
gressive designs have not been an option, due to the pro-
tracted emergency.
In 2015, the Shelter-NFI Cluster worked with other clusters 
to coordinate the delivery of multisectoral survival kits. 
In May 2015, an emergency airlift operation began, to pro-
vide lifesaving assistance to civilians who were cut off due 
to insecurity and access constraints in Greater Upper Nile. 
The operation delivered lightweight, portable, survival kits, 
which included: essential, multisector, items such as mos-
quito nets; short-maturity vegetable seeds; fishing supplies; 
water containers, water purification tablets, oral rehydration 
salts and nutritional biscuits; and kitchen sets. By the end of 
2015, agencies had delivered more than 27,800 survival kits 
in 14 deep-field locations, reaching 140,000 people
COMMON SHELTER-NFI PIPELINE
Following several years of humanitarian needs in Sudan and 
the former southern Sudan region, a common Shelter and NFI 
pipeline was established in 2011, to increase efficiencies of 
scale, as well as the timeliness and predictability of service to 
beneficiaries.
With the outbreak of political conflict in December 2013, the 
pipeline scaled up significantl . With ongoing and protracted 
conflict, multiple waves of displacement, and the need for con-
tinuous service in large displacement sites (e.g., the PoCs), 
the distribution of NFIs and shelter materials through a 
common pipeline remained the primary method of deliver-
ing humanitarian shelter assistance. As of late 2016, the pipe-
line has been used to reach 1,585,850 individuals, though in 
some cases the same people were reached multiple times, 
due to protracted displacement.
SITUATION IN 2017
By January 2017, more than 2.6 million people have been 
forcibly displaced from their homes. There were 1.83 million 
IDPs and 1.17 million others had fled to neighbouring coun-
tries (98,000 per month, since July 2016). More than 224,000 
IDPs were seeking refuge at existing PoC sites in Bentiu, Uni-
ty; Malakal and Melut, Upper Nile; Juba, Central Equatoria; 
Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal. The scale and protracted na-
ture of internal displacement into PoC sites is unprecedented, 
throughout the UN’s history.
The following case studies deal with the set up and operation 
of the common shelter-NFI pipeline (A.24) and a shelter project 
and site works conducted in the PoC site in Bentiu (A.25).
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Protection of Civilians sites, such as the one in Bentiu, are heavily secured because of the constant threat of attack by armed groups.
Annual flooding affects people across South Sudan every yea . With crowded 
conditions in PoCs, this caused significant additional public h alth concerns.
www.shelterprojects.org
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KEYWORDS: Pipeline, NFI distribution, Emergency shelter, Procurement
PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION
2015 2016 2017
1 2
STRENGTHS
+ The timely projection of potential breakages in the pipeline ena-
bles swift procurement of items.
+ Cost savings, by reducing overheads and staffing needs for part-
ner organizations.
+ Standardized the quality of assistance.
+ Prepositioning of stocks in strategic locations.
 WEAKNESSES
- Long lead times, mainly due to administrative processes.
- Lack of flexibility in the items supplied through the pipeline
- Continuous staff turnover.
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CRISIS
South Sudan Civil War, 
Dec 2013 - ongoing. Complex crisis.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
6.1 million in need of humanitarian 
assistance and 1.66 million internally displaced, 
as of December 20151.
For more updated figures, see overview A.23.
PROJECT LOCATIONS South Sudan, country wide
BENEFICIARIES2
579,849 households 
(2,894,407 individuals, 52% female) assisted 
between Dec 2013 and Dec 2016
PROJECT OUTPUTS
438,958 households assisted with NFIs
140,891 households assisted with 
shelter materials
SHELTER SIZE
Shelter designs supported by the pipeline: 
72m2 for communal shelters (for 32 people).
16m2 for individual shelters (for 5 people).
MATERIALS COST
PER SHELTER USD 110 for individual shelters.
PROJECT COST
PER SHELTER USD 135
RIO NAPO
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
UGANDA
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
CENTRAL 
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
SUDAN
1 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016, http://bit.ly/2d3Y2tB.
2 There is some duplication in these figures, as individuals in protracted 
displacement may be reached multiple times.
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PROJECT SUMMARY  
Through the management of a common Shel-
ter-NFI pipeline in South Sudan since 2013, this 
programme has ensured a continual and quality 
supply of materials for rapid distribution by cluster 
partners to displaced and conflict-a fected commu-
nities across the country. The pipeline has helped 
partners quickly implement emergency shelter 
interventions, through coordinated planning and 
prepositioning.
3
Dec 2014:  54,005 households assisted with shelter materials,
 159,725 with NFIs
Dec 2015:  36,011 households assisted with shelter materials,   
 123,654 with NFIs
Dec 2016:  50,875 households assisted with shelter materials,
 155,579 with NFIs.
1
2
3
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People were displaced across multiple sites and large distances across South 
Sudan (here within the PoC site in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal).
JUBA
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LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION
Humanitarians only engaged in direct construction within Pro-
tection of Civilians sites (PoCs), where land was already se-
cured for camp settlement by the UN Mission, or agreed with 
local government representatives. Other shelter interventions, 
such as those outside PoCs, have been limited to distribution 
of materials only, mainly due to unclear land ownership.
Beneficiaries served with materials through the pipeline are 
identified by State Focal Points in coordination with Opera-
tional Working Groups of the Cluster, mostly in priority loca-
tions after needs assessments have been performed, and with 
logistical support prioritized at the Inter Cluster Working Group. 
Beneficiaries are primarily those residing in concentrated IDP 
sites, such as the PoCs. Humanitarian agencies focused the 
assistance to people with specific needs and those who were 
extremely vulnerable. Gender considerations are integrated 
in planning, assessments, implementation and monitoring. 
Populations with specific vulnerabilities (physical disabilities or 
individuals made vulnerable due to gender or age) are consid-
ered and targeted with assistance to meet their needs, using 
methodologies that ensure access and prevent harassment.
Shelter responses outside of concentrated sites were limited 
due to transportation challenges and weight of framing mate-
rials. Assessments confirmed these locations in most cases 
have access to local construction materials and are able to 
construct their own shelters.
BENEFICIARY ENGAGEMENT  
Continuous engagement of beneficiaries allowed to incorpo-
rate indigenous knowledge into materials specifications. For 
example, log species suited for a certain area improved the 
lifespan of shelters and reduced the risk of environmental im-
pacts, including negative effects of insecticides. Shelter-NFI 
BACKGROUND
For information on the South Sudan conflict and background 
on the Cluster and the pipeline, see overview A.23.
PIPELINE OPERATION
A common Shelter and NFI pipeline for cluster partners was 
established in 2011 to increase efficiencies of scale, timeli-
ness and predictability of services. It is managed by a dedi-
cated small team of international and national staff from the 
cluster lead agency, while all stocks in strategic locations 
are overseen by the organization’s logistics unit. The pipe-
line programme was designed to support all shelter partners 
in South Sudan, through a central depository of materials, 
accessible upon identification of needs. The stocks are prep-
ositioned in key locations across the country (based on stra-
tegic planning and continuous context analysis), to facilitate 
a swift delivery of items in emergency situations. Standard 
Operating Procedures include statistically weighted assess-
ment and targeting tools. Rapid mobile response teams, as 
well as post distribution monitoring and evaluation exercises, 
are standardized and supported by the Cluster.
The primary users of the pipeline are partners of the Shel-
ter-NFI Cluster, numbers of which varying from 16 in 2015, 
to 21 by the end of 2016. The common pipeline is open to 
all operational agencies, however requires a formal contract, 
in order to ensure that minimum humanitarian standards are 
met and partner organizations are accountable to benefi-
ciaries. The pipeline provides a reliable, cost-effective and 
steady stream of quality materials for distribution to popu-
lations in need, allowing the implementation of humanitari-
an interventions that are efficient and economic, as well as 
large-scale procurement and distributions.
A common NFI pipeline allowed materials of consistent quality to be efficiently delivered across South Sudan
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interventions are designed around resilience and self-coping 
mechanisms of communities. Assessment reports are critically 
analysed to ensure interventions complement, and not com-
pete with or undermine, community resources.
Communities have been empowered to strengthen their ca-
pacities through training and community organizing, includ-
ing participating during distribution and monitoring activities.
Post-distribution monitoring explored in detail the efficiency and 
effectiveness of pipeline items. Based on the feedback collect-
ed, pipeline items specifications were adjusted and improved, 
to enhance their quality, durability, functionality and service.
COORDINATION 
Working within the Cluster approach, the Inter Cluster and Op-
erational working groups provide a common platform for dif-
ferent service providers and clusters, such as WASH, Health 
and Livelihoods, to optimize limited supplies, complement re-
sources, address common issues and improve the quality of 
the humanitarian response. The pipeline is a reliable resource 
that supports Shelter-NFI partners and the Cluster for coordi-
nation by streamlining responses to avoid duplications.
RISK MITIGATION 
Shelter-NFI partners work closely with community leadership 
to ensure interventions are conflict sensitive and respect the 
ethnic dimensions, privacy, land rights, safety and security of 
the affected populations. Contingency plans are discussed 
with communities, taking a holistic view of the context and im-
proving operational preparedness. Methods to make livestock 
safe, or protect other community assets, are also analysed as 
a whole, wherever possible.
PROCUREMENT
All framing materials are sourced nationally, while cladding 
materials such as plastic sheets are imported. These stocks 
are initially stored in central warehouses and then transport-
ed to field locations. In some areas with functioning markets, 
framing materials such as wooden poles, bamboo poles and 
rubber rope are locally sourced. Items are then transported to 
strategic locations via road. However, in cases where this is 
not possible, items are transported via barge or air. To supply 
framing materials, “no objection certificates” from the govern-
ment are mandatory to ensure items come from a sustainable 
source. Additionally, suppliers need to provide logging certifi-
cates issued by the Ministry of Environment. The organization 
also planned to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
in 2017, to better understand the effects of its shelter pro-
gramming on the environment.
MAIN CHALLENGES 
Poor infrastructure and road networks often make getting 
supplies in dispatch warehouses difficult. This is worsened dur-
ing the rainy season, wherein most dirt roads are inaccessible. 
To address this challenge, multiple suppliers have been iden-
tified and sometimes items are procured from local markets
The rugged land terrain, insecurity along transport routes, sea-
sonal hazards and vast distances, mean large areas of the 
country are cut off during the rainy season. Thus, transport to 
field locations poses a significant challenge. Humanitarians 
must preposition supplies during the dry season after negotiat-
ing for access. In this context, a high level of coordination and 
emphasis on secure, accessible, common, services is required. 
In some cases, convoys are arranged and items transported in 
collaboration with other cluster supplies. After July 2016, ac-
cess and security challenges increased, including: looting 
and ambushes on humanitarian convoys; higher number of 
checkpoints and armed actors demanding road taxes; seizure 
of private assets; security threats along unpoliced roads; and 
increases in transportation costs.
South Sudan is a landlocked country and does not have a 
well-developed manufacturing industry. Thus, plastic sheets 
need to be transported through border posts, where waiting 
times are often long. Delays in obtaining tax exemption cer-
tificate  also impact procurement timelines and pose challeng-
es for all partners in the country. The pipeline team must fore-
cast trends and plan procurement activities far in advance, in 
order to mitigate these delays. As of early 2017, investments 
were being made in sustainability and resilience activities 
to improve predictability of supplies for local procurement. For 
instance, in order to reduce delivery time and support local trad-
ers (who often lack resources to supply required quantities), the 
organization was planning a pilot project to form a consortium 
of traders in areas with functional markets. The organization 
was also working on Long Term Agreements and Frame-
work Contracts to ensure a minimum number of supplies are 
readily available on short notice.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
The common pipeline allows a uniform, coordinated and effi-
cient response. Its use has improved coverage, by enabling 
organizations to complement their own resources and achieve 
large-scale interventions, especially in concentrated PoC sites.
Common NFI and logistics procurement planning were key to ensure a constant supply, in an environment where it takes over four months between placing an 
order and it being delivered.
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STRENGTHS
+ Timely projection of potential breakages in the pipeline, 
caused by a lack of stock flowing through the pipeline or sup-
ply chain and transportation challenges, has enabled timely 
procurement of items.
+ The common pipeline concept significantly reduces 
overheads and staffing needs for partner organizations 
with centralized services. The project has contributed to val-
ue-for-money efforts and effectiveness of the humanitarian 
response as a whole, whilst also helping to standardize the 
quality of assistance.
+ Prepositioning materials in strategic locations across 
the country facilitates rapid deployment of life saving items. 
The availability of a network of contracted transporters 
has facilitated adequate prepositioning of shelter materials 
during the dry season, when roads are operational. 
Partner agencies were essential to ensuring effective and targeted delivery of shelter-NFI assistance.
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WEAKNESSES
- Generally, procurement takes between four to fiv  
months, largely due to the tax exemption process. While this 
issue is largely factored into programming, and procurement 
processes start well ahead of time, it still represents a weak-
ness, due to certain funding mechanisms that do not allow 
long lead times. 
- Lack of ability of the pipeline to support flexible re-
sponses, as only a few types of items can be supplied.
- The continuous staff turnover within partner agencies 
has made it difficult for new staff to understand common 
pipeline systems and procedures.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
Post-distribution monitoring, conducted between two to 16 weeks after distribution, highlighted beneficiary feedback and 
helped to improve the response and planning for future interventions. For instance, in communal shelters, protection and 
privacy were highlighted as key concerns. To address this, shelters were partitioned into smaller, independent, family 
units that enhanced privacy, especially for women and girls. This addition, although minor, was not planned and stretched 
the pipeline resources. Better gender analysis and incorporation in reporting would have provided an opportunity to 
segregate and analyse information for gender-sensitive responses, and therefore better resource planning.
The pipeline is a common service that reduces procurement burdens on partners, ensures standardized assistance 
(as per the criteria set by the Cluster), improves coordination and reduces overlaps through a centralized control system.
www.shelterprojects.org
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CASE STUDY
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SOUTH SUDAN 2014-2016 / COMPLEX
KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, Site planning, Phased construction, Infrastructure, Planned camps
CRISIS
South Sudan Civil War, 
Dec 2013 - ongoing. Complex crisis
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
6.1 million in need of humanitarian 
assistance and 1.66 million internally displaced, 
as of December 20151.
For more updated figures, see overview A.23.
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Bentiu, Protection of Civilians (PoC) 
site, Unity State.
BENEFICIARIES
105,786 people (47% male; 53% female; 
with 47% under five years old), relocated acros  
communal shelters, at 45 people per shelter.
PROJECT OUTPUTS 11,778 robust shelters.
SHELTER SIZE
84m2 (4.5x21m communal shelters, with 
partitions to accommodate between 35 and 55 
people in groups of 7 to 11 individuals).
SHELTER DENSITY
1.5m2 at peak. Shelter occupancy has been 
variable due to space constraints, with huge 
influx in PoC caused by repeated insecurity.
MATERIALS COST
PER SHELTER
USD 837
(Materials: USD 687, Labour: USD 150 approx.).
PROJECT (OVERALL)
PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2
2015 2016 2017
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May 2014: Population in Bentiu PoC: 8,000 individuals.
Sep 2014: Population in Bentiu PoC: 46,000 individuals.
Jul 2015: Population in Bentiu PoC: 87,000 individuals.
Oct 2015: Population in Bentiu PoC reaches 120,000 individuals.
Jul 2016: Population in Bentiu PoC: 102,000 individuals.
Dec 2016: Population in Bentiu PoC: 120,000 individuals.
Jan 2015: Robust emergency shelter design agreed upon, and ap-
proved by the community.
1 South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016, http://bit.ly/2d3Y2tB.
Feb 2015: Site redevelopment begins to reduce overcrowding and 
provide adequate drainage, addressing the flooding risk
Apr 2015: Implementation phase begins with a two-months delay 
(due to negotiations with UNMISS regarding usage of the space), 
and as a result of community resistance to being relocated to the 
new site within the PoC.
Jun 2016: Site development gradually completed in a phased ap-
proach, with sectors/blocks handed over to the partner NGO as the 
site works ended.
Aug 2016: Phase 2 of shelter construction completed (though on-
going, as new arrivals continue and reinforcement is done).
1
1’
2
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3 3’
4
4’
5
5’
6
STRENGTHS
+ Provided shelter secure from violence and localized flooding
+ Effective coordination between all actors.
+ Strong forward-planning for procurement and implementation.
+ Use of local materials where possible.
+ Enhanced cladding with grass to improve comfort and durability.
 
WEAKNESSES
- Delays due to logistics and weather constraints.
- Assistance was provided only within the site, causing disparities 
with the populations outside.
- Overcrowding in shelters.
- Issues in timber procurement and poor market analysis.
- Lack of partitions in the initial design.
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PROJECT SUMMARY  
The project constructed 11,778 shelters in the Protec-
tion of Civilians site in Bentiu. The project was closely 
linked with the phasing of a broader USD 18 million 
project of site works, which converted a camp that 
seasonably flooded into a habitable site
ABYEI
BENTIU
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lished, based on the Dutch “polder” system. Major works (with 
74 pieces of heavy machinery) led to the establishment of a 
4m tall berm (mainly for security purposes) and 24m2 section 
drainage ditch around the site. This was to prevent surface run-
off from the surrounding land. Additionally, a series of drainage 
ditches and water retention basins were dug. These had large 
capacity pumps, to remove rainfall from inside the berm. 
The site works were achieved through contractors and a care-
fully phased construction plan. This plan allowed for addition-
al timing for contingencies and monitored the volumes of soil 
moved, as well as the length of drainage ditches and berms.
Beyond the major site works, the site development project in-
cluded shelter construction, establishment of water, sanitation 
and hygiene systems, health and education facilities, alongside 
other services. Given that the site was already occupied, agen-
cies needed to work together to ensure carefully phased re-
location. Shelters, latrines and other structures could not be 
BACKGROUND
For more information on the context and the shelter-NFI re-
sponse in South Sudan, see overview A.23.
Before the outbreak of conflict in 2013, the bases of peacekeep-
ing forces – United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
– had hosted small populations seeking protection for short peri-
ods, with limited humanitarian response. Following the outbreak 
of conflict, tens of thousands of people fled to – and stayed in 
– Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites far longer than expected.
Over the course of the conflict, multiple waves of violence af-
fected the town of Bentiu, leading to 120,000 people seeking 
shelter in the PoC site. Bentiu is extremely hard to access, with 
a small airstrip of limited capacity, and is inaccessible by road 
during the rainy season. During the dry season, it is regularly 
cut off, due to poor security. As a result, all logistics and sup-
plies had to be planned in advance of the wet season, and plans 
needed to be flexible, to allow for this variable security cont xt.
Humanitarians arrived in Bentiu in January 2014, to provide 
essential, life-saving, services to the population residing there. 
In March 2014, the PoC site in Bentiu hosted 11,000 IDPs, 
with the population rapidly rising to 43,718 by December 2014 
as a result of escalated conflict in Unity State. The huge influ -
es created overcrowding and difficulties in service provision
In the rainy season of 2014 the site flooded for several 
months, leaving the camp population trapped, with many 
parts of the site deep in water. By mid-2014, living space was 
limited to 9m2 per person across the site. Overcrowding was 
compounded by stagnant water, which worsened living condi-
tions and exacerbated the risk of water-borne diseases, such 
as cholera. The site itself remained highly insecure, with reg-
ular violence outside the PoC – and at times inside, due to 
ethnic conflict – leading to fatalities throughout the project
SITE WORKS
To respond to the growing site population and address the is-
sues of localized flooding, during 2015 and 2016, the Bentiu 
PoC was expanded and rehabilitated over 1.68 million m2 (168 
hectares). To create better living conditions for people seeking 
shelter in the site, a massive drainage network was estab-
Although it is widely recognized that camps are an option of last resort, for tens of thousands of residents in Bentiu PoC, conflict meant that there was no other 
option. However, the site was too small and would flood every yea . This required massive expansion and infrastructural works.
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erected until ground works were ready and, if they were built 
before people were relocated, they risked falling into disre-
pair, or being looted.
GROWING SITE POPULATION
The site was designed for 50,000 people with a contingency of 
up to 75,000 people. As the site population continued to rise, 
reaching over 87,000 people by July 2015, revisions to site 
and shelter plans were necessary. In the first phase, there was 
significant community resistance to the programme, as the 
population influx meant that the number of people per shelter 
had to be increased from five to eight. In 2016, this increased 
further to 11, as the population increased to over 120,000.
IMPLEMENTING TEAM STRUCTURE 
The lead organization for the site sub-granted to a part-
ner NGO for the shelter activities. The implementing NGO 
had a Shelter Programme Manager and a Shelter Advisor, 
and was supported by the lead organization by two deploy-
ments of Shelter Cluster rapid response officers. The project 
also included an implementation and management team with 
functions such as quality control, cross-sectoral coordination 
and information management. In addition to project staff, the 
project implementation team included around 200 camp res-
idents, who were chosen by the community leadership and 
trained by the organization on shelter design and construc-
tion. The construction of shelters was phased employing six 
different teams (including plot demarcation, digging, erecting 
skeletons and spraying walls).
Technical supervisors and contractors were recruited by the 
partner NGO within the PoC sites, with each of the contractors 
further recruiting a team of labourers to build shelter frames.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
Close engagement with the community leadership was crit-
ical for maintaining the ability to operate safely in the camp. 
It was also essential to enable safe and phased relocations 
within the site, as new shelters were built.
PHASING AND COORDINATION 
As people were already occupying the site, a phased reloca-
tion process allowed site works to continue, according to an 
overarching project plan. The site was split into sectors and 
each sector was moved as the ground works were finished
and shelter frames erected.
Relocation could only take place once plots for families and 
communities had been established, shelter materials had 
been distributed and construction was completed. Given the 
limited space, some sectors had to be moved to newly ren-
ovated plots before all of the land could be worked on. This 
made the timing of different activities for the entire site recon-
struction project interdependent and highly time critical.
On 21 May 2015, the camp management agency coordinat-
ed 160 humanitarian workers in a population verification ex-
ercise, recording biometric details and assigning addresses 
within new areas. Verification was an important first step and 
helped in demarcating plots and defining movement plans
Overall, UNMISS, peacekeepers, humanitarians and the au-
thorities had to negotiate between each other and coordinate 
closely in a very complex military environment and in in-
credibly harsh conditions, including shrinking humanitarian 
access and a protracted conflict situation
Phase	1	
Phase	0:	survey	and	demining	
Phase 0: survey and de-mining. Phase 1: Access to site works 
and perimeter.
Phase 2: Internal access and 
drainage.
Phase 3: block development 
and relocations.
Phase 4: block development, 
relocation and completion.
The expansion plan included land that was already spontaneously occupied by camp residents. Careful phasing of major upgrading works was required, as the 
whole site needed to be upgraded.
©
 M
us
e 
M
oh
am
m
ed
104 SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
AFRICA COMPLEX / MULTIPLEA.25 / SOUTH SUDAN 2013-2016 / COMPLEX
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
Shelter frames were built by contractors and guards were hired 
to protect the shelter frames from theft, until they were allocated 
to a household. Once households had been allocated a shelter 
plot by the organization (in coordination with camp management 
agencies), they collected a shelter kit from the implementing 
partner NGO to complete their shelter. Demonstration shelters 
were built as prototypes and the partner NGO provided techni-
cal supervision to households to ensure that the materials were 
used effectively. For example, care was taken to ensure that 
plastic sheets were attached correctly. Individuals with identi-
fied vulnerabilities, such as disabled persons, pregnant women 
and the elderly, were provided additional assistance. A timber 
workshop was set up at the logistics base in the UNMISS site 
with outdoor storage for 3,000m3 of timber. At the workshop, 
teams prepared the timber for the structures of the shelters, 
including treating them with anti-termite solution.
SHELTER DESIGN 
The shelter design was discussed with the Technical Working 
Group in Bentiu and the national Shelter-NFI Cluster before be-
ing presented to communities. Local adaptations included the 
use of elephant grass, which could be harvested by women 
residing in the site. The windows and doors were also revised 
to be based on traditional local designs. The shelter design had 
an estimated life-span of one year, providing displaced house-
holds with a solution that is significantly more sustainable than 
standard emergency shelters built in the country by humani-
tarians. The design was inspired by the local summer housing 
solution known as Rakuba. 
In 2016, concerns were raised by the community about security 
in the site and the security of shelters. As a result, the partner 
NGO started the process of providing doors to shelters which 
did not have one, starting with the most vulnerable, as identifie  
by protection partners. 
To protect from water coming in, it was initially planned to use 
sand to raise the floors of the shelters, but this proved impossi-
ble to procure. Households were therefore encouraged to use 
white soil to raise their floors instead  
THE SITE IN THE LONGER TERM 
Relative stability in the first half of 2016 and the expansion 
of humanitarian services to wider Unity State led to a net re-
duction in the number of people in the PoC site. However, a 
resumption in hostilities following the July 2016 crisis led to a 
population increase in Bentiu PoC (as of 31 December 2016, 
the population was 119,853 individuals). The sustainability of 
this and other PoC sites has been object of debate, due to 
the limited resources, the protracted nature of the crisis and 
the need of displaced populations for long-term assistance.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
Humanitarians have been running similar sets of projects in 
other PoC sites, such as in Malakal, where the organiza-
tion has been redeveloping and rehabilitating the PoC site 
throughout 2015 and 2016. The shelter partner in that site 
has applied the communal shelter design and aimed to en-
sure the continued provision of essential emergency shelter 
services through distributing shelter kits, repairing damaged 
communal shelters when required and providing assistance 
to people with special needs to construct shelters. 
The implementation of activities across the country has been 
in line with the Shelter-NFI Cluster objectives and humanitar-
ian best practices, including lessons learned in Bentiu. 
Through regular monitoring and technical guidance, human-
itarian shelter teams have been working to help residents 
construct their shelters in more durable ways.
The shelter project built communal shelters due to lack of land and nationally limited resources. These shelters allowed to maximize the use of limited space and 
impacted shelter strategies throughout the country.
Shelter frames were built by contractors.
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STRENGTHS
+ The project provided (relatively) secure shelter from vio-
lence and localized floodin .
+ Coordination between all actors was key to the success 
of such a large-scale programme, which required careful 
phasing within many constraints.
+ Strong, forward-planning regarding required supplies 
helped the project team mitigate extreme weather variability 
and the lack of transport infrastructure. This enabled over 1,000 
units to be constructed per week, at the height of the reloca-
tion process.
+ Wherever possible, local materials were used. 84,000 
bundles of elephant grass, bamboo and garang rope were pro-
cured. The local elephant grass was procured from women 
over a period of two weeks, through a large community-mo-
bilization campaign.
+ The plastic sheet cladding was enhanced with grass to 
improve insulation and extend the lifespan of plastic sheets. 
WEAKNESSES
- Activities were delayed by approximately eight weeks 
compared to the proposed work plan. This was primarily due 
to logistics and weather constraints.
- The site became the only significant location where as-
sistance at scale could be provided in the state. This caused 
disparities between the assistance provided to those living 
in the PoC and those outside and was one of the causes of 
population growth of the site.
- The site became very crowded and shelters were rela-
tively small. Although the reasons for the lack of space were 
unavoidable (both political and financial), the overall density 
was higher than desirable.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
•  The project demonstrated the value of early collaboration and planning, particularly in such a complex and chal-
lenging environment. While shelter activities in 2014 were constrained significantly as a result of a lack of dry space 
and logistical challenges, the convening of stakeholders and the establishment of a technical working group to plan 
the redevelopment project in September 2014, as well as the relatively timely procurement of materials during the dry 
season logistical window, ultimately ensured the success of the project.
•  Shelter designs that are meant to accommodate households beyond an acute emergency phase should take into 
account privacy considerations and install partitions. The communal shelters were initially built without partitions, 
as the shelter approach was based on individuals-per-shelter (and not households). This was mainly a result of limited 
space available and the increasing population in the camp.
•  For such large projects, it is important to have a proper market analysis and adopt a design that suits locally 
available materials. Not enough consideration went into the procurement of timber, nor its potential environmental 
impact. With a non-functional timber market, non-standardized sizes and right species available, it was difficult for 
the supplier to keep up the demand; compounded by its limited understanding of the requirements, as well as access 
to appropriate tools and workshops to provide desired sizes.
MATERIALS LIST FOR ONE COMMUNAL SHELTER
Material Unit Unit cost(USD) Quantity
Total cost
(USD)
Plastic sheet 
(4x5) Piece 15 8 120
Rubber binding 
rope Bundle 5 20 100
Bamboo poles Bundle of 10 5.5 10 55
Timbers 3 x 2" 
x 3m Piece 4 28 112
Timbers 2 x 2 
x 4m Piece 6 10.25 61.5
Timbers 2 x 2 
x 3m Piece 4.5 12 54
Timber 4 x 2 
x 5m Piece 11 4.25 46.75
Timber 3 x 1" x 
3m bracings Piece 3.5 8 28
Nylon Rope 30m Roll 8 5 40
Nails 4" Kg 2 2.5 5
Nails 3" Kg 2 5 10
Nails (roofing) Kg 3 1.5 4.5
Anti-termite and 
wood borer Piece 10 5 50
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The site works were based on a Dutch “polder” system. They included 28m2 
section drainage ditches, berms, water retention basins, and large volume 
pumps to evacuate water.
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KEYWORDS: Transitional shelter, Site planning, Training, Local techniques
CRISIS South Sudan refugee crisis, Dec 2013-ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
DISPLACED
245,298 refugees in Gambella region
48,507 refugees in Tierkidi camp
(as of September 2014, at the start of this project).
PROJECT 
LOCATION Tierkidi Refugee Camp, Gambella.
PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES 835 households (4,125 individuals).
PROJECT
 OUTPUTS 835 Transitional shelters (Tukuls).
SHELTER SIZE 17.6m2 (4.2m x 4.2m).
SHELTER 
DENSITY 3.5m
2 per person (average household size is 5).
MATERIALS 
COST USD 604 per shelter (including labour).
PROJECT
COST USD 800 per shelter (estimated).
OCCUPANCY
RATE 100% (based on data from camp management agencies).
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project supported the construction of 835 
transitional shelters in a refugee camp in the 
Gambella region, for South Sudanese fleeing con-
flict, alongside WASH and NFI activities. The shel-
ters were constructed with traditional techniques, 
locally available materials and a high involvement 
of the beneficiaries
Map showing the locations of arrival of refugees to Ethiopia and 
the respective total figures for each region, as of November 2016 
(source: UNHCR).
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27 Jun 2014: Refugees from South Sudan reach almost 240,000 in 
Gambella, after a steady growth since the beginning of the conflict.
Mar 2015: Safe water provided to all camp residents through initial 
trucking of purified water and subsequent establishment of 33 emer-
gency water points. 500 tukul shelters constructed in zone D.
Oct 2015: Second phase of the shelter project starts, with different 
funding.
Mar 2016: Completion of 335 additional tukul shelters in zone C of 
the camp.
Apr 2016: Beneficiaries are relocated from the Emergency Centres to 
the newly constructed transitional shelters, although the project was 
handed over to the local authorities and the community at the end 
of 2015.
Dec 2014: Project starts. Refugee population in Tierkidi camp is ap-
prox. 49,000.
End Sep 2014: Project planning and shelter designs completed.
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STRENGTHS
+ Engagement of all actors in the process.
+ Use of local building practices.
+ Skills and knowledge of workers and refugees were enhanced.
+ Effective coordination and technical assistance.
+ Efficiency and savings
WEAKNESSES
- Scarce availability of raw materials.
- Poor site selection.
- Sourcing of the soil for walling delayed the project.
- Limited involvement of women.
CONTEXT
The Gambella region is located in the western part of Ethiopia, 
next to the border with South Sudan. It has a tropical climate, 
characterized by hot temperatures, heavy rainfalls from April 
to September (average of 229mm in July), however it is very 
dry during rest of the year. Settlement location is therefore 
particularly important in regards to the rainy seasons. Ethio-
pia is the country hosting most refugees and asylum seekers 
in Africa, with a total of 783,401 individuals as of November 
2016, mainly from South Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan1.
1 UNHCR, 30 Nov 2016, http://bit.ly/2jO0A1E.
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The shelter project built shelters in areas D and C of Tierkidi, a planned refugee camp (plan as of January 2015).
SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS  
The conflict in South Sudan erupted in December 2013 
and caused massive displacement, both internally, and into 
neighbouring countries2. The Gambella region received large 
numbers of refugees fleeing the conflict in the eastern parts 
of South Sudan. As of August 2014, there were over 190,000 
refugees in the region. This number continued to increase, 
reaching almost 250,000 individuals by the end of the year.
Several refugee camps were set up and received a high 
influx of people seeking protection and adequate shelter, 
along with access to food, water and basic services. At the 
planning stage of this project, in September 2014, Tierkidi 
camp was already hosting approximately 48,500 refugees 
and asylum seekers from South Sudan3, most of whom were 
living in emergency tents, in dire conditions.
NATIONAL SHELTER REFUGEE RESPONSE  
In 2014, the refugee shelter response in Gambella was led by 
humanitarian organizations, in coordination with the Adminis-
tration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) and the lead 
refugee agency in the country. The strategic focus of the sec-
tor for 2015 was to transition from emergency to stabilization, 
and to relocate refugees away from transit centres and flood
prone camps.
Two types of shelters were provided in camps, 1) Emergency 
shelters, primarily tents or Bajaj (plastic sheeting on wooden 
frames); and 2) Transitional shelters, mainly traditional structures 
known as Tukuls. Upon arrival to the camps, households were 
registered in reception centres and received the emergency 
units, which were gradually upgraded or replaced with the tran-
sitional options. Implementing partners undertook the sourcing 
and construction of the superstructures, including roof construc-
tion, and the refugees usually complemented the process by 
mud plastering the walls. This project supported 835 households 
in the Tierkidi camp, as part of a wider programme that included 
NFI, water and sanitation components.
2 For more information on the South Sudanese crisis and shelter response, see 
overview A.23.
3 UNHCR Information Sharing Portal, http://bit.ly/2kzuifp.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION    
The project targeted South Sudanese refugees who were 
residing in three camps in the area (Tierkidi, Leitchuor and 
Kule). The targeted households were new arrivals who tem-
porarily settled in the camps, without basic shelter. The lead 
camp management organization and the refugee govern-
ment agencies were directly involved in the assessment and 
selection of beneficiaries, according to common vulnerability 
criteria. Priority was also given to those who had been living 
in emergency shelters longer.
The government had already allocated the land for the ref-
ugees, which was demarcated in collaboration with ARRA 
along with camp management actors.
TEAM STRUCTURE AND STAKEHOLDERS’        
ENGAGEMENT    
For the implementation of this project, the Country Director pro-
vided operational oversight, with support of a Grants Manage-
ment Office . At the field level, an internationally recruited Area 
Manager was responsible for the quality of the intervention, su-
pervision of staff and liaison with ARRA, the camp management 
agency and other stakeholders. A WASH technical specialist 
and a team leader were also in place and a shelter project man-
ager was being recruited at the time. The field team consisted 
of more than 30 staff. To ensure standardized application of or-
ganizational compliance regulations, accountability and quality 
of programming across the region, regional and Headquarters 
staff were also employed as part of this project.
The shelter design was based on the standards in Gambella, 
used by different agencies, and agreed upon by the Shelter 
Working Group. Initially, there was resistance from the refugee 
community about the standard design; the organization, who 
joined the larger shelter programme at a later stage, therefore 
faced difficulties in adopting the selected model. This issue was 
overcome by incorporating the feedback that beneficiaries had 
given to the Working Group and other agencies. In fact, sector 
partners, relevant authorities and the beneficiaries, such as el-
ders and vulnerable people, were involved in the design phase.
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SHELTER DESIGN AND MATERIALS    
The chosen design consisted of a mud tukul (traditional house) 
with a eucalyptus wooden structure finished with bamboo or 
grass-thatch matting for the mud render. The shape, as well 
as the thick mud layer, protect the structure from the elements 
and helps in maintaining a cooler indoor temperature. The 
materials, grown in large plantations, are normally abundant 
in the region. However, a quick market survey showed the 
possibility of a shortage of bamboo, so the project chose to 
use primarily grass lattices.
The traditional shelter components included:
• Treated eucalyptus posts (with anti-termite solution using 
engine oil);
• Bamboo split-bracings, tied to vertical posts with nails, 
ropes, or grass thatch;
• Mud-plaster made with termite soil;
• Steep-sloped grass roof, on top of treated eucalyptus 
rafters and purlins (top height 5m);
• Lockable door made from eucalyptus pole frames and 
corrugated iron sheet;
• 60cm gap above the walls, left open for ventilation.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
After beneficiary selection, the project was implemented as 
follows:
• Plot demarcation, followed by the mapping of the shel-
ters location.
• A prefabrication workshop was set up, in a warehouse 
in section D of the camp, to produce the shelter elements, 
such as doors, poles and frames, in a standardized ap-
proach. The capacity of pre-cutting and processing was 
strengthened to meet the construction targets, within at 
least three days in advance of the construction.
• The superstructure (frame and roof) was built by a 
team of carpenters from the host community.
• The bamboo or grass lattice was undertaken by paid 
refugee workers, skilled in this type of construction.
• The grass thatch was installed by a team of skilled ref-
ugee workers. The thatching technique was improved in 
the second phase of the project, due to the observation 
of some parts of the roof deteriorating relatively quickly.
• The house was then handed over to the identified ben-
eficiary famil .
• Suitable locations for the quarrying of soil was agreed 
with ARRA and the host community, to ensure that safe 
practices were adhered to and conflicts with the host 
community mitigated. The soil was sourced by the refu-
gees themselves, with assistance from field officer
• Refugees then organized, in self-help groups, and were 
provided with the necessary local materials, tools and 
technical assistance to undertake the mud rendering 
and the raised embankments to protect from flooding
• Regular technical assistance and supervision was 
provided, according to the design and agreed criteria.
• Coordination and monitoring of the process was en-
sured with the organization staff, ARRA and other im-
plementing partners, to address any problems that may 
have arisen.
• The organization conducted a post-implementation as-
sessment, collecting sex and age disaggregated data. 
The majority of beneficiaries reported to be satisfied (over 
80%) or very satisfied (over 10%) with the shelter design 
and materials. The results were shared with the Shelter 
Working Group and its members.
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND TRAINING    
The refugee community was involved in the implementation 
of the shelters through several tasks, including the overall lay-
out and construction, aiming to incorporate their requirements 
and ensure a higher sense of ownership and user satisfaction. 
This was demonstrated in the post-implementation monitoring 
and by the fact that people personalized their shelters with 
decorations and paintings, as well as building fences, hedges 
and gardens on their plots.
During implementation, one of the main challenges was fin -
ing skilled workers (like carpenters, masons and foremen). 
Such technicians were not readily available, especially among 
the refugees. This was solved by providing on-the-job train-
ing and technical assistance throughout the project. Some 
workers were promoted to “shelter foreman level” due to the 
technical skills gained during their involvement. The refugee 
community also participated in the plastering of the shelters 
according to their traditional construction skills; however, 
women were not involved, only contributing to the collection 
of grass for thatching.
COORDINATION    
As the proposed programme was implemented in a refugee 
camp, there was coordination with development actors and 
programmes, and interventions were designed to be sustaina-
ble. Coordination with other agencies and sectors in the camp 
was essential to avoid duplication and create complementa-
rity, particularly as the organization adopted a “Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development” approach. Based on the un-
derstanding of the socio-cultural, environmental and technical 
components of existing building practices, the use of locally 
available resources and the improvement of traditional tech-
niques was favoured.
Skilled workers were paid to build shelters in the following stages: 1. The site 
was demarcated and structural poles were erected. 2.The structure and door 
were built. 3.Wall matting was added. 4. The roof structure was built. 5. The 
roof was thatched. 6. Once the thatching was complete, the Tukul was ready 
to be plastered with mud (see picture on the opposite page).
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Refugees plastered the walls of the shelters with mud, made from soil sourced by the refugees themselves, in areas agreed with authorities and host communities.
STRENGTHS
+ Involvement of all actors and the affected community 
in project design and implementation.
+ The shelters were designed respecting the local building 
culture.
+ The project engaged both the host community and 
some refugees, to enhance their skills and knowledge of 
building practices.
+ Effective coordination, technical assistance and supervi-
sion of works.
+ Efficient implementation, minimizing unnecessary ex-
penses. In the first phase, 500 shelters were completed in 
four months.
WEAKNESSES
- Scarce availability of raw materials for the roof, due to 
seasonality.
- Poor site selection. The second allocated site was at the 
bottom of a hill, therefore being more prone to flooding
- Sourcing of the soil for walling. The soil chosen for the 
construction was far from the site, therefore affecting procure-
ment times and delaying the whole project. 
- Women were not involved beyond collecting the grass. 
Their involvement in activities such as pit excavation and 
mudding of the shelters would have created income opportu-
nities and help them to support their families.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Engaging affected people at all stages of a project is key to facilitating implementation, skill transfer, as well as en-
hancing ownership and building trust.
• Strong coordination at all levels and technical and managerial support significantly contributed to the effective-
ness and efficiencies of the shelter project
• Effective monitoring and documentation of activities throughout the project can provide lessons for future evaluation 
and planning of similar interventions.
• Cash-for-work as a modality of assistance is highly dependent on assessments and thorough analysis. Without a 
proper assessment of existing economic activities and household-level livelihoods, as well as careful targeting to ensure 
that all affected groups can benefit from the assistance, cash may not be effective and exclude certain groups, such as 
women and persons with limited mobility.
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MATERIALS LIST FOR ONE TUKUL SHELTER
ITEMS UNIT QTY TOTAL COST (USD)
Bamboo poles, 10cm diam. pcs 8 27.3
Eucalyptus poles, 8cm diam. pcs 16 49.9
Eucalyptus poles, 6cm diam. pcs 4 10.9
Bamboo poles, 5cm diam. pcs 200 237.4
Corrugated Iron Sheet pcs 1 6.9
Bolt, latch, hinges for door lump 1 3.5
Local fibre strin roll 1.5 5.2
Plastic rope m 200 4.9
Roofing nails kg 0.5 1.5
Assorted nails: 10cm, 8cm, 6cm kg 5 7.2
Soil for walling and plaster m3 4 59.4
Grass: 55cm, 150cm long bundle 35 103.9
Transport + labour to load lump 1 4.9 + 1.0
Used motor oil litre 1 1.0
Community mobilization lump 1 24.7
Labour for shelter structure lump 1 32.1
Labour for roof thatching lump 1 22.3
www.shelterprojects.org
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KEYWORDS: Transitional shelter, Adobe brick making, Training, Community participation
CRISIS
Conflict / political tension, April 2015-ongo-
ing. Refugees from Burundi.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
DISPLACED
178,000 Burundian refugees in the United Re-
public of Tanzania (approx. 40,000 households).
326,000 total Burundian refugees in neighbour-
ing countries.
139,000 people internally displaced in Burundi.
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS
Nyaragusu, Nduta and Mtendeli camps in Kib-
ondo, Kakonko and Kasulu Districts, Kigoma Region, 
Western Tanzania.
PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES
37,760 individuals as of December 2016 (65% 
female).
PROJECT
 OUTPUTS
7,552 Transitional shelters (target: 11,000). 
30% are duplex shelters for small families/individuals.
SHELTER SIZE 18m2 covered living space.
SHELTER 
DENSITY 3.6m
2 per person (average household size is five).
MATERIALS 
COST USD 395 per shelter
PROJECT
COST
USD 500 per shelter (including transport, water truck-
ing, labour, support payment to persons with specific 
needs and project administration costs).
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project provided durable shelter for refugees 
fleeing violence in Burundi, across three refugee 
camps in Western Tanzania1. The programme was 
based on a community engagement model to pro-
duce adobe bricks within the camps and was ac-
companied by training and the production of a tech-
nical manual.
1 For editorial reasons, “Tanzania” will be used to refer to the United Republic of Tanzania.
The project was implemented in the three camps of Nyaragusu, Ndu-
ta and Mtendeli camps, near the border with Burundi, Western Tan-
zania. From Burundi Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan, 
January-December 2016.
PROJECT AREAS
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Mar 2016: Three different model shelters completed and tested with 
the community.
End-May 2016: Completion of first 64 -Shelters.
Aug 2016: Funding awarded and construction started for 11,000 
Transitional Shelters.
Dec 2016: 7,552 shelters completed and handed over.
End-Apr 2016: Completion of first 100,000 stabilized adobe bricks
Apr 2016: Start of brick making and testing.
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STRENGTHS
+ Community mobilization ensured high efficiency and speed
+ Suitability and flexibility of the shelter design
+ Use of locally available materials.
+ Significant sense of ownership and buy-in from the communit .
WEAKNESSES
- Limited experience in adobe brick-making and lime stabilization.
- Adobe bricks can be problematic in wetter months.
- Shelter staff with technical background needed guidance on the 
community engagement processes.
- Minor delays and high turnover of staff.
PIT RESTORATION
CONTEXT
Civil unrest in Burundi has resulted in over 326,000 refugees 
fleeing to the neighbouring countries of the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DR Congo), Rwanda, Tanzania1, Uganda 
and Zambia. An L1 emergency was declared in April 2015 and 
escalated to L2 in May, with a Regional Refugee Coordinator 
appointed. In addition to political instability and increasing vi-
olence, Burundi’s deteriorating economy and several natural 
disasters (floods, landslides, heavy rains and storms) over the 
last year have contributed to displacement.
The project was implemented in the Kigoma Region, Western 
Tanzania, which borders Lake Tanganyika to the south and 
Burundi to the north. The climate is bimodal with a wet season 
from November to January, reoccurring again from February 
to April. May to the end of October is primarily dry.
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Women were involved in mixing clay, lime and sand (Nduta camp pilot project). The process of adobe brick making in Nyaragusu refugee camp managed to 
produce a total of over 11 million bricks, used for the construction of the shelters.
SITUATION BEFORE THE CRISIS  
Kigoma is one of the poorest regions in Tanzania and has 
regularly hosted refugees in Government Gazetted refugee 
campsites. The road network is poor, with mostly dirt roads, 
and thus access to the region is difficult, particularly in the 
wetter months of the year. While larger towns, such as Kasulu 
and Kibondo have benefited from increased employment and 
local economies (as a result of the presence of humanitari-
an organizations), smaller towns near border crossings have 
seen minimal change. The environmental impact of refugee 
influxes, particularly on the surrounding forest resources 
(wood collection), has been significant. The Government of 
Tanzania was expected to increase focus on the host commu-
nities and regional infrastructure.
Prior to the development of an additional four refugee camps 
throughout 2015 and 2016 near the border with Burundi, 
all refugees were residing in Nyarugusu. This led to very 
poor conditions and heightened tensions between groups of 
longer-term refugees and new arrivals, as the camp, its facil-
ities, and infrastructure, far exceeded its capacity.
SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS  
As of 16 October 2016, Tanzania was hosting more than 
240,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Burundi 
(171,934) and DR Congo (68,009). The overwhelming major-
ity of these persons of concern resided in one of the three 
refugee camps in North-Western Tanzania. Due to continued 
insecurity in Burundi, from April 2015, refugees continued to 
flee to Tanzania, through over 18 border entry points.
New camps (including Nduta and Mtendeli) were established 
to allow the decongestion of Nyarugusu through relocation, as 
well as to provide space for new arrivals. 18,493 Emergency 
Family Shelters were constructed and 7,466 tents erected.
SHELTER STRATEGY   
The national shelter strategy focused on providing more du-
rable and secure transitional shelters, as well as responding 
to the immediate need for shelter and NFIs amongst new 
arrivals from Burundi and DR Congo. Shelter responses in-
cluded standardized family tents, to ensure that persons of 
concern did not spend more than three days in mass shel-
ters. Emergency shelter construction was prioritized to mini-
mize the use of tents and ensure the rapid upgrading to tran-
sitional shelter.
This project aligned to the sector priorities, by constructing 
transitional shelters in the three camps of Nduta, Mtendeli 
and Nyarugusu.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION    
The older areas of the camps, which had been occupied first  
were prioritized for this project. Households living in tents 
were also prioritized, due to the shorter lifespan of tents 
compared to emergency family shelters. People with specifi  
need for support, such as single female heads of household, 
the elderly and those with disabilities, were also identifie  
and prioritized (preventing their engagement in the construc-
tion phase).
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
Three implementing shelter partners were engaged for this 
project, one for each camp. The project team consisted of one 
project engineer, two assistant engineers for each implement-
ing partner and foremen (to directly supervise the construction 
of the transitional shelters). The shelters were fully constructed 
by refugees, using local materials, skilled and daily labour from 
the camp population.
PILOT SHELTERS    
During the first phase of the project, a Shelter Working Group 
was established with the lead agency, implementing partners 
and other shelter actors, to manage and coordinate the pro-
ject. Three shelter designs were constructed and tested 
with the community: 1) traditional clay and stick, 2) complete 
corrugated galvanized iron, and 3) adobe brick.
The three pilot shelters were constructed and trialled against 
the following criteria:
1) Economic (cost of materials, benefit to local community, 
cost to transport materials);
2) Social (maximize ownership, employment, and cultural ap-
propriateness); 
3) Environmental impact (materials used from natural re-
sources, distance to transport, impact on host community, wa-
ter, forest and other environmental resources);
4) Socio-cultural impacts (communities’ ability to self-con-
struct, acceptability of the shelter, protection issues, suitable 
size, security, plot size and layout, ventilation, storage, cook-
ing and social space).
The adobe brick shelter design was preferred by the commu-
nity and was deemed the most environmentally harmless and 
culturally acceptable. The government was very supportive of 
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this type, as the national environmental policy prescribes lim-
iting the use of native timber. While some partners and ben-
eficiaries initially expressed preference for contracted shelter 
construction, or other design types, once the shelters started 
to be completed and community participation increased, this 
challenge was overcome.
BRICK MAKING    
Once partners and the community had agreed on the type of 
shelter and design specification , community-led brick-mak-
ing commenced in each camp. Tests were carried out on dif-
ferent lime or cement stabilized bricks throughout the project, 
as variations in soil were encountered in different areas of the 
camps. It was initially decided to use lime, but later in the pro-
ject the team discussed the suspension of lime distributions, 
mainly due to its scarce effectiveness in such minimal propor-
tion, fear from some users that it would irritate their skin, and 
the fact that families did not use it at all in one of the camps. 
Brick-making was carried out in groups of 16 households, 
overseen by one full-time supervisor (foreman) from the im-
plementing agency. Each group included at least one family 
with persons with specific needs. The bricks were air-dried 
and could therefore be produced in any weather, as long as 
cover was provided during wetter months.
A brick-making guide was also produced in the local lan-
guage with diagrams to support best practice. These were 
distributed to communities, with regular community meetings 
held to ensure continuous targeted messaging. Trainings 
were held regularly for masons and carpenters, organized in 
mixed male and female groups to ensure that enough skilled 
labour was available to support households during the con-
struction phase.
CONSTRUCTION PHASE    
Each targeted household was assigned a construction 
plot within the camp. In Nduta camp, the plot was 20x15m, 
making it possible to construct the new shelter while the family 
continued to occupy their tent or emergency family shelter on 
the plot. In Mtendeli and Nyaragusu, the plot was 15x10m, 
making simultaneous construction more challenging. If living 
in tents, families were recommended to move their tent to the 
firebreak (or another space) while construction took place
Once the bricks were produced and transported to the family 
plot, a trained builder from the refugee community was as-
signed to each household to support the masonry work. 
Households were responsible for mixing mortar, carrying wa-
ter and other general activities. Following this, a carpenter 
was assigned to support roof construction. Skilled builders 
from the refugee community were remunerated through 
incentive payments. A small payment was also available to 
support correct finishing of the shelter. For persons with spe-
cific needs, cash support was provided to allow the hiring of 
labour to support the skilled builders. In 2016, approximately 
700 masons and carpenters were involved in the project.
SHELTER TYPES    
The adobe brick shelters were 18m2 which accounted for the 
average household size (five members). Small families and 
individuals were provided with “duplex” shelters. These were 
of the same size, with a partition wall in between and two sep-
arate doors to each of the rooms. 975 shelters also had a 4m2 
kitchen attached, built under a different project, which includ-
ed the use of gas stoves.
The design was slightly adapted for each partner, due to the 
soil type in each camp and the partner’s capacity.
LIME STABILIZATION    
Lime for brick stabilization was chosen over cement due to 
the high content of clay in the local soil, which hampered the 
efficient mixing with cement. 2x10kg lime bags were distrib-
uted to targeted households, while it was agreed that grass 
could also be used as a straw mix to protect the outside walls 
from rain – a technique that has long traditions within the 
refugee communities in the region. Protective gear was not 
distributed due to the minimal content of lime, which report-
edly did not cause concerns by the users.
PIT RESTORATION    
The soil for making the bricks was mainly extracted on the 
beneficiaries  plots. For environmental reasons, a strong fo-
cus was put to ensure the restoration of the soil extraction 
areas in each community. A parallel project implemented by 
and environment partner, in coordination with Environment 
and Camp Management actors, planted banana trees in the 
pits as part of this restoration phase.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT    
The project set a minimum standard for shelter con-
struction across the refugee camps in the Kigoma region, 
ensuring equality of assistance and providing households 
with a durable shelter option which could easily be up-
graded through extensions or partitioning. It also resulted 
in the training of thousands of refugees in lime-stabilized 
adobe brick making and shelter construction. It had a pos-
itive effect on local economies, through encouraging the 
sustainable use of resources from local and national sourc-
es, supporting local businesses, as well as allowing skilled 
tradesmen and labourers from amongst the refugee popu-
lation to generate income. The design was also approved 
and promoted by the government, as it meets the required 
minimal environmental impact standards, while also provid-
ing a durable solution.
Large-scale community engagement, and linkages with 
other projects and technical coordination through the 
Shelter Working Group, has brought considerable improve-
ments to living conditions of Burundian refugees in the three 
camps.
The lessons learned through this first phase also fed into 
and informed the continuation of the project, which aimed to 
deliver an additional 3,500 shelters in 2017.
Duplex lime-stabilized shelter completed in Nduta refugee camp. Some of the 
shelters were designed to host two small families and followed the same design, 
but had two doors and a partition that divided the indoors in two units.
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Lime-stabilized transitional shelters were built in Nduta refugee camp. The 
emergency shelter solution (tent), where the family was living during the con-
struction, can be seen on the same plot near the shelter.
Mason laying the bricks of a shelter in Nduta refugee camp. Skilled builders 
from the refugee population were employed for the construction of the shelters.
STRENGTHS
+ Community mobilization kept the shelter construction 
cost low and enabled a large quantity of shelters to be con-
structed in a short time.
+ Suitability and flexibility of the shelter design. The plot 
size left sufficient space for a kitchen, individual latrine and 
garden. The shelter was adequately designed for the local 
climate (hot days and cold nights), with the clay walls pro-
viding good insulation and protection. The low-tech, simple 
technique and the design itself allowed beneficiaries to adapt 
the shelters, ultimately achieving high flexibility (extensions, 
partitions, upgrades, etc.).
+ The chosen materials were easily available locally (par-
ticularly clay and lime), allowing local families to get involved 
more closely with the brick-making and construction process.
+ Community sense of ownership and buy-in was signif-
icant, thanks to the comprehensive process of community en-
gagement and consultation over the design and construction 
of the shelter. This could be seen in the care and pride families 
took over their new shelters after completion.
WEAKNESSES
- Lead agency and local partners had limited experience 
in community-driven lime stabilization and brick making. The 
identified need for initial sensitization, training and advocacy 
caused implementation delays of several months. However, 
pilot brick testing, capacity-building and consistent community 
messaging increased the quality of the bricks over time and 
the acceptance and understanding of the technical design.
- Stabilized adobe bricks can be problematic in the wet-
ter months and a significan  amount of training was required 
to ensure correct and maintained drainage in the areas sur-
rounding their shelter.
- Shelter staff in the sector had primarily technical back-
grounds (e.g. engineers) and were in need of additional guid-
ance on the community engagement process of the project. 
These skills were particularly necessary during the pilot pro-
ject, as a lot of skilled consultation was required in order to 
assess the acceptability of the design.
- The lead agency annual funding cycle and the need to 
accommodate capacity-building activities, prior to start of 
the project, led to minor delays and pushed back the deliv-
ery date of the project. However, all materials for the contin-
uation of the project have been prepositioned and no major 
disruption was experienced.
- High turnover of staff, due to short contracts in emergen-
cies, was problematic to ensure project continuity and con-
sistency.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Shelter partners working in community projects require training in community mobilization and communication, 
particularly those with a highly technical background. Piloting the ideas with the community proved beneficial in bringing 
partners and beneficiaries on board and exemplifying the benefits and shortcomings of certain technical solution
• A realistic time frame is required to take into account the significant time for planning such a project. Donors, lead 
agencies and implementing partners’ funding and budgeting cycles have to be seriously considered and discussed 
openly during the planning phase, to avoid unrealistic expectations and implementation work plans.
• A large-scale community-driven project requires a very high level of monitoring and quality assurance. A lack 
of monitoring can result in poor site demarcation, change of orientation of the shelters, inconsistency in brick quality, 
refugees paying for support in construction, or the sale of sites to families not targeted by the project, which can all lead 
to poor quality and heightened protection risks for already vulnerable populations.
• Different organizations have different capacities and networks. As funding was an issue in the early stages of 
the project, the international organizations were better able to pre-fund their own work and scale-up more quickly. 
Local organizations were more knowledgeable about the local context and could therefore access materials more 
cost-effectively. Better synergy and consultations with local partners would have avoided some of the tensions 
at the project start.
• The skills, ability and enthusiasm of the refugee community to participate in shelter construction projects should 
not be under-estimated. With correct support and facilitation, as well as strong communication and community en-
gagement, a very successful project with a high level of beneficiary  satisfaction can be implemented. Feedback and 
complaints mechanisms also needs to be in place.
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CONFLICT
PLANNING HANDOVERIMPLEMENTATION PHASE*
PROJECT (OVERALL)
JUL
2016
*The project was implemented in different phases, depending on 
different sources of funding. However, the main steps were:
1) Project publicly announced.
2) Home verification visits
3) Selection of most vulnerable households.
4) Shelters completed and inspected by staff.
GAZA (PALESTINE) 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
KEYWORDS: Transitional shelter, Cash assistance, Infrastructure, Training, Guidelines
CRISIS Israel-Hamas conflict in July-August 2014.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
160,000 severely or partially damaged
11,000 totally destroyed
 (Source: Shelter Cluster factsheet).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 974,700 individuals.
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Khan Younis, Rafah and Middle Area 
governorate, Gaza strip, Palestine.
BENEFICIARIES 484 households (2,831 individuals).
PROJECT OUTPUTS
470 Transitional Shelters
(344 small, 98 medium, 13 large, 14 two-story, 1 pilot).
235 conditional cash grants.
ISRAEL
WEST BANK
EGYPT
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project provided 470 transitional shelters to the most vulnerable households in Gaza, whose homes were completely 
destroyed in the conflict, but had sufficient rubble-free space on their land. This assistance allowed beneficiaries to return 
to their neighbourhoods to begin rebuilding their permanent houses, while living in an adequate, safe and dignified shelte .
STRENGTHS
+ Online registration and mobile-app surveys.
+ Durable solution using available materials.
+ Different shelters for a range of family sizes.
+ Hotline and email address for feedback and complaints.
+ Shelters built on beneficiaries  original plots.
WEAKNESSES
- Limited scale compared to needs.
- Long implementation time.
- Some design/building constraints due to limited budgets.
PROJECT AREAS
NORTH GAZA
GAZA
MIDDLE AREA
KHAN YOUNIS
RAFAH
SHELTER SIZE 44m² up to 7 persons, 53m² up to 10 persons, 62m² for 11 or more, 80m2 (two-story shelter for extended families).
SHELTER DENSITY More than 5m2 per person.
MATERIALS COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD USD 4,600 (average).
PROJECT COST PER 
HOUSEHOLD USD 6,600 (average).
MEDITERRANEAN 
SEA
T
IM
E
L
IN
E
Project staff consulted beneficiaries in order to determine the orientation of 
the shelter according to their preference, and to sign the contract.
JUL 2014
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BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS
Fifty-two days of intense fighting in July and August 2014, 
between Israel and Hamas, caused massive loss of life and 
infrastructure damage throughout Gaza. The incredibly dense 
urban environment, coupled with Israel’s belief that Hamas 
was operating in civilian areas, caused significant impact on 
civilians, infrastructure and land. During the conflict, the Is-
raeli forces instructed the population of Gaza to evacuate a 
3km-wide zone. This area was subject to bombardment, and 
then land forces caused further destruction of houses and 
property. Many people evacuated to stay with relatives and 
friends, while others found refuge in collective centres, mainly 
schools. Given the urgency, people left their homes with min-
imal possessions.
SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS  
Before the conflict, the majority of homes were built with rein-
forced concrete and concrete blocks and had access to public 
services, such as water and electricity. The conflict damaged 
or destroyed many homes. People either stayed with host 
families (usually relatives), or constructed make-shift shel-
ters on their land, next to the remains of their house. Some 
households rented private apartments, but rental space was 
very limited and anecdotal evidence estimated that prices had 
doubled since the conflict. Long after the conflict, the majori-
ty of affected people remained in approximately 19 collective 
centres, as well as in rented accommodation and with host 
families. A minority moved to individual shelters.
Given the time needed to raise the capital for reconstruction 
and the procurement restrictions in Gaza (e.g. cement and 
reinforcement bars), people needed a more durable shelter 
solution until they had the materials and funds to rebuild.
NATIONAL SHELTER RESPONSE  
A joint shelter survey was undertaken, to identify the level of 
damages and needs and inform the reconstruction process. 
The Shelter Cluster supported the provision of household 
NFIs and hygiene kits, as well as emergency shelter materi-
als to support individuals in collective centres and those with 
host families to provide some basic level of privacy in crowded 
conditions. Materials were also provided to seal off damaged 
houses. Various forms of assistance for basic repairs and 
temporary accommodation were provided. Some agencies 
imported steel caravans (modular buildings) as transitional 
shelters, which in some cases generated complaints for lack-
ing privacy and adequate drainage, being cramped, too hot 
in summer and too cold in winter. There were cases where 
people refused this form of assistance.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION   
Through public announcements, household visits and com-
munity meetings, the target communities were informed 
about the project and affected households were invited to 
register their interest. Beneficiary selection was based on an 
initial set of criteria:
• House completely damaged and uninhabitable.
• Family owned the land, or had written permission to live 
on it for at least two years.
• Sufficient space in the plot to build the transitional shelter.
This required various levels of verification, and there were 
some cases of false documentation, which, amongst other 
issues, slowed the beneficiary selection and consequently 
the construction process.
The selection then proceeded on a case by case basis, us-
ing criteria based on both pre-existing and conflict-relate  
The humanitarian shelter strategy included a menu of options. The project chose to provide transitional shelter support between emergency phase and reconstruction.
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vulnerability factors, developed by the organization in collab-
oration with local communities. These included households 
with people with disability, young children, female-headed 
households and low-income households.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
The organization and a local partner developed the designs 
for the shelters through a series of workshops and consul-
tations with the community, before beneficiary selection. A 
pilot building was constructed for the community to review, and 
was followed by a technical evaluation, to allow the most effi-
cient, safe, and culturally appropriate construction process to 
be agreed upon. Extensive feedback sessions with community 
members also confirmed the agreed solution
Because of the embargo on most building materials other than 
timber, the organization decided to use a timber frame struc-
ture. The organization then employed a consultant with 
experience in timber construction, to assist the procurement 
and implementation of the project. Timber construction was not 
common in Gaza and, due to the available time and skills, as 
well as for quality control, the wooden panels were assembled 
off-site, and construction done using a building contractor. 
This was selected through a competitive tender process and 
training was provided by the organization and the consultant. 
Once the first shelters were built, the contractor worked inde-
pendently, with supervision from the organization and partners.
The timber frames were constructed in a workshop and then 
transported by truck to the site. Once erected, the cladding, 
flooring and roofing materials were delivered and fitted to the 
frames. Other building trades, such as electricians, plumbers 
and dry-lining wall fitters completed the building. This com-
bination of on- and off-site method of working allowed for 
greater speed, efficiency and quality control
While the organization supplied the buildings, households 
were responsible for constructing or connecting to a sep-
tic tank, as well as for other enhancements. A user manual 
was developed for the buildings, and all families were pro-
vided information and training on fire safety. The contractor 
was required to supervise their workforce, while field engi-
neers from the organization oversaw the works and liaised 
with households and the larger community. The organization 
also assisted with monitoring and technical support, including 
all design and engineering, quantity surveying, and financial
administration.
A conditional cash grant of USD 500 was also provided to 
235 households to enhance their shelters, its amount define  
following a market assessment. This component was added 
at a later stage only for some of the shelters, as funding was 
received in separate tranches. This form of assistance gave 
households freedom to choose and install shelter improve-
ments, such as false ceilings, wall partitions, electrical net-
work, CGI roofing in the courtyard, sinks, showers, tiling for 
toilet, kitchen shelving, window screens and water tank stands.
©
  
C
R
S
 s
ta
ff
1
3
2
4
Timber-frame buildings were built on a platform with a plywood floo . From left to right, top: 1. Laying the foundation and ground beams for the transitional shelter. 
2. Installing plywood layer over the ground beams. Bottom: 3. Fixing the external wall cladding with screws. 4. Contractor staff placing CGI roofing on the shelte .
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The project built shelters of different sizes, to adapt to the different family siz-
es. Shelters included a bedroom/living area, a toilet, a kitchen and an open 
veranda, that could be used to expand the covered space, by adding walls. 
People had to take care of the external sanitation system, e.g. septic tank.
DRAINAGE CHANEL
DRAINAGE CHANEL
SOAKAWAY
Covered living area
Toilet
Kitchen
Veranda
Drainage
D
ra
in
ag
e
Drainage
117SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
MENA REGIONCONFLICT A.28 / GAZA (PALESTINE) 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
SHELTER DESIGN    
Each shelter consisted of three rooms – a bedroom, a kitchen 
and a bathroom – and was designed to meet cultural needs 
and expectations, especially privacy and dignity of women. 
This led to a density of more than 5m2 per person, above rec-
ommended standards. Moreover, the shelter was specifically
intended to be upgraded, extended and re-purposed after the 
estimated life span of five years. The L-shape design with the 
veranda allows households to easily construct perimeter walls 
using timber posts and sheeting material, to expand the living 
space and allow greater privacy and freedom of movement 
for women. Examples of modifications included installation of 
electricity, addition of room dividers, construction of external 
walls, lining of ceilings, landscaping around the shelter and a 
variety of other decorative and functional upgrades.
INVOLVEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE   
Key informant Interviews with community leaders, other shel-
ter actors and beneficiary households were undertaken and 
project details were shared through the Shelter Cluster. 
Focus group discussions (including female groups) were 
held to discuss shelter needs, designs, and implementation 
approaches, and the pilot construction facilitated direct 
discussion and feedback from the beneficiaries. Feedback 
could also be collected through an email address provided 
to the families and a toll-free hotline.
Moreover, the organization and partners made regular 
home visits to beneficiaries, to ensure that they were kept 
informed and to help with any issues or requests, such as 
works schedules and where to construct the shelter in the 
plot. All family members were involved, including children. 
Gender-balanced teams of trainers allowed both men and 
women in the family to participate.
RISK MITIGATION   
Training was provided to avoid risks associated with unex-
ploded remnants of war and also hazardous waste, such as 
asbestos. The organization initially considered using rub-
ble for construction, but was advised against and therefore 
avoided using it. The project included the distribution of fir  
extinguishers and electric lanterns and delivery of fire safe-
ty training to all shelter beneficiaries, to reduce fire hazards 
and improve safety.
MATERIALS AND PROCUREMENT   
Procurement was done locally, since materials could only be 
purchased in Israel. This was a major constraint for the pro-
gramme and there was little option to query to the environmen-
tal sustainability of the sources. The reliable supply of mate-
rials was indeed a major threat to the success of the project. 
While timber was not initially restricted, later the availability 
of large-section timber was prohibited. The programme over-
came this by redesigning timber frames that could be made by 
fixing timber studs together to obtain the required size
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS   
The project used an adaptation of modern platform-tim-
ber-frame construction, where the panels are the load-bearing 
structure – as opposed to the post-and-beam technique. The 
shelters were built with floor frames (a frame of floor joists) 
covered with a decking material, which created the platform. 
The walls of each level were then fitted to the platforms. To 
meet the challenge of limited space, two-storey buildings were 
constructed using this approach. A timber frame structural 
engineer checked all the designs prior to implementation.
WIDER IMPACTS  
This shelter model was highly demanded, as it was viewed 
as one of the best transitional options in Gaza, while many 
communities rejected other alternatives such as caravans. 
By providing a solution to live on their properties, the project 
also allowed people to restart livelihood activities and rebuild 
financial and social safety nets within their neighbourhoods 
of origin, hence supporting recovery.
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Given the risk of wooden structures catching fire, shelter owne s were given 
fire safety trainings and were provided with fire extinguisher
Some people were able to extend the shelters, by closing the open sides of the veranda.
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The timber-frame construction was new to the country, thus an experienced consultant was hired and, with senior staff from the organization, supervised the contractor.
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STRENGTHS
+ Online registration for beneficiarie  was developed, to 
avoid the lengthy hard copies application process, and the ben-
eficiary lists were shared with partners to avoid duplication
+ The use of timber provided a durable solution using 
available materials. This provided optimal space and ther-
mal comfort unlike other shelter options.
+ Satisfaction surveys on mobile devices provided a fast 
and efficient means of information and data collection
+ Choice was given to beneficiarie  through the cash grants 
for shelter enhancement.
+ Variety of shelter sizes ensured that the programme ca-
tered equitably for a range of family sizes.
+ A toll-free hotline and email address allowed a discrete 
and efficient feedback and complaints mechanism. Com-
plaints were mainly about delays in people’s applications or 
non-selection as beneficiaries
+ The transitional shelters were built on the beneficiaries  
original plots, helping them restart livelihoods.
+ Beneficiary willingness to invest in the shelters with 
additions and enhancements was a strong indication of their 
commitment to living in the shelters and to using them for 
their intended purposes. Two years after the project, the 
shelters were still used by those who were unable to rebuild.
WEAKNESSES
- Issues with the design became apparent during the con-
struction, such as the limited internal height. The design has 
been altered for future responses.
- The programme did not include external sanitation 
systems and required households to be responsible for this. 
The design provided for a septic tank was not suitable, the 
cost presented a constraint for low income households, and 
the availability of materials was a challenge.
- Limited scale and long implementation times. Due to 
the narrow funding, the project had to prioritize beneficia -
ies, although in fact all affected households were in need of 
shelter. Even if the transitional shelter solution was not ex-
pensive per se, procurement delays – coupled with the deci-
sion to achieve a high level of durability and quality for large, 
extended, families – caused the project to be relatively slow 
and reach only a limited number of households.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Communities should be involved early on, and the shelter model should be considered earlier in the process.
• The organization improved efficiencies and gained significant insights through this project, such as developing 
a strong working relationship with the contractor, which helped building its capacity and efficienc .
• The selection process was refine  based on lessons learned from this project. Given the extensive need in heavily 
affected border communities, it was challenging to select the most vulnerable people. A more nuanced scoring criteria 
was developed for future projects that takes into account factors related to socio-economics, health and economic assets.
www.shelterprojects.org
MATERIALS LIST
- White wood for the main framework
- Flooring plywood 17mm thickness
- External cladding from wood   
  (Tongue and Groove)
- Internal cladding 
  (Normal Gypsum boards)
- Corrugated Galvanized Iron
  (CGI) for roofin
- Vinyl for the Kitchen and bath
- Aluminium windows and doors
- Tarpaulin
- Nails and screws
- Painting material
- Sink with stand
- Toilet bowl
MENA REGION
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CRISIS Conflict, 20 1 onwards
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED1 22.3 million
SYRIAN REFUGEES
6.2 million (total estimated2).
4.8 million registered in neighbour-
ing countries3.
303,000 registered elsewhere4.
PEOPLE IN NEED 
WITHIN SYRIA5 13.5 million
BENEFICIARIES OF 
THE SHELTER-NFI 
SECTOR (2015-16)6
770,400 people (Shelter).
12.7 million people (NFIs).
Numbers of refugees and IDPs as a result of the Syrian conflic  7.1 For this overview, see all notes on page 125.
KEY SHELTER APPROACHES
ACROSS COUNTRIES 
• Emergency tents / emergency shelter kits (plastic 
sheeting, poles, fixings, tools)
• Upgraded shelters in camps (concrete slabs, kitch-
ens, water and sanitation units per family, prefabricat-
ed caravans).
• Sealing off kits for shelters and unfinished and aban-
doned buildings, as part of an emergency response, for 
interim shelter improvements or as part of climatization 
packages.
• Climatization packages for winter and summer, often 
with complementary shelter and NFI items and materials.
• Repair, rehabilitation or “durable upgrades” of in-
adequate, unsafe or substandard buildings, often with 
negotiated tenancy agreements.
• Cash-for-Rent schemes.
For shelter projects in the region, see: 
A.16 and A.17 in SP2011-12, and A.31 in SP2015-16: Leba-
non, on shelter repairs/upgrades and sealing off.
A.9 in SP2013-14: Iraq, on cash/voucher programmes for shel-
ter maintenance.
A.35 in SP2015-16: Iraq, on accessibility upgrades in camps.
A.10 in SP2013-14: Jordan, on transitional shelter in camps.
A.11 in SP2013-14: Jordan, on upgrading of unfinished build-
ings used as refugee rental stock.
A.12 in SP2013-14: Jordan, on tent recycling projects in camps.
A.13 in SP2013-14: Lebanon, on sealing off kits.
A.14 in SP2013-14: Lebanon, on multisector, mixed-modality 
interventions.
A.15 in SP2013-14: Lebanon, on conversion of buildings into 
collective centres.
A.32 in SP2015-16: Lebanon, on fire retardant insulation kits 
in informal settlements.
A.30 in SP2015-16: Syrian Arab Republic, on repairs and win-
terization of damaged houses.
WHOLE OF SYRIA 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
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SYRIAN CRISIS 
Mar 2011: Syria Crisis begins; first 5,000 refugee  (to Lebanon).
Dec 2014: 3.8 million registered refugees.
Dec 2015: Over 1 million Syrians arrive in Europe during the year.
Dec 2016: 3RP for 2017-2018 launched. 4,810,710 registered Syrian 
refugees in neighbouring countries.
Sep 2014: Whole of Syria (WoS) Approach launched.
Dec 2014: 12.2 million people in need.
Sep 2015: 13.5 million people in need (4.5 million in hard-to-reach or 
besieged areas).
Dec 2015: Humanitarian Response Plan 2016 launched.
Feb 2016: First “cessation of hostilities” agreement.
Aug 2016: Second “cessation of hostilities” breaks down after a few days. 
Dec 2016: 2017 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview released. 13.5 
million people in need.
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THE SITUATION IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 
• In 2016, the Syrian population remained the largest pro-
vider of shelter support, with 27% of households hosting 
people in need in their homes.
• Multiple and temporary displacements were frequent. 
50% of IDPs arrived in camps in 2015 from another loca-
tion of displacement.
• 3,030 collective centres (schools, public buildings, 
mosques, etc.) have been established in the country.
• Camps and collective centres were the last resort for 
the population, in tented camps (primarily self-settled), 
collective centres and makeshift settlements. These typ-
ically hosted the most vulnerable IDPs (1.1 million peo-
ple), as all other alternatives had been exhausted. IDPs 
tended to move out once other options arose.
• 1.2 million housing units have been damaged and 400,000 
destroyed. There has been a 28% increase in damage 
to housing stock since 20148. 
• The high level of damage sustained by residential infra-
structure forced populations to reside in substandard, 
inadequate and unsafe shelter, without access to basic 
amenities such as electricity, water and latrines, and often 
without windows and doors. Overcrowding (and shelters 
housing multiple families) increased protection risks sig-
nificantl .
• Lack of sites and buildings suitable for transitional 
shelter solutions that can be implemented by affected 
populations themselves.
• Restricted admission to neighbouring countries left 
170,000 people stranded near borders.
Given the very different operating environments, different responses took place in different countries. To promote some consistency, the Whole of Syria approach 
was adopted in 2013. In this picture we see assessment for a housing repair project within Syria.
The challenges faced in accessing people in need across 
the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) remained high, six years af-
ter the start of the crisis. Increased targeting of civilian infra-
structure and humanitarian convoys and workers reduced the 
ability to provide assistance to populations in greatest need. 
Widespread violations and abuses left populations with lit-
tle protection, while bureaucratic and administrative barri-
ers hindered timely and effective interventions. The scale and 
length of the crisis resulted in a convergence of severe needs 
across sectors, requiring an urgent multisectoral response.
To counter some of these huge challenges, the Whole of Syria 
Approach (WoS) was developed in 2013, to coordinate hu-
manitarian actors working inside the country with those opera-
tional from neighbouring countries and engaged in cross-border 
assistance. It also sought to support increased access, particu-
larly to besieged and hard-to-reach areas, and to enable the 
articulation of protection concerns within the country, through 
three operational hubs (in Syria, Turkey, Jordan). Focus on 
coordination and information management at sector/cluster 
level, across hubs and field locations, along with joint analysis, 
has reduced duplication, inconsistencies, and gaps in servic-
es. From January to August 2016, 1.9 million people were ac-
cessed in hard-to-reach locations with multisectoral humanitar-
ian assistance (food security, livelihoods, shelter, NFI, CCCM 
and nutrition), for at least one month, through a combination 
of cross-line, cross-border and air-drop operations.
Simultaneously, the 4.8 million Syrian refugees that were resid-
ing in the neighbouring countries of Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Iraq and Egypt, were requiring ongoing assistance. As their dis-
placement was prolonged, host systems, services and com-
munities went under increasing pressure; inflated rents, 
increased prices for consumer goods and heightened compe-
tition for scarce jobs in struggling economies, all led to growing 
social tension. These countries also needed stabilization and 
resilience-building, as a mid- to long-term solution, covered 
under the 3RP (Refugee and Resilience Response Plan).
For an overview of the shelter situation and response up to 
2014, see overview A.8 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014.
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SHELTER-NFI RESPONSE IN SYRIA
A primary challenge in Syria resulted from the shifting con-
flict and local power dynamics, which led to changes in se-
curity and access contexts from one period to the next. This 
impacted the ability of agencies to effectively provide assis-
tance in a sustained manner, or to respond to sudden and un-
predictable displacement. Complex formal requirements and 
administrative procedures further limited the ability to operate, 
and had repercussions on scale, scope and timeliness of in-
terventions13. Additionally, shelter programmes require con-
sistent access to sites over a longer period in order to ensure 
effectiveness, but this was hindered by the limited number of 
NGOs – with constrained operational capacity. Agencies had 
to adopt a variety of working methodologies, from partnering 
closely with local organizations, to integrating shelter pro-
grammes closely with protection, education or hygiene-pro-
motion activities. 
The use of shelter construction activities as an opportunity for 
skills-building and training supported affected families by of-
fering a possible source of income, at a time when unemploy-
ment had exceeded 50% and the poverty rate was estimated 
at 85%14. Due to the scale of needs and constrained access 
in many locations, prioritizing assistance was necessary 
– for example, targeting severely damaged houses for win-
terization repairs, or tailoring assistance to particularly vulner-
able groups (such as child-headed households, Palestinian 
refugees and the elderly). This needed a joint approach, with 
the involvement of all stakeholders, to conduct structured 
assessments, which form a key part of the Whole of Syria 
approach.
The Shelter-NFI Sector in Syria15 took a dual approach, by 
addressing emergency needs while promoting house-
hold and community resilience amongst displaced, hosting 
and non-displaced populations. This evolved, since the start 
of the crisis, from distribution of shelter material (as part of a 
core relief package), to improving collective shelters and into 
upgrading unfinished private buildings, in various stages of 
completion. 
Throughout 2016, the Shelter Sector focused on more dura-
ble solutions, by supporting owners and tenants to rehabili-
tate the premises to achieve adequate shelter, targeting hous-
es with minor damage in beneficiaries  places of origin, while 
restoring main services and utilities in neighbourhoods for the 
benefit of the wider communit . 
In parallel, the Shelter Sector continued to make provisions for 
contingency planning and emergency response, through 
tents and kits. Additional areas of the response included 
strengthening awareness among affected communities of 
Housing, Land and Property rights through awareness ses-
sions, and supporting ongoing capacity development to en-
hance governmental response to the IDP crisis16. 
A Shelter Technical Working Group (based in Gaziantep, Tur-
key), was established in late 2015 to develop technical de-
signs, standard operating procedures and improve coordina-
tion around shelter programming.
 SITUATION IN LEBANON (1.04M refugees)
• Lebanon is extremely diverse, religiously, environmen-
tally and politically. The country’s socio-political dynamics 
are complex and fragile, tensions between communities 
led to polarized ideological and political views, and re-
mained high since the last civil war. The relationships with 
its neighbours, Syria and Israel, are equally complex.
• Despite being an upper middle-income country, a no-
ticeable proportion of the population lives in poverty. 
Community vulnerabilities were further compounded by 
the State’s inability to provide blanket cover of basic re-
sources and services evenly across the country.
• Limited government housing-development polices, lack 
of affordable housing supply and market regulations, and 
real estate speculation resulted in an ongoing housing 
crisis for the past few decades.
• The large influx of refugees increased rental prices and 
saturated the limited market of adequate and afforda-
ble shelters, compounded by the absence of formal 
camps and the wide dispersal of displaced persons. This 
resulted in a large proportion residing in substandard 
or overcrowded conditions, such as garages, work-
sites, unfinished buildings, informal settlements and col-
lective shelters, often lacking basic services, protection 
from the climate and security of tenure.
• 80% of the displaced population was living in urban ar-
eas, as of 2016. The informal rental market offers little 
protection for vulnerable tenants in these areas.
• In 2016, there was a 13% increase in the number of in-
formal settlements9. 
• Other groups who needed shelter assistance were: 
vulnerable Lebanese, Lebanese returnees from Syria 
and Palestinian Refugees, both from Syria and from Leb-
anon. The latter hosted most of those from Syria in their 
camps and adjacent areas. Conditions in camps were 
typically overcrowded and lacked adequate shelter and 
infrastructure. The remaining Palestinian refugees settled 
in areas inhabited by impoverished and vulnerable Leba-
nese communities, with limited service provision.
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In Lebanon there was a no camp policy, and some families settled in tempo-
rary structures, often built with salvaged, improvised, materials.
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# of people reached per intervention type in Syria 2015-
2016 (absolute)
Shelter NFI
MONTHLY PEOPLE REACHED WITH SHELTER-NFI
 INTERVENTIONS IN THE WHOLE OF SYRIA (2015-2016)
NFIs
Emergency Shelter
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Almost one in three people in Lebanon in 2016 was displaced 
from Syria or was a Palestinian refugee17. The significant
increase in population (37% since the Syria crisis began) 
burdened existing service provision, infrastructural systems 
(such as energy and water) and household economies. The 
most vulnerable Lebanese also started requiring support, as 
competition for low-cost housing drove rent prices higher. Fur-
thermore, this situation posed a risk to exacerbate existing 
social tensions within the country’s fragile context. 
SHELTER-NFI RESPONSE IN LEBANON
An integrated stabilization and humanitarian approach 
was developed, to reach a broader scope of vulnerable in-
dividuals and institutions in need of support, with significant
measures for capacity development of institutions and nation-
al organizations18.  
The Shelter Sector aimed to ensure access to adequate 
shelter, through maintaining or improving shelter standards, 
improving living conditions within temporary settlements and 
poor urban areas characterized by large populations of dis-
placed and vulnerable groups, and ensuring public and pri-
vate institutions were aware of (and responsive to) the shelter 
situation of these groups. This was undertaken through:
• Minor repairs or enhancement to shelters, apartments 
and houses to meet minimum standards, including pre-
vention and preparedness measures (insulation, fire pro-
tection kits, raising of floors)
• Effectively combined winterization support for both 
household items and shelter insulation and weatherproof-
ing, including identification of alternative fuel and stove / 
heating sources. 
• Cash-for-Rent schemes to encourage selection of ade-
quate shelter befitting household size
• Shelter rehabilitation in exchange for affordable and se-
cure occupancy.
• Assisting households living in makeshift shelters and in-
formal settlements to weatherproof shelters and pro-
tect against other risks, to ensure minimum humanitari-
an standards at settlement level. This included water and 
sanitation upgrades, drainage, levelling and improving 
streets and paths, upgrading water points and soakaway 
pits, and decommissioning defunct latrines.
• Supporting neighbourhoods and vulnerable communities 
with shelter and infrastructure projects, through ho-
listic and innovative approaches that aim to strength-
en social cohesion and dialogue. This could be achieved 
through site-level improvements, upgrading and main-
taining little-used buildings as collective centres, estab-
lishing Collective Site Management and Coordination 
structures or neighbourhood committees, or conducting 
community training on referral systems, conflict mitigation 
and Housing, Land and Property rights.
• Enhancing the technical capacity of local institutions 
to participate in and support shelter assistance activities.
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In Lebanon, the shelter strategy included minor repairs and rental assistance 
for those who could find buildings to live in, and water and sanitation upgrades, 
drainage and site improvements For families living in temporary shelters. 
Some of these were in urban areas (including Beirut, Mount Lebanon and 
Tripoli), while others in more rural or peri-urban ones (such as in the Bekaa). 
As the crisis continued, agencies began to make direct repairs of shelters (with 
negotiated lease agreements) in urban and rural areas.
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SITUATION IN JORDAN (654,400 refugees)
• 120,000 people were living in the two refugee camps of 
Azraq and Za’atari, with another 10,000 people in other 
camps, as of 2016.
• 83% of Syrian refugees were living outside of camp 
settings, with the areas containing the highest proportion 
of Syrian refugees characterized by severe vulnerability.
• 17% increase in the cost of rent and higher prices for 
consumer goods impacted the host population as well. 
Overstretching of public services and competition for 
jobs compounded growing resentment and alienation.
• Lack of housing: 91,300 housing units were required in 
Jordan in 2015 to meet demand from refugees and mi-
grant workers, compared to an estimated annual require-
ment for 32,000 units10.
SHELTER RESPONSE IN JORDAN
Taking a similar approach to Lebanon, Jordan evolved its 
response to the refugee infl x into a resilience-based 
comprehensive framework, that tied in directly to mid- and 
long-term national and governorate-level development plans. 
It aimed to address the key issues facing the estimated 1.4 
million Syrians residing in Jordan, of whom 750,000 had al-
ready been living there before the crisis. However, as the 
crisis prolonged and return to Syria was not possible soon, 
the burden on social structures, public services and host 
communities began to show, especially as macroeconomic 
performance was poor. Oversupply of housing at the middle 
and upper end of the market led to an acute shortage of 
affordable housing. It contributed significantly to tensions 
between refugee and host communities19, and to the deteri-
oration of living standards, with exploitative subdivision of ex-
isting units and conversion of buildings into rental accommo-
dation, with little consideration of household size or standards. 
Within camp settings, the main focus was on maintenance 
and upgrading of existing shelters, facilities and infrastruc-
ture, including winterization. Some expansion or relocation 
could be foreseen, as shelters were upgraded to “perma-
nent” prefabricated caravans.
The 2015 inter-agency Shelter and Settlement Strate-
gy aimed to promote a resilience-oriented approach 
to both urban and rural settings in Jordan, with a Shelter 
Task Force developing guidelines for activities. These in-
cluded conditional cash-for-rent, upgrading substandard 
shelters, increasing the number of habitable housing units 
through the upgrading of unfinished buildings, provision of 
home adaptation and sealing-off kits (particularly for win-
terization), and raising awareness of rental rights and obli-
gations. In some cases, energy saving measures, such as 
solar panels, insulation and water savings fixtures, were in-
tegrated into the shelter response. This provided additional 
incentives to landlords to assure adequate, safe, shelter 
for refugees. Simultaneously, municipal services and infra-
structures were strengthened, with prioritization of areas 
with highest population stresses. 
However, with the shelter sector comprising less than 2% 
of the plan’s budget, a private-sector funding approach 
was required to provide a source of income for Jordani-
ans (as owners) and vulnerable Syrian refugee and Jorda-
nian families (as renters), accompanied by a programme of 
legal, institutional and policy reform. The Jordan Afforda-
ble Housing Programme commenced, with extensive 
land, market and financial sector surveys completed. A na-
tional design competition was held, and model houses were 
planned, while workshops with developers were arranged 
to secure their interest.
????? in Portoviejo area outside newly constructed temporary shelter
In Jordan, 83% of Syrian refugees were living outside of camp. However 120,000 people were sheltered in Azraq and Za’atari refugee camps.
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Syrian refugees in Turkey often seek shelter in unfinished and abandoned structures  as well as in shared accommodations. Humanitarian organizations started to 
implement winterization, repair, and cash-based interventions to support refugees in these situations.
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SITUATION IN TURKEY (2.74M refugees)
• In 2016, approximately 91% of refugees were residing 
within the host community, while 9% lived in 25 camps.
• Despite a change in regulation in favour of integration, the 
large number of refugees accessing social services 
stretched national structures and capacity to the ut-
most, particularly in areas which host a high proportion 
of Syrians; especially in the border provinces and towns.
• While the government provided comprehensive assis-
tance inside camps, including shelter, NFIs and winteriza-
tion, those living within the host community in urban 
or rural settings struggled to meet their basic needs, 
including accommodation, NFIs, electricity and heating.
• The average reported income remained well below the 
minimum wage11. Cost of rent and food accounted for 
a high proportion of expenditure, meaning that house-
holds often resorted to negative coping strategies to 
make ends meet and prioritized food and rent over their 
winterization needs.
• Refugees continued to inhabit poorly structured 
buildings, with about 60% living in shared accommo-
dation, and around 10% in unfinished buildings, barns, 
shops and other forms of inhabitable dwellings. Approx-
imately 35% of shelter types were in need of some 
form of repair or rehabilitation, and 82% of households 
were found in need of winterization assistance12.
As with other countries involved in the humanitarian crisis, 
Syrian refugees in Turkey found themselves in the situation of 
progressive destitution, as their displacement continued. Un-
able to become self-reliant due to difficulties in accessing the 
formal labour market, refugees continued to work informally 
(often on low salaries), with dependence on assistance from 
both the government and aid agencies.
SHELTER-NFI RESPONSE IN TURKEY
Multiple and repeated interventions were required in order to 
provide access to minimum standards, key services and to 
meet basic needs. Shelter actors operated under the Basic 
Needs and Essential Services sector, tying together shelter, 
NFI, sanitation and hygiene and public infrastructure support. 
At the start of the crisis, a vast quantity of Core Relief 
Items was mobilized by the government to respond to the 
new arrivals, supplemented by partners. This evolved into 
3RP partners creating and maintaining emergency stocks of 
tents, food, NFIs, medicines and equipment for potential in-
fluxes, as part of an inter-agency contingency plan. The gov-
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ernment continued to play the lead role in the response to 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. 
In the refugee camps, 3RP partners supported shelter, NFI 
and camp infrastructure in close coordination with the gov-
ernment. Outside of camps, however, due to partners’ lack 
of access to refugee registration and vulnerability data, the 
identification of needs among Syrians in host communities 
remained the biggest challenge. As the crisis continued, or-
ganizations began to provide assistance to refugees living 
outside of camps through NFI distributions and cash-based 
responses, and more recently direct repairs of shelters (with 
negotiated lease agreements) in urban and rural areas. Assis-
tance packages comprised emergency, regular and seasonal 
assistance, with resilience activities focusing on the host com-
munity relating to education, livelihoods and social cohesion. 
From 2016, winterization support and cash-based interven-
tions were scaled up for refugees outside of camps.
SITUATION AND RESPONSE IN IRAQ 
For information on the crisis in Iraq and the shelter-NFI re-
sponse, see overview A.33. 
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LOOKING FORWARD
In early 2017, hosting countries were increasingly looking 
to stabilize the situation of refugees, as the conflict contin-
ued and the opportunity for safe return remained unfeasible. 
Two-thirds of funds were allocated towards shelter and 
upgrades outside of camps, for refugees and vulnerable 
host community members. Mobilizing partnerships to incen-
tivize the supply of affordable housing was another key 
approach, alongside increasingly durable upgrading and re-
habilitation work, including climatization measures, to ensure 
multiseason habitability. NFI provision was going to target the 
poorest and most vulnerable refugee populations, with a scal-
ing up of cash-based assistance (e.g. through multipurpose 
cash grants)20. In addition, there was a shift towards provid-
ing mid- to long-term support, supplementing existing gov-
ernance structures and social capital, as host governments 
and primary duty bearers developed strategies to address the 
new and increasingly established refugee populations within 
their jurisdictions.
Within Syria, host communities remained the largest provider 
of shelter assistance, highlighting the need for community-fo-
cused solutions21. Local authorities also expressed the need 
for more durable shelter options along with emergency shelter 
support, focusing more on a resilient-oriented type of assis-
tance. In late 2016, the sector also started designing a winter-
ization shelter kit, to be tested during the winter and included 
in the 2017 shelter response22. NFI needs continued to be not 
uniform and required more flexible and specialized respons-
es, including alternative modalities (e.g. cash and vouchers) 
where the existing local markets could be supported.
ENDNOTES
1 Excludes 3.2 million IDPs displaced within Iraq as a result of internal conflict.
Calculated as follows: 4.8 million (refugees) + 4 million (affected communities as 
a result of refugee crisis) + 13.5 million (PiN in Syria – IDP + host/non-displaced)
2 Includes government estimates and unregistered refugees. From 3RP Regional 
Strategic Overview 2017-2018.
3 Registered refugees, OCHA, December 2016.
4 Registered refugees and asylum seekers in 120 other countries (excluding 
3RP countries), as of June 2015. From 3RP Regional Overview 2016-2017.
5 OCHA, December 2016.
6 Data reported to the Shelter-NFI Cluster.
7 Data from Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017, UN-OCHA Dec 2016.
8 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016-2017.
9 Inter-Agency Quarterly Dashboard: Shelter, January – May 2016.
10 According to the Sector Vulnerability Assessment (May 2015), in the Jordan 
Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2016-2018.
11 As per the minimum wage of Turkey at the time of writing (TRY 1,273). On 
average Syrians earned 35% below minimum wage. This amount used to be 
lower in rural areas compared to urban. 
12 Assessment carried out between Sep-Dec 2016 by IOM field staff for win-
terization assistance of 17,500 households, representing 96,386 individuals in 
Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa and Adiyaman provinces.
13 Syria Emergency Shelter Sector Factsheet, August 2016.
14 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017. 69% of affected people in 2016 
were living in extreme poverty and 35% in abject poverty.
15 Activated in 2012, the Shelter Sector in Syria consisted of 20 partners as of 
October 2016, covered 30 out of 272 sub-districts in Syria and completed 147 
shelter projects (Syria Hub Shelter Sector Profile Sheet, Oct 2016).
16 Syria Emergency Shelter Sector Factsheet, August 2016.
17 Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon may have either been displaced 
from Syria (where they were also refugees) during the recent conflict, or may 
have experienced historic displacement to Lebanon directly from the Palestin-
ian territories. 
18 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) 2015-2016.
19 An assessment in June 2014 indicated that “housing was the most commonly 
cited sector linked to community tensions by respondents with a total of 81 per 
cent”, cited in the Jordan Response Plan for the Syrian Crisis 2016-2018.
20 3RP 2017-2018.
21 Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017.
22 Shelter Sector monthly update October 2016.
Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries live in a variety of accommodation types, often in urban areas, such as in this apartment block in Lebanon.
www.shelterprojects.org
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CASE STUDY
CONFLICTA.30 / SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 2015-2016 / CONFLICT
SYRIAN ARAB REP. 2015-2016 / CONFLICT
KEYWORDS: Housing repair, Host family support, NFI distribution, Training, Structural assessment, Gender 
and GBV mainstreaming, Protection
CRISIS Syrian conflict, March 2011 - ongoing.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
1.2 million damaged (approx.).
400,000 destroyed.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
13.5 million total people in need within the 
Syrian Arab Republic (6.3 million IDPs, 5.7 million in 
acute need), including 6 million children.
6.2 million total estimated Syrian refugees.
PROJECT LOCATIONS Idleb and Aleppo governorates
BENEFICIARIES
873 households (552 in Idleb and 321 in Aleppo). 
143 (16.4%) were headed by women.
Total of 5,722 individuals. 51% female and 
52% were children (1-18 years of age).
RIO NAPO
IRAQ
TURKEY
JORDAN
PROJECT SUMMARY   
Linking relief to recovery, the project targeted IDPs and host communities with repairs to the main damaged parts of their 
houses and distribution of shelter repair kits, heaters, winterization kits and kitchen utensils. All activities were accom-
panied by awareness sessions on protection as wells as hygiene habits.
STRENGTHS
+ Installation of solar panels.
+ Coal heaters: suitable for indoors, easy to maintain and more 
affordable.
+ Using local materials and labour.
+ Integration of protection and hygiene components.
WEAKNESSES
- Short duration of the project.
- Limited budget allocated for shelter rehabilitation.
- Delays in the procurement and transport of materials.
- Dissatisfaction of most beneficiaries with the shelter repair k ts.
ALEPPO
IDLEB
JUL JANJAN OCTSEP NOVAPR DECAUG
2011
SYRIAN CRISIS 
2017
PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION HANDOVER
PROJECT
 OUTPUTS
463 houses rehabilitated - 1,460 winter and kitchen NFI kits distributed - 150 solar panels for lighting installed
305 shelter kits provided - 600 people attended 15 awareness sessions on hygiene and protection.
COSTS Materials cost per household: USD 226.8  /  Project cost per household: USD 322.7.
OUTCOME
INDICATORS
1/ Beneficiary satisfaction: 46.5% were very satisfied and 35.5% satisfied with the assistance re ived, in average.
2/ 80% of beneficiarie  (IDP and host community) had increased awareness on hygiene and protection topics 
through mainstreaming activities.
20162015
HOUSING REPAIRS
DISTRIBUTION OF NFIS
DISTRIBUTION OF SHELTER KITS
INSTALLATION OF SOLAR PANELS
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Repairs included the replacement of window frames or sealing off of openings.
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The extent of the damage to private properties, particularly the housing stock, has reached extreme levels within the Syrian Arab Republic. Before the rehabilitation of 
each house could start, the technical team had to check the local conditions and structural integrity.
CONTEXT
See overview A.29 for more on the crisis and shelter response 
within Syria and neighbouring countries.
The level of damage sustained by residential infrastructure in 
high-conflict zones in the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) is evident 
in the destruction of homes that have been targeted by aerial 
strikes, tanks, shootings, and other violent mechanisms. The 
uninhabitable nature of damaged buildings have forced people 
to reside in inadequate and unsafe spaces, without access to 
basic amenities, such as electricity, water, and latrines. Many of 
these makeshift homes lack doors and windows, causing priva-
cy, safety and protection concerns, and exposing households 
to theft, abuse, and other hazards. Further, given the reduced 
housing and the amount of displacement, many homes are in-
habited by two or more families.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
The organization and its local partner identified six regions 
in Aleppo and Idleb governorates marked by significant de-
struction, as a result of continued attacks. Due to the unsta-
ble security situation, selected sites were constantly moni-
tored prior to launching operations, to ensure they were safe 
for staff to carry out daily operations.
Residents of the selected regions consisted of both host com-
munities and returning IDPs that hoped for stability and safety 
for their families. The following vulnerability criteria were used:
1. Families hosting IDPs in their home;
2. IDPs living in unfinished buildings due to inability to afford rent;
3. Home was 40-75% destroyed by the conflict and residents 
cannot repair it;
4. Household with more than eight members and with teen-
agers who do not have any privacy;
5. The family has disabled/elderly and does not have the 
means to cover their needs;
6. Female- and child-headed households.
According to these criteria, the organization identified ben-
eficiaries with the local council, while the field team verifie  
the selected households, by conducting visits before the in-
terventions were performed. A second visit was conducted 
by the technical team, to check that the conditions and struc-
tural integrity of the house would allow the project to proceed 
with the rehabilitation. Finally, MoUs were signed with home-
owners, to make sure IDPs could be accommodated for at 
least one year after the completion of the works, therefore 
avoiding the risk of eviction and speculation.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION  
The project was implemented by the organization from its of-
fice in Turkey, in partnership with a local NGO. After recruit-
ing key personnel in the target governorates, the two partners 
performed community needs assessments, in conjunction 
with local councils and community groups, and distributed 
over 500 questionnaires to gather demographic data. 
Damage assessments were conducted by a technical team, 
to categorize homes as mildly, moderately, or severely dam-
aged. Families residing in mildly or moderately damaged 
homes were provided with shelter repair kits, and received 
training from the organization’s field staff on how to conduct 
repairs independently. On the other hand, field staff directly 
repaired homes identified as severely damaged. Repairs were 
carried out within six months of the assessments, to ensure 
that families had adequate living conditions in advance of the 
winter. Specific repairs for each home were made in accord-
ance with the full-home assessment, on a case-by-case basis, 
with repairs such as the following:
• Conversion of dirt floors to concrete
• Repair of plumbing/piping of homes in damaged bathrooms; 
• Installation of electrical wiring for solar panels for lighting 
purpose (150 panels were distributed);
• Latrine installation in homes without functional bathrooms;
• Replacement of damaged doors and addition of locks; 
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• Replacement of broken windows;
• Repair of damaged walls and replacement of destroyed 
walls;
• Repair or replacement of ceilings according to the level 
of damage.
Beyond the repair of homes, over 50 jobs were created for 
locals from the target communities who had technical back-
grounds, including civil, architectural and electrical engineers, 
carpenters, constructions workers, plumbers and electricians. 
Brief training sessions were conducted and maintenance kits 
were designed and distributed to be used in rehabilitation ac-
tivities.
Additionally, charcoal or firewo d for heating units (Sobas) 
was distributed to beneficiary families in lieu of fuel, given the 
high cost and intermittent availability in Syria and the logistical 
barriers of cross-border procurement and delivery. Beneficiary
families received trainings on the safe usage of heating units, 
to avoid fire hazards and ensure adequate ventilation for poi-
sonous gases produced.
PROTECTION AND HYGIENE COMPONENTS   
Given the scale and devastation of the Syrian conflict, the or-
ganization decided to extend the reach of its interventions to 
a wider target, not only the most vulnerable. Throughout this 
project, protection awareness and education were integrated 
into the other activities, viewing physical and psychological 
protection as a priority, alongside other aid and development 
efforts.
Protection encompasses both physical safety and the emotion-
al and psychological needs of survivors of conflict. The most 
pressing physical protection needs are from aerial bombard-
ments, warfare, gender-based violence (GBV), as well as en-
vironmental conditions, such as exposure to harsh weather, 
and other factors that contribute to poor physical health, such 
as poor sanitation. Creating safe havens within communities, 
wherever possible (homes, schools, underground sites), and 
privacy within households, by establishing barriers between 
genders, can address some key elements of protection. 
The most relevant emotional and psychological protection 
efforts for Syrians requires addressing outlets for grief, an-
ger and aggression, frustration over continued poverty, lack 
of employment opportunities for both men and women, and 
creating GBV referral pathways and post-traumatic support.
The organization delivered sessions to families receiving 
shelter and winter kits, and communities at large, based on 
the results from questionnaires distributed in the project areas. 
These sessions focused on 1) human rights; 2) anti-violence, 
and prevention of domestic abuse and GBV; 3) energy sources; 
and 4) hygiene and health promotion, and the importance of 
maintaining healthy interpersonal relationships. Particularly, the 
organization emphasized the need for gender equality, shared 
decision-making between men and women, early marriage pre-
vention, family planning decisions and mutual and self-respect.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT    
The project partners coordinated and collaborated with local 
authorities and consulted IDPs and vulnerable people, par-
ticularly to identify the items for the repairs, aiming to use 
local materials appropriate for the area. All staff recruited for 
the implementation were from the target communities, and 
all activities were implemented side by side with the heads of 
household. Where possible, beneficiaries contributed to the 
reconstruction efforts. In post-implementation assessments, 
they identified that participating in the work had a positive ef-
fect on their morale, such as giving them the feeling of being 
able to take care of their family.
PROCUREMENT AND MATERIALS    
All contents of the kits were established after coordination 
amongst other shelter agencies. Items were procured from lo-
cal markets as much as possible. Most of the construction ma-
terials for rehabilitation were purchased nationally, while the kits 
and a few other items were purchased in Turkey. The delays 
associated with transport of procured items across the border 
delayed the implementation of shelter and NFI distributions. As 
a result, the bulk of activities were carried out during the winter 
and were then impacted by slight weather-related delays.
In terms of winterization, coal heaters – which can also burn 
wood and olive pomace – were chosen due to their afforda-
bility, as fuel-burning heaters are expensive to maintain. 
However, the coal heaters came with safety concerns, as 
families were unfamiliar with how to operate and maintain 
them, with the main risk of carbon monoxide poisoning. To 
address this issue, instructions were printed onto aluminium 
panels that were later attached to the heaters.
SOLAR PANELS    
An interagency study in early 2015 revealed that roughly 83% 
of the electricity operating in the country before the conflict
had been cut off. In severely damaged areas, such as the 
Aleppo district, only 3% of the electricity sources remained 
active. Limited access to power has resulted in widespread 
hardships, including the dependence of hospitals and clinics 
on costly fuel-powered generators, the inability to resume ba-
sic daily activities and the increased risks of theft, kidnappings 
and violence, due to a lack of lighting. Considering the severi-
ty of the impact on people’s well-being, long-term, sustainable 
and efficient solution to the power shortage were essential. 
This prompted the organization to install 150 solar panels 
on the rooftops of beneficiaries  homes, each providing 100 
watts. The free electricity provided by the panels had a signif-
icant impact on households’ lives, leading the organization to 
increase the use of this technology for future responses.
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The project included installation of solar panels for selected households.
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The project included repairs and upgrades to walls, floors, cei ings, doors and windows and installation of wiring, plumbing and latrines.
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STRENGTHS
+ Installing solar panels, which provided an efficient and 
renewable energy source.
+ Distribution of coal heaters, which were suitable for in-
door usage, easier to maintain and more affordable compared 
to other types.
+ Using local materials and labour for implementing reha-
bilitation activities.
+ Integration of protection and hygiene components for 
the communities at large.
WEAKNESSES
- Short duration of the project, which affected the quality 
and extent of the repairs.
- Limited budget allocated for shelter rehabilitation activ-
ities, which resulted in many households being dropped from 
the beneficiary list; with more funds, more vulnerable families 
could have been reached.
- Delays in the procurement and transport of materials 
across the Turkey-Syrian border. 
- Dissatisfaction of most beneficiaries with the shelter 
repair kits, as the needs were very diverse for each house, 
and much greater than what could be solved by the materials 
provided. Also, some households felt that they did not have 
the skills to do the repairs, and this led the organization to 
change its modality.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Necessity of conducting trainings for local labours (on carpentry and construction) to enhance the quality of shelter 
interventions for future programmes.
• The importance of finding local alternatives for fue  used for cooking and heating.
• The need for more comprehensive projects that include multisectoral activities, such as shelter, WASH and protection.
• Ensuring the integration of protection to improve dignity and taking into account the needs of the most vulnerable 
(women, elderly, children, etc.) in a culturally appropriate manner.
• The amount of kits (both repair and winterization) should be decreased in future projects, in order to increase 
the funding allocated to each household to cover more critical shelter needs. Following this project, the organization 
was also considering the use of voucher and cash-based approaches, which improve the dignity and choice of 
beneficiaries, on the precondition that markets are accessible and functioning. Given the unstable situation in Syria, 
this has proven challenging. However, the organization was piloting a voucher programme for fuel in an area where 
the market is working.
MATERIALS LIST
Items Unit Quantity Cost per unit
Winterization Kit 
Kitchen Utensils 
Shelter repair kit 
Solar lighting panels 
Heaters (Soba)
Heating fuel 
Kit
Kit
Kit
Panel
Pcs
ton
300
300
305
150
430
430
USD 107
USD 31
USD 81
USD 325
USD 46
USD 220
www.shelterprojects.org
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CRISIS
Syrian Refugee crisis in Lebanon,
2011-ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
1.04 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
(Source: Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017)
PROJECT LOCATIONS Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates
BENEFICIARIES
706 households (3,751 individuals) assisted with 
shelter repairs (Including Lebanese and Syrian families, 
with a minority of Palestinian and other minorities).
2,745 households attended hygiene promotion 
sessions (Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian households).
35,700 individuals attended HLP awareness 
sessions.
PROJECT OUTPUTS
499 shelter upgrades
207 shelter rehabilitations
Other outputs: 25 Focal Points and Committee Members 
trained; Establishment of a roster of 14 skilled workers; 
1,222 man-days of construction activities.
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PROJECT SUMMARY   
The organization used a holistic, neighbourhood, approach across delineated zones in dense urban areas. Shelter re-
habilitations and upgrades were provided to 207 and 499 households respectively, along with improvements to water 
and sanitation facilities. Campaigns on hygiene promotion and housing, land and property rights were also conducted. 
Community-wide projects were implemented to improve service delivery, such as water and solid waste management.
STRENGTHS
+ Enhanced local technical skills and sense of ownership.
+ Raised awareness about HLP rights and obligations, and improved 
landlord-tenant relationships.
+ Served as a platform for information sharing between community 
members and municipalities.
WEAKNESSES
- Strategy had to be adapted due to a lack of empty units available.
- Information flow and community participation could have been 
improved.
- Recruitment of staff/labour from within the community, quality control 
and flexibility in specifications could have been strong .
MOUNT
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LEBANON
AKKAR
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EL-HERMEL
BEKAA
EL NABATIEH
SOUTH 
LEBANON
MATERIALS COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
Upgrades: USD 636 - Rehabilitations: USD 1570. As per sector standards, upgrades are minor works up 
to USD 700 and rehabilitations are major works up to USD 1,500.
PROJECT COST
PER HOUSEHOLD USD 1,731 on average.
MEDITERRANEAN 
SEA
1
BEIRUT
PROJECT AREAS
Aug 2015: Neighbourhood-level social and 
shelter mapping, establishment of focal 
point networks and committees, and capac-
ity-building.
Nov 2015: Beneficiary-led voucher-based 
emergency shelter and WASH upgrades to 
substandard shelters completed.
Mar 2016: Rehabilitation of occupied shel-
ters units completed.
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CONTEXT
For more background information on the situation and shelter 
response in Lebanon, see overview A.29.   
Lebanon suffered from structural inefficiencies even prior to 
the Syrian conflict. In 2015, an estimated 87.7% of the pop-
ulation was urban1, and there was a significant heteroge-
neity between rural, urban and peri-urban areas, in terms of 
institutional service delivery and governance2. This was fur-
ther exacerbated by the conflict in Lebanon (lasting over two 
decades) and the political fractionalization that brought the 
country to a standstill.
The influx of Syrian refugees into such context dramatically 
deteriorated the living conditions for both refugees and host 
populations. The crisis increased population density in Leb-
anon from 400 to 520 persons per km2, especially in urban 
areas, leading to urban congestion, competition over housing, 
increasing pressures on existing resources and tensions be-
tween host populations and refugees3. This situation was par-
ticularly constrained in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with only 
a limited number of informal settlements in the area. Most ref-
ugees in Beirut and Mount Lebanon (92%) resided in rented 
apartments or houses, although the comparatively high cost 
of living meant that many refugee families were only able to 
afford substandard or overcrowded accommodation. An 
assessment by the organization in the target areas showed 
that 23% of households in Beirut and 59% in Mount Lebanon 
lacked basic facilities and were in need of urgent rehabilita-
tions.
PROJECT GOAL AND TEAM STRUCTURE  
The objective of this project was to provide immediate com-
munity-driven WASH and Shelter support to the most vulner-
able Syrian populations and their host communities in Beirut 
and Mount Lebanon.
The organization had been registered in the country since 
2006 and had an established country office in Beirut, as well 
as a field office in Akkar, with established links with local au-
1 CIA World Factbook, [Accessed 6 August 2015].
2 Lebanon: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity, World Bank, 
June 2015.
3 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, 2016, pp. 16.
thorities and civil society stakeholders. The team for this pro-
ject included one project manager, two team leaders, nine 
field staff and four technical staff, in addition to support staff.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
Firstly, target communities were identified based on 1) refu-
gee concentration; 2) socio-economic vulnerability; 3) access 
to basic services; 4) willingness of local stakeholders to host 
refugees and collaborate; and 5) interventions by humanitari-
an actors. This selection was informed by Key Informant Inter-
views and inter-agency rankings. Based on the knowledge of 
the target areas, the organization provisionally identified clus-
ters from which target communities were selected.
Secondly, the priority in target neighbourhoods was to gain a 
thorough understanding of local community dynamics, in-
cluding mapping key stakeholders from relevant demograph-
ic groups (Syrian and Lebanese), inter-community dynamics 
and current WASH and shelter conditions. This included an 
overview of main shelter types, the state of landlord-tenant 
relationships, and any issues which could impact the prioriti-
zation and implementation of shelter activities. In order to do 
this, a social-mapping process was conducted, which involved 
semi-structured interviews and focus-group discussions with 
immediately identifiable local key informants, including munic-
ipal authorities and local NGOs or community-based organi-
zations. Within target areas, vulnerable households were tar-
geted irrespective of shelter type or nationality.
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION    
The neighbourhood approach used to implement this project 
relied on benefi iary involvement in the development and de-
livery of all activities, at both the community and household 
levels. Following the mapping of local stakeholders and identi-
fication of community representatives, consultations were held 
to review the proposed selection criteria (for household-level 
assistance) and identify key challenges of the target commu-
nities, to be addressed through small-scale emergency pro-
jects. Following consultations, the organization established a 
network of community focal points, committed to improving 
their neighbourhoods. These assisted in identifying shelter 
units in need of rehabilitation, and in liaising with landlords.
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The majority of refugees in Lebanon stayed in rented accommodation. High housing demand, combined with the high cost of living, led to many people living in 
substandard and overcrowded conditions.
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PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION   
The project initially focused on the rehabilitation or upgrading 
of empty shelters within the targeted community, to have alter-
native housing options for families facing eviction. However, 
due to a number of contextual challenges, the organization 
shifted to a beneficiary-led model of rehabilitation or up-
grading of their own properties. Through this, beneficiaries
received the main inputs with a voucher scheme, and were 
paid for fittings and installation on cash-per-task basis. Apart 
from providing livelihood opportunities to some beneficiaries,
this modality also helped the organization to overcome the 
issue of having limited access to the sites.
Agreements were signed with local suppliers for material 
procurement, and vouchers provided to each family in one 
instalment. The value was based on a bill of quantities that 
covered the repairs specific to each household. The benefi-
ciaries redeemed their vouchers through one purchase and 
were given ownership over their own installations. In addition, 
the organization closely monitored the distribution of materi-
als, to ensure high quality.
In order to support vulnerable populations without formal rent-
al contracts, landlords and tenants were asked to sign a lease 
agreement in order to participate in the project. The organi-
zation also provided sessions on hygiene promotion and 
legal advice on Housing, Land and Property (HLP) issues 
through this intervention. This included training for local com-
mittee members, as well as campaigns in targeted neighbour-
hoods. Participants of these campaigns received information 
on how to obtain a lease agreement, obligations of each party 
and how to avoid legal trouble. This included advice on hand-
ing over of the rented premises, guaranteeing against hidden 
defects upon move-out and against eviction following end of 
lease, and advice on conducting major repairs and mainte-
nance, to avoid unexpected costs upon lease termination.
COORDINATION   
In addition to conducting coordination through the Sector Work-
ing Group meetings in Beirut, the organization liaised with local 
NGOs conducting other shelter projects by sharing beneficiar  
lists to avoid overlaps, as well as by referring cases between 
agencies to avoid gaps in coverage. The organization also li-
aised with NGOs conducting other protection and WASH pro-
jects in the target area, to share ideas on the neighbourhood 
approach used and, in some cases, other INGOs attended the 
organization’s forums to learn more about this approach.
MATERIAL PROCUREMENT   
The organization conducted detailed market assessments and 
selected local suppliers for materials to be procured locally. This 
reduced operational costs and increased support for the lo-
cal businesses, thereby contributing to the area’s economic 
development, and reduced tensions with host communities 
over limited resources and jobs.
For larger rehabilitations, the organization signed contracts that 
included material specifications and prices with local contractors. 
Sourcing the materials from within the neighbourhood or district 
was key to reduce transportation costs and contribute to the local 
economy. Moreover, it was important to rely on materials that 
were accessible and affordable to all beneficiaries. Finally, cash 
was provided for transport in cases where a large volume of 
materials had to be shipped to the beneficiary s house.
MAIN CHALLENGES   
SECURITY ISSUES IN ACCESSING CERTAIN AREAS. Such risks im-
posed restrictions on the selection of target communities. The 
rapidly evolving security context in Lebanon required the or-
ganization to increase engagement with neighbourhood focal 
points and local municipalities. Daily monitoring of shelter activ-
ities also contributed to stronger relationships with beneficia -
ies. However, in many other vulnerable areas where other IN-
GOs faced difficulties for gaining access (due to socio-political 
issues), the organization was able to successfully implement 
the project, through its engagement with local authorities.
LOW QUALITY MATERIALS. Due to complaints of low quality 
materials being used for rehabilitations and upgrades, the 
organization instituted a new process, in which a follow-up 
agreement was signed with the supplier, specifically on ma-
terial quality. In some cases, low quality items were replaced, 
in order to address beneficiari s’ complaints. The quality of 
materials was continuously assessed by the project engineers 
during the distributions. In any event where materials were 
considered substandard, they were returned and the distribu-
tion was delayed.
MANAGING BENEFICIARIES’ EXPECTATIONS. Some complaints 
on the quality were also due to high expectations that were un-
realistic, given the project budget. To avoid this challenge, the 
organization ensured that each household received complete 
information on the quality of work that would be provided. Agree-
ments were signed with one local supplier per target area, which 
beneficiaries could select to complete the works if they desired. 
Beneficiaries were informed of their ability to register complaints 
at fora and via the organization’s local hotline, and these were 
followed up by the project engineer after implementation. 
LAND OWNERSHIP ISSUES AND INSECURE TENURE AGREEMENTS. 
Some of the targeted households had no proof of ownership, 
which is a widespread issue, given the complex context in Leb-
anon. Close collaboration with the municipality was needed for 
verifications of ownership. Additionally, very often only verbal 
agreements existed between landlord and tenants, without any 
rental contract. This was tackled through prolonged negotia-
tions between both parties, to clarify the terms of the housing 
arrangement and to sign a lease agreement.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT  
At the community level, the project provided a catalyst for change, 
combined with continued community engagement and capacity- 
building activities, to highlight needs such as HLP, protection, 
hygiene promotion, conflict resolution, participatory planning and 
community-based solutions. The project also helped to identify 
engagement opportunities for better responses in the future. For 
example, the committee in one of the neighbourhoods was able 
to solve a ten-year problem related to solid waste management, 
by relying on the initiative of the community and planning oppor-
tunities that were generated during this project.
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Many refugees in Lebanon settled in unfinished buildings, often in urban areas
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The project made basic upgrades, but it became challenging to find enough build-
ings in the targeted communities.
Bathrooms were also repaired and upgraded under the project.
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STRENGTHS
+ The cash-for-task concept allowed beneficiaries to con-
tribute in their own communities and enhanced their techni-
cal skills. While all supplies were made available before the 
works, cash was given following the completion of activities.
+ The project improved the organization’s visibility and 
credibility. Community engagement activities, conducted 
throughout the course of the project, led to a widespread 
acceptance of the organization for future interventions.
+ HLP considerations and significant improvement in 
tenant-landlord relationships, as both parties became 
more aware of their rights and responsibilities.
+ Served as a platform for information sharing between 
the community members and the municipalities, and responded 
to the urgent needs of both parties.
WEAKNESSES
- The organization could not identify sufficient empty 
shelters in the target communities to be rehabilitated and, 
for the small number identified, landlords refused to sign 
rental agreements (binding them to keep the shelters empty 
until potential evictions occurred). Given such a context, the 
organization modified its strategy, and capacitated the focal 
points to rapidly respond to evictions, by providing housing 
to beneficiaries in alternative houses within the same neigh-
bourhood, as well as conducting emergency referrals to other 
agencies working in the areas, until a more permanent housing 
solution could be identified
- Community engagement could have been improved. 
Better information flow and participation of affected commu-
nities in the identification of activities and target areas, as 
well as in the discussion of gaps and challenges, could have 
ensured a more tailored and effective assistance.
- Recruitment of staff/labour from within the communities (by 
the organization and contractors), quality control of mate-
rials, stricter procedures in signing changes in BoQs and 
flexibility in specification could have been stronger.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Stimulating local livelihoods. The beneficiary-led approach was largely successful in stimulating the local economy 
and empowering beneficiaries in implementing their own rehabilitations. The final assessment found that the target of 
490 man-days of labour was greatly surpassed, with 1,222 man-days created through these works.
• The organization was aware that not all target households would have sufficient technical skills to conduct such 
upgrades. As a result, the team identified skilled workers from the neighbourhoods, and households were able to utilize 
these workers to complete their upgrades. In addition, 30% of beneficiaries were found to have conducted further home 
improvements at their own expense.
• Maintaining community ties and livelihoods. One of the key learnings from previous programming was that geo-
graphically spread-out shelter works, especially for empty shelters, created a problem for evicted beneficiaries by forcing 
them to move to a new neighbourhood, severing ties with their communities and threatening their livelihoods. The 
neighbourhood approach was specifically designed to overcome th s.
www.shelterprojects.org
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CRISIS
Syrian Refugee crisis in Lebanon,
2011-ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
1.04 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon 
(Source: Syria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2017).
PROJECT LOCATIONS Bekaa and Akkar regions, Lebanon.
BENEFICIARIES 2,346 households (11,608 individuals: 3,259 
boys; 3,005 girls; 2,301 men and 3,043 women).
PROJECT OUTPUTS
2,346 insulation kits distributed (set of 
roofing nails, carpentry hammer, stanley knife, insu-
lation adhesive tape, 2 insulation foil and foam rolls 
- 30x2m, instruction sheet and content list)
MATERIALS COST USD 229 per household.
PROJECT COST USD 295 per household.
OUTCOME
INDICATOR
80% of vulnerable children and families reporting 
improvements in thermal comfort in their shelters. 
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PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project provided fire-retard nt insulation kits and weatherproofing to over 2,300 refugee households in informal settle-
ments and incomplete dwellings. The kits provided thermal comfort, enhanced health outcomes and decreased fuel consump-
tion, without adding to the fire hazard
STRENGTHS
+ Significant improvement to living conditions, effective weather-
proofing and fire hazard mitigatio
+ Buy-in and high beneficiary satisfaction
+ Adaptable kits.
+ Significant saving on fuel
+ Speed and scalability of the intervention.
+ Additional support provided for vulnerable cases.
WEAKNESSES
- Inadequate fixing tems in some cases. 
- Communication issues with beneficiaries
- Part of the winter window was missed due to procurement delays.
- Adequate insulation material was not available locally.
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PROJECT AREAS
Jun 2015: Approval of insula-
tion materials by the Minis-
try of Social Affairs
Nov 2015: Mapping assess-
ment in all informal settle-
ments in East Akkar and 
North and Central Bekaa
Dec 2015: Start of procure-
ment of insulation foam from 
China
Aug 2015: Insulation kit pilot 
project in informal settle-
ment
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CONTEXT
For more background information on the situation and shelter 
response in Lebanon, see overview A.29.   
Since the start of the Syrian crisis, a significant proportion of the 
population in Lebanon has been living in poverty, concentrated 
in the impoverished North of the country and the Bekaa region. 
With over one million Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon, 
the government’s refusal to establish camps (fearing that they 
would turn in permanent settlements) has been particularly det-
rimental for those in mountainous areas, such as North Lebanon 
and Bekaa (which hosted the bulk of the displaced population).
Lebanon’s weather conditions can be extreme, and vary 
throughout the year. Winter usually begins in November and 
lasts until March, bringing rain, snow and a significant drop in 
temperatures. The North of the country and Bekaa valley expe-
rience particularly harsh conditions, with even colder tempera-
tures and snow in the mountains and at higher elevations.
Socio-economic vulnerabilities, substandard accommodation 
and exposure to winter conditions have had severe impacts on 
households, making adequate shelter especially important.
NORTH 
LEBANON
SOUTH 
LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB 
REPUBLIC
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NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY 
In the absence of formal refugee camps, the sector lead 
agency, in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
in coordination with other international organizations and na-
tional NGOs, has implemented a number of integrated shelter 
interventions. Although shelter assistance is provided all-year 
round, there has been a focus on providing vulnerable house-
holds with weatherproofing kits to help withstand the harsh 
winter months. There are five kits provided as part of shelter 
winterization interventions: Sealing off kit (for unfinished hous-
es), Light repair kit (plastic sheeting), Medium repair kit, Heavy 
repair kit / New arrival kit, and Insulation kit.
PILOT PROJECT  
In early June 2015, the Ministry of Social Affairs approved the 
installation of insulation materials within informal settlements. 
In August 2015, the organization piloted a winterization pro-
ject, upon request of the sector lead agency. The aim was to 
develop a technical intervention that could support the Shel-
ter Working Group and shelter actors in the field, give recom-
mendations on winterization solutions and improve protection 
against the elements more generally. Two insulation foams 
were used: 1) Expanded polyethylene insulation foam (EPE), 
foil faced on both sides; and 2) Cross-linked polyethylene in-
sulation foam (XPE), foil on one side and white PE film on the 
other. Both reflect radiant energy and act as effective barriers 
against moisture, air currents and vapours, protecting from 
both hot summer temperatures and wet and cold winter con-
ditions. The second option achieved better results and was 
therefore chosen for the subsequent phases.
The pilot project demonstrated that the installation of insu-
lation provided physical protection from the harsh weather, 
improving the thermal conditions inside shelters. Testing car-
ried out in the summer indicated that indoor temperatures 
differed on average by 5°C from the outdoors. Once the pilot 
results were analysed, the organization decided to include 
the insulation kits in its weatherproofing interventions
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
An informal settlement mapping assessment was carried 
out, using the Inter-Agency Mapping Platform, in all informal 
settlements in East Akkar and North and Central Bekaa. This 
tool has been used by partners on the ground to collect infor-
mation of all informal settlements on a bi-monthly basis. The 
information was then used to coordinate humanitarian activ-
ities in these informal settlements. Partners were assigned 
areas of implementation, to ensure there were no overlaps 
or gaps in interventions. Coordination also ensured effective 
targeting of the most vulnerable households.
Informal settlements in Bekaa and Akkar (at altitudes higher 
than 800m above sea level) were prioritized for this project, 
based on a combination of needs (most vulnerable to the 
harsh, wet and cold winter conditions), gaps in assistance 
and the organization’s operational coverage. A blanket ap-
proach was used in these areas, for equity reasons and 
staff security, as well as to mitigate any possible tension 
between households in the informal settlements. A total of 
11,608 individuals were targeted for insulation support – 
across 48 informal settlements, in 17 villages in East Akkar 
and 127 informal settlements, in Central and North Bekaa. 
Within these relatively large areas, cadastral zones were 
prioritized on the basis of community-level vulnerability, as 
defined by the inter-agency mapping tool
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION   
The project was implemented directly – and distributions car-
ried out – in partnership with key actors, including the sector 
lead agency and partners.
A total of 37 project staff implemented the project: seven 
technical staff, 20 unskilled distribution support staff and 10 
drivers. As part of distribution, field staff explained programme 
selection criteria and the technical guidance (needed to install 
the insulation) to recipients. Each kit contained a toolbox and 
two rolls of insulation foam that can cover 60m2. 
Participant feedback mechanisms allowed beneficiaries to 
evaluate the programme and contribute to its ongoing im-
provement. Regular and timely communication of relevant in-
formation was vital to maximize participation of all stakehold-
ers and benefici ries. A monitoring, evaluation, accountability 
and learning specialist team also monitored project indicators, 
through the organization’s Post-Distribution Monitoring tool.
FIRE RISK MITIGATION    
An increasing number of fire incidents, injuries and fatalities 
have been reported in informal settlements and substandard 
buildings. Contributing factors range from heating practices 
to electrical wires being exposed to the rain during the winter, 
whilst in the summer incidents are due to dry materials and 
melting of electric wires. These factors are further compound-
ed by the use of high fire-loading building materials, such as 
wooden frames, plastic, cardboard and hardboard sheeting, 
used to construct shelters in informal settlements. This led to 
the decision to use a fire retardant insulating foam
PROCUREMENT   
The insulating foam was procured from China, as no insula-
tion material available in country met the minimum stand-
ards outlined by the sector. Procurement was undertaken in 
January, once funding had been secured, and the lead time 
required 60 days from production to delivery, delaying imple-
mentation and causing the project to miss coverage for part of 
the winter. However, as the insulation kits were intended to be 
used all-year round, this was not detrimental overall.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT   
In September 2015, following the successful pilot project, the 
Shelter Working Group adopted the insulation kits as part 
of the winterization component of the integrated Leba-
non Crisis Response Plan. The main agencies active in the 
country have since distributed the insulation kits.
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The insulation foam was to be applied to both walls and ceilings, and in some 
cases people were creative and made decorations out of the same material.
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People installed the insulation foam to reduce the heat loss, which generally 
tends to be higher through the ceiling/roof and the floor/groun .
The foam was applied to walls and ceiling, while mats and pillows were used to 
insulate the floo . This achieved a full insulation of the shelter, which ensured a 
significant reduction of the heat loss during the winte , as well as good perfor-
mance during the summer.
Before installation of the insulation kits, poor quality plastic sheeting and other 
temporary materials, such as cardboard, were commonly used in most of the 
shelters targeted by this project.
STRENGTHS
+ Significant improvement to living conditions and ef-
fective weatherproofing. The insulation kits were one of the 
most significant improvements made to shelters, with 84% of 
sampled households reporting their living conditions having 
greatly improved as a result of installing the kits. The main 
added value was the improved thermal comfort during both 
winter and summer seasons. Some beneficiaries also report-
ed that the presence of insects decreased.
+ Buy-in and beneficiary satisfaction. Post-Distribution 
Monitoring reports indicated that 94% of beneficiaries installed 
the kits fully, and the remaining 6% partially. In some cases, 
refugees took initiative to use the insulation to improve their 
homes in alternative ways. 95% of households expressed sat-
isfaction regarding the quality of the kit received.
+ The kits are adaptable and can be utilized within shelters 
or incomplete buildings. 
+ Significant saving on fuel. Heat loss calculations showed 
that the insulating foam can lead to significant heating sav-
ings, of up to USD 150 per household.
+ Speed and scalability of the intervention. A large num-
ber of shelters can be insulated in a short period of time.
+ Fire hazard mitigation. The use of fire retardant insulation 
foam ensured the intervention was not adding to the fire haz-
ard in the makeshift homes. 
+ Additional support provided to install the kits. Due to 
their high vulnerability, some families required additional sup-
port, which was provided by skilled daily workers, hired spe-
cifically for these cases
WEAKNESSES
- The items provided to fix the insulation were not al-
ways adequate. Roofing nails provided in the kits were in 
some cases too long and pierced through the timber into the 
covering plastic. The insulation in some cases was difficult to 
secure adequately, due to adhesive tape becoming loose. This 
was due mostly to the irregular surface of walls and ceilings.
- Communication issues. A combination of tips sheets (in-
cluding pictures) and verbal instructions were used during 
distribution. However, community sessions explaining the 
benefits of the kit and the best practices for installation were 
observed to be more effective.
- Lack of locally available insulation material that met 
minimum standards outlined by the sector.
- Part of the winter window was missed due to procure-
ment lead times that caused delays in the project. However, 
the kits were intended to be used for both summer and winter 
conditions.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• The insulation was one of the most significant improvements made to shelters. The installation of insulation foam 
on walls and ceilings in contact with the outside led to an indoor temperature decrease of 5°C during the summer, 
on average. In the winter, the indoor temperature was 4°C higher than the outdoors, on average.
• Beneficiaries attempted to resolve the lack of adequate fixing items by using other methods, for example screws, shorter 
nails and staples. As a result, the content of the kit was revised as part of following procurement and distributions, to 
ensure that a variety of nail sizes and lengths would be included.
www.shelterprojects.org
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
The situation in Iraq has been unstable for several years for 
both the internal conflict and the impacts of the Syrian cri-
sis. The shelter response has taken a range of approach-
es, from mobile assistance for populations on the move, to 
a variety of interventions for displaced, host communities, 
refugee and returnee caseloads in multiple settlement situa-
tions, including camps, which have been the preferred form 
of assistance from the government. Integrated programming, 
protection and accessibility considerations have become es-
sential in responding to such protracted crisis.
IRAQ 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
CRISIS
Conflicts in the Syrian Arab 
Republic and Iraq provoking 
protracted cross-border and internal 
displacement, 2012-onwards.
PEOPLE AFFECTED1
4.4 million in need1  
3.1 million IDPs2 
1.3 million returnees2
228,894 Syrian refugees
in Iraq (74,984 families)3
PEOPLE SUPPORTED 
BY THE RESPONSE4
(2014-2016) 
597,841 households (NFIs).
201,682 households (Shelter 
assistance).
Aug 2014: The UN declares a Level 3 Emergency in Iraq.
Jan 2015: 2.2 million Iraqis have been displaced from their homes 
since the start of 2014.
May 2015: Military operations in Tikrit create some displacement, 
but also allow returns to commence.
Jul 2015: The Anbar offensive commences, with 100,000 people dis-
placed over the following six months.
Sep 2015: Cholera outbreak lasts until November 2015.
Oct 2015: Heavy rain and flooding creates additional displacement
Jan 2016: 3.2 million Iraqis have been displaced since January 2014, 
50% in Anbar, Baghdad and Dohuk governorates. 400,000 people have 
been able to return home. Procurement, planning and prepositioning 
begin, as plans for the Mosul offensive are shared with the Human-
itarian Sector.
Oct 2016: The Mosul offensive starts; mass displacement prompts 
humanitarian actors to scale up emergency preparedness and re-
sponse plans.
Dec 2016: 121,158 people displaced due to the Mosul crisis by the 
end of the year, and increasing5.
1
2
3
8
7
6
4
9
5
2015 2016
2012
1 SHNO / HRP 2017.
2 2017 HRP Advanced Executive Summary, http://bit.ly/2iCMO24.
3 UNHCR (30 November 2016).
4 Data reported to the Shelter Cluster, as of December 2016.
5 Displacement Tracking Matrix factsheet # 10.
3 4 5 6 7 8
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SYRIAN AND IRAQ CRISES 
Map based on Iraq Humanitarian Needs Overview 2016. Severity of needs has 
been calculated on: proportion of displaced people compared to the population of 
Iraq; proportion of displaced people to host governorate population; percentage 
of displaced people living in critical shelter arrangements.
Camps have been established in Iraq since 2013 to host Syrian refugees.
AUG
2014
DEC
21 9
For projects in Iraq or similar approaches see:  
Shelter Projects 2011-2012, A.16 and A.17: Lebanon, on shel-
ter repairs/upgrades and sealing off.
Shelter Projects 2013-2014, A.13 and A.14: Lebanon, on seal-
ing off kits; and on multisector, mixed modality interventions.
Shelter Projects 2013-2014, A.9: Iraq, on cash/voucher pro-
grammes for shelter maintenance.
Shelter Projects 2015-2016, A.34, A.35 and A.36: Iraq, on repairs 
of damaged homes and religious buildings; on accessibility up-
grades in camps; and on resettlement of IDPs to a planned site.
SYRIAN 
ARAB 
REPUBLIC
TURKEY
SAUDI
ARABIA
KUWAIT
IRAN
JORDAN
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BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS
Against the background of the ongoing Syrian crisis as it 
entered its fifth year, Iraq’s internal conflict against armed 
opposition groups has resulted in a protracted crisis that 
has left almost 3.2 million people displaced. The economic 
crisis has seen a 40% drop in oil revenues, resulting in the 
collapse of the social protection floor across the country and 
seriously compromising the ability of communities to access 
basic services, maintain incomes and meet everyday needs. 
Overcrowding, dwindling resources, perceptions of dispropor-
tionate assistance, lack of (or competition for) employment 
opportunities, and continued insecurity threatened to exacer-
bate already fragile ethnic and sectarian tensions across the 
country, particularly as sections of the non-displaced popu-
lation are already in a situation of destitution. By the end of 
2016, it was estimated that over 10 million people in Iraq 
required some form of humanitarian assistance, of whom 
a large proportion were host communities. More broadly, in-
formal settlements increased significantly after 2003, due to 
a shortage of land allocated for housing, lack of services and 
infrastructural investment, corruption and poor governance, 
compounded by significant waves of displacement in 2003 
and 2007-20086.
SHELTER STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES
The Shelter and Non-Food Items (Shelter-NFI) Cluster in Iraq 
was activated in January 2014 to address the IDP crisis, with a 
6 Over one million people were already displaced during these years, accord-
ing to the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration.
Shelter Sector Working Group already established to focus on 
the Syrian refugee response. Given that many host commu-
nities (particularly in northern Iraq and the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq) were composed of a mix of vulnerable non-displaced, 
refugee and IDP families living in similarly substandard shelter 
and settlement conditions within proximity of each other, the 
Shelter-NFI Cluster merged to consider both IDP and ref-
ugee responses in this mixed crisis.
In parallel to allowing longer-term displaced families achieve 
and maintain adequate shelter, agencies in Iraq have also had 
to prepare for regular waves of new displacement across 
the country, as the active conflict continued. This required 
a phased and incremental approach, covering emergen-
cy, post-emergency and early recovery activities, often in 
the same locations during the same timeframe. Building on 
the national strategy set out by the Ministry of Migration and 
Displacement, the Shelter-NFI Cluster in Iraq set out the re-
sponse strategy in the following three packages: 1) first-line
response to address the emergency shelter needs of the 
newly displaced; 2) second-line response to upgrade shelter 
for existing IDPs in critical need; and 3) full-cluster response 
to maintain shelter for the most vulnerable and support rap-
id return. However, due to the scale of emergency needs, 
funding for first-line, and sometimes second-line responses, 
has had to be prioritized over the longer-term responses. For 
2017, the strategic objectives also included: replenish core 
households items (second-line) and expand shelter and hous-
ing options for vulnerable households, according to standards 
(full-cluster).
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Sealing-off kits were distributed as one of the shelter response options. IDPs live in a variety of conditions, including in rented accommodation, collective centres 
(such as schools) and spontaneous, self-settled, sites. Most of the displaced population (both refugees and IDPs) lives outside of camps.
“Transit camps” with tents as a temporary measure were initially established for temporary accommodation of the influx of Syrian refugees. These grew in number
and size over time, and structures were partially upgraded. The number of refugees was only a fraction of the total number of people displaced (IDPs and returnees).
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 OUT-OF-CAMP  
While the preferred response option for the authorities in Iraq 
has been the establishment of formal, planned, camps for both 
refugees and IDPs, 62% of the Syrian refugee population6 and 
86% of the IDP population7 across the country have been liv-
ing outside of camps within the host community, though there 
has been insufficient focus on their needs and conditions. As 
the crisis in Iraq continued, greater efforts towards support-
ing self-reliance, sustainability and building resilience 
has become increasingly urgent. This had to be addressed 
within affected populations, as well at the administrative level 
through local authorities.
As of December 2016, 45% of the displaced population were 
in rented accommodation (including hotels), facing increas-
ing financial pressure, as a result of saturation in the rental 
market and high rental costs, leading to greater vulnerability – 
and particularly a risk of eviction – as resources were depleted 
and families fell into debt. In addition, the ability to rent private 
accommodation did not necessarily correlate with achieving ad-
equate shelter, with 17% of families living in what was con-
sidered “critical shelter” types – unfinished or abandoned 
buildings, schools or religious buildings and informal settle-
ments8. A main approach of cluster partners working outside of 
the camp context has been to improve shelter alongside se-
curing tenure, while coordinating closely with WASH, CCCM 
and Cash and Livelihoods actors, to ensure displaced families 
do not fall into deteriorating shelter and settlement situations 
over time. Therefore, the shelter response had to adopt a holis-
tic and cross-sector approach towards meeting complex, multi-
faceted, needs outside of camp settings, over a longer duration.
Approaches have included combinations of the following:
• Standardized and complementary Mobile or Basic 
Emergency Shelter Kits (ESK) and Mobile or Basic 
NFI Kits, to respond to anticipated new and large-scale 
6 3RP, 2016-2017.
7 Shelter-NFI Cluster Factsheet, September 2016.
8 See case study A.34 for an example of a repairs project in these shelter types.
REFUGEES 
IDPs 
RETURNEES 
Mobile assistance packages 
for people on the move 
 
COMMUNAL SETTINGS 
DISPERSED SETTINGS 
Formal / planned camps 
Collective centres 
Spontaneous sites 
Including self-settled camps 
Hosted accommodation 
Rented accommodation 
SETTLEMENT OPTIONS  
[1] MOBILE NFI KIT  
 
[2] MOBILE EMERGENCY
     SHELTER KIT (MESK)   
 
 
 
[A] TEMPORARY CAMPS / 
      TRANSIT SITES
 
[B] CONSTRUCTION OF TENT -
      FREE CAMPS
 
[C] UPGRADING OF TRANSIT SITES
      TO TENT - FREE CAMPS
 
[D] CAMP INFRASTRUCTURE
[3] BASIC NFI KIT
 
[4] BASIC EMERGENCY SHELTER 
      KIT (BESK)
 
[5] EMERGENCY SEALING OFF 
      KIT (ESOK)
 
[6] FULL SEALING OFF
[7] REHABILITATION AND DURABLE 
       UPGRADE
 
 
POPULATIONS  
IN NEED  
TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
Diagram summarizing the main types 
of assistance by settlement typology
MAIN TYPES OF SHELTER ASSISTANCE IN IRAQ
[1] MOBILE NFI KIT
USD 100-120 per kit
Non-shelter-grade plastic sheeting, blan-
kets, Mylar blankets, spoons, forks, cups, 
bowls, deep plates, basic First Aid Kit, so-
lar lantern, hand-crank torch, collapsible 
jerry can, duct tape, rope, wet wipes, bag 
[2] MOBILE EMER-
GENCY SHELTER 
KIT (MESK)
USD 60-80 per kit 
One woven bag containing: 2 x tarpaulin 
(shelter-grade); 1 x rope (30m); 1 x wire 
(5m); 0.5kg x roofing nails; 0.5kg x wire 
nails; 1 x claw hammer; 1 x shovel; 10 x 
tent pegs 
[3] BASIC NFI KIT
USD 220-260 per kit 
(including supplemental 
seasonal support)  
Shelter-grade tarpaulin, blankets (possible to 
replace with sheets in summer), mattresses, 
hygiene kit (30 day), kerosene or gas cooker, 
kitchen set, solar lantern, water jerry can
[4] BASIC EMER-
GENCY SHELTER 
KIT (BESK)
USD 80-100 per kit 
One woven bag containing: 2 x tarpaulin 
(shelter-grade); 4 x timber lengths or poles 
(2.3m); 1 x rope (30m); 1 x wire (5m); 
0.5kg x roofing nails; 0.5kg x wire nails; 1 
x claw hammer; 1 x shovel; 10 x tent pegs
[5] EMERGENCY 
SEALING OFF KIT 
(ESOK)
USD 250-300 per kit 
Select items and quantities to form a kit 
within cost envelope in response to needs 
assessment at each location: 
(1) Construction materials: tarpaulin and 
plastic sheeting, square cut timbers, other 
framing material, plywood sheeting, fixing  
and rope, sealants and adhesives, metal 
straps and angles, insulation materials
(2) Personal and site safety equipment
(3) Tools
[6] FULL SEALING 
OFF
BoQs and technical design led by agency,
implemented by beneficiary families with 
supervision or by hired contractors. Includes 
more durable sealing off measures such 
as insulation, PVC windows and doors, 
and roof repair 
[7] REHABILITA-
TION AND DURA-
BLE UPGRADE
Repair of existing shelters (e.g. unfinished
and abandoned buildings) and/or installation 
of good quality shelter or settlement level in-
terventions that address priority issues identi-
fied through technical assessments of shelter 
safety and adequacy.  Security of tenure and 
scope of works confirmed through signed 
agreements with legal owner. The Shelter 
Cluster works very closely with the HLP 
Sub-Cluster to develop robust guidelines on 
how to ensure that HLP issues are addressed 
and do not become barriers for the upgrades. 
All partners follow the same process.
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displacement, aiming to address emergency, life-saving, 
needs in a variety of potential transit, non-camp and 
camp-like settings.
• Sealing-off shelters through distribution of sealing-off 
kits or implemented sealing-off activities. Inter-agency joint 
methodologies and mobile site monitoring by CCCM 
teams have been developed to ensure site, shelter & 
settlement, WASH and protection (including HLP/tenure 
security) issues are addressed.
• Development of Emergency Sealing-Off Kits (ESOK) 
for rapid distribution in the case of a large influx, returns, 
or for climatization measures. 
• Repair, rehabilitation and “durable upgrades” of collec-
tive centres and unfinished / abandoned buildings, includ-
ing the installation of appropriate shelter-level water and 
sanitation facilities, as part of shelter actors’ responsibility. 
• Phased and incremental approaches towards collective 
centres, unfinis ed and abandoned buildings and spon-
taneous sites transitioning to more formally managed set-
tlements. These include sealing-off (often non-structural, 
for climatization purposes), followed by rehabilitation and 
durable upgrades to ensure protection against climate in 
the short term, while longer-term shelter needs are ad-
dressed comprehensively.
• Tenure security and incentives have been integrated 
through negotiated bi- or tri-partite agreements between 
beneficiar , land or building owner, and sometimes with 
local authorities and/or the agency. For example, in ex-
change for allowing a displaced family to remain in a house 
with set rent levels and duration, durable upgrading works 
to the property (such as installing windows and doors, or 
bathrooms) would be undertaken. Cash-for-Rent and other 
cash-based programming have also been piloted. 
• Community construction activities, such as Quick Impact 
Projects, to support over-stretched public services in host 
communities with large populations of refugees and IDPs, 
often engaging Cash-for-Work or skills-building modalities. 
WITHIN CAMPS
In some locations, shelters have been established from the 
start in so-called “permanent” (or “tent-free”) camps with 
concrete slabs, kitchens and bathrooms, or planned as tran-
sitional settlements with prefabricated composite panel car-
avans forming single-family dwelling units. In other areas, 
where “transit camps” were initially established for tempo-
rary accommodation of the influx of Syrian refugees, a pro-
cess of transformation and shelter upgrading has been un-
derway since 2014. Tents as temporary, emergency shelter 
solutions have been phased out and replaced with more du-
rable shelters. 
A key aspect of camp activities has been installing, upgrad-
ing and maintaining camp infrastructure, from public ser-
vice facilities, educational buildings and recreation areas, to 
roads, electrical connections and drainage. Close working re-
lationships with WASH and CCCM actors have been required, 
in order to coordinate both hardware and software compo-
nents, with increasing coordination and engagement with lo-
cal authority counterparts, as management of camps and their 
associated infrastructure and service provision was handed 
over to primary duty-bearers. Although rules vary between 
camps, single-storey construction (masonry or using mixed 
materials) has been permitted, resulting in the stabilization of 
the areas as settlements.
SYRIAN REFUGEE RESPONSE
Refugees and IDPs comprised 25% of the total population of 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in 2016. A spike in arrivals 
of Syrian refugees came in August 2013, with a subsequent 
influx in late 2014. The majority of Syrian refugees entered 
the KRI. As of December 2016, around 39% resided in one 
of ten camps established from 2013, with the remaining 61% 
of refugees living outside of camps, in host communities. The 
refugee population remained largely stable, with movement 
into and out of camps characterizing population movements 
in some areas, alongside migration to Europe and other coun-
tries.
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Unfinished buildings were occupied by some people. Where agreem nts were possible with landowners, repairs, light or durable upgrades were made. In some 
cases, frame tents or sealing-off kits were provided.
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Throughout 2015 and 2016, the refugee camps have moved 
into a period of significantly reduced involvement of human-
itarian actors, accompanied by an increased role for the 
government authorities, through mentorship, capacity de-
velopment and partnership programmes. For this, a Joint 
Crisis Centre was established by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government in 2015, to continue coordination of responses. 
Enhancement of livelihoods remained a key focus of resil-
ience-building amongst the refugee population and within 
host communities, which have struggled to cope with the in-
flux of both refugees and IDPs since 2014
INTEGRATED PROGRAMMING
The needs encountered by the newly displaced, those expe-
riencing multiple and/or prolonged displacement, returnees, 
host and non-displaced communities have been of large scale 
and complexity. This has made necessary to trial ways to 
effectively integrate sectors, for reasons of stimulating 
longer-term impacts, cost-effectiveness and sometimes due 
to changing security and access situations. Examples include:
• Encouraging the use of conditional and multipurpose 
cash-based modalities for shelter and NFI activities.
• Shelter activities include installation or repair of house-
hold-level and shared water and sanitation facilities; 
WASH cluster partners could then more effectively focus 
on addressing the high needs of community-level net-
works and municipal systems.
• Development of referral databases and staff sensitization 
across the sectors (particularly between Shelter, WASH, 
CCCM and Protection), to refer potential issues rapidly 
to relevant counterparts.
• Mobile site monitoring (or CCCM) teams roving between 
settlements to monitor conditions, identify issues and en-
gage or follow up with responsible agencies. 
• Combining NFI distributions with sealing-off kit dis-
tributions, assessments and information dissemination.
• Training beneficiary and host community households 
in basic safety and construction, using emergency shelter 
kits and sealing-off kits, complemented by training in fir  
prevention and fire-fighting by CCCM actor  
• Hiring local labour and residents to install shelter and 
WASH facilities, with training in operation and maintenance 
to ensure shelters and settlements remain in serviceable 
condition and to strengthen a sense of ownership.
PROTECTION, ACCESSIBILITY AND INCLUSION
The crisis in Iraq has been called “a protection crisis” and re-
quired to address the challenges faced by persons with spe-
cial needs, supporting the security of women and girls within 
the household and settlement (often in very overcrowded 
conditions), and ensuring that health and safety considera-
tions are woven through physical interventions, as well as in 
use and behaviour of beneficiaries. Shelter actors have been 
active in attempting to mainstream protection through:
• Using sealing-off and upgrading activities for partition-
ing, segregation or fire compartmentalization, to pro-
vide more culturally acceptable, safe and secure shelter 
and settlements.
• Participating in gender-based violence and safety au-
dits, to identify critical areas at shelter and site level.
• Awareness-raising campaigns with displaced communities 
on electrical and fire safety, fire prevention and fire fighting
• Adapting shelter improvements to meet both physical 
and cultural needs, and facilitating the role of carers9.6
• Developing “Quality of Life” indicators, in addition to 
technical assessments, and furthering consideration 
of accessibility through multiple sectors.
• Designing mobile, agile and rapid response packages, 
to deliver assistance on the move, in temporary situations, 
scattered across dispersed host communities or wide geo-
graphical areas, and in insecure or inaccessible areas.
LOOKING FORWARD
Prior to the start of the Mosul offensive by the Iraqi govern-
ment on 17 October 2016, partners prepared for the expected 
displacement by pre-positioning standardized NFI and shelter 
kits and building camps. Once the offensive started and villag-
es and districts of Mosul became accessible, partners moved 
in to provide first-line critical shelter and NFI assistance. Dur-
ing this period, temperatures dropped to below freezing, with 
heavy rain and snow. 
As of early 2017, the East of Mosul was largely taken back 
from the so-called Islamic State, and the focus was shifting 
to the West, which prompted Shelter partners to pre-position 
items and prepare camps again, as well as facilitating safe 
and voluntary return to the regained areas. The Cluster and its 
partners were also working very closely with the authorities, to 
ensure gaps were filled and to avoid duplication.
9 See case study A.35, on accessibility upgrades in camps
www.shelterprojects.org
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IDP and refugee camps, in some cases, initially consisted of emergency shelter solutions (e.g. tents), which have been gradually replaced by more durable shelters.
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IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2 PDM
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1
2016
Sep 2015: 3.19 million internally displaced persons and 370,000
returnees in Iraq.
Mid-Sep 2015 and Mid-Mar 2016: On-the-job training conducted for 
host community and IDPs on rehabilitation works, by the organiza-
tion’s engineers and contractor’s skilled workers.
Mid-Dec 2015 and Mid-Jun 2016: Upgrade and repair of damaged wa-
ter and sewer pipes and septic tanks completed.
Mid-Mar 2016 and Mid-Sep 2016: Construction of internal partitions, 
plastering, roof leaks repair, electrical rewiring, repair of damaged 
concrete floo , installation of protection perimeter fencing completed.
End-Sep 2016: Awareness sessions on hygiene promotion, electrical 
safety and fire protection. Handover to host communities / bene ciaries.
Mid-Oct 2016: Post Distribution Monitoring, Quality Control and M&E 
Assessment completed. Project close.
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KEYWORDS: Housing repair / retrofitting, Religious buildings upgrade, Training, Guidelines
CRISIS Armed conflict in Iraq since January 2014
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
Approx. 70-80% of the private houses 
owned by returnee families were majorly or 
partially damaged due to the conflict in the regio  
(Source: OCHA).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
3.1 million IDPs in Iraq 
(Source: 2017 HRP Advanced Executive Summary).
1.3 million returnees (Ibid.).
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Salah al-Din, Baghdad, Najaf, Kerbala, Wassit, 
Qadissiya, Babylon and Diyala governorates
BENEFICIARIES 2,278 households (13,028 individuals).
PROJECT OUTPUTS
300 religious buildings upgraded.
400 returnees damaged homes rehabilitated.
RIO NAPO
SYRIAN 
ARAB 
REPUBLIC
TURKEY
SAUDI
ARABIA
KUWAIT
IRAN
JORDAN
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The project assisted 2,278 displaced and returnee families to rehabilitate and/or reconstruct damaged and deteriorating 
shelter structures. Rehabilitation prioritized infrastructure upgrades of religious buildings (Husseinyas) and other critical 
shelter arrangements, including the damaged houses of returnees. The interventions included the construction of internal 
wall partitioning, WASH and electrical upgrades, replacing damaged roofing and mino  structural repairs.
STRENGTHS
+ Protection measures for the most vulnerable.
+ Provided work opportunities to IDPs and host community.
+ Effective communication with local government and partners.
+ Completion of works ahead of schedule and high beneficiary satisfaction.
+ Publication of a step-by-step guidelines booklet.
WEAKNESSES
- Procurement from outside target areas delayed the project.
- Inaccuracies in cost estimations due to price fluctuations
- Issues in contractor pre-qualification exercise and evaluation process.
- Insufficient capacity-building for staff, in the supervision of shelter-
related projects.
- Project management approach was not always consistent with other 
programmes.
KERBALA
QADISSIYA
BABYLON
BAGHDAD
SALAH
AL-DIN
NAJAF
WASSIT
DIYALA
SHELTER SIZE 21m2 floor space for each family (3.5m2 per person for 6 people per family).
MATERIALS COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
Religious buildings rehabilitation: USD 840 per household (USD 4,200 per building). 
Damaged house rehabilitation: USD 1,540. 
PROJECT COST
PER HOUSEHOLD
Religious buildings rehabilitation: USD 1,200 per household (Total: USD 6,000 per building). 
Damaged house rehabilitation: USD 2,200. 
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CONTEXT
For more background on the Iraq crisis and shelter responses, 
see overview A.33.
As of September 2015, the organization identified a total of 
91,440 displaced families (an estimated 548,640 individuals) 
who lived in critical shelter arrangements, such as schools, re-
ligious buildings, informal settlements and unfinished or aban-
doned buildings. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in critical 
shelter arrangements were extremely vulnerable, with little pro-
tection from the harsh weather conditions (below 0°C during the 
coldest months and above 50°C during the summer). Further-
more, IDPs in these shelters generally suffered from inadequate 
WASH conditions, health services, as well as educational and 
employment opportunities. Multiple displacements were com-
mon, causing long-term instability and vulnerability for IDP fam-
ilies. Furthermore, IDPs were increasingly difficult to access, 
caught behind front lines, or held at security screening centres. 
SITUATION DURING THE CRISIS / NEEDS ANALYSIS 
Since 2015, IDP families from the districts of Iraq that were re-
cently liberated by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and/or Kurdish 
Peshmerga, have slowly returned to their area of origin (12,784 
families as of September 2016). However, many of these return-
ee families have found their homes damaged and in need of ur-
gent rehabilitation or repair. Therefore, the organization targeted 
these families in the Central Belt of Iraq with shelter assistance, 
to aid in the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of partially dam-
aged private homes. According to the Displacement Tracking 
Matrix (DTM), more than 16,000 families were living in religious 
buildings called “Husseinyas”, or Shiite prayer halls, primarily 
within the central governorates of Kerbala, Najaf, Qadissiya and 
Wassit2. Religious buildings were classified as a critical shelter 
arrangement, as they failed to provide safe living conditions, 
and were not sustainable in the long-term. Furthermore, as the 
prayer halls are open, the majority of Husseinyas lacked ade-
quate partitions, sanitation facilities, household items and other 
infrastructure to meet the specific shelter needs of a growing 
number of IDP families. Consequently, during the Ashura hol-
iday, when thousands of Shiite Pilgrims travel to these areas, 
IDPs were temporarily evicted from the Husseinyas.
SHELTER CLUSTER STRATEGY  
In 2016, the Shelter-NFI Cluster delivered assistance to IDPs 
in varying geographic locations and across all shelter types 
and phases of displacement. The minimum assistance con-
sisted of two components: 1) ensuring sufficient, covered living 
space, which provides thermal comfort, fresh air and protection 
from the climate; and 2) providing critical household and shel-
ter support items. Thus, it supported the upgrade of substand-
ard housing using durable materials, as well as rental support, 
small scale repairs, and phased assistance to host families, 
2 DTM assessments started in mid-2016.
especially for those in critical shelter arrangements. Persons 
returning to partially damaged homes were to be provided with 
shelter and NFI materials, as well as housing, land and property 
rights support. Cash-based, occupant-driven, or owner-driven, 
approaches were encouraged. Sites in the greatest need of 
WASH support were also identified and in general responses 
had to be coordinated with relevant clusters.
This project was initiated after field assessment reports de-
picted the worsening conditions in critical shelter conditions of 
the Central, Northern and Southern regions of Iraq. In coop-
eration with the government and the Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration (MoDM), this project provided shelter rehabilita-
tion and basic repairs and upgrades to waste water, electrical, 
structural and ground upkeep, as well as infrastructure main-
tenance, in line with Cluster objectives. Additionally, the pro-
ject fell under the second line of the humanitarian response 
strategy3.
SITES SELECTION   
Firstly, DTM surveys prioritized three categories: gover-
norate of origin, period of displacement and governorate of 
displacement, within each shelter type. The surveys further 
categorized shelters into districts, family units and sex and 
age disaggregated data for the individuals. DTM reports (in-
clusive of safety audits) and assessment reports from REACH 
captured the unsuitable living conditions of IDPs in informal 
settlements and returnees’ damaged houses. Follow-up fo-
cus groups by shelter technical field staff with vulnerable 
IDPs were also conducted for two rehabilitation work sites. Fi-
nally, safety and living environment assessment audits were 
carried out with rapid shelter assessment forms. A total of 300 
critical shelters (Husseinyas) and 400 damaged houses were 
assessed and recorded. The criteria used regarding the reha-
bilitation needs included WASH plumbing repair and upgrades, 
electrical repairs and upgrades and roof leakage repair.
Before starting the project, the findings were shared with local 
authorities and MoDM for endorsement. Focus group dis-
cussions were held with district representatives, community and 
religious leaders, and formal Memoranda of Understanding – 
specifying the type of rehabilitation works allowed – were signed 
with the owners of the Husseinyas. Work plans, quality control, 
3 Iraq 2016 HRP, http://bit.ly/1U3LFAI.
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The project conducted upgrades in religious buildings hosting IDPs, including 
the addition of partitions between units (here in Kerbala).
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monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports were also prepared, to 
ensure the project’s quality and mitigate delays.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
Project implementation began with a selection exercise of 
residential construction contractors, through an open tender 
advertised in local newspapers and through social media. The 
organization’s technical staff in each governorate were then 
provided basic training in supervising rehabilitation works; the 
shelter team was involved in direct management and quality 
control supervision of the project. IDPs and returnees were se-
lected to take ownership of the project through a participatory 
approach, by engaging in the repairs of the Husseinyas and 
damaged houses. Their involvement contributed to increase 
their skills and provided livelihood opportunities.
The 300 Husseinyas and 400 damaged houses were then 
randomly inspected once again (after project completion) by 
senior shelter engineers, to check the technical quality of the 
interventions, as well as benefici ries’ satisfaction. Post-distri-
bution and assistance monitoring was performed by the M&E 
unit.
COORDINATION    
The organization worked in close coordination with the MoDM, 
the Iraqi Government and the Shelter-NFI Cluster, prioritizing 
governorates based on the influx of IDP arrivals to informal 
and unfinished settlements and buildings. Following the com-
pletion of the generalized surveys, CCCM Cluster partners 
conducted site focused “Red flag” assessments, which cap-
tured “prioritized needs” in rehabilitation, in regards to WASH, 
presence of mines, electrical security, lack of food and NFI, 
as well as other critical needs. In addition to the above men-
tioned tools, shelter partners conducted caseload assessment 
and focus group discussions in each governorate, using the 
shelter assessment form developed by the organization for 
this project. 
Finally, the organization worked closely with all stakeholders 
and humanitarian partners, in referencing each partner’s site 
assessment caseload, in order to avoid duplication. Assess-
ments were shared with Shelter-NFI and WASH partners in 
coordination meetings, as well as with contractors.
ENGAGEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE   
Shelter staff conducted initial focus group discussions with dis-
placed persons, as recommended by representatives from re-
ligious leaders, heads of households and adolescent groups. 
Selected IDPs were provided with on-the-job skills training 
in shelter rehabilitation, such as: WASH plumbing, roofing  
concrete work, wall plastering, painting and basic electrical 
wiring. In addition, community groups were briefed on the 
planned rehabilitation scope for each family unit, specificall  
on dignity, privacy and protection. Post implementation mon-
itoring indicated more than 95% beneficiary satisfaction   
RISK MITIGATION COMPONENTS   
Protection measures were included in the rehabilitation of 
Husseinyas, through partitions for privacy and adequate 
lighting along open corridors and water and sanitation facil-
ities. Separate toilets and bathroom facilities were installed 
for women and men, with adequate lighting along corridors, 
as well as open washing areas. Health and hygiene promo-
tion campaigns were conducted to mitigate the risks of vec-
tor-borne diseases. Finally, awareness-raising campaigns on 
electrical and fire safety and prevention were also delivered
MAIN CHALLENGES   
In addition to infrastructural challenges, several logistical is-
sues were encountered, such as the lack of access through 
military controlled check points into post-conflict liberated 
regions, controlled by separatist Militias. As such, material 
deliveries were frequently disrupted or put on hold for long 
periods. Further, there was a lack of qualified contractors 
with proven track records in building construction, especially 
across Central Iraq. To rectify this, focus group discussions 
were initiated with the local district mayor, religious leaders, 
and militia leaders. This resulted in the organization’s staff 
receiving special access permits (contractors and suppli-
ers) for humanitarian projects. Further, the organization’s site 
engineers provided pre-selected contractors with trainings on 
good construction practices for rehabilitation works.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
This was the first emergency shelter project focusing on re-
habilitation in the region, after the start of the conflict. Ongo-
ing lessons learned from this project, particularly in light of 
the increasing displacement of communities, were utilized 
in the fast-track procurement and contractor selection pro-
cesses, to expedite responses in these emergency environ-
ments. A booklet on rehabilitation works was also produced, 
as an outcome of this project.
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The project repaired damaged homes of returnee families through a variety of works. Here in Salah Al-Din, before (left) and after the upgrades (right).
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The organization produced a step-by-step booklet for rehabilitations and upgrades, as an outcome of this project.
13
Safe Construction : Step by Step Rehabilitation
Before  Rehabilitation
Lack of Protection and Privacy
The family room partition was covered with plastic 
canvas, tarpaulin, and blankets, making women and 
children highly vulnerable.
Protection and privacy provided through internal 
plywood partitions with doors and locksets.
After Rehabilitation
Step one: Step two: Step three: Step four:
•Align plywood wall in
line with straight edge 
along wall corners.
•Install plywood door in
each family bedroom
with privacy lock for
protection.
•Plywood wall partitionis
ready for occupancy.
•Install doors with hinges,
align and test.
•Install and secure 75 mm
plywood along the metal 
frames 
•Use rivets in each
plywood sheet ( 4’ x 8’ /
10.1 cm x 20.3 cm ) in
between metal studs and
secure the plywood wall to
each corner of wall.
•Provide door and ventila-
tion openings in each parti-
tion family room.
•Start ﬂoor layout with
string adjustment for wall 
framing. 
•Tools and materials 
required :
measuring tape, string, 
chalking and straight 
edge (long wood pole) 
for marking.
•Use plumb rule/ plumb 
bob to ensure that 
corners are plumb and 
square. 
•Install Metal Framing
along marked ﬂoor line.
•Secure metal frames in
ﬂoor with cross bracing
support.
•Secure bottom plate by
rivet into ﬂoor.
•Secure each vertical
frame wall.
•Align metal frame with
plumb rule and string.
STRENGTHS
+ Emphasis on protection measures for the most vulnera-
ble (women, girls, sick and disabled persons). 
+ IDP heads of households, as well as adolescent male and 
female members of the family, were provided work oppor-
tunities through: basic skills training in masonry, electrical 
wiring, concreting, plastering and roof repairs.
+ The programme developed effective communication with 
the local government and partner agencies.
+ Field staff received training in project planning and budg-
eting, timeline management and quality controls, before un-
dertaking programme responsibilities. 
+ Rehabilitation projects were completed ahead of schedule 
and with high beneficiary satisfaction
+ Publication of a booklet with step by step guidelines on 
Rehabilitating, Repairing and Upgrading of Critical Shelter 
and Damaged Houses (see snippet above).
WEAKNESSES
- Lack of local building materials and sourcing of items 
outside conflict zones delayed the project, also due to in-
consistencies at military checkpoints on import regulations.
- The organization’s estimates did not match contracted 
projects costs, due to an escalation in building materials and 
transportation costs across different regions in Iraq. Consider-
ation of this cost variations would have expedited the project.
- Issues in contractor pre-qualification exercises and eval-
uation processes resulted in the hiring of contractors who 
were not familiar with international humanitarian standards.
- Insufficient capacity-building for shelter staff in project 
management, specifically in the supervision of shelter-relat-
ed projects. Due to the lack of experienced local contrac-
tors, staff was recruited from other regions. This also caused 
some tensions with local municipalities and residents.
- The technical project management approach was not 
always consistent with other programmes, including other 
shelter and livelihoods initiatives of the organization.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Repair of broken and dysfunctional plumbing was mostly missing in the scope of works (sanitation piping, 
septic tanks, waste water drainages and water supply pipes). The lessons learned workshop revealed major gaps and 
WASH repair and upgrades were included in subsequent rehabilitation works.
• A database of pre-qualified contractors was developed to expedite hiring of competent contractors for various 
projects (including civil infrastructure, building and electrical works).
• Extra capacity-building was needed. A project-management training and a lessons learned workshop were con-
ducted on planning, quality control and construction management, during a retreat with shelter staff.
www.shelterprojects.org
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PLANNING (A)
PLANNING (B)
2015
Project A: Feb 2014, Project B: Aug 2014: Development of social and 
technical assessments and prioritization scoring.
A: Winter 2014, B: Sep 2014: Initial household level technical assess-
ments completed, allowing the creation of a materials database.
A: Early May 2014, B: Dec 2014: Framework Agreements established.
A: May 2014, B: Dec 2014: Recruitment of skilled and unskilled labour.
A: Late May 2014, B: Jan 2015: Works initiated in camps.
A: Jun 2014, B: Jan 2015: Rolling handover of shelters.
Mar 2013: First refugee camp established in KRI for Syrian refugees.
Jan 2014: 213,223 Syrian refugees in Iraq. 95,587 individuals (26,924 
households) live in camps. Conflict begins between the Iraqi forces 
and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. 85,000 people displaced.
Oct 2015: 245,585 Syrian refugees in Iraq. 94,628 live in camps.
3.21 million IDPs in Iraq.
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KEYWORDS: Accessibility, Disabilities, Planned and managed camps, Materials distribution
CRISIS
Syrian conflict, Refugees in Iraq. 
2011-ongoing
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
239,000 Syrian refugees in Iraq (as of 2016)
3.1 million IDPs in Iraq (as of 2016)
213,000 Syrian refugees (January 2014)
85,000 IDPs in Iraq (January 2014)
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Domiz refugee camp, Dohuk Governorate (Project A). 
Kawergosk, Qushtapa, Darashakran, and Ba-
sirma refugee camps, Erbil Governorate (Project B)
PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES
901 households (including 1,047 individuals 
with disabilities). 362 HH in Domiz camp, 157 HH in 
Darashakran camp, 112 HH in Basirma camp, 147 HH in 
Kawergosk camp, and 123 HH in Qushtapa camp
PROJECT OUTPUTS 901 shelters upgraded
MATERIALS COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
USD 350 (average for Project A),
USD 500 (average for Project B).
PROJECT COST PER 
HOUSEHOLD USD 640 (Project A), USD 900 (Project B). Estimated.
RIO NAPO
TURKEY
SAUDI
ARABIA KUWAIT
IRAN
JORDAN
PROJECT SUMMARY   
The programme was carried out in five refugee camps in Iraq in two separate projects, focusing on shelter-related issues spe-
cific to persons with disabilities. The projects upgraded existing shelters and plots and adapted global accessibility standards 
to the camp context and cultural norms of the Middle East. The programme sought to adopt a holistic approach, through 
focusing not only on the individuals with disabilities, but also on the needs of the caregivers.
STRENGTHS
+ Tailored interventions for persons with disabilities.
+ Addressed a gap in accessibility and quality of life in camps.
+ Provided income to assisted households.
+ Challenged teams to think “outside the box”.
+ Pushed the issue of accessibility and upgrades to the forefront of 
discussions.
WEAKNESSES
- Tendency for staff to adopt standardized approaches.
- Fencing off household plots further isolated some households.
- Quality of work carried out by paid labourers varied greatly.
- Difficulty in finding balance between the specific needs and the more 
general household needs.
- Poor communication about targeting and project objectives.
ERBIL
SYRIAN AND IRAQI CONFLICTS
2011
SYRIA
2014
IRAQ
DOHUK
IMPLEMENTATION (A)
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SITUATION IN THE CAMPS
The first camp constructed to host Syrian refugees in the 
Kurdish Region of Iraq was established in March 2013 in 
Dohuk Governorate, with a camp population of approximate-
ly 55,000. In 2014, four additional camps for refugees were 
established in neighbouring Erbil Governorate, with a total 
population of 27,700. In the winter of 2014-2015, 13 camps 
were established for IDPs escaping conflict in Southern and 
Central Iraq.
In early phases, households were principally provided with 
tents as an emergency shelter solution, along with the re-
quired basic camp infrastructure. In the later-established 
camps, there was a greater variety of shelter types, ranging 
from pre-fab shelters to tents on concrete platforms. Con-
currently, an increasing number of camp residents engaged 
in incremental upgrades, using construction materials from 
local markets. Local authorities initially restricted the use 
of “permanent” construction materials (e.g., concrete and 
blocks), though later opened up to their utilization in a con-
trolled manner. In early 2015, the vast majority of shelter 
coverings in the camps were still constructed with soft ma-
terials. This was even more prevalent amongst households 
with individuals with disabilities, as they were less likely to 
have access to resources to improve their shelters.
Prior to implementation, the organization worked with UN 
agencies, local authorities and the refugee community rep-
resentatives, to assess the number of households in need, 
the most common types of disabilities, and the current levels 
of support from other humanitarian actors. Many of the fami-
lies with persons with disabilities reported that the organiza-
tion’s field staff were the first humanitarians to engage 
with them directly, or that they had received no prior assis-
tance addressing their specific needs. When the organiza-
tion was funded for the Erbil project, two other organizations 
also received funding to provide assistance to persons with 
disabilities. All three organizations worked together in 
the identification and provision of assistance. Approxi-
mately 9% of households in the camps of Erbil were found 
to have at least one individual with disabilities. Although 
the types of disability were varied, the most prevalent were 
physical, sensory and cognitive and, in 30% of the cases, 
multiple conditions.
SHELTER SECTOR STRATEGY  
In camp settings, the shelter strategy principally focused on 
four points: land allocation for new camps; expansion of ex-
isting camps; provision of emergency shelter for new arriv-
als; and shelter improvements for refugees in camps prior to 
the influx. The strategy highlighted the general needs of dif-
ferent vulnerable groups, but there was no specific technical 
guidance on shelter construction or upgrading for persons 
with disabilities.
PROJECT GOALS  
This project aimed at improving accessibility in shelters, shel-
ter plots and surroundings in camps, as well as the quality 
of life for individuals with disabilities, through different types 
of upgrades, such as floors, walls, openings and coverings, 
and including access to nearby water and sanitation facili-
ties. It also intended to provide a starting point for incremen-
tally improving accessibility across the camps.
BENEFICIARY SELECTION   
The organization targeted refugee populations in camps in 
Dohuk and Erbil governorates. Domiz camp was initially se-
lected, following a multisectoral needs assessment carried 
out by another organization, which identified gaps in specific
service provision for households with persons with disabilities. 
The camps in Erbil were later identified as having similar gaps. 
IDP camps were not targeted under these projects, though the 
organization had other projects and funding streams which 
targeted the shelter needs of IDPs. 
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Camps were established to accommodate Syrian refugees in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq. Over time, residents and organizations upgraded the shelters 
in the camps. However, many gaps remained in terms of accessibility and mo-
bility throughout the sites. This project tried to address some of these issues.
DISABILITY TYPE - ERBIL CAMPS (%)  
Sensory 
(211)
20
40
60
Cognitive
(133)
Physical
(438)
Other
(45)
Chronic
Illness (99)
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Potential individual beneficiarie  and households were iden-
tified in close coordination with protection agencies, camp 
management and other actors providing services within the 
camps. Following the initial pre-identification process, social 
and technical assessments were carried out at the household 
level and were scored based on weighted vulnerability (both 
socio-economic and technical, as well as severity of disability 
and mobility or quality of life issues). This scoring phase deter-
mined which households were to be assisted, in which order, 
and played a role in defining the unit costs
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
Both skilled and unskilled workers from the camp pop-
ulation were employed to implement the projects. The aim 
was to include one unskilled labourer from each beneficiar  
household as a means to provide a source of income. Each 
project was implemented by a separate team of six to ten 
individuals, supervised by a project coordinator. Area based 
teams worked in pairs, with technical staff focusing on tech-
nical assessments, design solutions and construction mon-
itoring, while household assessments, outreach and moni-
toring were covered by non-technical shelter officers or 
assistants. Materials were delivered to each household and 
works were carried out by labourers at household plots.
Though the construction time was generally brief, the overall 
implementation required multiple visits: an initial social and 
technical assessment, the development of a bill of quantities 
(sometimes this was carried out more than once due to the 
movement or modification of the household structure), regu-
lar supervision of works and follow-up monitoring visits.
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT     
Detailed social and technical assessments were carried out at 
the household level, focusing on the needs and capacities of 
the household member(s) with disabilities and technical shelter 
conditions, as well as general household information. Social 
and technical field staff worked closely with the individual 
with disabilities and their primary caregivers, to identify 
and prioritize specific upgrades to improve mobility and 
quality of life. The teams continued to engage the households 
to ensure that upgrades would be used as intended and met 
the needs of both the individuals and their caregivers. Vis-
its were done jointly with a partner organization carrying out 
WASH upgrades, in order to ensure complementarity of the 
interventions.
Commonly experienced engagement challenges included:
• Eliciting the priorities of the individual beneficiaries when their 
disability prevented them from communicating effectively;
• Balancing the expectations and wishes of the families 
with the issues related specifically to the persons with 
disabilities;
• Observing the shelter and plot to recognize usage pat-
terns, in addition to listening to expressed needs;
• Time required to elicit information from persons with 
special needs and their caregivers;
• Dealing with requests to replace mobility items that were 
outside the project scope and expertise of field sta f;
• In Erbil, targeted assistance led to significant pressure 
from households who did not meet the selection criteria.
COORDINATION    
The organization closely coordinated with other actors imple-
menting shelter and WASH activities in the targeted camps, 
to ensure complementarity and higher impact. At the house-
hold level, the organization focused its efforts on the plot and 
the shelter itself, while another organization aimed to address 
the WASH specific needs. Assessment forms were har-
monized, initial planning was done collaboratively, and 
project managers met regularly to discuss project imple-
mentation. Technical teams jointly carried out the technical 
assessments during implementation, to ensure that all inputs 
were considered when designing the interventions for each 
plot. Additionally, a multisectoral Technical Working Group 
was formed to develop guidelines for accessibility and quality 
of life upgrades in the camp settings of Iraq. Though the final
product was never completed, the working group served as a 
coordination and communication forum, to address some of 
the challenges encountered during implementation.
MAIN CHALLENGES   
There are a number of guidelines at the global level for the 
construction of shelter in emergencies for people with disabili-
ties2. Although the guidance highlights the need to tailor inter-
ventions to each individual’s needs, it includes little regarding 
how this tailoring can be done practically, and at the same 
time how such projects can be scaled up, or streamlined, giv-
en the time and budget constraints often faced by humanitari-
an organizations in the field
Commonly found challenges included:
• Attaching handles to soft tent or plastic sheeting walls 
and working with non-standard self-built shelters, expan-
sions and plots;
• Support for people (or their caregivers) sitting down and 
standing up from the floor;
• Extending supports to the outdoor of the shelters;
• Improving accessibility to latrines on public pathways, in 
between tents in close proximity;
• Improving access points (particularly for tents) for per-
sons with disabilities and their carers;
• Customization versus standardization;
• Redesigning solutions to adapt to new locations, when 
households moved;
2 See, for instance, All Under One Roof, IFRC 2015 (http://bit.ly/2iDTTCT), and 
Guidelines for Creating Barrier-free Emergency Shelters, Handicap International 
2009 (http://bit.ly/2iuB30o).
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The project worked on a variety of upgrades focused on improving the accessibility and Quality of Life of individuals with disabilities. From left to right: Shaded area 
and fencing around prefab shelter. Concrete slab improving wheelchair access. Fold out support railing. Shaded entrance and support posts for better access.
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• Rapid evolution of camps and varying and inconsistent 
rules for shelter upgrading;
• Households uninstalling materials and repurposing them 
for things other than accessibility.
MATERIALS  
Materials were sourced from local vendors, through flexibl  
framework agreements that allowed the organization to pro-
cure most items based on need. Materials were then distrib-
uted to each household according to site-specific BoQs, de-
veloped by the technical staff. While this approach allowed 
for rapid delivery, it also had the unintended consequence of 
pushing the team to work within existing material resources. 
This, at times, hampered creativity in identifying unique solu-
tions to the specific needs of the individuals with disabilitie .
REMARKS AND WIDER IMPACTS  
In their geographical areas of implementation, the projects 
were unique, as they targeted the specific shelter-related 
needs for individuals with disabilities and their caregivers, 
through tailored upgrades. Although these interventions 
reached a relatively small number of households, niche pro-
jects such as this enable to fill gaps created when carrying 
out larger scale standardized interventions (such as the con-
struction of plots/shelter/WASH facilities). Of course, there 
were other vulnerabilities, within the camps, that fell outside 
the scope of this project and have been addressed in follow-
ing projects, by the same and other organizations.
Finally, these camp-based projects served as a basis for ad-
ditional programming, which addressed these same issues 
for households residing out of camps. 
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Works also included mobility upgrades within plots or across the camps. From left to right: Concrete pathway and railing leading from shelter to shared/communal 
latrine. Concrete slab improving wheelchair access. Handrails, concrete stairway and pathway around or between shelter plots.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
STRENGTHS
+ Tailored interventions were implemented, based on com-
prehensive consultations, to address specific and self-identi-
fied needs of persons with disabilities and their caregivers
+ The project addressed a significant gap in accessibili-
ty and quality of life at the household level, existing since the 
establishment of the camps.
+ Short-term income was provided to assisted house-
holds, and additional short-term employment opportunities 
to camp residents.
+ Teams were challenged to think “outside the box” and 
develop innovative solutions to address the specific needs of 
the individuals assisted.
+ The issue of Accessibility and Quality of Life upgrades 
was pushed to the forefront of discussions within coordina-
tion meetings and amongst shelter partners.
WEAKNESSES
- Tendency for staff to adopt standardized (rather than 
tailored) approaches led to inconsistent outcomes, principal-
ly due to time constraints and the feeling to be bound to the 
originally developed material lists.
- Fencing off household plots was a frequent request, to 
keep children with cognitive disabilities from wondering off and 
potentially endangering themselves and others, but it also po-
tentially further isolated such persons from the community.
- The quality of work carried out by paid labourers varied 
greatly; supervising a large number of sites spread over nu-
merous camps posed significant challenges for the team
- The difficulty in finding a balance between the specific
needs of individuals with disabilities and the more general 
needs of the household as a whole.
- Poor communication about targeting and project objec-
tives with the camp community at large. As the project was 
the first in camps using targeted coverage, the communication 
could have been improved, in order to reduce requests for as-
sistance by households that were not within selected groups.LEARNINGS 
• Keep the needs of persons with special needs at the forefront of shelter interventions, from the onset of an emergency.
• Standardized items and materials, available through framework agreements, can impair the development of 
customized solutions to address specific needs, which could instead use items procured outside these agreements.
• The lack of consistent leadership in the Technical Working Group focusing on Shelter and WASH Accessibility, 
led to the final intended product not coming to fruition
• Foster and encourage the lateral thinking and observation skills of team members, in order to identify creative 
solutions for individual needs.
• Provide additional support to staff that are consistently interacting with individuals and households in dire condi-
tions, including early training on engagement with persons with special needs.
www.shelterprojects.org
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CASE STUDY
CONFLICTA.36 / IRAQ 2015-2016 / CONFLICT
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PLANNING PHASE
2016
Nov 2015: Approval and handover of land by the targeted governorates.
May 2016: Completion of construction and infrastructure projects.
Jun 2016: Handover of the IDP sites to the targeted governorates.
End Aug 2016: Relocation of IDPs to the sites completed for first phase.
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3
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IRAQ 2015-2016 / CONFLICT
KEYWORDS: Prefab shelters, Site planning, Infrastructure, Capacity-building, Protection, Gender, Advocacy
CRISIS Conflict, January 2014-ongoing.
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
11 million people in need.
3.1 million IDPs. 
1.2 million returnees1.
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Baghdad, Dohuk, Kerbala, and Missan 
Governorates.
PROJECT
BENEFICIARIES
1,252 IDP families (8,231 individuals, 4,506 female
and 3,725 male), including 145 female-headed house-
holds and 488 physically or mentally impaired individuals.
512 students.
PROJECT OUTPUTS
Four planned sites with infrastructure and services.
1,406 prefabricated shelter units.
25 university classrooms and 128 student 
residential units.
RIO NAPO
TURKEY
SAUDI
ARABIA KUWAIT
IRAN
JORDAN
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project established four durable sites for vulnerable IDPs, equipped with 1,406 prefabricated shelter units accompa-
nied by basic infrastructure and public facilities. It also developed institutional capacity of the targeted governorates and 
introduced guidelines and plans to develop and manage these sites. Additionally, the project provided temporary premises 
(classrooms and accommodation) for 512 students of Fallujah University.
STRENGTHS
+ Close coordination with all actors.
+ Organizational expertise in site planning and construction.
+ Collaboration with other agencies to enhance basic services.
+ Contribution to reduce the emergence of informal settlements and 
mitigate tensions with host communities.
WEAKNESSES
- Initial costs for establishing the sites were high.
- Small percentage of the total needs in the country were covered.
- Uniformly designed prefabricated units reduced costs, but flexible
designs/sizes could have better addressed households’ needs.
MISSAN
IRAQ CONFLICT
JAN 2014
SHELTER SIZE 22.5m2 per shelter unit. SHELTER DENSITY 3.75 m
2 per person 
(Average household size is 6 persons).
MATERIALS COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
USD 5,500 (average)
Dohuk: USD 4,255; Baghdad: USD 6,505; 
Missan: USD 5,987. All including labour.
PROJECT COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
USD 9,621 (including site preparation 
and infrastructure).
DOHUK
IMPLEMENTATION (FIRST PHASE) HANDOVERT
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2017
PROJECT AREAS
KERBALA
BAGHDAD
JAN
2015
4
LIVINGROOM
BATHROOM
m
m
Entrance
BEDROOM
KITCHEN
Shelter layout. The prefab units included a living space with kitchen separat-
ed by the sleeping area, as well as a bathroom.
1 Humanitarian Response Plan 2017, Advanced Executive Summary, 
http://bit.ly/2iCMO24.
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BACKGROUND
For more information on the background and shelter response 
in Iraq, see  overview A.33.
The conflict in Iraq has had profound humanitarian consequenc-
es, with more than three million Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDPs), who in some cities have now exceeded their original 
population, putting host communities under severe pressure. 
In protracted displacement situations, temporary shelter 
interventions can lead to the formation of informal set-
tlements and are inadequate to protect vulnerable groups, 
including women and girls, from harsh weather conditions and 
safety concerns. These settlements increased significantly af-
ter 2003 and some became “self-ruled zones”, potential incu-
bators for extremism and radicalism.
The humanitarian crisis has deteriorated rapidly since June 
2014, generating further displacement, exacerbating pre-ex-
isting vulnerabilities throughout the country, and putting ex-
isting infrastructure and services under increased pressure. 
More than 90% of IDPs were living outside of camps.
The Government of Iraq through its Ministry of Displacement 
and Migration (MoMD) has the overall objective to “create an 
enabling environment in Iraq to achieve longer-term shelter 
solutions for people affected by displacement”. To achieve 
this objective, the national strategy focuses on addressing 
the following key issues: land for housing, dispute resolution, 
basic services, housing options, housing finance, host com-
munities, livelihoods and governance strategy.
CORE ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THE PROJECT  
Within this framework, the project aimed at offering more dura-
ble solutions to protracted displacement, enhancing protection 
and livelihoods opportunities, as well as considering ways to 
alleviate tensions with host communities and prevent further 
conflict. It did so by establishing four sites with prefabricated 
shelter units and infrastructure.
Firstly, the project considered social and economic vulnera-
bilities, as well as cultural differences. In terms of protection 
aspects, the prefabricated shelters have one living space and 
a bedroom, with a partition to ensure privacy for women and 
girls. Furthermore, all units are equipped with a lockable door, 
to ensure security of the residents. Each site has facilities for 
local police or security guards to be regularly stationed. The 
project also provided trainings for site managers to enhance 
their managerial capacity, as well as to increase awareness 
on gender and gender-based violence risks.
Secondly, the sites included social facilities that are open 
to the host communities, enhancing their access to basic 
public services – which is lacking especially in areas with 
a high IDP presence – and contributing to increase accept-
ance and mitigate tensions with IDP residents.
Finally, the project aimed at providing livelihoods oppor-
tunities to the residents, as well as temporary educational 
facilities and accommodation for students.
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION  
Locations were selected through extensive consultations 
with the governorate counterparts. The organization iden-
tified a number of sites that could be allocated, which were 
away from the conflict zones and at the same time close 
enough to the major cities (so that basic services could be 
extended), and conducted technical surveys to assess the ge-
ophysical conditions of the sites.
The organization then provided technical support to the tar-
geted governorates to develop beneficiary selection crite-
ria, taking into consideration the vulnerability, socio-economic 
background and gender sensitivity – for example prioritizing 
female-headed households and individuals with physical or 
mental impairments. Special consideration was also given 
to displaced families living in unfinished buildings, pub-
lic buildings such as schools and mosques, in tents out-
of-camp and in rental accommodation (at risk of eviction). 
These were considered to be in worse living conditions, with 
less access to social and public services, and the local authori-
ties needed to make public buildings (particularly schools) avail-
able to serve local populations, including newly arrived IDPs.
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The project planned and built four sites equipped with durable, prefabricated, shelter units for vulnerable IDPs across the country (here, the Darkar Ajam site).
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PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION    
The organization first consulted with the targeted governorates 
and the MoDM to identify their needs and plan the responses 
appropriately. Steering Committees and working groups 
consisting of governorate officials, the organization’s staff and 
implementing partners, were then established to consult key 
stakeholders, monitor the progress of activities, identify risks 
and highlight learnings and good practices. The organization 
developed the site plans, which included basic infrastructure 
such as roads and electricity networks, as well as public facili-
ties such as health clinics, women’s centres and open spaces. 
Official agreements were made with the governorates and 
Fallujah University that they would be responsible for operat-
ing and maintaining the sites, to secure local ownership and 
sustainability. Based on the site plans and on research of local 
market prices, the organization developed BoQs and pro-
vided overall coordination, as well as technical supervi-
sion, of the activities carried out by the implementing partners 
(NGOs and contractors), for quality assurance.
INVOLVEMENT OF AFFECTED PEOPLE      
IDPs and host community members were actively engaged in the 
project, as labourers for the construction activities. This contrib-
uted both to improve their livelihoods and gain support and un-
derstanding from the local communities. Local committees com-
posed of representatives from the IDP families were then created 
in the established sites, to assist with management duties.
COORDINATION    
The steering committees were key in identifying challenges and 
discussing preventive or corrective measures. One commit-
tee, for instance, foresaw the risk of delay in the construction, 
due to snow and wet ground conditions in winter. The committee 
recommended to increase the work force to make maximum use 
of the limited time, and increased the frequency of monitoring. 
These measures enabled the project team to catch up on the 
progress despite the difficult weather conditions, and resulted 
in the timely delivery of the project. Secondly, coordination with 
relevant cluster members allowed the joint development of ben-
eficiary selection criteria, prioritizing the most vulnerable. Finally, 
collaboration with specific agencies was essential, on one hand, 
to operate and maintain the reproductive health clinics and 
women’s centres and, on the other, to establish a primary school 
in one of the sites.  
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION COMPONENTS   
In order to minimize the risks posed by hazards such as floo -
ing, land-sinking and fire, extensive technical surveys were 
conducted to assess geo-physical conditions of the proposed 
sites. For instance, one of the surveys identified that one site 
had been used as agricultural land and, therefore, the soil was 
soft and muddy, which could result in cracks in the dry season 
and land-sinking in the rainy season. To address this hazard, 
the top layer was removed and the ground was compacted.
MATERIALS  
After a competitive bidding and selection process, the mate-
rials for the prefabricated units were procured from the 
local markets (though originally imported from neighbouring 
countries). Once the site preparation and basic infrastructure 
were ready, the implementing partners transported the mate-
rials to the site, where small workshops were established to 
assemble the units. This partially avoided the potentially neg-
ative impacts of using imported prefabricated solutions.
MAIN CHALLENGES AND COUNTERMEASURES  
Security concerns have been the major challenge faced 
during implementation. For example, security concerns were 
raised after one site had been assessed and approved, after 
lengthy discussions. The project team tried to negotiate with 
the local authority, but at the end had to identify another site 
and delay the project. Furthermore, there were several oc-
casions where construction materials were confiscate  
by the militias, and the organization had to liaise with local 
authorities and the Iraqi Security Force to have the materials 
released. This caused slight delays, although they were cov-
ered by speeding up the construction works.
The project was also able to adapt in its second implementa-
tion phase (ongoing at the time of writing), thanks to lessons 
learned from its first phase. Although the design was agreed 
within the Cluster and with the local authorities (based on 
the average household size of six), due to cultural reasons 
some families complained about the size of the shelter 
units. This led the organization to adopt a different design 
(with larger space) in the most recent site, where the family 
size is even higher. Secondly, the use of buried electrical 
cables was changed to hanging cables – which are easier 
and quicker to maintain – based on reactions from the local 
authorities. Finally, the floors of the living space were in-
itially damaged due to washing inside the units, and floor  
were not waterproof, except in the bathrooms. In the follow-
ing phase, this challenge was addressed by producing clear 
instructions that were printed and distributed to the families. 
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT      
The overall project approach was praised by the governo-
rates and became a model to address complex and prolonged 
challenges faced by IDPs in Iraq. Moreover, the construction 
of temporary educational premises contributed to support dis-
placed youth who bear enormous human, social and economic 
costs, by enabling them to proceed with their education. While 
not envisaged in the original project plan, the university facil-
ities were later added, due to the request from the Governor 
of Anbar. Lack of access to education, basic social services, 
economic opportunities, grievance over injustices, and a gen-
eralized distrust in the capacity of the state to account for its 
citizens, fuel a cycle of poverty, hopelessness and frustration 
that can lead to radicalization. While there is no evidence that 
this is the case, it is hoped that the facilities will help the 
affected youth to resume their education and maintain their 
positive attitude.
Finally, global trends show that, with protracted displacement, 
unplanned sites can turn into urban slums, further exacerbat-
ing social and environmental challenges that already exist 
within the host community (in conflict-a fected areas). Estab-
lishing planned sites that can function as a neighbourhood, 
equipped with basic social and public infrastructure, services 
and durable shelter, contributed to prevent the irregular ex-
pansion of informal settlements. Additionally, while in some 
cases planned IDP sites are poorly located and do not consid-
er livelihood opportunities, this project prioritized the proximi-
ty to the existing urban areas, and encouraged livelihood 
interventions carried out by specialized actors.
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The new sites and the shelters represented a significant improv ment in 
terms of security, privacy and dignity for the selected households. However, 
the project targeted a very small fraction of the affected population in Iraq.
IDP families before (bottom) and after (top) the shelter intervention.
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STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
STRENGTHS
+ Close coordination with governorate counterparts and 
implementing partners, and creation of steering committees 
to discuss challenges and mitigation measures.
+ Organizational expertise in site planning and construction.
+ Collaboration with other agencies to enhance basic ser-
vices, such as health and education, strengthening the sus-
tainability of the project.
+ Contribution to reduce the emergence of informal settle-
ments and also to mitigate tensions between IDPs and host 
communities, reducing risks of future conflicts.
WEAKNESSES
While more economical in the mid- and long-term, initial 
costs for establishing these sites with prefabricated 
shelter units were higher than providing other emergency 
shelter solutions, making the number of beneficiaries rela-
tively small compared to the scale of the crisis in Iraq.
The project had to find the right balance between scale and 
quality in the mid-term. To achieve this balance, it applied 
minimum standards of living for the units, to minimize the cost, 
thereby maximizing the number of beneficiaries. Ultimately, 
the project directly benefitted approximately 8,200 vulnerable 
IDPs, which is a very small percentage of the needs (with 
over 3 million IDPs in the country).
LEARNINGS 
• Consultation and agreement with governorate counterparts and other humanitarian actors are crucial to ensure the 
sustainability of the project. This is true especially on roles and responsibilities for operating and maintaining the IDP 
sites, after the completion and handover to the governorates, including camp management and delivery of basic services.
•  While uniformly designed, prefabricated, shelter units contributed to reduce the project cost, adaptable, culture- and 
context-sensitive designs may have helped to better address the needs of the IDPs.
•  In two sites, the organization faced difficulties due to security issues, as well as some grievances of farmers in the 
area, after the site selection and official handover from the government. Additional and rigorous verification efforts 
through different concerned departments should be carried out to confirm the suitability of the assigned land
MATERIALS LIST FOR ONE SHELTER UNIT
Component Items
Main steel structure
Base frame (10cm x 10cm 3mm), 
Hollow steel tube columns, Roof frame, 
Rectangular hollow tubes, Steel plate, 
Steel angle
Walls and Partitions External and internal wall coverings: PU insulated sandwich panel upper layer
Flooring Floor covering, Plywood sheets, Fibre-glass sheet for bathroom floo
Roof and ceiling PU insulated sandwich panel upper layerCanopy top: galvanized steel sheet
Windows (3 pcs) Frame, Wing, Handle
Doors (3 pcs) Frame, Wing, Handle and lock
Sanitary works
Toilet with water outlet, Shower base 
and mixer, Hand wash basin and mixer, 
Stainless steel kitchen sink, Mirror
Electrical installation Distribution board, cables, wires, light-ing and water heaters 
www.shelterprojects.org
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CRISIS
Yemen conflic
March 2015-onwards.
PEOPLE AFFECTED
18.8 million people with 
humanitarian needs, as of Septem-
ber 20161. 
4.5 million people with 
shelter or NFI needs. 
2 million IDPs.
RESPONSE OUTPUTS2
(2015-2016) 
81,953 households (Shelter 
assistance).
211,199 households (NFIs).
19-26 Mar 2015: Suicide bombings target two mosques in Sana’a. 
Houthi/Saleh forces advance south. Saudi-led military coalition be-
gins air strikes. Fighting and air strikes escalate quickly across the 
country.
12 May 2015: Five-day humanitarian pause begins. Frequent viola-
tions are reported.
1 Jul 2015: UN designates Yemen a “Level-three” emergency.
10 Nov 2015: Two consecutive cyclones batter the southern coast 
and Socotra Island.
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1 Yemen Humanitarian Needs overview 2017, http://bit.ly/2jzVbjB.
2 Data reported to the Global Shelter Cluster, as of 31 Dec 2016.
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BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS
Yemen is dry, with very low rainfall. It is very hot in the summer 
and cold in the winter, particularly at night. It has a conserva-
tive society and a population of 26 million people.
Even before the conflict escalated, the country faced enor-
mous levels of humanitarian need (15.9 million people in 
late 2014). These needs stemmed from years of poverty, un-
der-development, environmental decline, intermittent conflict
and widespread violations of human rights.
In March 2015, the conflict in Yemen developed from inter-
mittent clashes, to a full-fled ed military conflict  involv-
ing several foreign countries. Access to food, clean water, fuel 
and medical supplies became increasingly difficult throughout 
the country, and many families remained trapped in their plac-
es of origin, struggling to access basic services. 
As the conflict dragged on, economic conditions deteriorated, 
worsening the humanitarian situation. The commercial sector 
was unable to easily import and export goods, as the air and 
sea space was controlled by conflicting parties
MAR DEC
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE   
Working in an extremely insecure environment, with international and national armed actors and enormous needs, the shelter 
response in Yemen struggled under enormous access and funding constraints. Programmes primarily provided non-food items 
and emergency shelter materials. At a smaller scale, shelter programmes rehabilitated collective centres and provided condi-
tional cash transfers for rental assistance or non-food items.
15 Dec 2015: Ceasefire comes into force during peace talks. Fre-
quent ceasefire violations are reported. Ceasefire ends in early Jan-
uary.
10 Apr 2016: A renewed cessation of hostilities comes into force.
May and Aug 2016: Heavy rains in May and August cause flooding in 
seven governorates.
6 Aug 2016: Peace talks in Kuwait adjourn without agreement. Clash-
es and air strikes intensify immediately afterwards.
6 Oct 2016: The Ministry of Health announces a cholera outbreak.
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DISPLACEMENT
Damage to houses and fear caused by airstrikes and com-
bat, often in residential areas, led thousands of families to 
flee their houses. Displaced people were mainly hosted by 
relatives, often in crowded conditions. Some families hosted 
up to seven households. Displaced people were also living in 
collective centres, mainly schools and health facilities, or in 
open air spaces, or makeshift shelters, in dispersed self-set-
tled sites.
The government did not allow formal camps to be established, 
and access to many areas for humanitarian workers was se-
verely restricted throughout the conflict  
By the end of 2016, more than 4.5 million people required as-
sistance with shelter, non-food items (NFIs), or management 
of collective centres in which they were living. Of these peo-
ple, 3.9 million were in areas of acute need, and over 2 million 
were displaced.
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Though the majority of the displaced population in Yemen has found shelter 
in host settings or rented accommodation, there were also a high number of 
spontaneous displacement sites. Here, about 200 families, displaced from 
Sa’ada by fighting, live in a site in Khame , Amran Governorate.
The Shelter/CCCM/NFI Cluster was only 36% funded in 2016. 
As of December 2016, the Cluster had reached 81,953 house-
holds with shelter assistance since the start of the conflict,
and 211,199 households with NFIs. The Cluster had 40 active 
members, including UN, INGOs, local civil society partners, 
and government authorities (including the IDPs Executive 
Unit). A key advantage of the Cluster in Yemen has been its 
robust linkage with national NGOs, which ensured effective 
coverage, capacity and better access nationwide.
MAJOR CHALLENGES IN THE RESPONSE
Given the context, there were several challenges encoun-
tered. Areas for particular engagement in shelter were:
• Insufficient funding.
• Finding alternative shelter solutions for IDPs currently liv-
ing in schools (or other public buildings) and facing high 
pressure from the host community to vacate the prem-
ises. If the set-up of camps continued to be excluded, 
the question would remain as to where people could be 
moved to, the potential establishment of transitional shel-
ters, and how the displaced population could integrate in 
the host community.
LOOKING FORWARD
The Shelter/NFI/CCCM Cluster strategy for 2017-2018 envi-
sioned a comprehensive response package, tailored to each 
governorate, targeting the most vulnerable families, working 
with other clusters, and with protection mainstreaming as its 
core.
As the conflict continued in early 2017, additional challeng-
es such as depleted savings and lack of access to financial
resources, and/or saturation of available housing capacity, 
meant that all viable alternative shelter options needed to be 
pursued. CCCM approaches had to be developed, working 
with affected populations, and emergency relief items had to 
be prepositioned. The use of cash and vouchers, and working 
through multifunctional mobile teams in areas requiring such 
approaches, also needed to be considered.
To face the large influx of returnees to areas that were de-
stroyed, assistance should include emergency support on re-
turn, as well as fuller support for housing rehabilitation. There 
also had to be increased focus on capacity-building of national 
stakeholders, to support shelter design and programming and 
camp management approaches, based on a strong under-
standing of local needs.
CHALLENGES DURING THE CRISIS 
LACK OF FUEL. With the entire country’s oil production at a 
complete halt due to the conflict, Yemen witnessed a severe 
shortage of fuel in the markets. Prices skyrocketed from USD 
0.7 per litre, to nearly USD 7 in some areas. The black market 
in fuel thrived, making it extremely difficult to locate transport-
ers; who, if located, asked for extremely high prices. 
BLOCKADES. Unavailability of items in the local markets, due 
to imposed blockades, represented a major procurement chal-
lenge for implementing organizations. Supply options meant 
that international procurement was often required, with careful 
routing of supplies to ensure that they could arrive in Yemen.
SECURITY AND ACCESSIBILITY CHALLENGES. Due to on-
going security incidents, including assassinations and bomb-
ings near agency offices, staff were often advised not to report 
to work. In order to overcome this challenge, the teams often 
worked from home and in the field, whenever the situation 
warranted it. Since many roads leading to target areas of as-
sistance were either blocked, or witnessed clashes, longer 
routes to reach target areas were often used. The challenges 
in accessing areas also made it harder to effectively monitor 
interventions.
NATIONAL SHELTER STRATEGY
The Shelter-NFI Cluster was merged with CCCM. Its response 
strategy prioritized the delivery of assistance to all affected 
populations, including provision of cash assistance as a rental 
subsidy. Rehabilitation of a limited number of damaged hous-
es, construction of transitional shelters and rehabilitation of 
collective centres, were also considered in the strategy. 
Chart Title
host families (relatives) host families (non-relatives) Rented accommodation
ﬂee to 2nd home collective centres spontaneous settlemen s
Chart Title
returned to original house Rented accommodation Host family
Settlement types 
for Returnees
Settlement types 
for IDPs
Host families
(relatives),
 40%
Host families 
(non-relatives),
10%
Rented accom-
modation, 22%
Second 
home, 7%
Collective 
centres, 4%
Spontaneous settle-
ments, 17%
Returned to original 
h use, 86%
Host family, 6%
Rented accom-
modation,
8%
www.shelterprojects.org
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KEYWORDS: Housing reconstruction, Subsidies, Self-recovery, Urban
CRISIS Valparaiso fire, Chile, 12 April 2014.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED More than 3,309 destroyed (ONEMI, April 2014).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED 12,500 people (ibid.).
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS
Various locations across the city. The affected 
areas were the hills in the south, particularly the ravines 
known as “Quebradas”.
BENEFICIARIES
Emergency: 2,000 households (planned).
Reconstruction: 3,870 households (Target: 4,912).
PROJECT 
OUTPUTS
(As of Dec 2016)
2,000 Emergency shelters (planned1).
1,588 Reconstruction subsidies (target: 2,977).
1,914 Self-reconstruction projects.
PROJECT SUMMARY  
This government-led programme provid-
ed four types of reconstruction subsidies 
to over 3,800 families affected by the fir  
in the steep hills of Valparaiso, Chile. The 
majority of the subsidies were provided 
through an assisted self-reconstruction 
scheme, whereby the funds would be dis-
bursed along with technical assistance by 
architects or engineers in coordination with 
local NGOs, and the families would take 
care of rebuilding themselves.
17 Apr 2014: Government agency announces the construction of 2,000 
emergency shelters for the families affected by the fire
Dec 2014:  1,095 reconstruction subsidies granted (302 paid)
 347 self-construction subsidies granted (25 paid).
1 ONEMI, April 2014, http://bit.ly/2lXbLYa.
Dec 2015:  1,948 reconstruction subsidies granted (835 paid)
 1,420 self-construction subsidies granted (382 paid).
Dec 2016:  2,829 reconstruction subsidies granted (1,588 paid)
 1,914 self-construction subsidies granted (961 paid).
Oct 2014: Government launches revised reconstruction plan includ-
ing  self-reconstruction subsidies.
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
5
4 5
12 APR
2014
20172015 2016
STRENGTHS
+ Large-scale programme to support safer self-construction.
+ Combined action of government subsidies and NGOs.
+ The subsidies took into account people’s needs.
+ The initial plan was adapted in response to the requests of the 
affected people.
WEAKNESSES
- The initial response did not consider affected people’s preference.
- Many families did not receive any subsidies due to land tenure 
issues, side-lining the most vulnerable.
EMERGENCY PHASE RECOVERY PHASE
The fire on 12 April 2014 affected the hills in Valparaiso, where most of the 
people settled in informal land, in very dense environments, close to the forest.
Map highlighting the area affected by the fire and the 
density of the dwellings, from high (red) to low (yellow). 
Source: Salinas-Silva 2015.
SHELTER SIZE
Emergency shelters: 18m2
Reconstruction: more than 45m2 (Minimum require-
ment to apply for the subsidies).
SHELTER DENSITY
Emergency shelters: 5.3m2 per person (based on 
average family size of 3.4).
Reconstruction: min. 13.2m2 per person (perma-
nent houses). 
PROJECT COST 
PER HOUSEHOLD
Approx. USD 40,000 (weighted average of the four sub-
sidies described in this case study).
Figure 6 (Up) Poverty density per city block; Figure 7 (Upper right) 
Extension of Valparaíso fire; Figure 8 (Lower right) Overcrowded 
households in Valparaíso. 
Source: Figure 6 (Krueger 2007a); Figure 7 (Salinas 2014a); Figure 8 
(Salinas 2014b). Based on census 2002.  
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developing intuitive construction knowledge, including of struc-
tural risks and possible mitigation measures. It is estimated that 
approximately 80% of the housing stock in the city is self-built2.
SITUATION AFTER THE FIRE 
On 12 April 2014, a forest fire quickly spread into the urban set-
tlements and destroyed over 3,000 homes, consuming 2,500 
acres of land3. The fire, which was the largest urban fire in the 
history of Chile, also killed 15, injured 500 and left 12,500 people 
without a home4.
The fire affected especially the poorest areas, as they 
were informally constructed without any urban planning, lead-
ing to a high density of structures, proximity to the forests, 
and poor accessibility. During the emergency, fire-trucks could 
not reach the affected areas, worsening the situation further. 
The density of construction, mainly due to extended families 
building large complexes on the same plot of land to live in 
close proximity, contributed significantly to the fire spreading 
faster and more devastatingly. Some neighbourhoods were 
hence burnt down completely.
Despite being at risk of future catastrophes in the current loca-
tions, most residents of the ravines affected by the fire started 
to self-rebuild almost the next day. Inhabitants of the ravines 
returned to their homes within hours of the fire being under 
control, to salvage any material goods and clean up their land, 
worried about losing their land and unwilling to resettle outside 
of the city (as intended in the initial government plan).
INITIAL GOVERNMENT PLAN                             
AND LOCAL REACTION
After the fire, the initial government plan was to clear everything 
and to rebuild the ravines in a “more orderly manner”5. The 
government also proposed to relocate citizens to safer sites, 
including social housing estates built outside the centre6. 
2 Pino Vásquez and Ojeda Ledesma, 2015, http://bit.ly/2lthcAe.
3 IFRC, 2014, http://bit.ly/2ltg7bI.
4 Salinas-Silva, 2015, The “great fire” of alparaiso 2014.
5 Vergara, 2014, http://bit.ly/2kJ92zI.
6 Social housing had been built prior to the fire but in part it was also being built 
in response to it.
SITUATION BEFORE THE FIRE
Valparaiso is a coastal city of about 250,000 inhabitants, fa-
mous for its colourful housing stretching across densely popu-
lated hills of great aesthetic and cultural value. The hills are also 
the source of vulnerability to hazards, as a significant part of the 
city is built informally on the 39 so-called Quebradas (ravines). 
These form a historic informal area with many land seizures, 
which concentrate the highest rates of poverty and unemploy-
ment in the country. The Quebradas have little or no connec-
tion to urban infrastructure and vehicle accessibility is generally 
difficult, as access is mainly provided by steep stairways up 
and down the hills. The hazards in these locations include 
not only fires, but also landslides and slope failures, floodin  
in the lower areas, as well as the ever-present earthquake and 
tsunami risks along the Chilean coast.
According to a survey before the fire, the inhabitants feel that 
“inefficient policies” of the government have failed to meet the 
housing demand. Many current inhabitants of the Quebradas 
moved to this location as consequence of previous earthquakes 
destroying their homes (in 1906, 1965, or 1985). According to 
interviews, especially poor communities felt they did not re-
ceive enough assistance from the government for rebuilding or 
repairing their houses in the city centre after these disasters, 
hence moving to the ravines to build their own neighbourhoods, 
mainly by occupying unclaimed land. In the urban area, near 
the port, this would not have been possible.
Moreover, the government may have added to the desire of 
locals to remain on these sites, as staying in an illegally appro-
priated site is key to its subsequent legalization. A decree states 
that to legalize an occupied site one must be able to prove a 
presence on this site (in the form of a home) for more than fiv  
years, and the site also needs to be approved by the govern-
ment. However, the sites on the ravines are often not legalized 
after these five years, due to the precarious and high-risk lo-
cations (steep slopes or proximity to the forest). Moreover, up 
to the legalization, people live in constant fear of eviction and 
they do not trust government agencies, even in the context of 
post-disaster reconstruction.
Self-construction in Valparaiso has happened for gener-
ations and many residents work in the construction industry, 
86 102
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The “Quebradas” are the ravines overlooking the city of Valparaiso, famous for 
their colourful houses of great aesthetic value, but also site of many hazards.
Access to the ravines is extremely challenging, and the density is very high, as 
families build on informal plots and tend to expand their dwellings over time.
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Moreover, the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU), 
developed specific subsidies to address the scale of the 
disaster, but also the particular situation of illegal settlements 
in the ravines. However, before the legal framework of the new 
subsidies was established, the people had already started 
rebuilding. The government agency in charge of emergency 
shelter provided 6m by 3m units that were erected on new 
sites and in the Quebradas in “safe zones” determined by the 
government. The shelters were deemed of bad quality by the 
local population, further accelerating the drive to self-recon-
struction.
Within six months the ravines were nearly completely rebuilt 
by the local population, much faster than public management 
and the vision of the planners. Notably, self-reconstruction in 
Valparaiso was heavily driven by women, who traditional-
ly lead the household in the Quebradas, are very attached to 
their homes and try to keep the extended family close together. 
For this rapid recovery, locals used recovered building materi-
als, but also improved the quality of their homes, partially due 
to the availability of government grants for self-construction. 
ADAPTATIONS TO THE PLAN 
The initial response plan by the government (relocation and 
emergency shelters) was heavily criticized by the local popula-
tion, which resulted in the subsidies being adapted in order to 
be more efficient and useful for the needs of self-builders. This 
happened in approximately six months from the fire, thanks to 
demonstrations and the support of local NGOs, who consulted 
the residents and advocated with the government to propose 
alternative solutions.
MINVU’s revised plan in October 2014 (with a timeframe until 
2021) was to invest about USD 510 million in the reconstruc-
tion of Valparaiso’s affected neighbourhood7. This included in-
vestment in a road around the city, as well as access roads to 
and in-between the Quebradas, and a geotechnical study of the 
slope stability of the affected areas.
7 MINVU, 2016. Visit http://bit.ly/2l5vFlt.
RECONSTRUCTION SUBSIDIES 
Four separate types of subsidies for reconstruction were giv-
en to house the affected population, with the precondition 
that the new house be in a low risk zone (chosen by MINVU).
1) The first subsidy applied to families renting a property, 
as well as families living on their own site. It involved buying 
a new house with a value of 900 UF8 or an existing house 
with a value of 700 UF in a new location.
2) The second subsidy was for reconstruction of pre-de-
signed houses in a new location by external contractors. No 
completed construction was reported by the end of 2016.
3) Subsidies for reconstruction in the same location were 
also available. The payment could be done before or after 
construction, but in the second case a contractor must have 
been hired for construction. This subsidy could be used to 
build a house according to designs proposed by MINVU, or 
own designs with assistance by an architect, often from a lo-
cal NGO. The house could be an individual house or a group 
of houses for densification of a site owned by other family 
members. The subsidy covered 1,050 UF broken down as 
follows: 600 UF for construction costs, 300 UF for mitigation 
measures (e.g. seismic improvements), including the struc-
ture and ground, 80 UF for site preparation and any demo-
lition work required, and 70 UF for technical assistance by 
architects. Additional funding was available for site densifi-
cation (150 UF) as well as for mobility-impaired residents. 
About a half of the construction was finalized for this type 
of subsidies by the end of 2016, with the remaining projects 
mainly in the process of construction.
4) The fourth type was a subsidy for assisted self-construc-
tion (ACA). This offered about the same total financial aid as 
the previous one, with an average of 1,090 UF assigned per 
family9. From the fire up to the end of 2016, a total of 5,090 
self-construction programmes were financed in Valparaiso 
by MINVU, of which 1,914 were reconstruction projects, cor-
responding to 39% of all reconstruction projects.
8 The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is a unit of account used in Chile and created in 
1967. The exchange rate between the UF and the Chilean peso is constantly 
adjusted for inflation. In 2016, 1 UF was approximately USD 40
9 MINVU and CEHU, 2016.
Houses were often built in clusters by families in the ravines of Valparaiso. These typical “Kinship-based Residential Complexes” were heavily affected by the fire, but 
people started rebuilding almost the next day. From left to right: January 2010; February 2012; April 2014, just after the fire; and October 2014, only six mon hs later.
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01-2010    02-2012
04-2014    10-2014
Figura 15: Fotografía de proceso evolutivo de construcción  y re-construcción de
CRF Sra. Rosa. Periodo 2010-2014, quebrada La Rinconada.
121
01-2010   02-2012
04-2014    10-2014
Figura 15: Fotografía de proceso evolutivo de construcción  y re-construcción de 
CRF Sra. Rosa. Periodo 2010-2014, quebrada La Rinconada.
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Jan 2010 Feb 2012 Apr 2014 Oct 2014
TYPES OF SUBSIDIES FOR RECONSTRUCTION
SUBSIDY VALUE (USD) TARGET(FAMILIES)
PROGRESS
TO DATE
SITUATION AS OF JANUARY 2017*
FINALIZED ONGOING NOT INITIATED
1 BUYING A HOUSE IN NEW LOCATION ~35,000 / 27,000 994 98.2% 976 18 0
2 RECONSTRUCTION IN NEW PLOT ~41,000 761 0% 0 684 77
3 RECONSTRUCTION ON ORIGINAL PLOT ~41,000 1,222 50.1% 612 539 37 + 34
4 SELF-CONSTRUCTION** ~42,500 1,914 50.2% 961 NA NA
* MINVU, 2017, http://bit.ly/2lhe48v. // ** MINVU and CEHU 2016.
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Architects and local NGOs helped affected people rebuild their damaged houses, thanks to the “assisted self-construction” subsidies provided by the government.
Local groups of architects organized building workshops to rebuild some of the 
houses affected by the fire on the Quebradas
SELF-RECONSTRUCTION SUBSIDY AND THE 
ROLE OF LOCAL NGOS 
Conversations with residents suggested that many people did 
not like the government-designed solutions, as the houses 
were too small, built with a poor choice of materials (steel pro-
files + PVC), and all adopted the same design. In Valparaiso, 
family identity is strongly associated to diversity in style of the 
house, and people have a strong feeling for location and aes-
thetics of their homes, hence preferring staying in unsafe sites 
than moving to often smaller social housing or locations outside 
their communities.
The ACA subsidy provided the resources to design and 
build a house, as long as the beneficiary owned or had some 
rights over the land. This could also include densification of 
a site, in which other family members lived, which was par-
ticularly relevant in the ravines of Valparaiso.
A local NGO was very active in informing the population about 
the possibility to self-rebuild and assisting in the process using 
the ACA subsidy. The NGO believed that self-reconstruction 
was the best way for the local community to get involved in 
shaping housing that responded to the needs of each individ-
ual family.
The role of local NGOs in sharing the information about 
the ACA and the other types of subsidies was essential, as 
many residents were not aware of the different options availa-
ble and had a general distrust in the government, mainly due 
to past initiatives that failed to assist them.
In coordination with local NGOs, architects (paid through 
the ACA subsidy) provided technical advice to the fami-
lies, teaching them how to build their own houses, which were 
designed based on their needs and proposals. This ensured a 
safe design of the house, as well as a more lasting impact, as 
families often expand their houses with time. Several NGOs 
worked on rebuilding sustainable wood and earth structures, 
based on traditional construction concepts in Chile.
The statistics do not paint a full picture of the number of self-re-
builders and also crucially ignore the geographical and social 
component of subsidy allocation. However, it can be said that 
assisted self-reconstruction is particularly popular in Val-
paraiso, especially compared to the much lower number of 
such subsidies after other disasters, both in Valparaiso and in 
other Chilean cities. Similar ACA funds existed after the 2010 
earthquake, but much lower numbers of these were applied 
for and allocated. Additionally, the subsidies were heavily im-
proved after the 2014 fire, due to the fact that Valparaiso rep-
resents a special case in Chile, with such a high number of 
self-built houses.
LAND TENURE ISSUES 
Land tenure issues proved to be crucial in the context of this 
response, as it is often the case in similar post-disaster sce-
narios10. Given that access to the subsidy was conditional to 
a proof of land ownership, many households were not assist-
ed. Several disputes over land ownership arose, but no large 
scale solution was found. Most of the families who knew they 
could not apply to the subsidy started rebuilding very quickly, 
replicating the same vulnerabilities that existed prior to the fire,
e.g. high density, proximity to the forest and poor accessibility. 
In January 2017, a new fire in the same areas affected again 
those who were in these hazardous situation. Although the 
municipality started to work towards an improvement of the 
land tenure situation in Valparaiso, this example shows how 
the cycle of vulnerability was not broken, even though best 
efforts were taken to consider the needs of the local popula-
tion through the ACA subsidies.
10 See for instance the overview A.39 of the Ecuador Earthquake in 2016.
THE CASE OF MINGAVALPO
A group of local architects and volunteers joined after the fire to 
provide a model of self-reconstruction using local and recycled 
materials, based on sustainability principles and a community 
workshop approach (Minga, a Chilean tradition of community 
self-help). The structures are built with a timber structure, walls 
are made of reused pallets, filled with straw mixed with mud and 
in some cases eco-bricks (plastic bottles filled with compacted 
plastic bags), finished with a mud and straw render. The result 
is a well-insulated house with a very low carbon footprint, for a 
cost of approximately USD 39,000 excluding labour, which was 
provided by volunteers.
Franco, 2014, http://bit.ly/2lXsKd3; Visit http://www.mingavalpo.cl/.
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The damage caused by fires in the ravines of Valparaiso is often extensive. 
Entire neighbourhoods were burnt down by the fire in April 2014. The same 
areas were again affected by a fire in January 2017
Many houses were rebuilt thanks to the subsidies, with the help of local architects. In some cases, houses were built during community self-build workshop, ex-
perimenting with low-cost materials.
©
 M
. 
C
am
po
s
STRENGTHS
+ As of late 2016, almost 2,000 houses had been rebuilt 
by their owners with the guidance of architects, having 
improved construction quality, materials and size. Before the 
fire of 2014, the houses built in the ravines were precarious, 
constructed mostly with recovered materials from shelters and 
emergency housing.
+ The combined action of government subsidies and 
NGOs that tried to promote the use of these subsidies to help 
people rebuild, engaging them in the design and teaching 
them how to build safer.
+ The subsidies took into account people’s needs and for 
instance allowed for the option of densifying a site to ensure 
families could live together and self-built houses could evolve 
with need and occupancy.
+ The initial plan was adapted to take into consideration the 
needs and requests from the affected population.
WEAKNESSES
+ The initial response did not account for affected peo-
ple’s preference in terms of designs or location.
+ Many families did not receive any subsidies as they de-
cided to remain and self-rebuild in informal locations, without 
ownership and in high-risk zones. The risk of fires spreading 
across the ravines hence remained, as many structures were 
rebuilt close to the forest. The fire in January 2017 proved 
that the most vulnerable remained so, even after this large-
scale response.
www.shelterprojects.org
LEARNINGS 
• Affected people are the first responders, and will start rebuilding as soon as possible. This response showed 
how recognizing this and supporting self-recovery as quickly as possible can have a significant impact in the success 
of the reconstruction and longer-term resilience of affected people.
• Relocation is seldom the solution. People settle in specific locations due to a variety of reasons, and as proved 
in this case they rarely want to relocate to far-away areas, distant from their social ties and livelihood opportunities, 
or to move into standardized housing blocks which did not cater for their needs and aspirations. Locally sensitive, 
tailored solutions proved to be more effective and accepted by the residents of the affected areas.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
On 16 April 2016, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck the 
coastal areas of north-west Ecuador, impacting eight differ-
ent provinces across the country and damaging or destroy-
ing over 45,000 houses. The response was led by the gov-
ernment and consisted of an emergency subsidy package 
followed by a reconstruction plan for the longer term. The 
international community assisted primarily in the emergency 
and transitional phases in rural areas and with advocacy and 
capacity-building activities.
ECUADOR 2016 / EARTHQUAKE
CRISIS
Ecuador Earthquake,
16 April 2016
More than 2,000 aftershocks were felt 
in the 6 months after the earthquake. 9 
of these were equal to / greater than 6 
on the Richter scale, adding to the ini-
tial damage.
RESPONSE LOCATIONS
Primarily the Provinces of 
Manabí and Esmeraldas (to-
tal of eight affected provinces).
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
45,455 houses categorized as 
insecure or of restricted use 
(Government figures as of Dec 2016)  
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
386,985 people (as per the 
Government Register).
BENEFICIARIES OF 
THE RESPONSE
151,699 people (38,045 
families).
RESPONSE OUTPUTS
As of December 2016
45,464 households reached
with NFIs / kits. 
14,581 households reached 
with tarpaulins. 
1,186 tents. 
12,178 households trained. 
1,453 houses repaired.
2,962 t-shelters built.
505 households receiving con-
struction materials.
PLANNING PHASE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 98 10 11
EMERGENCY PHASE
CLUSTER HANDOVER/PHASING OUT PHASE
TRANSITIONAL / RECOVERY PHASE - ongoing
20 Apr 2016: Shelter Cluster activated.
28 Apr 2016: Establishment of Technical Working Group.
4 May 2016: Draft shelter sector strategy document agreed.
30 May 2016: Temporary shelter options submitted to government.
13 Jun 2016: Position paper submitted to government (MIDUVI). 
20 Jul 2016: Updated shelter options presented to government.
11 Aug 2016: Finalisation of agreed key messages.
15 Aug 2016: Request from government (MICS) for implementation of 
transitional shelter solutions.
9 Sep 2016: Workshop on lessons learned.
12 Sep 2016: First Training of Trainers in use of key messages.
28 Sep 2016: Official cluster han over.
1
6
2
7
3
8
4
9
5
10
11
The earthquake affected primarily the two north-western coastal provinces of 
Manabí and Esmeraldas, with its epicentre near the town of Muisne.
Families affected by the earthquake set up emergency shelters (Chamanga).
15 NOV 
2016
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CONTEXT
Ecuador is an upper-middle income country in Latin America, 
with a population of around 14.5 million people. It is a country 
that is resource rich, but also highly vulnerable to natural haz-
ards. Around 96% of the population live in coastal and moun-
tainous areas that are exposed to earthquakes, volcanic activity, 
floods, landslides and El Niño hazards including drought
In the early to mid-2000s, the economy in Ecuador enjoyed a 
high growth, due in large part to its petroleum resources and 
strong global oil markets. Although there was rapid growth 
and progress in health, education and housing, it did not al-
ways ensure high standards. Income during this time also re-
mained unequal and levels of poverty high in some provinc-
es. In 2015 and 2016, the collapse of oil prices contributed to 
push the economy back into recession, further exacerbating 
disparities for vulnerable populations and increasing general 
pressure on society.
SITUATION BEFORE THE DISASTER
Prior to the earthquake, there were a number of pre-existing 
vulnerabilities in the country. The hardest hit provinces of 
Manabí and Esmeraldas had levels of poverty about 30% and 
40% respectively. Both provinces were over 40% rural. Almost 
half of the homes lacked access to public water networks and 
only a third had access to a sewerage system. The livelihoods 
of many people in the affected coastal areas depended on 
fisheries, aquaculture and tourism
In urban areas, poor land use planning in many towns had 
resulted in an increase of inadequate and informal settle-
ments. A high proportion of the population across rural and 
urban areas had no access to recognized land titles. Sub-
standard and unsafe building practices and regulations were 
in evidence across a number of different building typologies, 
from lightweight to masonry construction. 
SITUATION AFTER THE DISASTER 
The above vulnerabilities played a significant part in the high 
impact of the earthquake. Post disaster, an estimated 60% of 
the affected people found themselves without adequate hous-
ing and/or sanitation and little knowledge of how to access 
support. In some communities, up to 80% of the local housing 
stock was lost. Many people were forced to find alternative 
housing solutions away from their home, affecting critical so-
cio-economic networks and support systems. In the first weeks 
following the earthquake, people sought refuge in makeshift 
camps or in community buildings, such as schools. Govern-
ment-run, planned, camps - the official national solution - were 
established from May onwards and financial incentives were 
given during the emergency to support: 1) host families; 2) 
rentals (though the available rental stock was scarce).  
Despite these options, many people chose to stay either on 
or close to the land they inhabited prior to the quake, often 
staying in unstable or inadequate shelter to retain links to 
their livelihoods, networks and assets, until more permanent 
solutions could be found. This presented a number of prob-
lems, not only because people stayed and rebuilt in dan-
gerous situations, or designated no-build zones, but also as 
it hampered their access to formal assistance mechanisms.
NATIONAL SHELTER RESPONSE
Given the extent of the damage, the government requested in-
ternational support. Two weeks later, the Shelter Sector leads 
established coordination services and set up a response team, 
ensuring co-leadership of the Sector with the Vice-Minister of 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MIDUVI). 
The Sector leads provided field and desk support and ran 
weekly meetings in the hubs of Quito, Portoviejo and Peder-
nales for the first four months and thereafter every two weeks, 
until the formal handover in late September 2016.
The government’s reconstruction plan “Reconstruyo Ecua-
dor”, was released by MIDUVI in early May as a mechanism 
to provide rapid support for housing repair and reconstruction 
through financial assistance in the eight affected provinces. To 
complement these plans, which were mainly focused on ur-
ban areas and outskirts, Shelter Sector partners directed their 
assistance predominantly to the rural areas. The strategies of 
the Sector built up from immediate lifesaving activities, to tran-
sitional and permanent shelter options, along with technical 
assistance to communities, which included Build Back Safer 
messaging and Housing, Land and Property (HLP) support.
Sector partners were restricted in the early months of the 
response, especially with transitional shelter options, due to 
perceived conflicts with government reconstruction plans. 
Successful projects by humanitarian actors (including A.40), 
were able to provide assistance by being adaptable and not 
compromising the position of the humanitarian community, or the 
government. Such responses included distribution of relief items 
(tools and emergency shelter kits) along with brief technical train-
ing, to allow beneficiaries to make simple repairs to their homes, 
or build small impermanent shelters that allowed them to stay 
on their land. More durable solutions from the Sector were 
later approved in areas where the government was projected 
to take many months to provide permanent housing solutions.
The Shelter Sector also collaborated with the Protection Sector, 
to establish the HLP Working Group. This group has worked 
closely with the government at all levels to ensure more inclu-
sive access to the reconstruction and repair incentive package, 
to respect people’s rights in the reconstruction process (includ-
ing relocations) and to improve the regulation in building codes, 
promoting the participation of non-governmental actors in the 
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The urban area of Portoviejo was particularly affected by the earthquake. Here  
is an image of the centre, soon after the first earthquake in April 2016.
The initial response of the government was to set up 28 camps across the 
affected areas. About a year after the earthquake, many of these were still open.
163SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
NATURAL DISASTER A.39 / ECUADOR 2016 / EARTHQUAKE OVERVIEW AMERICAS
process. These efforts helped to enable the implementation of 
repairs and transitional shelters, and some regulations were 
modified or adopted in order to protect HL  rights. 
COORDINATION CHALLENGES
Although the Shelter Sector was successful during the initial 
response in providing essential non-food items to the affected 
communities, the challenge was finding space to act in the transi-
tional phase. With the presence of a strong government plan for 
reconstruction, with a short timeline, there was little political will 
to allow the implementation of transitional solutions from Shelter 
Sector partners (in spite of significant needs for such options .
These delays in the roll out of the incentive scheme and the 
construction of permanent housing meant that many affected 
families remained without adequate shelter for months. The 
Shelter Sector advocated successfully for the necessity of 
temporary shelters (including water and sanitation) in rural 
communities, especially where the government would take 
more than six months to provide permanent housing. The 
Sector also worked to gain approval for alternative permanent 
housing options as part of the reconstruction/recovery plan-
ning. There was resistance to this from government actors, 
due to the use of alternative materials (i.e. bamboo) or the 
incremental nature of sector partners’ solutions.
LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES
Estimates indicated that only between 20% and 30% of peo-
ple in the affected areas had access to legally recognized or 
formal land titles. This presented a major challenge to the 
Sector as it meant that the majority of the affected population 
may be excluded from government assistance. The incentive 
package, when first offered by the government, only included 
legally recognized “owners” of land. The HLP working group 
advocated with government authorities to include a wider 
range of possible beneficiaries of the incentives, ensuring that 
the majority of the population that held no land tenure would 
also be included. The advocacy was successful and resulted 
in the government reforming the regulation to recognize differ-
ent forms of tenure, as appropriate or relevant to the context. 
For instance, bona fid  landowners who may not have pos-
sessed legally recognized title, but could prove their link to the 
land, were granted tenure through “right of use”. Moreover, 
the new regulation granted a grace period of three months 
after receiving the house, to deliver documents proving that 
the person was legal owner or bona fid  landowner.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT
One consequence of the damage was a shift in support for 
non-standard construction materials. Many affected commu-
nities expressed a desire to move away from poorly built re-
inforced concrete buildings (which collapsed, causing many 
causalities), to use more lightweight materials that were seen 
as less dangerous. Although the use of local materials was 
advocated for by the Shelter Sector, it was also very important 
to protect natural resources and discourage use of protected 
or endangered species, especially timber. The Sector facilitat-
ed the production of a timber guideline that was circulated as 
a resource to all sector partners1.
The Shelter Sector worked with key academic institutions in the 
affected area to develop a registry of alternative materials (bam-
boo, timber) which included resources required and available, 
sustainable producers and potential supply pipelines, in an ef-
fort to control pressure on these materials. During the response, 
the government developed new building regulations for the use 
of bamboo in construction (yet to be fully released). A detailed 
evaluation tool was developed to assist the government, sector 
partners and industry stakeholders in evaluating various models 
of permanent housing design in a more holistic way (including 
the social, environmental and economic impact of each model)2. 
1 This guideline is available online at http://bit.ly/2hNEHDs
2 All these documents, along with other resources, can be found on the Shelter 
Cluster Ecuador webpage, http://bit.ly/2k0hTR0
Although initially challenged by the government, many agencies proposed temporary or transitional shelter solutions, that would use local materials (such as bamboo) 
and provide adequate living conditions in the time span between the emergency phase and the formal reconstruction process (planned by the government). 
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KEY ‘BUILD BACK SAFER’ MESSAGES
Knowledge and implementation of hazard-resistant construc-
tion was low in Ecuador. Although the government scheme 
aimed to ensure the reconstruction of the majority of houses 
by qualified contractors, a significant number of affected peo-
ple would not receive such assistance. In many of these cases, 
people started to rebuild immediately, repeating many of the 
same practices that led to previous construction weaknesses.
Starting from the observation that there were crucial and basic 
deficiencies in the use of construction materials and detailing, 
the Technical Working Group within the Shelter Sector decid-
ed to produce key messages, both for non-professionals and 
for local tradespeople, to develop Build Back Safer informa-
tion and support an improved building culture in the affected 
areas3. These were produced within the working group and 
based on previous natural disaster responses, such as Ty-
phoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the Nepal earthquakes4, 
contextualized and expanded with the assistance of local en-
gineers and construction experts. A guidance document was 
produced to explain how to use the key messages and a train-
ing of trainers was developed, to assist sector partners in deliv-
ering the messages to affected communities at a larger scale.
The key messages were disseminated through official chan-
nels, partner NGOs and the private sector, including over local 
media avenues, such as radio and newspapers. A challenge 
in the collaboration with the authorities around the produc-
tion of these key messages was to name them “support for 
self-construction”, given the government position not to sup-
port alternative construction channels. This severely hindered 
the validation and distribution process. 
3 All these documents, along with other resources, can be found on the Shelter 
Cluster Ecuador webpage, http://bit.ly/2k0hTR0
4 See A.8 (Haiyan Key Messages: http://bit.ly/2iEFUwJ) and A.3 (Nepal Key 
Messages: http://bit.ly/28WMJ5s) 
The first key message from the Cluster in Ecuado , as for other shelter respons-
es, was related to the safe location of houses. Much of the vulnerability of the 
housing stock was in fact due to the location, often in informal, steep, or general-
ly hazard-prone areas (Source: Shelter Cluster Ecuador and MIDUVI).
Most shelter options supported by the international community used locally 
available materials, supplemented by CGI roofing sheets or plas ic sheeting.
Mensajes claves y recomendaciones para auto construcción: PRINCIPIOS Ministerio
de Desarrollo
Urbano y Vivienda
No construir cerca de ríos o de 
una zonas inundables.
Construir separado del muro,os
(no adosado y no appoyado).
No construir sobre relleno
sanitario o tierra agrícola.
Mantega buena distancia
al borde del relleno.
Es peligroso construír cerca de  la 
costa (riesgo de tsunamis).
No contruir sobre rellenos.
LA SEGURIDAD DE LA CASA DEPENDE DE SU UBICACIÓN Y FORMA1
No construir en barrancos
ni zonas de derrumbe.
No construir cerca
de acantilados.
1A : UBICACIÓN DE LA CASA
1B : FORMA DE LA CASA
Mejor proporción: 1:1
Buena propoción: 1:2
Proporción máxima: 1:3
Cada fachada debe tener
al menos una pared llena.
Evitar las formas complicadas,
creando juntas sísmicas.
Mínimo 10 cm (recomendado 45-60 cm).
junta
Las paredes deben ser colocadas
continuamente, una encima de la otra.
¡del suelo hasta el techo!
SÍ
SÍ
SÍ
SÍ
SÍ
SÍ
SÍ
NO
EVITAR
NO
NO
NO
NO NONONO
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LESSONS LEARNED 
One of the main issues highlighted by this response was the 
need for the humanitarian community to develop more 
flexible models and structures to work in middle-income 
countries, wherein government capacity is higher than other 
crisis areas. The Sector should be adaptable and able to pro-
vide the appropriate assistance required by the host govern-
ment and not simply operate with standardized approaches. 
The response mechanism needs to be ready for action, but 
flexible enough to be influence  by the context and adapt-
able. The Sector should support the government directly 
and include urban planning, hazard mapping and engineering 
expertise, along with relief, HLP, and recovery planning, in its 
activities. The potential avenues of assistance need to be 
made clear both to the government and existing in-country 
actors, who may not have an understanding of the humanitari-
an system and the potential added value it can bring.
It is necessary to establish clear and consistent sectoral 
coordination under government leadership, or at least un-
der a co-leadership arrangement, and be complementary to 
existing response structures. The Shelter Sector in Ecuador 
operated well for five months with the co-leadership of one 
international agency and the ministry for housing (MIDUVI), 
however the relationship could have been strengthened by 
increasing collaboration from the outset, to clarify roles and 
responsibilities; targeting other key ministries that may 
have been able to assist in any bottlenecks and handover; 
and having more crossover with national disaster response 
mechanisms.
In relation to HLP, the Shelter Sector should continue to work 
together with the protection cluster and governments with the 
support of the international community, to promote HLP stud-
ies as a means of prevention and disaster preparedness. 
There is also a need to build the capacity of local govern-
ments, who were responsible for many territorial planning, 
urban planning and building regulations issues, but who were 
unable to play a strong role in this regard.
The Sector should also work closely with national and local 
authorities in order to ensure that policies and implementation 
modalities do not exclude affected populations due to, for 
instance, their tenure status. Ensuring tenure security (not 
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Humanitarian organizations built transitional shelters made of local bamboo, 
often with the help of volunteers from local NGOs.
www.shelterprojects.org
necessarily formalisation) needs to be a focus of all shel-
tering activities.
Although they took some time to complete, due to the collabo-
rative nature of the process, the key messages were a largely 
successful part of the response. The fact that the messages 
were produced directly in Spanish was seen as a strength, 
and the accompanying guidance notes and subsequent train-
ings were a further positive step forward in making the mes-
sages both relevant and immediately usable. 
The potential of the Shelter Sector is reflected in the following 
case study (A.40) that demonstrates flexibilit , collaboration 
and a locally based approach, that ensured an appropriate 
and effective outcome. The international humanitarian actors 
provided technical and resource support to an existing organ-
ization working on the ground, acting within the local govern-
ment structures. Each organization worked to their strengths 
to deliver a coordinated and well-rounded response that as-
sisted families in the recovery process, gave advice where 
needed and strengthened community knowledge.
Affected households received either emergency shelter solutions, mainly made of tarps and bamboo framing (left), or transitional shelters that would last longer 
(right). However, initially there were concerns that solutions seen as more “permanent” would have disqualified people from the government ass stance.
AMERICAS NATURAL DISASTER
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KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, NFI distribution, Capacity-building, Community participation, Partnerships
RIO NAPO
CRISIS Ecuador Earthquake, 16 April 2016.
TOTAL HOUSES 
DAMAGED
45,455
(Government figures as of December 2016).
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
386,985 people 
(source: Government of Ecuador).
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Selected parishes in Portoviejo, 
Manabí Province.
BENEFICIARIES 3,290 households (Approx. 16,450 
people, with five persons per household).
PROJECT OUTPUTS
3,290 Emergency Shelter Kits.
220 Construction Materials Kits.
2,100 Water filters.
2,680 NFI kits (Mosquito nets, Jerry 
cans, water filters, kitchen set, solar lamps).
COLOMBIA
PERU
PACIFIC 
OCEAN
QUITO
PROJECT SUMMARY   
This project was the result of a collaborative effort between two international organizations (INGO) and a local NGO, 
to assist earthquake-affected families through the provision of emergency shelter kits and non-food items, coupled with 
technical support and trainings. Further construction materials were distributed for particularly vulnerable households in 
the second phase of the project.
1
 17 May 2016: Home distribution of shelter kits
2
1 Jun 2016: Start of materials distribution
3
30 Jul 2016: Completion of first phase distributio
PLANNING
1 2 3
16 APR
2016
18 MAY
2016
15 NOV 
2016
STRENGTHS
+ Excellent community ties of the local partner.
+ Well established relationships amongst project partners and 
complementarity of approaches.
+ Capacity-building components and community ownership.
+ Focus on one geographic location.
WEAKNESSES
- Potential delays due to limited staff available for the project.
- The integration of community volunteers was not very high.
- Mosquito nets were not included for all households.
- Implementation by local leaders was not always consistent with the 
training and advice given by project partners.
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 1 IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2
PROJECT AREAS
SHELTER SIZE Approx. 24m2
SHELTER DENSITY Approx. 4.8m2 per person.
MATERIALS COST PER HOUSEHOLD
Phase 1: USD 71 (Not including labour: Households invested approximately USD 32).
Phase 2: construction materials kit cost: USD 340.
PROJECT COST PER HOUSEHOLD Approx. USD 132 (Phase 1).
OUTCOME INDICATORS
1/ Knowledge and skills: 75% of surveyed beneficiaries agreed with the statement that 
“the shelter training provided was useful”.
2/ Reduced Displacement: 85% stated that they had built their shelter on their original 
plot. 90% stated that the distribution of shelter items made it easier to stay on their plots.
3/ Reduced Stress and Anxiety: 70% stated that by receiving shelter aid they could 
concentrate on meeting other critical needs (Source: Post Distribution Monitoring Report).
PORTOVIEJO
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tives acted as focal points in each community, to enable 
beneficiaries to have clear guidance from within their own 
community, rather than from external agencies. This approach 
aimed at developing a sense of community ownership over 
the process of self-recovery. Distributions were carried out at 
community centres, the local community being informed well 
in advance of the date and time. Project partners ensured that 
there was a high level of community representation, with com-
munity members actually distributing many items themselves. 
Beneficiaries were also trained, during the distributions, 
on the use of the kits. 
In the second phase (also implemented by the local partner), 
selected households were given additional construction ma-
terials funded by one INGO and trainings that complemented 
the distributions in phase one. Demonstration shelters were 
built to provide a reference to the communities. The second 
phase was designed to build on the first phase, to support 
households in their recovery efforts, and focused only on a 
part of the first caseload. Initial technical supervision of phase 
two was provided by one INGO and then passed on to the 
local partner. 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
The affected populations were considered as key partners in 
the project, being actively engaged by project partners dur-
ing beneficiary selection and implementation, thanks to the 
training of trainers approach. In all cases, the partners worked 
within existing community structures to allow as much in-
volvement and ownership as possible. This led to a highly 
community-driven assistance model, which was praised 
by project partners and sector coordinators, as households 
felt comfortable and supported along the process. It was also 
seen that the cascade training methodology led to high lev-
els of uptake of best practices, especially in the use of shel-
ter kits. In a monitoring visit, around 70% of the shelter kits 
distributed were seen in use 48 hours after distribution. Of 
these, around 95% were seen using techniques that had been 
taught to community members. Conversations with beneficia -
ies showed that they knew the focal points in their community 
and felt supported by community structures in the use of the 
shelter kits.
CONTEXT
For more information on the background and the shelter re-
sponse, see overview A.39.
PROJECT GOALS AND PHASES
Through effective partnerships at global and national level, 
the project aimed at addressing the emergency shelter needs 
of people in targeted locations affected by the earthquake, 
minimizing displacement and paving the way for self-recovery 
strategies. This was achieved through a first phase distribu-
tion of shelter kits and NFIs (three months), and a second 
phase distribution of construction materials to selected vulner-
able households (two months).
LOCATIONS AND BENEFICIARY SELECTION 
The project areas were selected in coordination with national 
and local governments and shelter sector coordinators. The 
local partner had established links with the targeted commu-
nities and most agencies had focused their response on other 
areas. At the time of implementation, this project was the only 
visible shelter project in the area. Households were select-
ed following government damage surveys (red = destroyed/
uninhabitable, yellow = partially restricted use, green = safe). 
Houses categorized as red were all targeted. Households with 
specific vulnerabilities, such as female-headed households, 
those with members with disabilities, or with children under 
five years or elders, were selected for additional assistance in 
the second phase of the project and received extra materials 
and labour support.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
The project was implemented through distributions and train-
ings at the community level, primarily by the local partner, with 
approximately 10 staff. INGO partners sent a total of six staff 
and provided remote support throughout. Firstly, a training 
of trainers for the local organization staff and community 
representatives was conducted by one INGO partner on the 
use of the shelter kits and distribution methods. Subsequently, 
the local partner took care of the technical supervision of 
trainings and distributions, while monitoring was undertaken 
by an INGO partner. The trained community representa-
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The project provided earthquake-affected families with emergency shelter kits and trainings at the community level, so that they could be better able to build shelters.
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COORDINATION 
Prior to this response, there had been good coordination 
between the two INGO partners at the global and regional 
levels. This had been initiated through Shelter Cluster mech-
anisms, and meant that both parties communicated and 
were familiar with their methods. The continuous support 
from sector coordinators also facilitated the implementation 
process. At the response level, coordination was passed on 
to the local organization, to encourage local solutions and 
capacity-building. The local organization also had good links 
with the municipal government, paving the way for a smooth 
process and good access in targeted areas.
MATERIALS SOURCING 
The NFIs and shelter kits for phase one were all sourced in-
ternationally by one INGO partner and imported during the 
emergency phase. Stocks were sourced in this way so as to 
ensure swift delivery at scale, to the correct specifications,
when there was not the time to complete full market surveys 
and procurement in country. As the kits were standard IFRC 
specification, procured from accredited manufacturers, the 
quality control was built-in and no issues were identified at the 
time of the project, nor in subsequent evaluations. 
In phase two, materials – such as untreated bamboo and tim-
ber for framing – were locally sourced by the affected popu-
lation. Bamboo was chosen as it was abundantly available, 
relatively cheap (when untreated) and locally accepted. Many 
of the affected communities seemed highly skilled in its use, 
being able to produce secure frames very quickly. Additionally, 
many households were salvaging timbers and other materials.
Remarkably, the emergency shelters funded by one INGO 
were built upon the kits initially provided by the other INGO, 
generating significant economies of scale.
TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS 
In phase one, the use of locally available, low-tech, skills and 
materials was encouraged, and simple techniques were de-
signed so that community members could easily understand 
and use them. The local partner representatives were trained 
in the use of the shelter kits, such as standardized fixing tech-
niques for tarpaulins to timber, bamboo and rope. These tech-
niques were in line with Shelter Cluster guidance.
In phase two, 220 extremely vulnerable families from two par-
ishes received additional construction materials, to improve 
the quality of their temporary shelters. According to the dif-
ferent needs and land typologies, two different kits were 
designed. In Crucita, a coastal parish, the design considered 
the use of the shelter kit provided in advance and included 
bamboo structures and a concrete floo . The other type of 
materials kit was designed for Rio Chico, a parish affected 
by seasonal floods, and allowed the households to raise their 
shelters with a bamboo structure and wooden floors. In the 
future, this temporary shelter can be used as a storage unit.
In all of the cases, tarpaulins were used for walls and coverings. 
Families were instructed not to use permanent materials for 
their temporary shelters, as it would potentially disqualify them 
for future government support towards a permanent house, and 
add additional weight on the limited load-bearing structure. 
MAIN CHALLENGES 
TIMELINESS. Although initially some partners felt that the shelter 
kits had taken too long to be procured (approx. one month), a 
post distribution survey found that beneficiaries were satisfied  
Most of the procurement challenges were overcome thanks to 
the local partner, who could act as a consignee to import the kits.
DEVELOPING THE PARTNERSHIP. Although it was seen 
as a key project strength, the development of the partnership 
between the two international and one local partners required 
time and input from all three parties. This challenge was 
mitigated through pre-existing agreements between the two 
INGO partners and the in-country relationship between one 
INGO and the local organization. Agreements and working 
methods were established in a timely manner, thanks to effec-
tive coordination at global, regional and field levels.
DEFINING A CASELOAD. In the initial phase, the three part-
ners selected beneficiaries based on damage data compiled 
by the government. Once a caseload had been defined, fur-
ther aftershocks caused some areas to be reassessed and 
some previously excluded households became eligible for 
assistance. This could not be covered by the first round of 
distributions, as it happened after the logistical mobilization 
of the kits. However, it was addressed with a second round 
of emergency assistance that mirrored the first. It was highly 
beneficial that the local partner was continuously active both 
at field and capital levels to understand the changing needs, 
and that the INGO partners continued to coordinate and had 
resources to enable the second round.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT 
As shown in the Post Distribution Monitoring report, the project 
helped communities in their self-recovery, both through tech-
nical trainings and promotion of community ownership of the pro-
cess. The project avoided displacement, as most beneficiarie  
were able to stay on their original plots, without leaving their com-
munities and livelihoods. They also felt that, thanks to the shelter 
intervention, they were able to focus on other critical needs.
Additionally, INGO partners felt that the project led to in-
creased capacities, both within the local organization and 
the communities, in terms of dealing with shelter issues in re-
sponse to a natural disaster. Such capacities are both “hard” 
and “soft”, as communities now have clear systems and focal 
points to respond to a disaster. It was also felt that relation-
ships between the communities and the local organization 
were strengthened by the project.
Shelter sector coordinators, who visited project areas and 
distributions, praised the project approach, especially for its 
community focus and capacity-building aspects. The success 
assessed by partners, communities and coordinators, has led 
one of the INGO partners to consider replicating this model 
of assistance in other contexts.
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The project had a high level of community engagement and training. Community 
representatives would act as focal points to ensure a smooth implementation.
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Shelter kits (and construction kits in phase 2) were distributed by the local 
partner (see materials list below), while supervision and programme design, 
monitoring and evaluation was done by the two INGO partners.
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STRENGTHS
+ Capacity of the local implementer, who had excellent 
community ties.
+ Well established relationships amongst project part-
ners. The two INGO partners had good relationships at the 
regional and global levels, and had worked together before. 
These relationships had been created and fostered through 
Shelter Cluster mechanisms. The relationship between the 
two INGO partners is based on the complementarity of ap-
proaches, as one has a focus on emergency shelter, while 
the other has a more recovery-based focus, whilst the local 
organization had community ties and knowledge of the local 
context. The partnership hopes to enable good quality shel-
ter programming throughout the post disaster phases, thanks 
to elements of continuity from the emergency phase through 
early recovery, as well as the continued dialogue and assis-
tance between actors.
+ Capacity-building components and community owner-
ship. The cascade-style training of trainers reinforced com-
munity recovery efforts, even though the items and trainings 
were provided by project partners. Particularly, the training 
of community leaders (as a network of local focal points to 
support families in the proper use of shelter kits) ensured the 
sustainability of the intervention.
+ Focus on one geographic location, rather than attempt-
ing to cover more areas than capacity allowed.
WEAKNESSES
+ The decision to use minimal staff for the project meant 
that project timescales were potentially lengthened.
+ The integration of community volunteers was not as 
high as was hoped, primarily due to a lack of monitoring 
capacity.
+ Mosquito nets should have been included since the 
start and for all beneficiaries, as many shelters had open 
gables to allow airflo , and the first round of distributions did 
not include mosquito nets for all households.
+ Implementation by local leaders was not always con-
sistent with the training and advice given by project 
partners. This was mainly due to a lack of project staff at 
site level. It was agreed by project partners that greater lev-
els of monitoring, immediately post distribution, would have 
enabled a more consistent implementation. 
www.shelterprojects.org
MATERIALS LIST
Shelter Kit, http://bit.ly/2ohLMxI 1 kit per HH USD 30
CONSTRUCTION 
MATERIAL KIT - TYPE 1
Bamboo 12 yards
Bamboo 8 yards
Bamboo 7 yards
Bamboo 4 yards
Nails 2 lbs
Split Bamboo 3 yards
Cement
Sand
Rubble
Thread 3/8
Screw
Pole 
Pole
Pole
Pole
Box
Pole
Bag
m3
m3
Unit
Pound
3
1
4
2
17
2
13
1.5
1.5
4
2
USD 320 
per kit
CONSTRUCTION 
MATERIAL KIT - TYPE 2
Bamboo 12 yards
Bamboo 8 yards
Bamboo 7 yards
Bamboo 4 yards
Nails 2 lbs
Split Bamboo 3 yards
Wood Board
Cement
Sand
Rubble
Thread 3/8
Screw
Pole
Pole
Pole
Pole
Box
Pole
unit
Bag
m3
m3
unit
pound
10
1
6
2
2
17
23
13
1.5
2
4
2
USD 380 
per kit
LEARNINGS 
• Training of trainers, directly targeting community representatives, greatly enhances self-recovery. 
• It is important to foster ownership with a community-based approach and engage local leaders since the 
start. In this project, they were responsible for different activities, supporting communities towards their own recovery.
• Continued dialogue between INGO partners at the regional and global levels, outside of times of calamity, will lead 
to increased coordination and partnerships at field level. This can be achieved through official coordination mecha-
nisms, such as the Shelter Cluster and bilateral conversations.
• Working alongside – and building the capacity of – local organizations can be key to gaining sustainable access to 
affected communities and can lead to a longer-term presence, than if works are carried out by international actors alone. 
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
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SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
A massive influx of refugees and migrants through South-East-
ern European countries resulted in an emergency in transit – 
as well as destination – countries between 2015 and 2016. 
However, migration towards Europe was not a new phenom-
enon. This overview focuses on the shelter coordination and 
response to this crisis in key locations, primarily Greece, the 
Balkans and Germany, where the majority of first arrivals to 
the EU, transit and final arrivals to destination were found
EUROPE 2015-2016 / REFUGEE CRISIS 
CRISIS
Migrations flows to Europe  
2015-2016
TOTAL ARRIVALS
BY LAND AND SEA 
TO EUROPE1
1,046,599 in 2015
387,739 in 2016
Migrant Routes: Mediterranean 2016 (Source: IOM - http://migration.iom.int/europe/)
1 IOM, as of 31 December 2016 (http://migration.iom.int/europe). Data collated 
from national authorities, IOM and UNHCR. 
2 Stranded migrants are those who, for a reason beyond their control, have 
been unintentionally forced to stay in a country (European Migration Network).
3 IOM, Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Compilation of 
Available Data and Information – No. 30, 1 December 2016.
COUNTRIES OF
ARRIVAL IN EUROPE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
ARRIVING 
(1 Jan 2015 - 31 Dec 2016)1
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE STRANDED 
(As of 31 Dec 2016)2
Italy
Greece
Bulgaria
Spain
335,278
1,034,269
47,136
17,091
Not available
62,784
5,560
Not available
COUNTRIES OF
TRANSIT IN EUROPE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE 
ARRIVING 
(1 Jan 2015 - 31 Dec 2016)1
NUMBER OF
PEOPLE STRANDED 
(As of 31 Dec 2016)2
FYROM*
Serbia
Hungary
Croatia
Slovenia
478,004
678,493
430,690
659,105
477,791
137
5,633
460
624
315
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To Italy To Greece
EASTERN AND CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN - MONTHLY ARRIVALS 
TO GREECE AND ITALY (2015 - 2016)
TIMELINE
2011: Arab Spring prompts start of increased migration from North and 
sub-Saharan Africa to Malta and Italy via the Central Mediterranean route. 
Start of conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and first population movements 
into neighbouring countries (Turkey and Lebanon).
2012: Escalating flight of Syrian refugees into neighbouring countries (including 
Jordan, Iraq and Egypt).
Apr 2015: Start of “Balkan route” migration.
Jun 2015: UNHCR declares internal Level 2 Emergency for Greece, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia.
Aug 2015: Start of open borders in Austria and Germany.
Sep 2015: Closure of Hungary’s borders; arrivals to Croatia and Slovenia increase
Oct 2015: Peak monthly arrivals to Greece by sea.
Mar 2016: Closure of the migration routes through the Balkans due to re-activa-
tion of Schengen border regimes. EU-Turkey deal made to relocate new arrivals.
Nov 2016: 543% increase in stranded migrants in Bulgaria since March 20163.
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* the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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MIGRATION IN 2015
Migration departing from North Africa towards Europe in-
creased since 2011. However, since 2015, attention was 
focused on the emergency situation caused by large pop-
ulation movements into the Balkans4 and Northern / Western 
European countries (via Turkey and Greece). Compared to 
the 219,000 people who arrived in 20145, a 500% increase 
in total arrivals to Europe was seen in 2015. Ongoing and 
escalating conflicts were likely to account for the dramatic 
increase in numbers arriving to Greece, with 47% of arrivals 
coming from the Syrian Arab Republic, 24% from Afghan-
istan and 15% from Iraq. During the second part of 2015, 
arrivals to Greece by sea reached their peak. By the end 
of the year, 857,363 people arrived in Greece (compared to 
153,842 to Italy). Arrivals did not decrease significantly over 
winter, despite harsh conditions at sea.
MIGRATION IN 2016
Arrivals to Italy in 2016 (total: 181,4366) increased 18% from 
2015, mostly via the Central Mediterranean route. Migrants and 
refugees originate from a number of different countries in North 
Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn of Africa7, with a small 
proportion from the Syrian Arab Republic (less than 1%)8. 
Greece saw a 79% decrease in cumulative arrivals9, totalling 
176,906 in 2016, inverting the trend from 2015. The reac-
tivation of the standard Schengen border arrangements in 
March 2016 closed the borders of several transit countries, 
to stem the flow of people. Combined with an agreement be-
tween the European Union (EU) and Turkey in March 2016 
4 Use of the term “Balkans” relates to the geographic peninsula and does not 
differentiate between EU and non-EU countries. “Balkan route” refers to those 
countries through which migrants transited (or were attempting to transit), i.e. 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary 
and Slovenia.
5 UNHCR, The Sea Route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of 
refugees, July 2015.
6 IOM, as of 31 December 2016: http://migration.iom.int/europe.
7 The majority originate from Nigeria, Eritrea and Gambia, Guinea, Sudan and 
Ivory Coast – UNHCR, Dec 2016.
8 UNHCR, December 2016.
9 Up to 31 December 2016. From IOM, Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterra-
nean and Beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information – Reporting 
period 1 December 2016 – 11 January 2017.
to return migrants and asylum seekers to Turkey, this led to 
a significant decline in arrivals by sea to Greece
As of December 2016, the total number of migrants and ref-
ugees stranded in Greece and the Balkans was 75,031. In 
Greece, all new arrivals were restricted to the islands, until asy-
lum status (or safe relocation to Turkey) could be established.
COORDINATION AND RESPONSE
Initially, the authorities and humanitarian responders in 
Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, 
Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia were addressing a dynamic 
situation of populations in transit. This required tempo-
rary accommodation and mobile and lightweight assistance 
at strategic points, as people continued their journey north-
wards. Assistance often comprised distribution of NFIs, emer-
gency shelter, establishment of collective shelters in existing 
buildings or in tents and Rubb Halls, and adaptation of build-
ings and sites to allow basic services and facilities to be pro-
vided in areas of transit. 
As border closures and restrictions on movement came into 
force in early 2016, longer-term assistance was required 
to adapt to more static populations in numerous locations 
across Greece and countries on the Balkan route. For exam-
ple, reception centres were consolidated and expanded, to al-
low the closure of other ad-hoc transit areas, and services and 
facilities in these sites were improved, through upgrades and 
rehabilitations, such as the installation of heating, insulation, 
water networks and sanitation.
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Many new arrivals to Europe in 2015-16 passed through the Balkans. Often, people were registered at border crossing points (Berkasovo Bapska, Serbia, Oct 2015).
In Greece, many refugees were accommodated in tented camps. In summer, tents had to be shaded, also by building metal-framed structures (Elliniko, Athens).
Note: It is impossible to adequately provide detailed informa-
tion on the wide-ranging and varied responses across the re-
gion, given the geographic scope of this overview, alongside 
the political complexities and administrative variances of each 
country involved. Therefore, the main focus of this overview is 
the Greece-Balkan-Germany route, as it is more relevant to the 
context of the publication and the case studies that relate to 
it – i.e. the set up and evolution of (emergency) humanitarian 
shelter response – than the more established and longer-term 
responses in Italy, Malta and Spain, for example. 
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GREECE
Emergency support needs in Greece remained high in 2016. 
Formal and informal settlements, including refugee camps, 
were negotiated and established, with other accommodation 
and shelter options being explored. There was a high level of 
technical capacity already present, as well as a desire from 
Greek civil society to be at the forefront of the response10. 
Pre-registration of arrivals occurs in Reception and Identifi-
cation Centres (formerly called “hotspots”) on the islands of 
Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos, rather than direct 
transferral to the mainland. Surveys indicate that people pre-
fer to be transferred to alternative accommodation in urban 
centres, such as Athens or Thessaloniki. During the first-wave
of arrivals, refugees and migrants with greater financial means 
attempted to leave Greece quickly, while more vulnerable pop-
ulations had to remain, mainly in urban areas11. Those with 
financial resources chose to improve their shelter situation 
by finding alternative private accommodation, for instance. In 
2016, occupancy far outstripped capacity on the islands12 
and, towards the end of the year, capacity to absorb arrivals 
became limited also on the mainland. Approximately 51,000 
places were available in various forms of accommodation in 
December 2016, leaving a shortfall of 11,000 places.
In 2016, Greece therefore evolved from a transit country into a 
longer-term hosting location. The majority of sites on the main-
land were government-built, emergency, tented settlements, 
intended for temporary use. They soon went over capacity, 
with limited services that did not meet minimum standards and 
were located away from urban centres13, increasing depend-
ency on multisector assistance. While the government took 
on the primary duty of providing shelter and services to 
camps, gaps in service provision emerged – particularly 
for persons with specific needs and vulnerabilities. At the time 
of writing, additional and expanded sites were being planned, 
with the evacuation of spontaneous settlements in public 
parks and squares foreseen.
By the end of 2016, 21,057 reception places were created 
in Greece for relocation candidates to other EU countries, 
when the capacity in 2015 was about 1,20014. During 2016, 
this programme was expanded to other people seeking asy-
lum in Greece, prioritizing the most vulnerable and embracing 
other forms of accommodation than formal camps, including 
10 Greece Mainland Needs Assessment Report, NRC, March 2016.
11 CRS, Refugee and Migrant Emergency in Europe: City of Athens Shelter 
Analysis, June 2016.
12 NRC Rapid Assessment for out-of-camp housing and education, July 2016.
13 CRS, Refugee and Migrant Emergency in Europe: City of Athens Shelter 
Analysis, June 2016.
14 UNHCR Greece: Weekly Accommodation and Relocation Update 3 January 2017.
apartments, hotels and “matchmaking” refugees with host 
families. The provision of this type of accommodation included 
service delivery in compliance with applicable Greek laws and 
regulations. Local NGOs and community-based organiza-
tions also engaged in alternative shelter support to refu-
gees and migrants. These organizations either rented a hotel, 
which provided the services, or a building and rehabilitated 
or adapted it, with services provided by the residents them-
selves, or the organization’s volunteers.
The sector also started identifying opportunities for mid- to 
long-term shelter solutions within the existing building 
stock, including the use of public-private and market-based 
initiatives. For example, the use of holiday homes and apart-
ments (approx. 30% of buildings in Athens are vacant), or 
renovations to older buildings. Another idea was the conver-
sion of public and commercial buildings to residential accom-
modation, with expedited procedures to obtain permission 
for a change of use and negotiations over rent. 
A Shelter-NFI Sector Working Group was established in 
March 2016 in Greece, to facilitate inter-agency coordination 
of response activities for refugees and migrants. The main 
activities were: 
1) Coordinating with relevant government bodies and all oth-
er sectors. 
2) Validating, promoting and monitoring of the use of techni-
cal guidance and minimum standards, across all shelter and 
NFI interventions. 
3) Building local and national capacity to understand human-
itarian needs with regard to shelter and NFIs.
4) Exploring appropriate shelter and site planning designs 
for longer-term solutions within sites.
5) Pursuing an integrated urban shelter strategy to promote al-
ternatives to camps, by capitalizing on existing building stock.
At the regional field level, there were two hubs: Attica / Central 
Greece and Thessaloniki. Each of the five main reception is-
lands had their own working group hub. The Working Group 
developed a number of technical guidance documents, 
including minimum standards and procedures on shelter shad-
ing structures, NFIs and distributions, heating solutions, site 
planning standards, shelter upgrading and communal kitchens.
By the end of 2016, at national level, the coordination struc-
ture was modified, to better reflect the operational needs of the 
refugees and migrants and to facilitate stronger communication 
with relevant governmental counterparts. Thus, Shelter merged 
with WASH, while NFI split to standalone as one working group. 
The intention for 2017 was for NFI, cash and food to merge as 
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Many refugee camps in Greece were either upgraded from tents or built from the start with containers (Left: Kara Tepe camp, Lesvos. Right: Eleonas, Athens).
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a “Basic Assistance” Working Group, while shelter and WASH 
would remain combined at all coordination levels15.
THE BALKAN ROUTE
With the sealing of Hungary’s borders in September 2015, in-
creasing numbers of migrants arrived in Croatia and Slovenia 
from Serbia. Transit and reception centres started to be 
established at the multiple entry, transit and exit points. 
Available facilities at these crossing points were put to tem-
porary use as registration points and accommodation, but 
conditions were very basic, providing only protection against 
the elements, NFIs, food distribution and emergency medical 
services. As these camp-like sites were mostly not suitable 
for winter conditions, alternative transit areas had to be 
developed to provide registration and other services, such 
as medical assistance, psychosocial support, family reunific -
tion, food, separate showers, mother-baby centres and child 
friendly areas, alongside meeting other minimum standards, 
such as covered space and WASH. Changing transport ar-
rangements for incoming populations (from train to bus-
es) succeeded in reducing the need for such numerous and 
dispersed facilities. In urban centres, some of the migrant 
population were living in unofficial sites, such as abandoned 
buildings, or sleeping rough.
However, the number of people transiting through the Balkans 
was under-estimated, as many did not register. The major-
ity aimed to travel through the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Serbia, onwards to Hungary, Croatia and 
Slovenia. Shelter needs in 2015 were for safe, temporary 
shelter along transit routes, particularly at border crossings, 
boat crossings and registration sites, where bottlenecks would 
form and people would remain stranded for significant periods 
of time. A major challenge in 2016 remained ensuring protec-
tion from the severe winter weather in the region, as well as 
the provision of more suitable overall conditions for longer-
term accommodation and integration.
GERMANY
At the end of August 2015, Germany opened its doors to Syrian 
asylum seekers, no matter in which EU country they had set 
foot before. There were up to 60,000 new arrivals per week in 
September 2015 (figures decreased to 21,000 in January 2016 
and plummeted to 700 in August 201616), most of whom travelled 
through Austria and entered Germany in the state of Bavaria.
Once in Germany17, populations on the move were received 
at reception centres at border towns, typically for only a few 
days before being relocated to mid-term accommodation. Be-
fore the opening of reception centres, first accommodation 
for newly arriving refugees and migrants was ad hoc, rang-
ing from sports halls and unused buildings, but also including 
people sleeping in train stations, or even in the open.
In order to provide adequate shelter for almost one million 
refugees and migrants who arrived during 2015, a number of 
interventions were mobilized:
• Winterizing existing accommodation;
• Re-purposing of existing buildings as collective centres;
• Construction of Rubb Halls / large tents as collective centres;
• Erection of family-sized tents; 
• Installation of infrastructure and communal facilities;
15 2017 Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RRMRP)
16 German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, http://www.bamf.de/EN
17 This overview focuses on Germany, as it was the main destination country 
and because the following case study A.42 deals with the set-up and operation 
of a reception centre near the Austrian border. Other destination countries include 
Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Norway.
These evolved into mid-term accommodation sites run by a num-
ber of organizations, in order to provide support during the asy-
lum application process. Long-term accommodation for accept-
ed asylum seekers was ideally seen as a general social housing 
scheme. The government emphasized integrating the refugees 
as soon as possible, instead of risking the creation of “refugee 
ghettos”. Therefore, long-neglected social housing programmes 
were reactivated, funded by the communes and the federal gov-
ernment. Since there had been a shortage of affordable housing 
in most of major German cities for years, the aim was to benefi  
both the refugees and the hosting communes.
LOOKING FORWARD / CHALLENGES
In early 2017, short-, mid- and long-term accommodation op-
tions in Greece, countries along the Balkan route and in desti-
nation countries were being explored, through a scaling-up of 
construction, upgrading and expansion of facilities and sites. 
However, the attainment of suitable, durable, solutions for 
those already in Europe and those that continued to arrive – 
both in terms of legal status and more immediate basic needs 
– remained a higher-level political issue, which usually takes 
time to resolve in each hosting country and within the EU.
Advocacy for clear, coordinated and consistent long-term 
strategies to address the needs of migrants, refugees and 
host populations continued. However, the challenges faced 
across Europe were rising, as intended temporary shelters 
became a longer-term norm for many people. Tensions be-
tween some host communities and migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers, escalated in many countries in Europe, 
occasionally resulting in violence and destruction of shelters 
and settlements. Frustration was also felt for the long regis-
tration waiting times and the deterioration of living conditions. 
While camp-like solutions often seemed to be preferred, sites 
varied greatly in service-provision, standards and conditions. 
Some governments were slow in assigning sites and expand-
ing capacity in alternative locations, to enable a transition to 
mid-term accommodation, while asylum or relocation proce-
dures are underway. In addition, lack of coordination and 
resources led to gaps in service provision, such as winterized 
accommodation and safe cooking provision.
www.shelterprojects.org
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Along the Balkans route, migrants and refugees were assisted with transport 
to and between transit or registration centres (Croatia, October 2015).
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CASE STUDY
JANOCT MARSEP NOV APRDEC MAY JUNFEB
GERMANY 2015-2016 / REFUGEE CRISIS
KEYWORDS: Emergency shelter, NFI distribution, Site planning, Infrastructure, Short-term reception centre
CRISIS European migrant and refugee crisis (multiple 
countries of origin)
TOTAL PEOPLE 
AFFECTED
1,047,162 total arrivals to Europe in 2015.
382,687 total arrivals to Europe in 2016.
476,649 Asylum Requests in Germany in 2015.
PROJECT 
LOCATIONS Feldkirchen and Erding, Bavaria, Germany.
BENEFICIARIES 170,000+ individuals (across both sites).
OUTPUTS
Feldkirchen: accommodation for up to 3,200 
individuals.
Erding: accommodation for up to 5,000 individuals.
SHELTER SIZE
Varies from single-family tents (18m2).
to pre-fabricated shared structures (2,500m2).
SHELTER
DENSITY
Varies from 3m2 per person (family tent) to 8m2 
per person in larger halls. Note: more than 90% 
of the people spent less than 24 hours in the facilities.
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PROJECT SUMMARY   
Two short-term reception centres were set up in the state of Bavaria 
to provide temporary accommodation for thousands of migrants and 
refugees entering Germany at the peak of the migration crisis in 2015. 
One site was set up in the summer and then winterized in phases, 
while the other opened as a winterized camp after a longer construc-
tion period.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
18 Sep 2015: Non-winterized accommodation for up to 3,000 people
25 Sept. 2015: Ground preparation for collective structures
15 Oct 2015: Start of set-up of four large, pre-fab, light-weight, collec-
tive hall structures
Nov 2015: Start of works for dismantling summer tents and ground 
preparation for semi-permanent winter tents. Installation of drainage 
and sanitation
15 Nov 2015: Replacement of administration tents with modular win-
terized containers
Dec 2015: Start of works for dismantling collective halls and replace-
ment with wooden structures, with higher snow-bearing capacity
1 Jul 2016: Stand-by mode for both sites (arrivals have ended)
1
4
2
5
6
7
3
STRENGTHS
+ Rapid involvement of local volunteers at scale.
+ Support and engagement of the armed forces.
+ Positive partnership with civil protection and armed forces.
+ Very fast, flexible and coordinated approach to set up the camp
+ Quick availability of essential items thanks to the organization’s 
network.
 
WEAKNESSES
- Lack of available space and stricter regulations, due to poor site 
location.
- Complex coordination structures, which diverted resources and 
energy
- Lack of experienced staff at field and HQ levels
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MASSIVE INFLUX OF REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS
CAMPS OPERATING
SUMMER CAMP IMPLEMENTATION
PLANNING FOR WINTERIZATION
WINTERIZED CAMP IMPLEMENTATION
BERLIN
STUTTGART
HAMBURG
MUNICH
MUNICH
VIENNA
BUDAPEST
BELGRADE
ATHENS
FRANKFURT
HAMBURG
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SEA
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PROJECT SITES
TURKEYGREECE
SERBIA
CROATIA
SLOVENIA
AUSTRIA
AUSTRIA
GERMANY
HUNGARY
FYROM*
Main migrant route to Germany, 2015 * the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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PROJECT GOALS
The organization was asked to provide mass accommoda-
tion for short-term use close to the Austrian border, where 
the majority of migrants and refugees entered. Two sites 
(Feldkirchen and Erding) were set up for this purpose. These 
first reception centres needed to cover basic needs, whilst at 
the same time the official government registration process 
was starting. The project used a holistic approach, aimed 
at providing warm and safe shelter, food, essential NFIs, fam-
ily-member tracking and medical services to the newly ar-
rived refugees and migrants, with priority to unaccompanied 
minors, sick and traumatized people. An official registration 
centre on site allowed the start of the legal process to apply 
for asylum, as well as providing information and counselling 
about the asylum processes in Germany and the EU. 
PROJECT LOCATIONS
Different sites, belonging to the German army and municipal-
ities in lower Bavaria, were assessed for a possible location 
to set up a camp for up to 5,000 people in a very short time 
frame. Feldkirchen, one of the two chosen sites, is located about 
100km away from Passau (the main border-crossing point from 
Austria) and is outside the boundaries of a military base. The 
proximity to the base ensured access to infrastructure (elec-
tricity, water and sewerage grids), ready-to-use facilities such 
as gyms (in Feldkirchen) and hangars (in Erding), manpower 
provided by the federal army, as well as equipment and ma-
chinery for a quick set-up. Although the organization worked 
on both sites, this case study focuses primarily on Feldkirchen.
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
The camp in Feldkirchen had to be opened just after one 
week of construction, in order to release the pressure from 
the immediate border towns and to prevent big numbers of 
refugees heading to Munich, where the Oktoberfest was on-
going. It started as a summer-camp, using gymnasiums and 
family tents as accommodation facilities. Step by step, it was 
scaled up to a winterized camp, with works carried out during 
CONTEXT
See overview A.41 for more information on the migration/refu-
gee crisis in Europe in 2015-2016.
ACCOMMODATION FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS
All asylum seekers in Germany were first received in the 
closest reception facilities of the Federal Land in question. 
Such a facility could be responsible for temporary, as well as 
longer-term, accommodation. Depending on the country of 
origin, asylum seekers could be accommodated in reception 
facilities for up to six months, or until their application was 
decided on. They could also be allocated to another facility 
during this period, under certain circumstances, for instance 
for family reunificatio 1.
New arrivals had to be distributed evenly across the differ-
ent states and communes in Germany, based upon the size 
and capacity of each individual community. The government 
granted waivers to town- and country-planning codes, in or-
der to accelerate the set-up of accommodation facilities for 
asylum seekers.
There were three accommodation types: 1) short-term, 
first reception centres, intended for registration and very 
short stay (up to three days); 2) mid-term, secondary recep-
tion centres (up to three months); and 3) long-term, collective 
centres (though individual apartments were the preferred op-
tion in the long run). Given the emergency situation, most 
short-term accommodations, such as schools and gymna-
siums, were used for longer periods of time. While at firs  
short-term centres received people both at day and night, 
once transport by trains and buses was established at border 
towns, the migrants were taken directly to mid-term recep-
tion centres all over the country, where they stayed until a 
decision was taken about their asylum application. Most peo-
ple arrived at the short-term reception centres at night, when 
transport to other parts of the country was not operating.
1 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: Stages of the German Asylum 
Procedure, http://bit.ly/2jrU58D.
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Two short-term accommodation sites for new arrivals were set up and upgraded in phases before the winter. Here, Feldkirchen in October (left) and December (right).
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normal camp operations by temporarily reducing the capacity. 
The site in Erding opened already as a winterized camp, after 
a longer construction period.
The project was implemented in a joint effort of multiple part-
ners, including the implementing organization at the national 
and local levels, the civil protection, the armed forces and rel-
evant local authorities. Three gymnasiums could be used for 
collective centres immediately, with enough space around to 
set up hundreds of family tents. 
Besides active support in the set-up, the armed forces (the 
Helfende Hände / helping-hands sector) were also used for 
the registration process. The civil protection’s huge network of 
highly skilled volunteers was well equipped with heavy machin-
ery and tools to be used in case of emergencies. Within one 
week, a camp to accommodate up to 3,000 people was set up.
In a second step, a better planned camp, with proper infra-
structure and sufficient winterized accommodations, was to 
be built on the former airfield of the base. However, due to 
environmental protection issues, the preferred location was 
finally not available. The winterized accommodation facilities 
(3,200 in Feldkirchen, 5,000 in Erding) were set up on the 
same site, using a variety of different shelter interventions: 
re-purposing of existing buildings and construction of large 
tents as collective centres; deployment of family tents; instal-
lation of infrastructure and structures for communal facilities. 
At peak, Feldkirchen was accepting up to 25 buses (with ap-
proximately 1,400 new arrivals) per night.
All those who passed through the reception centres of Feld-
kirchen and Erding, moved to longer-term accommodation 
elsewhere in Germany through a series of steps, or tried to 
reach another European country to apply for asylum.
After June 2016, due the decrease in arrivals, the two sites 
were put in stand-by mode. Within 72 hours, Feldkirchen 
could accommodate up to 1,000 people, and after 14 days it 
could reach full capacity. Erding could be back to full capacity 
within a notice of 30 days.
COORDINATION
New arrivals to the state of Bavaria who could not be distributed 
to other states, or were caught by the border police, were sent 
by buses to Feldkirchen. The capacity of the camp was com-
municated on a daily basis to the refugee coordination centres 
in Passau and Munich, in order to decide how many refugees 
would be distributed between the different reception centres.
Within the camp, there were two complex layers of coordina-
tion for the project. Both daily camp management and longer 
term modificati ns of the camp had to be coordinated with a 
wide range of actors. Bi-weekly coordination meetings aimed 
to solve all issues as they arose, which was normal for a pro-
ject under such extreme time pressure. 
MAIN CHALLENGES
The major challenge was turning the summer camp into 
a winterized camp, because the works had to be conducted 
on the same site, while it was operating. Scaling-up was done 
by sectors, causing a temporary reduction of accommodation 
capacities. The sector that was to be scaled up had to be sep-
arated by fences from the main camp, the summer tents were 
removed and the ground was prepared, before the winterized 
structures could be installed in each sector. There was a sig-
nificant drop in numbers of refugees in November and De-
cember 2015, which made this process easier.
Without the waivers to normal planning codes, granted by 
the government for the emergency situation, this project 
would not have been possible in the given time frame. Still, 
it was challenging to implement such a project with au-
thorities who were used to very clear laws and responsi-
bilities, which were not always applicable for the camp con-
struction. Administrative levels and requirements changed 
during the set-up period, causing some inconsistencies. For 
example, several rows of winterized tents (that had already 
been installed) had to be moved to provide wider escape 
alleys in case of fire or panic, although the set-up had previ-
ously been agreed. Fire prevention was the most difficult and 
controversial part, due to different interpretations of safety. In 
Feldkirchen, for instance, bunk beds were not allowed in col-
lective halls (due to fire risk), whilst there were no problems 
in Erding. Although at the national level there was consent 
to prioritize action over bureaucracy, at field level it was not 
always clear how flexible rules were. As a result, the project 
would sometimes make a brave step forward followed by two 
steps back.
WIDER IMPACTS OF THE PROJECT
There was great interest in this project within the hosting 
community and many volunteers supported the camp op-
erations in different ways: with in-kind donations, during the 
welcome of new arrivals, or playing with the children. A local 
night club organized charity concerts to support the camp. The 
entrance fee was a pair of warm socks, shoes or other winter 
clothes, which were all urgently needed for the camp residents.
The camp also attracted local businesses. Soon, private 
taxis were waiting in front of the camp to take customers from 
the camp to the next train station, though this was not encour-
aged. Local suppliers also provided other services to run the 
camp, such as heating fuel, catering and laundry.
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The reception centres were upgraded/winterized, while in operation, through several steps between October and December (e.g., by adding a layer of gravel).
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STRENGTHS
+ Involvement of local volunteers through the local branch 
was rapid and at scale. Volunteers were interviewed and de-
ployed within a few weeks, according to their capacities and 
interests. Several people from the organization and its local 
branch were deployed just to coordinate the volunteers.
+ The armed forces were supportive and engaged 
throughout the process.
+ Positive partnership with civil protection and armed 
forces, due to the ad-hoc availability of skilled manpower 
and professional technical equipment.
+ Very fast and coordinated approach to set up the 
camp. All partners were strongly committed to provide the 
best support possible to the refugees. There was flexibility to 
start with a quick-and-dirty solution to provide urgently need-
ed relief, and then to scale up, step by step.
+ Quick availability of huge numbers of essential items, 
like tents, field beds and blankets, was possible through 
combined donations of the organization’s partner societies.
WEAKNESSES
- Lack of available space and strict regulations, due to 
poor site location. The site was situated between military 
barracks, a water protection area and the breeding ground 
of a protected bird, so there was no space for expansion or 
relocation during the winterization phase. Additionally, strict 
regulations were applied on handling fuel for heating and 
power generators, because of the direct proximity to the en-
vironmental protection area.
- Complex coordination structures to plan the winterized 
camp, with changes in levels of authorities, diverted resources 
and energy from daily activities.
- Lack of experienced staff at field, as well as Headquar-
ters, levels caused stress and misunderstandings. Rapid de-
ployment of experienced people, who could run such a camp 
24/7, turned out to be very challenging. International partner so-
cieties stepped in, but staff still needed to work very long hours, 
and there was high turnover.
- Insufficient strategic approach to the recruitment of na-
tional staff in all positions, but in particular those with trans-
lation capacities.
- No real link to mid- or long-term accommodation, since 
no one knew where people would be hosted next.
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND LESSONS LEARNED
LEARNINGS 
• Include an expert on environmental issues in the assessment team tasked with choosing the site.
• Have all relevant authorities on board from the beginning. In this case, such a project was new to the authorities 
and the legal implications not always clear. The local fire brigade seemed to be one of the most important p rtners.
• Include a shelter expert in the planning process from the very beginning.
• The multi sectoral approach was essential to the success of this project. Shelter, food, medical screening  and 
treatment (also important to protect others in mass accommodation), NFIs and restoring family links were all key 
components, which would not have worked if done independently.
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The site in Erding between October (left) and December 2015 (right).
Accommodation options varied greatly in the two sites. From individual family 
tents, to large collective tents or field beds in gymnasiums
www.shelterprojects.org
EUROPE
178 SHELTER PROJECTS 2015 - 2016
OVERVIEW
CONFLICTA.43 / UKRAINE 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
JUL AUGMAR APR JAN FEB JAN FEB MAR APR JUL AUGJAN SEP
SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE 
Political unrest in Eastern Ukraine led to a humanitarian 
crisis, since the start of hostilities in early 2014. After three 
years, shelter-NFI needs remain high for IDPs, non-displaced 
populations with damaged dwellings, host communities and 
returnees. Along with covering immediate needs, the Shel-
ter-NFI Cluster has promoted preparedness and durable 
solutions, especially focusing on winterization activities.
UKRAINE 2014-2016 / CONFLICT
CRISIS Conflict, 2014-onward
PEOPLE AFFECTED1 4.4 million 
(2.6 million for Shelter-NFI)
PEOPLE IN NEED 
OF HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE1
3.8 million 
(0.6 million for Shelter-NFI)
PEOPLE SUPPORTED
BY THE RESPONSE 
(as of November 2016)2
20,526 houses repaired
109,937 individuals 
received emergency assistance
438,882 individuals
 received NFIs
Nov 2013: Protests commence in Kyiv; President Yanukovych flees in 
February 2014.
Mar 2014: Crimea crisis erupts; declaration of autonomous regions in 
Donetsk and Luhansk.
Apr 2014: Armed groups take control of the eastern Donbas region.
Jul 2014: Shelter sector activated and strategy developed.
Aug 2014: Preliminary Response Plan launched.
Dec 2014: Shelter Cluster activated.
Jan 2015: Debaltsevo crisis – third wave of displacement.
Feb 2015: Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) launched.
Sep 2015: First Winterization Guidelines produced focusing on North-
ern Donbass.
Feb 2016: Government suspends social payments to IDPs.
Mar 2016: Shelter-NFI Cluster rolls out Damage Database per address 
in Government Controlled Areas (GCAs).
Apr 2016: Subnational Cluster begins implementing a cooperation 
agreement with Donetsk and Luhansk authorities in GCAs to discuss 
transition options.
Jul 2016: Shelter Cluster Transition Plan is drafted.
Aug 2016: Second Winterization Guidelines produced focusing on North 
and South Donbass and on Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCAs).
1
2
3
8
7
6
4
9
10
11
12
13
14
5
20152014 2016
NOV 2013
1 From Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) 2017.
2 Pre-Conflict Housing in Ukraine: Real Estate Markets and Tenure Dynamics. 
Shelter Cluster Ukraine, November 2016.
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CONTEXT
Eastern Ukraine experiences long, harsh, winters. Average 
temperatures drop below 0°C from the end of November to 
mid-March, with an average low of -10°C and -20°C in the 
colder areas. Rainfall is consistent throughout the year. Rural 
villages, especially those with already restricted access, are at 
risk of being cut off during periods of heavy snowfall.
Following the Government of Ukraine’s decision to abandon 
talks that would bring the country closer to EU membership in 
2013, political unrest led to a destabilizing humanitarian crisis. 
In March 2014, a first wave of displacement took place from 
Crimea, following its declaration as an Autonomous Republic, 
while violence escalated in Donbas region in the east, where 
it continued for two years. In 2016, shelling was concentrated 
in specific – rather than di fuse – areas.
The political unrest has affected households in prepar-
ing adequately for the winter. Homes damaged by shelling 
urgently needed to be repaired in time for winter, while the 
internally displaced and non-displaced alike struggled to meet 
basic needs, such as purchasing winter clothing and house-
hold items, or being able to pay for the rising costs of utilities.
EUROPE
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SITUATION BEFORE THE CRISIS
After the process of mass privatization in the housing sector 
following 1991, access to adequate housing became limited 
and communal residential infrastructure and services – that 
had previously been maintained by the state – started decay-
ing. The economic crisis of 2008 resulted in a reduction in 
foreign investment, leading to neglect of existing buildings and 
a halt of new construction. Inadequacies in social housing and 
housing policy failed to address the housing needs of low-in-
come households (1.39 million people in 2013)2.
SITUATION AFTER THE CRISIS
Just before the start of the conflict, 93.7% of the housing stock 
was privately owned, with 3.4% living in private-rental hous-
ing and 2.9% in communal housing. Individual houses outside 
major cities sustained shrapnel punctures to roofing, damaged 
windows, and in 3% of cases full destruction. With the esca-
lation of hostilities in 2014, people fled the contact-line areas 
of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces), taking refuge in 
collective centres and apartments, or being hosted by rela-
tives. Properties and income were left behind, with displaced 
families relying on their savings to meet basic needs. 93% of 
the houses that sustained damage in the Government-Con-
trolled Areas (GCA) of Donetsk and Luhansk were privately 
owned, the extent of which was exacerbated by historical lack 
of maintenance and care2. 18,500 of these houses were in the 
GCA, while a similar scale of damage was estimated in the 
Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCA)3. 
As the conflict has continued for three years, resources and 
coping mechanisms have been seriously depleted. The situa-
tion was compounded by the suspension of social payments 
to IDPs, making pensioners the primary breadwinners, for 
38% of affected families in the GCA and 60% in the NGCA4.
Returns were noted in 2016, both voluntary and involuntary 
(e.g. those forced to return home having depleted all their re-
3 Due to limited humanitarian access in the NGCA, the figures are estimated 
through various sources.
4 HNO 2017.
sources, or been evicted). Across the country, 59% of IDPs 
have stated a preference to return home because of their pri-
vate property, highlighting the importance of private houses 
as a main source of capital5. Significant differences exist in 
the adequacy of shelter and access to basic items, servic-
es and utilities, between urban and rural contexts6. Groups 
with specific needs include IDPs, non-displaced populations 
with damaged dwellings, host communities, households ex-
periencing multiple displacement, and returnees (sustainable 
return; formerly displaced, dwelling uncertain)7.
SHELTER CLUSTER STRATEGY 
The Shelter-NFI Cluster in Ukraine was established in Decem-
ber 2014, to respond to urgent humanitarian needs for shelter 
and NFIs during the sudden onset of the crisis, initially through 
unconditional cash grants. This has transitioned into prepared-
ness activities, to enable vulnerable and affected households 
to better cope with protracted displacement, in often inadequate 
conditions – particularly in dealing with the extreme winter, 
as access to items, fuel and heating became increasingly re-
stricted by dwindling household resources. Shelter actors have 
begun mainstreaming winterization preparedness into all repair 
works, prioritizing the creation of “one warm room”, before up-
grading and insulating other areas of the house.
While continuing to coordinate the emergency and winteri-
zation response, the Shelter-NFI Cluster promoted durable 
solutions for IDPs and conflict-a fected populations, through 
emergency assistance, transitional solutions, and the facili-
tation of longer-term shelter, until the minimum criteria for 
cluster deactivation would be met. This included a transi-
tion of responsibility from the Cluster to national actors, 
particularly the Oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, who have 
taken a primary role in the emergency response8. 
5 From IOM NMS Round 4, Sep 2016, cited in Pre-Conflict Housing in Ukraine: 
Real Estate Markets and Tenure Dynamics.
6 Shelter-NFI Needs Assessment Report: Ukraine, Aug 2015, REACH / UNHCR.
7 Shelter-NFI Cluster Strategy, June 2015.
8 Draft Shelter Cluster Transitional Plan, July 2016.
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A focus of the Shelter-NFI response in Ukraine has been preparing for the harsh winter conditions. This included the distribution of firewood in the affected areas.
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TABLE 1 - WINTERIZATION ACTIVITIES*
RESPONSE OPTION DESCRIPTION VALUE / COST
Winterization cash grant Injection of a one-off, unconditional cash grant for utilities, NFI and clothes through bank transfer or vouchers USD 100 per individual
Collective centre winterization
Basic repairs and NFI provision for collective centres sheltering 
people with specific needs (e.g. institutions, retirement homes, 
orphanages, accommodation for people with disabilities, etc.)
Up to USD 600 per individual
Solid fuel and heater Distribution of heating items USD 110 per household without heater;USD 200 per household with heater 
NFI Clothing Set In-kind provision of warm clothes, jackets, thermal underwear and shoes USD 80-100 per person
* Source: Shelter-NFI Cluster Activity Matrix, HRP 2017.
SHELTER-NFI RESPONSES
83% of Shelter-NFI assistance has been provided in-kind. Mon-
etized assistance in NGCA was not considered a viable option 
due to limited access to financing and markets for communities 
along the contact line. While unconditional cash was used 
prevalently in 2015, restricted cash has always been used as 
a modality for shelter repairs. Starting in 2016, as shelter part-
ners moved into heavy repairs and reconstruction works, 
mixed modality (a combination of delivery of materials, provi-
sion of construction support and transfer of cash to finish repair 
works) was increasingly used by shelter partners. In 2016, clos-
er links were developed with government authorities to coordi-
nate the delivery of assistance with the coverage of heating 
and utility subsidies. A major focus of shelter and NFI activi-
ties have been in preparing for and mitigating the effects of 
low temperatures (see table 1). Other shelter activities, such 
as repairs, were an important feature of winterization activities, 
to achieve adequate shelter conditions and protection of vulner-
able populations (see table 2). Other activities included the pro-
vision of permanent social housing for IDPs and vulnerable 
groups (in need of housing) who did not wish to return to areas 
of hot conflict, but lacked adequate accommodation. Contin-
gency plastic sheeting was also provided.
The Cluster has developed a series of tools to support part-
ners in the implementation of activities. These included the 
collection of a database of damaged houses in partnership with 
local authorities in the GCA; the development of winterization 
guidelines, drawing on lessons learned during the response 
in 2014-20159; a referral database focusing on winterization, 
as well as other needs, to keep organizations updated10; and 
preliminary feasibility assessments for a profiling exercise, to 
identify durable solutions for the most vulnerable IDPs11.
9 Available at http://bit.ly/2juGgT2 and http://bit.ly/2kFoTRe.
10 For more information on the referral system, visit http://bit.ly/2kj0qUp.
11 More information can be found on the Profiling Technical Working Group page: 
http://bit.ly/2kj0HXr.
TABLE 2 – MAIN SHELTER AND NFI ACTIVITIES*
RESPONSE OPTION DESCRIPTION VALUE / COST
Cash for rent or other shelter-
linked monetized solutions
Securing adequate and to-standard shelter. As a response for 
potential eviction. Possibility to decommission Collective Centres.
USD 600-700 per year per household for 
rural and urban areas (this varied by city)
Acute emergency repairs
In areas where active conflict damaged houses or where conflic  
has restarted. Plastic sheeting, wooden battens for quick repairs 
of openings and roofs, cement and in some special cases sand. 
USD 40-80
Light and medium repairs Roofing materials and glazing to stabilize living conditions USD 400-500 for light repairs;Up to USD 1,000 for medium repairs
Structural (heavy) repairs 
Partial reconstruction of one or several walls. Full concrete 
ring beam and retrofitting for the structure. Partial flooring and 
partial opening (warm room). Full roofing. Partial insulation. 
Basic sanitation and heating system.
Up to USD 4,000 per household of two 
persons; USD 500 per extra person
Essential utilities, network 
repairs and connections
Conditional on other works being implemented in the commu-
nity, and repairs are complementary to other general activities. USD 100-250 per household
Reconstruction
Reconstruction on existing foundations of a new, structurally 
sound small house. Average 10 to 12m2 per person (gross sur-
face area), insulated, with basic furniture (bed), heating system, 
and sanitation. May include possibility of future expansion. 
USD 8,000 per household (two persons) 
plus USD 1,000 per extra person
NFI (general) Essential household item provision, e.g. kitchen kit, hygiene kit (if not covered by WASH sector); bed and mattresses if needed. USD 200 per household
NFI (bedding set) In-kind provision of bed linen, pillowcase, blankets. USD 16 per linen set;USD 8 per blanket
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Interventions included housing repairs (Starohnativka, Dec 2015).
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Group was established, between the Protection and 
Shelter Clusters.
• Recovery programming also had to consider the 
“ghost-town effect” of settlements along the contact 
line to mitigate the likelihood of displacement or second-
ary displacement. These areas were characterized by 
damaged houses or lack of adequate housing, unemploy-
ment, low wages, lack of available transportation, lack of 
social services, poor road conditions, and lack of medical 
and educational services.
• Next steps to foster peaceful co-existence could in-
clude managing absorption capacity of the housing sec-
tor, developing social housing initiatives, supporting prop-
er urban development, stimulating community support, 
and engaging various stakeholders (including the private 
sector, humanitarian actors and local authorities).
CHALLENGES
The lack of access in NGCA severely restricted humanitar-
ian coverage. Regular liaison with local authorities and cre-
ating opportunities to work with local organizations on the 
ground remained essential. Advocacy efforts have been key 
to meet the humanitarian needs, though poor information 
sharing between stakeholders severely constrained the in-
forming of good advocacy. Lack of early recovery program-
ming destabilized the population and forced them into wors-
ening humanitarian conditions, or secondary displacement. 
There was also a lack of technical resources, particularly in 
the NGCA. While communities close to the front line have not 
experienced shelling for over a year, traditional development 
donors would not fund any reconstruction or access-to-hous-
ing projects in these communities, due to the continued and 
unpredictable instability12. 
LOOKING FORWARD
• By the end of 2016, short-term humanitarian needs 
of IDPs remained high, as the conflict prolonged and 
resources depleted. The most vulnerable non-displaced 
populations, mostly residing near the contact line, re-
quired continuous support, due to ongoing damage to 
shelter and infrastructure, alongside access to markets 
for fuel and NFIs. 
• Self-ownership of housing in Ukraine presented an op-
portunity for resilience and recovery, being an asset of 
economic stability. 
• Topping up acute and primary repairs through larg-
er-scale structural and reconstruction activities was an 
integrated part of the early recovery process, and includ-
ed the revitalization of basic infrastructure. As part of this 
effort, the Shelter-NFI Cluster began cooperating with 
the Education and Health Clusters, in order to create a 
database of damage and repair for schools and hospitals.
•  Given the neglect of common premises, infrastructure 
and utilities in residential buildings following privatization, 
it was proposed that programmes include social pro-
gramming, specialized institutions (such as elderly 
care facilities), or access to credit to facilitate renting 
and acquisition of housing. 
•  In 2016, the Cluster initiated discussions with develop-
ment donors, to provide guidance on vulnerability pro-
filin , in order to come up with specific policies for better 
targeting of needs.
• Compensation programming for damage and losses 
might secure the rights of citizens who lost assets and 
family members. 
• The Housing, Land and Property Technical Working 
12 Draft Shelter Cluster Transitional Plan, July 2016.
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Multistorey buildings (top) and houses (bottom) in conflict zon s sustained 
significant damage due to shrapnel punctures, and required urge t repairs.
This diagram was used to orientate actors in a conflict setting, and to come up 
with possible solutions to facilitate a longer-term path towards recovery.
Some projects aimed at re-building completely destroyed houses (Sloviansk).
www.shelterprojects.org
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This section contains short discussion documents on various issues in shelter and settlements, written by 
individuals with a specific interest in each subject
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WHY SHOULD SHELTER ACTORS WORRY ABOUT 
GENDER AND GBV?
Shelter programmes are based on the most fundamental prin-
ciples of protection: a roof over one’s head, clothing on one’s 
body; and at a minimum, freedom from physical harm and vi-
olence. The settlement as a whole, as well as individual shel-
ters or “homes”, are often the one place where people seek 
wellbeing and safety. Shelter is critical in allowing dignity and 
recovery after a crisis. It must be habitable, provide physical 
safety and adequate space, as well as protection against the 
cold, damp, heat, rain, wind, and other climatic threats which 
impact health. In essence, shelter offers protection. Howev-
er, it is not enough to build shelters: these – and settlements 
in which shelters are built – also need to provide protection 
from violence, including gender-based violence (GBV)1. While 
Shelter practitioners should not replace GBV and Protection 
specialists, good shelter programming must include mitigation 
measures throughout the project cycle to reduce GBV risks 
across their programmes, ultimately contributing to better 
shelter outcomes. 
ONE SIZE DOESN’T FIT ALL 
GBV mainstreaming is part of an overall gender approach and 
is essentially about achieving better, more effective and im-
pactful, shelter projects that proactively aim to do no harm. 
1 “Gender-based violence (GBV) is an umbrella term for any harmful act that 
is perpetrated against a person’s will and that is based on socially ascribed 
(i.e. gender) differences between males and females. It includes acts that inflict
physical, sexual or mental harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion, 
and other deprivations of liberty. These acts can occur in public or in private.” 
IASC 2015, Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in 
Humanitarian Action: http://bit.ly/1MMWHBt, also at http://gbvguidelines.org/
GBV mainstreaming is not an end in itself, but a strategy and 
process that aims at not overlooking issues that relate to gen-
der and protection dynamics; which, if incorporated early in a 
response, are more likely to help staff to reduce vulnerabili-
ties of affected populations, including women, girls, men and 
boys. As a minimum, projects should work with the gender 
norms in a society to make access to assistance more equita-
ble (gender sensitive) and hopefully even change inequitable 
structures (gender transformative2). A focus on protection and 
gender-specific needs and capacity ensures better participa-
tion and more relevant shelter assistance, which meets indi-
viduals’ needs, including improved privacy, safety and dignity. 
Potential GBV risk-mitigation interventions in shelter pro-
grammes should always be informed by a gender and risk 
analysis, conducted at the start of the programme3. These 
can support shelter practitioners to identify risks before they 
unintentionally cause harm. For example, the involvement of 
women may inadvertently lead to a decrease in men’s ac-
cess or control of the recovery process, contributing to do-
mestic, intimate partner violence, and other types of GBV4, if 
a proper assessment of the gender dynamics and roles is not 
undertaken early on.
This highlights more than ever the importance of good as-
sessments and risk analyses that consider cultural, religious 
2 Gender and Shelter; Good Programming Guidelines, 2016, http://bit.ly/2iOIRqq.
3 Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action, IASC 2006, http://bit.ly/2iWPWu9.
4 Good Shelter Programming, Tools to Reduce the Risk of GBV in Shelter Pro-
grammes, CARE UK, IOM 2016. Available at http://www.sheltercluster.org/gbv.
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Women often have to transport NFIs and shelter materials for long distances 
and through unsafe locations (Pariang refugee camp, South Sudan).
Shelter staff are frequently taken to remote locations and interact with cri-
sis-affected people, often in their homes (Nigerian refugee woman in Niger).
GBV MAINSTREAMING FOR GOOD SHELTER PROGRAMMING
Reducing GBV risks through better shelter programme design and implementation
By Amelia Rule and Jessica Izquierdo
Case study A.16 gives an example of a shelter project that pro-
vided cash and NFIs to families in collective centres, to encour-
age return to their original houses. Poor knowledge and con-
sideration of the family structure and cultural practices, such as 
polygamy, led to insufficient support and contributed to reported 
incidents of intimate partner violence.
In the Haiyan response, certain projects aimed to equally in-
volve women in the reconstruction process, e.g. in the promo-
tion of Build Back Safer messaging and vocational trainings 
on construction. Women also had a key voice in deciding the 
design of shelters, to ensure the inclusion of elements to guard 
their privacy and dignity, such as internal partitions for separate 
sleeping areas, opaque cladding and spaces for hygiene and 
sanitation activities. Ultimately, to mitigate risks of GBV. 
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and economic practices, as well as the distribution of gender 
roles and existing power structures. The appropriate inclusion 
of gender and female participation in any project can have the 
potential not only to improve women’s status in society, but 
also to decrease risks that can lead to GBV.
PROTECTION INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE HOME
The starting point for any shelter programme is at the settle-
ment level: the location where people will find shelter. Taking 
GBV risks into account at settlement level can help shelter 
practitioners to consider how shelter programmes will impact 
on issues such as overcrowding and site density, access to 
sanitation facilities, markets and emergency relief items. 
An often overlooked type of GBV is the denial of resourc-
es, opportunities or services, which in the shelter context 
can be the denial of rightful access to housing, land, NFIs, 
safe shelter or livelihoods opportunities. To successfully 
ensure access to life saving services, shelter programmes 
must integrate protection and gender considerations prior to 
and during implementation. For example, considering GBV 
risks in an NFI distribution can allow shelter programme 
staff to better plan assessments and targeting, distribution 
locations, prioritization of individuals at distribution sites, on-
wards transportation of materials, feedback and complaints 
systems and staffing, to ensure safe access for vulnerable 
groups during distribution activities.
GBV does not just occur outside the home. Once settlement 
approaches and location have been decided, the focus of 
shelter programmes moves toward the home. For many, the 
home is not a place of safety. Intimate partner violence and 
domestic violence often take place in private, behind closed 
doors and between family members. Providing suitable shel-
ter designs and sleeping spaces for different family mem-
bers can help to mitigate certain acts of GBV. For example, 
providing adequate covered space per person reduces risks 
associated with sharing spaces with non-family members5.
Good shelter programming which considers GBV will not only 
focus on practical construction aspects, but will also make 
sure that vulnerable families feel safe and secure in their com-
munities and are not relying on negative coping mechanisms. 
5 Sphere Standards for Shelter, Chapter 4, http://bit.ly/2iOYe21.
If families cannot meet the costs of shelter (such as rent, bills, 
maintenance and repairs), then negative options such as ear-
ly child marriage6, trafficking of persons and transactional cop-
ing strategies can put vulnerable groups at risk of GBV. When 
designing shelter programmes, practitioners not only have 
the responsibility to consider the protection of all vulnerable 
groups when travelling to access water and shelter materials, 
but also to ensure safety within the home.
SHELTER ACTORS WORK WITH SURVIVORS  
Project implementation frequently takes shelter staff to remote 
locations and directly into the homes of affected populations. 
Staff members may be the only humanitarian actors to meet 
with families and witness or hear about a case of GBV that 
may or may not be linked to shelter activities7. In these set-
tings, referral pathways8 and qualified GBV staff are not al-
ways easily accessible, emphasizing the responsibility of all 
humanitarian actors, including shelter practitioners, to know 
how to safely respond to GBV disclosures and how to facilitate 
access to available support services for GBV survivors.
The appropriate response to survivors of GBV will vary by 
context. However, all field staff should be trained in when 
and how to act on GBV disclosures, to minimize further 
negative impacts on survivors. This requires shelter actors 
to understand the concepts of confidentialit , consent, and 
child safeguarding, while also adhering to referral protocols 
in place to support survivors9.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to quantify the number of GBV incidents in any 
context, but it should always be assumed that GBV is occur-
ring. Measuring the impact of shelter interventions on GBV 
mitigation can also be challenging. Despite this, ensuring 
privacy, dignity and a feeling of safety can greatly influenc  
families’ security and well-being, so that people are free to 
access lifesaving services. Therefore GBV integration should 
not be seen as an additional task to add to shelter practition-
ers’ to do list; it can be understood as an integral approach to 
programming, which includes the key principles of risk anal-
ysis, participation, inclusion, consultation and engagement 
with the affected communities. Abiding by these principles 
ultimately contributes to the overall objective of good shelter 
programming and is vitally important in ensuring the rights of 
those individuals we aim to protect.
8 To Protect Her Honour: Child Marriage in Emergencies, http://bit.ly/1Ky3vkF.
7 This is defined GBV disclosure  
8 A referral pathway is a flexible mechanisms that safely links survivors to sup-
portive and competent services.
9 The GBV Constant Companion, a useful tool with practical step-by-step advice 
on how to react when faced with a disclosure of GBV, is available along with 
other resources at http://www.sheltercluster.org/gbv.
Case study A.5 shows an example of distribution points that 
were carefully chosen and procedures designed to ensure the 
most vulnerable groups – especially women and girls – had a 
priority line and a “safe passage”, as well as support to transport 
the valuable items back home. The distribution was carried out 
by a gender-balanced team who was trained to detect and re-
spond to incidents appropriately.1
1 Gender and Shelter; Good Programming Guidelines, 2015, p.14-15.
A staff member was carrying out a shelter assessment in 
South Sudan, when a mother of a beneficiary disclosed that 
her daughter was being abused by a host family member. The 
shelter practitioner offered to take the daughter and mother to 
the health clinic, but the mother feared further reprisal. The 
staff member then reached out to colleagues to support the 
removal and relocation of the daughter and her family. How-
ever, in doing so, he compromised the confidentiality of the 
survivor, which resulted in further and more acute abuses. 
In 2011, following findings from focus group discussions, a 
transitional shelter project in Haiti adapted shelters to include 
an additional door to the rear. Not only was it traditional to 
have two entrances but it also served as a secondary exit 
from the house if a family member needed to escape an act 
of violence1. Separately, some women also felt safer in homes 
with outward opening doors, as they felt it would be harder for 
someone to pry the door open rather than to kick it in.
1 Lessons Learnt and Best Practice, IFRC Shelter programme in Haiti 
2010-2012, p.74, http://bit.ly/2iONfFT 
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For shelter practitioners in international organizations, working 
in natural disaster responses, there are strong pressures and 
incentives to build back “better” (or “smarter”, or “safer”), and 
subsequently, to interpret “better” as a question of structural 
safety1. This often leads to hastily agreed approaches, isolat-
ed from host government and affected populations, that define
and assess “risk” in terms of structural robustness, rather than 
other factors relevant to people’s safety, dignity and wellbeing. 
Structural safety is important: the collapse of unreinforced 
masonry and reinforced concrete structures, built without fol-
lowing building codes, has been the main cause of death in 
the major earthquakes of the last 60 years2. In contexts where 
housing of these types proliferates, the shelter sector should 
be asking deep questions about its role, the underlying sys-
tems which produce these homes, and where and how vulner-
able people live in these systems.
Despite this, shelter programmes which disproportionately 
prioritize structural safety potentially miss or exacerbate risks 
which are more relevant to affected men, women, girls and 
boys, such as losing access to livelihoods, social exclusion or 
exploitation. Structural solutions in isolation will be insufficient
to ensure vulnerable people are safer than they were pre-dis-
aster. This is particularly true for marginalized groups, who do 
not have decision-making power (or ownership) over shelter 
structures, or fewer choices on where they are able to settle. 
Often, this applies disproportionately to women. 
While there are notable examples of non-structural risks be-
ing addressed by shelter programming, such as the more fre-
1 Build Back Better analysis includes re-affirming post-disaster settlement and 
shelter principles of Shelter After Disaster (UNDRO, 1982). 
2 Spence, R., 2007. Saving lives in earthquakes: successes and failures in seis-
mic protection since 1960. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering 5, 139–251.
quent inclusion of housing, land and property rights interven-
tions in programmes and increasingly integrated approaches, 
the measures of success of shelter programmes often contin-
ue to remain focused on the quality of buildings, rather than 
the quality of lives.
This article argues that, to address this, shelter practitioners 
need to rethink their role in defining what is “better”, by re-
vising how the shelter sector currently assesses “risk” and 
“success”, in ways that transfer decision-making power in the 
hands of affected people, instead of largely being kept in the 
hands of professional shelter practitioners.
“RISK” AND “SUCCESS” IN THE SHELTER SECTOR
WHY PRIORITIZE SAFETY?
There are many factors which lead practitioners to prioritize 
structural strength in the delivery of shelter projects. 
• Shelter practitioners often bring assumptions about 
(other people’s) safety from their own countries and back-
grounds, and do not understand or give sufficient impor-
tance to the risks and problems disaster-affected people 
live with.
• Shelter funding draws scrutiny because housing is of-
ten a private rather than a public good3, so mechanisms 
for subsidizing and guaranteeing housing recovery are 
politically and economically controversial.
• Shelter-related responsibilities are unclear, because 
responsibilities for land, infrastructure and housing are 
often split across institutions. Structural strength is (often 
wrongly) perceived to be simpler and more easily con-
3 Disaster Recovery Framework Guidance, http://bit.ly/2cIHF6Q.
Shelter programmes which tend to prioritize structural safety over other objectives run the risk of missing or exacerbating other risks, such as loss of livelihoods, social 
exclusion or exploitation. Addressing structural concerns in isolation will not ensure that vulnerable people are safer than before the disaster.
ENABLING POST-DISASTER SHELTER RECOVERY
Changing our standard approaches to risk and success
By Kate Crawford, Tom Newby and Robyn Baron
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trolled by INGOs, in comparison with other shelter-related 
vulnerabilities.
• Resources involved in shelter construction per 
household are significan , and agencies and donors 
prioritizing value-for-money want to ensure their invest-
ment will last. 
• Shelter structures, and failure of those structures, 
are highly visible. Structural failure is also more easily 
linked to implementing agencies than, say, the inability of 
a household to pay rent or access essential services. For 
this reason, and the great focus implementing organiza-
tions put on the risk of brand damage and liability, they 
concentrate disproportionately on structural safety.
• Shelter after a disaster is newsworthy, understanda-
bly creating a window of opportunity and pressure to im-
prove building practices4, as indeed stated in Principle 8 
of Shelter After Disaster5.
Visibility, scrutiny, cost, misperceptions of risk and re-
sponsibility and the invisibility and complexity of oth-
er factors drive the international humanitarian system to 
expend great time and expertise addressing the structural 
strength of shelters, rather than other risks that might matter 
more to marginalized people.
MORE THAN JUST “STRUCTURAL SAFETY”
Often, “better” is interpreted as “safer” – i.e. buildings that bet-
ter resist collapse. Measuring success on these narrow terms 
can be problematic, because the definition of “safer” is unclear 
or hard to check, but we could instead use broader criteria, 
such as:
• Quantity, Speed and Coverage: the sector’s typical indi-
cator is a count of the number and rate of shelters built by 
international organizations, with no perspective on shel-
ters being built by other actors, or the rate of household 
formation and shelter construction before the disaster. 
Factors such as occupancy rate, post-occupancy satis-
faction, maintainability and other longer-term outcomes, 
are rarely measured.
• Choice and Quality: after the 2005 earthquake in Pa-
kistan6, knowledge was cascaded through government 
structures and district engineers, and improvements in 
structural safety were, in part, achieved by recognizing 
and drawing on existing, local practices. Structural safety 
was prioritized, but in the context of what could realistical-
ly be achieved and was culturally appropriate.
• Sustainability, Liveability and Longer Term: a lon-
gitudinal study of reconstruction projects following the 
2001 Gujarat earthquake7 suggested that measures of 
“success” encompass the preferences and engagement 
of the people who will occupy the shelter.  Where pro-
jects prioritized structural safety to the detriment of other 
requirements, and/or had neglected social capital and 
“longer-term considerations of comfort, adaptability and 
the environment”, the results were a mixture of outcomes, 
ranging from vibrant communities to abandoned villages. 
Such findings were echoed in more extensive studies of 
4 Collapse of unreinforced masonry and non-engineered reinforced concrete 
buildings has been the primary cause of death in major earthquakes of the last 
60 years. Spence (2007), http://bit.ly/2lUjybp.
5 Shelter After Disaster, 2nd Edition, Davis et al, http://bit.ly/1KZcAcj.
6 See case studies B.09-B.11 in Shelter Projects 2008.
7 Sanderson et al (2012), NGO permanent housing 10 years after the Gujarat 
earthquake, http://bit.ly/2mq32QS.
projects in India over the last two decades8. Early evalua-
tions of the shelter response of one organization after Ty-
phoon Haiyan suggest high satisfaction with the liveabili-
ty, likeability and appropriateness of the houses, but only 
incremental improvement in structural safety, compared 
to the pre-disaster housing9.
WHAT SHELTER ACTORS OFTEN DON’T KNOW
Overall, the shelter sector risks doing harm, unless affected 
people play a central role in shelter-related decision-making. 
If “building back better” is to respond to community members’ 
safety, dignity and survival needs, we need to acknowledge 
how poorly we understand the following: 
• What the affected people do to make their homes meet 
their needs, outside the scope and timescales of our pro-
jects.
• Whether those who live in the building would feel and, 
indeed are, safer, just because a building is more struc-
turally robust, or because they have recovered secure ac-
cess to housing that is affordable, maintainable and close 
to social and economic networks. 
• Whether we overall collectively act to increase risk by 
setting safety standards for individual buildings that are 
in reality slow, fiddl , costly, impossible to control and 
check and, if done badly, more dangerous than busi-
ness-as-usual. 
• Why projects work well in some contexts and not in 
others.
8 Post-disaster shelter in India: A study of the long-term outcomes of post-disas-
ter shelter projects, CARE India, 2015, http://bit.ly/213Mk3H.
9 CARE Haiyan shelter project evaluation, http://bit.ly/2msDLpH.
The shelter sector risks doing more harm than good, unless affected people are 
more involved in the decision-making process.
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SUCCESSFUL POST-DISASTER 
HOUSING OUTCOME
[ Durability      +      Sustainability ]    x     People
Disaster resistant
Repairable
Strong
Location
Carbon footprint
Adaptable
Right materials
Ownership
Extendable
Livable
Likeable
Feels safe
Appropriate
Culturally right
“Hypothesis” from David Sanderson & Anshu Sharma’s study of Gujurat Project.
=
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“RISK” AND “SUCCESS” IN OTHER SECTORS
It is often argued that prioritizing structural safety should not 
apply lower standards for those already marginalized and at 
-risk, and we should not deny access to global scientific and 
engineering evidence on resisting hazards to those groups. 
However, shelter practitioners need to take a broader view 
of evidence and have a deeper understanding of standards. 
Other sectors that seek to use technical expertise to system-
atically define “risk”, make related programmatic decisions 
and assess “success”, provide lessons the shelter sector can 
learn from. For example:
• Role of evidence in standards: Setting standards is 
a deliberation, not a calculation. In “health technology 
assessments” in the United Kingdom, there is a vast 
evidence base to support decisions on how to achieve 
the highest number of quantity and quality “human life 
years”10 for a given budget, though the investment thresh-
old itself is not based on “empirical research”, but on the 
collective judgment of experts. “There is no known piece 
of work which tells you what the threshold should be”11.
• System standards: The World Health Organization, 
amid fierce internal arguments about the potential injus-
tice of lowering standards for the poor, shifted away from 
the objective of setting high, global, water-quality stand-
ards. Instead, a systemic approach was taken: to build 
community capacity to assess, find and fix the worst risks 
in their own water systems12. 
CONCLUSION
In practice, building and sharing technical evidence is valu-
able, but threshold-setting by technical experts often brings 
biases and arbitrary time horizons to the table, when defining
“risks” and assessing needs in programme planning13. Struc-
tural engineers, for example, have a professional duty to fol-
low rules14 – set by others – so are compelled to focus on what 
is compliant, rather than what is deemed “safe enough”.
Shelter practitioners designing and implementing “better” 
shelter responses, often interpret “safer” as compliant, mod-
10 Such that a new drug or procedure costing less than a threshold of about GBP 
25,000 per “life year” is approved.
11 See Affordability and rationing, in Select Committee on Health – First Report, 
http://bit.ly/2n2PdoF.
12 WHO (1997), Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality, 2nd Edition, Volume 3, 
Surveillance and control of community supplies.
13 For example, arbitrary thresholds include: colour coding of hazardous zones 
on a map or decision points of the opening algorithm in Shelter After Disasters 
dictating the appropriate intervention for each technical “classification”
14 The Institution of Structural Engineers, Code of Conduct and Guidance Notes, 
http://bit.ly/2mTQ242.
el, shelter. This leaves them in danger of overlooking other, 
less evident, risks facing disaster-affected populations. While 
structural safety must not be neglected, the focus on other 
risks in shelter programmes must be re-balanced. 
Shelter practice in recent years has made positive changes 
in the way it addresses broader safety issues, with a strong-
er integration of gender, HLP, GBV and other considerations, 
with settlements approaches, and with improved community 
engagement and accountability. However, there is a way still 
to go, as these are not always measured (or reported on) in 
ways that contribute to larger sectoral improvements.
Ultimately, shelter practitioners working in natural disaster re-
sponse and recovery must re-define measures of success, 
to support affected people in defining and prioritizing the 
risks that matter most to them, supporting their safety, sur-
vival and resilience. Success must be measured in outcomes 
for disaster-affected people, not in outputs of shelters in com-
pliance with externally set standards.
In existing debates about “duty of care” vs “informed choic-
es”, the former is often narrowly defined to be about structural 
safety. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that, if only peo-
ple have sufficient understanding of structural design, it will 
change their understanding and prioritization of the risks they 
face. Rather than prioritizing and seeking to fully control risks 
that lie within their professional competence (to the detriment 
of recognizing other risks), shelter practitioners must enable 
informed choice, by providing affected people with the tools 
and knowledge they lack. Shelter practitioners must also learn 
to trust the informed choices that people make, even if 
they do not understand or cannot relate to them.
Success must be measured in outcomes for disaster-affected people, not in outputs of shelters in compliance with externally set standards.
In Corail, Haiti, a camp was built to engineering standards, though largely ignor-
ing the surrounding area. Soon, it was accompanied by a massive, unmanaged, 
urban expansion on the adjacent land (see A.9 in Shelter Projects 2010).
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In most crises, those people receiving support in shelter and 
settlements (S&S) are a minority of the total with need. Ques-
tions of scale, coverage, quality, and impact in implementing 
S&S  programmes thus become key in defining appropriate 
and responsive (“good”) programming, and how best to use 
limited resources for timely support to populations in need.
Humanitarians working in any sector face the question of how 
to best use available funds, skills, and materials. For S&S pro-
gramming, this can be a particularly challenging question, as 
needs are often great, and funds, skills, and materials in short 
supply. In agreeing an appropriate level of support, humanitar-
ians need to be mindful of what the impacts will be on those 
who will be directly assisted, those who are able to support 
themselves, and what will happen to those whom they are not 
able to assist. 
The different case studies in Shelter Projects can highlight 
these challenges, by showing the diversity of programming for 
the same crisis response. For example, there are seven case 
studies1 after typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, where organ-
izations faced similar contexts and worked within government 
and Shelter Cluster guidance, but programme designs and re-
sponses differed, due to differing funding, capacities, agency 
mandates and available materials.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY SCALE AND COVERAGE?
“Scale” refers to the number of people assisted by an inter-
vention. In the case studies in this edition of Shelter Projects, 
assistance ranges from 484 households, to over half a million 
households. Whilst looking at absolute numbers provides an 
idea of scale, looking at the percentage of crisis-affected peo-
ple supported (including host communities) provides an idea 
of “coverage”. However, the definition of coverage depends 
upon whether we are referencing the proportion of people (or 
households) affected, in need, or to be targeted, as well as 
the timing of assessments, whilst assuming no duplication of 
effort.
1 See A.24 and A.25 in Shelter Projects 2013-2014, and A.9 to A.13 in this edition.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY QUALITY AND IMPACT? 
By “quality ”, we mean the timely, efficient, effective, and ap-
propriate provision of assistance, i.e., how well project inputs 
are designed and implemented. By “impact”, we mean how 
well project outputs result in positive outcomes and influence
beneficial, longer-term, processes following assistance. For 
example, a project to distribute NFIs can be a simple “dump 
and run” operation, or can be based on detailed assessments, 
careful targeting, and viewed as a basis for future commu-
nity engagement. Poorly designed and implemented projects 
(of even limited scope) can do harm, while well-planned and 
implemented projects, however modest, can have significant
beneficial impacts on the lives of a fected populations. 
In addition, reduced funding availability may limit assistance 
to choices between NFI kits for each of thousands of house-
holds, or the construction of houses for a handful of house-
holds. There is a tradeoff between the level of support pro-
vided to individual households and the number of households 
which can be assisted. In this context, humanitarians make 
decisions on how to balance quality and household-level im-
pacts of intervention, anticipated impact, and scale. The S&S 
sector does not yet have the metrics which exist in, say, the 
Health sector, to objectively measure interventions. While 
there has been a lot of work on evaluating the impacts of shel-
ter projects, many decisions on project selection and method-
ology will continue to be based upon personal experience and 
resources, i.e., “best practice”. 
DIFFERING ROLES IN RESPONSE
Organizations have their own varied capacities, and project 
design should take into account how to maximize those ca-
pacities. For example, one agency may have experience in 
managing common NFI pipelines, whilst another may spe-
cialize in training. There may also be an institutional interest 
in certain types of projects. For some organizations, there 
may be an interest in designing the “perfect” response pro-
ject, while for those working in national coordination or mak-
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Humanitarian shelter actors are constantly challenged to maximize the available funds, materials and skills. When deciding the appropriate level of support, there needs 
to be a balance between the impacts on those who will be directly assisted, those who have the capacity to help themselves, and those who will not be reached at all.
SCALE, COVERAGE, QUALITY AND IMPACT
in Shelter and Settlements projects
By Joseph Ashmore, Jim Kennedy and Charles Setchell
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ing funding decisions, the focus might be ensuring equita-
bility and coverage, or looking at how to leverage funding to 
create shifts in government policy2.
One role of sector coordination is harnessing different agency 
capacities and avoiding situations whereby one agency pro-
vides a USD 20,000 house, next to another providing a USD 
500 transitional shelter to households with similar needs; or, 
ensuring that entire regions are not overlooked. The common 
goal should be that all agencies maximize their available re-
sources to support the most vulnerable individuals.
WHAT IS A REALISTIC MINIMUM?  
S&S project managers need to decide a realistic minimum 
of implementable support per household, recalling Sphere 
Project guidance on support of “minimally adequate” covered 
living space3. Beyond the type of intervention, operational de-
cisions need to balance whether to go for larger numbers of 
people in easier to reach locations, or focus on those in less 
accessible locations (or some other focus). People in hard-
to-reach areas are often the most vulnerable, yet also among 
the most resilient, leaving agencies to determine who to tar-
get and where the largest cover and impact can be achieved. 
Decisions on targeting should be made on how vulnerability 
is defined, where people most in need of assistance are, and 
how S&S resources and capacities can best support them.
BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF ACCOUNTABILITY
When organizations decide to work in selected locations, they 
also decide not to work in other locations, cognisant that they 
cannot be held accountable to entire affected populations, 
and that most agency accountability frameworks relate only 
to the populations within project areas. Indeed in many cases, 
accountabilities of implementing agencies are taken to apply 
only to project beneficiaries. Practically, it is often impossible 
to fully understand the breadth of the needs, given limited 
time, scope and reach of assessments; the result being that 
decisions are often made with partial/imperfect information.
Coordinating agencies have a differing set of accountabili-
ties. In the Cluster system, most lead agencies take on the 
responsibility of calling on partners to address critical gaps in 
humanitarian response. As a result, Cluster leads may need to 
push for lower levels of per capita assistance, to ensure that 
life-saving shelter needs are met, before shelter programmes 
can start to address a broader resilience agenda. They may 
also look at the broader national recovery agenda, where, for 
example in Nepal, large-scale government assistance has 
been planned4. In this sense, the coordination role needs to 
understand accountability as being to the entire affected pop-
ulation.
SETTLEMENTS AND COMMUNITY
To provide a strong framework for all shelter interventions, a 
settlements focus provides an excellent starting point of shel-
ter strategy and operations. The choice of a specific location 
of intervention has significant short- and long-term implica-
tions for the quality and impacts of a project. Further, adopt-
ing a settlements-based approach increases the likelihood of 
local/national authority participation in key project decisions.
2 See, for instance, two projects in the Philippines: A.13 compared to A.11.
3 See, for instance, case study A.20 (Malawi), where tents were distributed as 
emergency shelter assistance to decongest overcrowded collective centres.
4 See overview A.3 of the response to the Nepal earthquakes and case study 
A.4 on the set up and operation of the Shelter Cluster Nepal.
However, one of the recurring S&S sector challenges is that of 
scaling up community-based approaches in a timely fashion. 
How can S&S actors engage rapidly at the neighbourhood 
level, and encourage multisectoral response at scale? Opera-
tionally, the assessment and response at neighbourhood level 
is like a scaled-up household response – working at communi-
ty, rather than household, level. However, this takes resources 
to achieve effectively. To date, successful multisectoral pro-
jects exist as examples for single neighbourhoods5.
To help promote neighbourhood responses at scale, Shelter 
Clusters should create a settlements-based framework as 
part of the sector strategy that prioritizes neighbourhoods for 
intervention, based on assessment of neighbourhood needs, 
boundaries, and local and regional plans. Governments have 
a critical role in scaling up community-based S&S projects. 
Well-implemented projects can become models, but at the 
same time they must be designed to be financially and po-
litically realistic enough to be replicable at scale – something 
which may only be demonstrable after work in the first “model” 
neighbourhood is substantially completed.
S&S PROGRAMMING AS A PROCESS
Accounting for the critical programmatic parameters of scale, 
coverage, quality, and impact, serves as the basis for promot-
ing “good” S&S programming. However, there is no fixed rule 
on how to balance these parameters. Coordination forums 
can, for example, establish standards of intervention and strive 
for consistency in their implementation, while also promoting 
quality programming. No matter what intervention types an 
agency chooses, it is the actual implementation of the project 
and the levels of social engagement, wherein the quality and 
the impacts of a project lie. At whatever scale, and with which-
ever intervention, a shelter team decides to intervene, S&S 
programming is a process, and the success of interventions 
will depend on whether it meets the needs of those it seeks to 
support in a timely way, and whether it facilitates engagement 
of affected populations in longer-term processes, towards du-
rable solutions, recovery and development.
5 See, for example, case studies A.31 (Lebanon) and A.13 (Philippines).
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Shelter programme managers have to define a realistic minimum o  support, 
and find a balance between larger numbers of people assisted, i  easily acces-
sible locations, or a higher-impact support to a smaller number of people. Top: 
NFI distribution for IDPs; Bottom: urban neighbourhood, Maiduguri, Nigeria.
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= 1,000 HH= 12 months
Total households supported by the 
project
Average project cost per 
household served / per unit 
(in USD, converted with 
exchange rate at the time of 
the project). In case different 
modalities of assistance 
were used, this is an avera- 
ge for the whole project.
% of HH served out of total HH 
aected by the crisis
Project duration in months
ES = Emergency Sh. = Cash-based assistance
= Site planning / infrastructure
= Guidelines / Communications
= Training / Capacity-building
= Distribution of NFI / tools / kits
TS = Transitional Sh.
HF = Host Families
RS = Rental Support
CH = Core Housing
HR = Housing Repair
IH = Individual House
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ANNEXES C.1 / INDEX OF CASE STUDIES BY COUNTRY
All the case studies, overviews and updates in this book and 
the past editions of Shelter Projects are available online, and 
they can be searched by country, year, article type, emergen-
cy type and publication, or through a free text search.
1
Case studies/overviews
2
3-4
5-9
10-16
Afghanistan, 2012, Conflict  SP 2011-2012
Afghanistan, 2009, Conflict  SP 2010
Afghanistan, 2009, Conflict  SP 2009
Afghanistan, 2002, Conflict  SP 2008
Afghanistan, 2002, Conflict  SP 2009
Algeria, 1980, Earthquake  SP 2009
Azerbaijan, 1992, Conflict  SP 2008
Bangladesh, 2009, Cyclone  SP 2009
Bangladesh, 2007, Cyclone  SP 2009
Bangladesh, 2007, Cyclone  SP 2009
Bangladesh, 1975, Conflict  SP 2008
Benin, 2010-11, Floods  SP 2015-2016
Burkina Faso, 2012, Conflict  SP 2011-2012
CAR, 2013, Conflict   SP 2013-2014
Chile, 2014-16, Fire  SP 2015-2016
Chile, 2010, Earthquake   SP 2010
China, Sichuan, 2008, Earthquake  SP 2009
Colombia, 2011, Floods   SP 2013-2014
Colombia, 2010, Floods   SP 2011-2012
Côte d’Ivoire, 2010-11, Conflict  SP 2011-2012
Côte d’Ivoire, 2010-11, Conflict (2  SP 2011-2012
Cuba, 2012, Hurricane   SP 2013-2014
Dominican Rep., 2012, Hurricane  SP 2013-2014
DR Congo, 2008-16, Conflict SP 2015-2016
DR Congo, 2009, Conflict  SP 2009
DR Congo, 2002, Volcano SP 2011-2012
DR Congo, 2002, Volcano SP 2008
Ecuador, 2016, Earthquake SP 2015-2016
Ecuador, 2016, Earthquake SP 2015-2016
Eritrea, 2004, Conflict   SP 2009
Eritrea, 1998, Conflict   SP 2008
Ethiopia, 2014-2016, Conflict SP 2015-2016
Ethiopia, 2011, Conflict   SP 2011-2012
CS
UP
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
OV
OV
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
Ethiopia, 2012, Conflict   SP 2011-2012
Europe Refugee Crisis, 2015-16 SP 2015-2016
Fiji, 2016, Tropical Cyclone SP 2015-2016
Fiji, 2012, Tropical Cyclone  SP 2013-2014
Gaza (Palestine), 2014-16, Conflic  SP 2015-2016
Gaza (Palestine), 2009, Conflict  SP 2009
Georgia, 2008, Conflict   SP 2009
Germany, 2015-16, Refugees SP 2015-2016
Grenada, 2004, Hurricanes  SP 2010
Guatemala, 1976, Earthquake  SP 2008
Haiti, 2012, Hurricane   SP 2013-2014
Haiti, 2010, Earthquake   SP 2011-2012
Haiti, 2010, Earthquake (3) SP 2011-2012
Haiti, 2010, Earthquake   SP 2010
Haiti, 2010, Earthquake (7) SP 2010
Haiti, 2008, Floods   SP 2009
Haiti, 1982, Hurricane   SP 2009
Honduras, 1998, Hurricane  SP 2008
Honduras, 1974, Hurricane  SP 2009
Hurricane Sandy, 2012,   SP 2013-2014
India, 2001, Earthquake  SP 2008
India, 1977, Cyclone (2)  SP 2009
India, 1977, Cyclone   SP 2008
India, 1971, Conflict   SP 2008
Indonesia, 2009, Earthquake  SP 2010
Indonesia, 2009, Earthquake (3) SP 2010
Indonesia, 2006, Earthquake  SP 2008
Indonesia, 2006, Earthquake (2) SP 2008
Indonesia, 2004, Eq./Tsunami   SP 2008
Ingushetia, 1999, Conflict  SP 2008
Iraq, 2014-16, Conflict  SP 2015-2016
Iraq, 2014-16, Conflict (3) SP 2015-2016
Iraq (KR-I), 2013, Conflict  SP 2013-2014
CS
OV
CS
UP
CS
UP
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
OV
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
OV
OV
CS
Natural disaster
Conflic
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1 
2
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5 - 9
10 - 16
Number of 
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CS
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CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
OV
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OV
CS
CS
www.shelterprojects.org
This map is for illustrative purposes only and 
should not be considered authoritative.
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Italy, 2009, Earthquake   SP 2009
Italy, 2009, Earthquake   SP 2009
Japan, 2011, Eq./Tsunami    SP 2011-2012
Jordan, 2014, Conflict   SP 2013-2014
Jordan, 2013, Conflict (2) SP 2013-2014
Kenya, 2008, Conflict   SP 2008
Kenya, 2009, Conflict   SP 2009
Kenya, 2008, Conflict   SP 2009
Kenya, 2007, Floods/Conflict  SP 2008
Kenya, 2011, Conflict/Famin  SP 2011-2012
Kyrgyzstan, 2010, Conflict  SP 2010
Lebanon, 2015-16, Conflict (2  SP 2015-2016
Lebanon, 2013, Conflict   SP 2013-2014
Lebanon, 2012, Conflict (2  SP 2013-2014
Lebanon, 2011, Conflict   SP 2011-2012
Lebanon, 2007, Conflict   SP 2011-2012
Liberia, 2007, Conflict   SP 2008
Liberia, 2007, Conflict   SP 2009
Madagascar, 2012, Cyclone  SP 2011-2012
Malawi, 2015, Floods  SP 2015-2016
Malawi, 2015, Floods (2)  SP 2015-2016
Malawi, 2009, Earthquake  SP 2010
Mozambique, 2007, Cyclone  SP 2008
Mozambique, 2007, Cyclone  SP 2010
Myanmar, 2013-16, Coordination SP 2015-2016
Myanmar, 2014-16, Conflic  SP 2015-2016
Myanmar, 2012, Conflict   SP 2013-2014
Myanmar, 2008, Cyclone   SP 2009
Myanmar, 2008, Cyclone (2) SP 2010
Nepal, 2015, Earthquake  SP 2015-2016
Nepal, 2015, Eq. Coordination SP 2015-2016
Nepal, 2015, Earthquake (3) SP 2015-2016
Nicaragua, 2007, Hurricane  SP 2011-2012
Nicaragua, 1972, Earthquake  SP 2008
Nicaragua, 1972, Earthquake SP 2009
Nigeria, 2015-16, Conflict SP 2015-2016
Nigeria, 2012, Floods   SP 2013-2014
Pakistan, 2010-2014   SP 2013-2014
Pakistan, 2012, Floods (3) SP 2013-2014
Pakistan, 2011, Floods (2) SP 2011-2012
Pakistan, 2010, Floods (2) SP 2011-2012
Pakistan, 2010, Floods   SP 2010
Pakistan, 2010, Floods (3) SP 2010
Pakistan, 2009, Conflict   SP 2010
Pakistan, 2005, Earthquake  SP 2008
Pakistan, 2005, Earthquake (2) SP 2008
Peru, 2012, Floods   SP 2011-2012
Peru, 2007, Earthquake  SP 2008
Peru, 2007, Earthquake (3) SP 2008
Philippines, 2013, Typhoon  SP 2015-2016
UP
UP
CS
UP
CS
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
OV
CS
OV
CS
OV
CS
CS
CS
CS
CS
UP
UP
CS
CS
Philippines, 2013-, Typhoon (5) SP 2015-2016
Philippines, 2013, Typhoon  SP 2013-2014 
Philippines, 2013, Typhoon (2)  SP 2013-2014
Philippines, 2012, Typhoon  SP 2013-2014
Philippines, 2011, Cyclone  SP 2011-2012
Philippines, 2011, Cyclone (2) SP 2011-2012
Philippines, 2010, Typhoon  SP 2010
Portugal, 1755, Earthquake  SP 2013-2014
Romania, 2010, Floods   SP 2010
Rwanda, 2008, Conflict   SP 2008
Rwanda, 2008, Conflict   SP 2009
Somalia, 2011-13, Complex SP 2015-2016
Somalia, 2011, Conflict/Famine SP 2011-2012
Somalia, 2009, Conflict (2) SP 2009
Somalia, 2008, Conflict  SP 2009
Somalia, 2007, Conflict   SP 2008
South Sudan, 2013-, Complex SP 2015-2016
South Sudan, 2014-, Complex (2)  SP 2015-2016
South Sudan, 2011, Conflict SP 2011-2012
South Sudan, 2012, Conflict  SP 2013-2014
Sri Lanka, 2009, Conflict  SP 2010
Sri Lanka, 2007, Conflict  SP 2009
Sri Lanka, 2007, Conflict  SP 2008
Sri Lanka, 2004, Tsunami SP 2008
Sri Lanka, 2004, Tsunami  SP 2008
Sudan, 1985, Conflict   SP 2008
Sudan, 2004, Conflict   SP 2008
Sudan, 2004, Conflict   SP 2009
Syrian Crisis, 2014-16, Conflict SP 2015-2016
Syrian Arab Rep., 2015-16, Conflic  SP 2015-2016
Syrian Crisis, 2011-14, Conflict  SP 2013-2014
Tajikistan, 2010, Earthquake  SP 2010
Tanzania, 2016-17, Conflict SP 2015-2016
Thailand, 1979-1980, Conflict  SP 2008
Thailand, 2011, Floods   SP 2011-2012
Tonga, 2010, Tsunami   SP 2010
Tonga, 1982, Cyclone   SP 2008
Tunisia, 2011, Conflict   SP 2011-2012
Turkey, 1976, Earthquake  SP 2009
Turkey, 1975, Earthquake  SP 2009
Turkey, 1970, Earthquake  SP 2009
Uganda, 2007, Floods   SP 2009
UK, 1945, Conflict   SP 2009
Ukraine, 2014-16, Conflict SP 2015-2016
USA, 1906, Earthquake   SP 2010
USA, 1871, Fire   SP 2011-2012
Vanuatu, 2015, Cyclone  SP 2015-2016
Vietnam, 2009, Typhoon  SP 2010
Yemen, 2015-16, Conflict SP 2015-2016
Yugoslavia-Ex,1963, Earthquake SP 2009
UP
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
CS
OV
CS
CS
UP
CS
CS
OV
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CONVERSION TABLES & ACRONYMS
These tables are included to help readers convert the measurements in the Bills of Quantities. The data on this page is all 
rounded to 4 significant figures. Penny sizes are rounded to the nearest millimeter (mm
For equivalence tables in timber sizing, see UN OCHA / IFRC / CARE International publication:
“Timber as a construction material in humanitarian operations”
Length
Imperial 1 inch (in) 1 foot (ft) = 12 inches 1 yard (yd) = 3 feet = 36 inches 1 mile = 1760 yd
Metric 25.4mm 304.8mm 0.9144 m 1.609 km
Area
Imperial 1 square foot (sq. ft) 1 square yard (yd2) 1 acre = 4,840 yd2 30.25 yd2 2.471 acres
Metric 0.0929 m2 0.8361 m2 4046.9 m2 1 perch 1 hectare =10,000 m2
Volume
Imperial 1 cubic foot (ft3) 1 cubic yard (yd3)
Metric 28.32 litres = 0.02832 m3 0.7646m3
Other 1 gallon (UK) = 4.546 litres 1 liquid gallon (US) = 3.785 litres 1 dry gallon (US) = 4.405 litres
Weight
Imperial 1 pound (lb) 1 ton (T) (UK: long ton) Ton (US: net ton, short ton)
Metric 0.4536 kg 1016 kg = 1.1016 MT 907.2 kg =0.9072 MT
Other 1 stone = 16 lb. 1 lb = 16 ounces (Oz) 1 hundredweight (cwt.) (US) = 100 lb. 1 cwt. (UK) = 112 lb.
Note: There are several different imperial systems of weights. We quote the British imperial ton as in the Weights and Measures Act of 1824, and the 
United States customary system.
Nails - “Penny Sizes”
Imperial
Penny Size 2d 3d 4d 6d 8d 10d 16d 20d 40d 50d 60d 100d
Inches 1 11/4 11/2 2 21/2 3 31/2 4 5 51/2 6 10
Metric
Nearest length 
(mm) 25 32 38 51 54 76 89 102 127 140 152 254
BBS 
BoQ
CBO
CGI
CSO
CCCM
DRR 
GBV
HH 
Build Back Safer
Bill of Quantities
Community Based Organization
Corrugated Galzanized Iron 
Civil Society Organization
Camp Coordination and Camp Management
Disaster Risk Reduction
Gender-Based Violence
Household
CONVERSION TABLES
CONVERSION TABLES & ACRONYMSACRONYMS
HLP
INGO
MoU 
M&E
NFI 
NGO 
PDM
SOP
WASH
Housing, Land and Property
International Non-Governmental Organization
Memorandum of Understanding
Monitoring and Evaluation
Non-Food Item(s)
Non-Governmental Organization
Post-Distribution Monitoring
Standard Operating Procedures
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
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FURTHER READING AND RESOURCES
In compiling this edition of Shelter Projects, we have drawn on key informant interviews and a variety of sources. Some of the
published sources are listed below under General statistics and websites, whilst others were project documents.
Also included are a list of key shelter texts, which readers can refer to for many of the shelter-related issues raised by these 
case studies. Some of them are directly cited in the text. Visit www.shelterprojects.org for a full list of resources for download.
CRED, EM-DAT disaster database: Global database of 
world disasters. www.emdat.be
IFRC, World Disasters Report, 2016 / IFRC, World Disas-
ters Report, 2015: Annual report providing a global overview 
of disaster trends. http://bit.ly/2aXaYzG
IFRC Reports: including Appeals, Operational updates, and 
Final, Mid-year and Annual reports. http://bit.ly/OCsTRK
IDMC/ NRC, Internal Displacement Global Overview of 
Trends and Developments in 2010
www.internal-displacement.org
www.sheltercluster.org
Home page of the Global Shelter Cluster - the coordination 
mechanism for shelter responses. Contains links to individual 
responses, including strategy documents.
www.sphereproject.org
Download the Sphere Handbook, find information on
trainings and other activities from the Sphere Project. The 
Sphere Project aims to improve the quality of humanitarian 
assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to 
their constituents, donors and affected populations.
www.humanitarianlibrary.org
The Humanitarian Library is designed as a global clearing 
house for regional humanitarian knowledge. As a user-
oriented resource, it is designed to be the first reference for
both sharing and searching for field-relevant documents
http://procurement.ifrc.org/catalogue/
IFRC/ICRC Emergency relief items catalogue: detailed 
specifications of all items commonly used by IFRC, ICRC,
IOM and other organizations.
UN OCHA, Sitreps: Situation reports on major responses.
http://bit.ly/OCsTRK
UN OCHA Appeal documents: Financial appeals, action 
plans and reviews with narratives for OCHA coordinated 
responses. http://www.unocha.org/cap/
UNHCR, Global Trends 2015
http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf
https://www.youtube.com/user/ShelterCluster
Global Shelter Cluster Youtube channel.
www.reliefweb.int
Up to date information on complex emergencies and natural 
disasters as well as an archive of information, field reports
and situation reports from emergencies since 1996. OCHA 
situation reports (sitreps) and IFRC appeal documents and 
operations updates have been of particular use in compiling 
these case studies.
http://www.globaldtm.info/
The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is a system to 
track and monitor the displacement and population mobility. 
It is designed to regularly and systematically capture, 
process and disseminate information to provide a better 
understanding of the movements and evolving needs of 
displaced populations, whether on site or en route.
Cuny/Intertect collection: http://bit.ly/2oY4lFR
Digital collection of Frederick Cuny’s working library, office
files, press clippings, slides, photos and videos of Cuny and
his team at the disaster relief/response firm, Intertect
GENERAL STATISTICS
WEBSITES
KEY SHELTER PUBLICATIONS
Camp Management Toolkit
The toolkit gives official guidelines on the setup and running
of camps and settlements, both in emergencies and long-
term situations. Available at: http://cmtoolkit.org/
Care International, Gender and Shelter: Good program-
ming guidelines, 2016
Guidelines to provide practical guidance on how to integrate 
gender in the shelter sector, enabling shelter programmes to 
address the needs of affected communities more successfully. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2nj3PAX
Corsellis and Vitale, Transitional Settlement: Displaced 
Populations, Oxfam publishing, 2005
Guidelines for the strategic planning and implementation of 
settlement responses for displaced populations. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2mUXhaq
CRATerre, IFRC, Assessing local building cultures for 
resilience & development: A practical guide for commu-
nity-based assessment.
This guide is a tool for those working on habitat and commu-
nity resilience, to improve the quality of their interventions. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2ni6XNp
CRS, Pintakasi: A review of shelter/WASH delivery meth-
ods in post-disaster recovery interventions, 2016
A study to assess the efficienc , effectiveness and appropri-
ateness of shelter and WASH assistance modalities in the 
Filipino context. Available at: http://bit.ly/2ofS7aW
CRS, Using Cash for Shelter, 2015
An analysis of CRS shelter programmes to understand when 
cash works, why it works, and what factors contribute to its 
success or failure. Available at: http://bit.ly/2nzsVhn
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CRS, Extending Impact: Factors influencing households
to adopt hazard-resistant construction practices in 
post-disaster settings, 2015
A study to understand what influences people s behaviour by
analysing what prompts, guides or drives people to behave
in a certain way, in relation to the use of hazard-resistant 
construction practices: Available at: http://bit.ly/2nixXwp
CRS, How-to Guide: Managing Post-Disaster (Re)-con-
struction projects
A step-by-step management guide for the two main construc-
tion modalities; owner-driven and contractor-built construc-
tion projects. Available at: http://bit.ly/2nLlO66
Global Shelter Cluster, Selecting NFIs for shelter - 2008
Provides information, case studies and guidance on how to 
choose the best items to distribute to those affected by natu-
ral disaster or conflict. Available at: http://bit.ly/2oLAgZ9
Global Shelter Cluster, GBV in Shelter Programming 
Set of documents which aim to provide tools to help shelter 
actors to mainstream GBV risk mitigation in their shelter pro-
gramming. Available at: https://www.sheltercluster.org/gbv
IFRC, Owner Driven Housing Reconstruction Guidelines 
(ODHR), 2010
Guidance on the planning and implementation of assisted 
self help reconstruction projects. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2nbyEbf
IFRC, The IFRC shelter kit, 2010
A guide on the IFRC shelter kit and how to use it. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/1tdEV3p
IFRC, Shelter Designs: Structural Reviews (2 publications)
A review of risks in shelter construction and detailed structur-
al analysis of different post-disaster and transitional shelter 
designs that have been used in the field in large scale pr -
jects.  Available at: http://bit.ly/2nVPLhr
IFRC, Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness 
PASSA aims to raise the awareness of the ‘everyday risks’ 
faced by vulnerable populations, related to their built environ-
ment, and foster locally appropriate safe shelter and settle-
ment practices. Available at: http://bit.ly/2lqQBUA
IFRC, Handicap International, CBM, All under One Roof.
A guideline for providing disability inclusive shelter and set-
tlement solutions in emergencies. http://bit.ly/2ng7Xkn
IFRC, Oxfam GB, Plastic sheeting, 2007
A guide to the use and specification of plastic sheeting in
humanitarian relief. An illustrated booklet on when and how 
to use plastic sheeting most effectively in emergencies. Avail-
able at: www.plastic-sheeting.org
UN OCHA, Tents - A guide to the use and logistics of 
tents in humanitarian relief, 2004
A booklet describing when and how to use tents, as well how 
to support those living in them to best adapt them to meet 
their needs. Available at: http://www.alnap.org/resource/8341
UN OCHA, IFRC, CARE International, Timber as a con-
struction material in humanitarian operations, 2009
An illustrated booklet on how to source and use timber for 
the construction of basic structures. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2mUWUwy
MSF, Shelter Centre, Shade Nets: Use, deployment and 
procurement of shade net in humanitarian relief environ-
ments. Available at: http://bit.ly/2nzpUxq
Jha, A., Duyne Barenstein, J., Phelps, P., Pittet, D., Sena, 
S., Stronger Homes, Stronger Communities
A handbook developed to assist policy makers and project
managers, engaged in large-scale post-disaster reconstruc-
tion programmes, make decisions about how to reconstruct 
housing and support communities after natural disasters. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2onN2AF
Maynard, V., Parker, E. and Twigg, J. (2017). The effec-
tiveness and efficiency of interventions supporting
shelter self-recovery following humanitarian crises: An 
evidence synthesis. Humanitarian Evidence Programme. 
Oxford: Oxfam GB. Available at: http://bit.ly/2nfUOHV
NRC, Shelter Centre, Urban Shelter Guidelines, 2010
General guidance for urban humanitarian response. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2nbyOzu
NRC/IFRC, Security of tenure in humanitarian shelter 
operations, 2013
A short report highlighting the regulatory barriers to the pro-
vision of short and medium term shelter solutions, presented 
in collaboration through several case studies. 
Available at: http://bit.ly/2nMXmSs
UNDRO, (now UN OCHA), Davis, I., Shelter After Disas-
ter, Guidelines for Assistance, 1982
Guidelines and description of shelter provision in all aspects 
of natural disasters (from preparedness to reconstruction).
Available at: http://bit.ly/2o9cfL8
Shelter Centre, UN, DfID, Shelter after disaster - Strate-
gies for transitional settlement and reconstruction, 2010
A book containing information and guidance on how to agree 
strategies for reconstruction after natural disasters. Contains 
description of the types of shelter programmes that organiza-
tions can implement. Available at: http://bit.ly/2nbLOFu
Sphere Project, Sphere - Humanitarian charter and mini-
mum standards in humanitarian response, 2011
Contains consensus standards agreed among major human-
itarian organizations for key sectors, including shelter and 
settlement. It also contains actions, indicators and guidance 
notes as to whether standards have been achieved. 
Available at: http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/
UN HABITAT, IFRC, UNHCR, Shelter Projects
Case studies and overviews of humanitarian shelter and 
settlement responses. Five editions spanning 2008-2014. 
Available at: www.shelterprojects.org
UNHCR, Handbook for Emergencies, 4th Edition, 2015
Handbook and tool containing guidance on the management 
and all key sectors in emergency operations
Available at: https://emergency.unhcr.org/
WWF and American Red Cross, Green Recovery and 
Reconstruction, 2010
The GRRT is a toolkit and training programme designed 
to increase awareness and knowledge of environmentally 
responsible disaster response approaches.
Available at http://envirodm.org/green-recovery


ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter
Global Shelter Cluster
In 2015 and 2016, the total number of people displaced 
by crises in the world was higher than any other year 
in the last 25 years. In 2015, 65.3 million people were 
displaced due to conflict or violence, and there were 
19.2 million new displacements due to natural disasters. 
With such large scale sheltering needs, there is also an 
imperative to ensure that the assistance that is delivered 
makes best use of often limited resources.
Spanning humanitarian responses from all over the 
world, Shelter Projects 2015-2016 is the sixth in a 
series of compilations of shelter case studies, overviews 
of emergencies and opinion pieces. The projects 
represent responses to conflict, natural disasters and 
complex or multiple crises, demonstrating some of the 
implementation and response options available.
The book is intended to support learning by highlighting 
the strengths, weaknesses and some of the lessons 
that can be learned from different projects, which try 
to maximize emergency funds to safeguard the health, 
security and dignity of affected people, whilst – wherever 
possible – supporting longer-term shelter needs and 
sustainable recovery.
The target audience is humanitarian managers and 
shelter programme staff from local, national and 
international organizations at all levels of experience. 
Shelter Projects is also a useful resource for advocacy 
purposes, showcasing the work done by the sector, as 
well as for research and capacity-building activities.
All case studies and overviews contained in this book, 
as well as from all past editions, can be found online at:
www.shelterprojects.org
ISBN Number: 978-92-9068-736-8
